忧乐圆融：儒家忧乐思想的核心特质

儒家肯定感性忧乐的自然合理性,但是认为感性忧乐有待于外,陷溺于感性忧乐,容易使人流于以物役心的异化状态。儒家忧乐思想的根本形态是德性忧乐,德性忧乐的根据是本心自足之德性。儒家以德性之忧作为德行修养的内在心理动力,德性之乐是在德性彰明过程中本心情感的自然涌现,可以统摄和超越感性忧乐,实现忧乐圆融。     

The Pleasure Deficit in Schizophrenia

Thought, emotional and motivational disorders have long been recognized as clinical features of schizophrenia. This paper will focus on one deficit frequently observed in schizophrenia, hypohedonia, the diminished capacity to experience pleasure. As hypohedonia is difficult to distinguish from lack of social interest, avoidance and withdrawal from activity and interpersonal contacts, the following aspects of hypohedonia will be reviewed: definition; etiology; demographic characteristics; specificity to schizophrenia; related clinical features; and prognosis. Of special concern will be the implications of hypohedonia for the practice of occupational therapy and the possibilities for O.T. clinical intervention. Finally, the frustration and difficulties experienced by the clinician in developing the therapeutic relationship and maintaining professional interest will be addressed.     

Aesthetic Judging and The Intentionality of Pleasure

I point out some unclarities in Allison's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic theory, specifically in his account of the free play of the faculties. I argue that there is a tension between Allison's commitment to the intentionality of the pleasure involved in a judgment of beauty, and his view that the pleasure is distinct from the judgment, and I claim that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the latter view. I conclude by addressing Allison's objection that my own view fails to accommodate judgments of non-beauty or ugliness.     

The Importance of Pleasure in the Moral for Kant's Ethics

I argue for a new reading of Kant's claim that respect is the moral incentive; this reading accommodates the central insights of the affectivist and intellectualist readings of respect, while avoiding shortcomings of each. I show that within Kant's ethical system, the feeling of respect should be understood as paradigmatic of a kind of pleasure, pleasure in the moral. The motivational power of respect arises from its nature as pleasurable feeling, but the feeling does not directly motivate individual dutiful actions. Rather, the feeling is motivational in the sense that, after an agent has acted in a morally good way, the pleasure that results from that action contributes to the cultivation of virtue in the agent and, consequently, morally good actions in the future. Understanding the feeling of respect to be moral pleasure not only gives us insight into how finite rational beings develop virtue, but also a new way of understanding respect as an incentive.     

The Amenability of Pleasure and Pain to Aggregation

According to several prominent philosophers, pleasure and pain come in measurable quantities. This thesis is controversial, however, and many philosophers have presented or felt compelled to respond to arguments for the conclusion that it is false. One important class of these arguments concerns the problem of aggregation, which says that if pleasure and pain were measurable quantities, then, by definition, it would be possible to perform various mathematical and statistical operations on numbers representing amounts of them. It is sometimes argued that such operations cannot be sensibly applied to pleasure and pain, and that sentences expressing such operations must be false or meaningless. The purpose of this paper is to present, explain, and rebut several versions of this argument. In the first section, I present a generic version of the argument. In the second section, I present a defense of its key premise based on a case involving comparisons of relief from pain, and explain why I think it fails. In the third section, I present and rebut another defense, based on a pair of analogies with temperature. In the final section, I present a third defense, based on an analogy with spatial distances. I then present my reasons for rejecting it. Along the way, I explain my reasons for thinking that pleasure and pain are amenable to interval measurement.     

Assessing Client Progress Session by Session in the Treatment of Social Anxiety Disorder: The Social Anxiety Session Change Index

Frequent assessment during therapy can improve treatments and provide accountability. However, clinicians often do not monitor progress because of the time it takes to administer and score assessments. In response, the Social Anxiety Session Change Index (SASCI) was developed. The SASCI is a short, easily administered rating of subjective improvement that asks clients with social anxiety disorder how much they have changed since the beginning of therapy. Change on the SASCI was related to change in fear of negative evaluation, a core aspect of social anxiety, and to clinician-rated improvement, but not to ratings of anxiety sensitivity or depression. Because it is brief and easily interpretable, the SASCI can be used in a variety of clinical settings to monitor change across therapy. The SASCI is presented along with examples of how the information gathered from frequent administration can inform clinical practice.     

首次咨询中心理咨询师的言语反应类型

本研究旨在探索心理咨询师在首次咨询中言语反应类型。研究选择4位在高校从事心理咨询的咨询师作为研究对象,对首次咨询录像进行文本分析。结果：咨询师在首次咨询中的言语反应类型按反应功能和效果分为设置性反应、倾听性反应、跟进性反应和影响性反应;4种反应类型共由25种子类别组成;不同咨询师在首次咨询中均使用了4种反应类型。结论：持续使用倾听性反应有利于后续咨询的维持;影响性反应的过度使用导致首次咨询后来访者易脱落。     

The Problem of Interpersonal Comparisons of Pleasure and Pain

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Judgments of happiness during trail running: Pleasure,engagement, and meaning

ObjectivesIt has been theorized that happiness is derived from three major, unique sets of life experience: pleasure, engagement, and meaning. The present study examined the mental processes by which individuals combined five information cues (relatedness, autonomy, competence, mental vitality and physical vitality) when judging the degree of happiness felt by a trail runner during a run.Design/methodThe participants (104 adult male athletes; M_age = 32.70; SD = 10.86) rated pleasure, engagement, and meaning in 32 scenarios built from combinations of these cues.ResultsThe results of multivariate and univariate analyses of variance indicated that all five cues had a positive effect on judgments of pleasure, engagement, and meaning. The participants used three different information integration rules, depending on the pathway to happiness being probed.ConclusionsThe information integration and the integration rules highlighted the different contributions of pleasure, engagement, and meaning in cognitive building of happiness.     

Self-Knowledge and the Elusive Pleasure of Vengeance

Philosophia - The present essay looks to add to the body of literature that seeks to clarify the nature of vengeance and evaluate it morally. However, unlike previous philosophical investigations...     

Pleasure Can Hurt: The Erotic Politics of Sexual Coercion

Sexual coercion is an unstable practice, often performed nervously on the boundary between flirtation and violation, flattery and coercion. While it is true that sexuality may sometimes be lived on a liminal fourth dimension, where it is immunized from morality by the press of (mutual) desire, it is also true that desire can be commandeered by all manner of malignancies which coopt the erotic into a traumatic register. This essay takes sexual coercion on its face, and explores many of its grim varietals, while also seeking to deconstruct the alchemy of sexuality, awash in its painful pleasures.     

VI—The Philebus on Pleasure: The Good, the Bad and the False

In Plato's Philebus Socrates and Protarchus dispute whether pleasure, like belief, can be false. Their dispute illustrates a broader pattern of disagreement between them about how to evaluate pleasure. Of two contrasting conceptions of false pleasure—derived from work by Bernard Williams and by Sabina Lovibond respectively—false pleasure of the Lovibond type best answers the challenge to which Protarchus' resistance gives rise. Socrates' own example of false pleasure may be read in this way, in contrast to its prevailing interpretation, and this alternative reading seems better suited to the argument's context, both immediate and distant.     

Attitudinal and Phenomenological Theories of Pleasure

On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects' favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views.