Determinants of Attitudes toward Affirmative Action in a Swiss Sample

162 Swiss employees were surveyed to assess knowledge of and attitudes toward different types of affirmative action programs (AAPs) for women. Findings show that knowledge of AAPs was limited and AAPs were most frequently associated with child care measures. Attitudes toward opportunity enhancement programs, especially toward child care, were more positive than toward preferential selection and positive discriminatory programs. Women held more positive attitudes toward AAPs. However, for some attitudes, gender differences were entirely mediated by symbolic prejudice toward working women. Independently of gender, symbolic prejudice was a key predictor of all attitudes. Measures of self-view (self-esteem and gender self-concept) were largely unrelated to attitudes toward AAPs. Implications for research and organizations are discussed.

Shared Being,Old Promises,and the Just Necessity of Affirmative Action

Although the residues of official segregation are widespread, affirmative action continues to meet resistance in both official and everyday life, even in such recent Supreme Court decisions as Grutter v Bollinger (539 U.S. 306). This is due in part to a governing ontology that draws the line between individual and collective. But there are other possibilities for conceiving the social, and I offer one here in a theory of affirmative action that is developed through close examination of sharing and promising as elemental qualities of equitable communal life. The nature and value of these actions are demonstrated in narrative formulations of fairness as exemplified in triage and the situation at the end of slavery; of the difference between equality and equity and how justice depends on their conjunction; and finally of theorizing how these may come together in the permutable, opaque, yet resilient interdependence of person and community that represents most deeply the Greek idea of two in one, that is, of one two, not two ones. In these respects the paper is successful insofar as it discloses the kinds of reasoning that underlie both resistance and commitment to affirmative action.     

Polarized Opinions on Racial Progress and Inequality: Measurement and Application to Affirmative Action Preferences

This study presents new measures of opinion about progress toward racial equality and provides a multifaceted rationale for preferring the new measures to the old ones. To reduce several sources of measurement error and improve analytic bite by breaking progress into its constituent elements, surveys should ask about past, present, and ideal conditions, not “progress.” These questions reveal racially polarized opinions: Black and White Americans agree on the goal of equality and agree that conditions were worse in the past, but Blacks think conditions were much worse than Whites do. They especially differ in opinions on current conditions and thus in how much change is required to achieve the goal of equality. Blacks see much more current inequality than Whites do. These opinions help explain preferences for affirmative action (AA). Contrary to previously published findings, reactions to AA do not depend on opinions on progress but depend strongly on something related but distinct: how much current racial conditions differ from the ideal. Implications for theories of policy preferences, racial attitudes, progress, and equality are discussed.     

Competing Conceptions of Justice: Faculty Moral Reasoning About Affirmative Action

College faculty (N = 115) were recruited to investigate the influence of moral reasoning on hiring decisions about affirmative action dilemmas. Participants completed the Defining Issues Test (DIT), a standard test of moral reasoning, a measure that presented two hypothetical moral dilemmas about affirmative action that manipulated candidates' race and moral issues, and a scale evaluating the use of external norms versus self-chosen principles. Results indicated that moral issue but not race of a minority candidate affected hiring decisions. Faculty used greater percentages of principled reasoning when solving the more salient affirmative action dilemmas than when solving the hypothetical dilemmas of the DIT. Higher scores on the DIT were related to the use of principles rather than norms when making hiring decisions. Findings suggest that faculty decisions about hiring a hypothetical affirmative action candidate are more influenced by moral reasoning level and competing conceptions of justice than racial bias or ambivalence.     

Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action as a Function of Racial Identity Among African American College Students

Variations in support for affirmative action were assessed in a sample of 181 African American college students in Massachusetts. These students generally endorsed affirmative action, and endorsement varied positively as a function of the belief that one had personally benefited from affirmative action. Aspects of racial identity, indexed by the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity, also predicted variations in attitudes toward affirmative action, over and above background factors and personal benefit. Consistent with realistic group conflict theory, the most influential aspects of identity were centrality (i.e., the degree to which group identity is central to personal identity), private regard (i.e., pride in the group), and an oppressed minority ideology (i.e., a viewpoint that emphasizes the similarities between African Americans and other oppressed groups).     

Beliefs About Gender Discrimination in the Workplace in the Context of Affirmative Action: Effects of Gender and Ambivalent Attitudes in an Australian Sample

This study investigated beliefs about gender discrimination in opportunities for promotion in organisations and their relation to gender and gender-focused ambivalent beliefs as measured, respectively, by the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) and the Ambivalence toward Men Inventory (AMI) (Glick and Fiske, Ambivalent sexism. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, 33: pp. 115-188, San Diego, CA: Academic, 2001a). These two inventories were administered to 225 students at Flinders University in Adelaide, Australia along with discrimination items concerning advantage, responsibility, guilt, and resentment about the advancement of men and women in the workplace. Results showed gender differences in discrimination beliefs and in the hostile and benevolent scales from the ASI and AMI. Gender differences and relations between these scales and the discrimination variables were interpreted in terms of system-justification, self and group interests, and the effects of values and beliefs about deservingness and entitlement. This study was supported by a grant from the Australian Research Council.     

Searching for Common Ground between Supporters and Opponents of Affirmative Action

Supporters and opponents of affirmative action are often characterized as debating about a single, consensually understood type of affirmative action. However, supporters and opponents instead may have different types of policies in mind when thinking about affirmative action and may actually agree on specific manifestations of affirmative action policies more than is commonly believed. A survey conducted using a student sample and a sample from the broader Chicago-area community showed that affirmative action policies can be characterized into merit-violating versus merit-upholding manifestations. Supporters of affirmative action in general were more likely to think of affirmative action in its merit-upholding manifestations, whereas opponents were more likely to think of the merit-violating manifestations. However, both supporters and opponents showed more support for merit-upholding rather than merit-violating manifestations of affirmative action. The same pattern of results was upheld even when splitting the samples into those who endorsed negative racial attitudes versus those who did not, suggesting that even those who may be considered racist will endorse affirmative action policies that uphold merit values. The results are discussed in terms of the importance of clarifying the political discourse about what affirmative action is and what it is designed to do.     

Attributional Ambiguity of Affirmative Action

We propose that affirmative action policies that are perceived to give preference to individuals solely or primarily on the basis of their group membership create attributional ambiguity about the personal deserving of individuals affected by these procedures. This ambiguity about the extent to which outcomes are deserved is hypothesized to be self-protective for people who are denied a position, but to have detrimental consequences among beneficiaries, especially if they are members of groups whose competence is doubted (either by themselves or others). Selection procedures that are perceived to be based both on individual merit and group membership, in contrast, are hypothesized to reduce attributional ambiguity about deserving and thus attenuate the effects of group-based preferential selection procedures on those who are benefited and bypassed by these procedures. An experiment was conducted to test these hypotheses. Men and women were randomly selected or rejected for a leadership role under one of three procedures: outcomes based (a) solely on sex, (b) solely on merit, or (c) on both sex and merit. Results provided partial support for our hypotheses.     

Christian Counselors and Affirmative Counseling of Lesbian and Gay Clients

In this phenomenological study, we interviewed 12 counselors who identified as both religious and able to provide ethical and competent counseling to lesbian and gay clients. Participants discussed their lived experiences providing counseling. Our analysis revealed three primary themes: seeking congruence, responding to lesbian and gay clients, and cultivating competency. We discuss these findings and identify implications for counselor training and practice.     

Affirmative Action as Help: A Review of Recipient Reactions to Preferential Selection and Affirmative Action

We review research on four areas of recipient reactions to affirmative action: (a) self-evaluations of ability and performance, (b) motivation and task interest, (c) performance and achievement, and (d) evaluations of selection procedures. Not surprisingly, the process by which affirmative action was implemented strongly affected the findings. Self-evaluations of ability and specific components of performance were adversely affected when selection procedures did not provide unambiguous, explicit, and focused evidence of recipient qualifications. In contrast, measures of motivation were largely unaffected by any type of selection, although task choice was adversely affected when the selection process did not provide clear evidence of recipient qualifications. Task performance was complexly affected by selection process and other contextual variables. Finally, selection procedures that did not provide unambiguous, explicit, and focused evidence of qualifications were regarded by recipients as less fair than procedures that did not provide evidence of competencies. We interpret the literature using a model of affirmative action as help (Turner, Pratkanis, & Hardaway, 1991), draw further parallels to research on recipient reactions to aid, and develop strategies for the effective management of affirmative action programs.     

The Doctrine of Double Effect and Affirmative Action

ABSTRACT William Cooney has recently argued ( The Journal of Applied Philosophy , Vol. 6, pp. 201–204) that the social programme of affirmative action, though controversial, can be supported by the doctrine of double effect in that, according to the doctrine, responsibility falls on the side of intended consequences and not on that of unintended consequences. The point of affirmative action is to include certain disadvantaged groups; it is not to exclude other groups, though this is an inevitable and foreseeable by-product. In this article I contend that Cooney's argument ignores two important conditions of the doctrine of double effect; namely, that the good which results from the intended effect must be at least commensurate with the harm that results from the unintended effect; and, that the intended good effect is causally separate from the unintended harmful effect. Any use of the doctrine which neglects these conditions leads to morally problematic cases. Further, once we take the conditions into account, we have good reason to think that the doctrine of double effect has no relevance to the affirmative action debate.     

Attitudes Toward Different Methods of Affirmative Action1

It was found that the men's and women's attitudes toward affirmative action (AA) in general were related to differences in self-interest. In addition, consistent with predictions drawn from notions of organizational justice and attribution principles, it was found that people held different attitudes toward different methods of affirmative action. People were most favorable toward AA involving special training programs and least favorable toward AA that employed differential selection criteria for target group members. Attitudes toward quota-based systems were intermediate.     

Affirmative Action and the Doctrine of Double Effect

ABSTRACT  This article attempts to show that affirmative action can be supported by the doctrine of double effect which recognises distinctions between desired and unintended effects such that the responsibility for acts falls on the side of the former rather than the latter. With this doctrine it may also be seen why affirmative action programmes cannot be simply equated with numerical quota systems, nor can they be called discriminatory, at least not under the definition of discrimination utilised.     

Right Action as Virtuous Action

I argue in favour of the central claim of virtue-ethical accounts of right action: that right action is virtuous action. First, I disambiguate this claim and argue for a specific interpretation of it. Second, I provide reasons to prefer target-centred over both agent-centred and motive-centred accounts of virtuous action. Third, I argue that an action is right if, only if, and because it is overall virtuous. Finally, I respond to important arguments to the contrary.     

Pluralistic Ignorance and Political Correctness: The Case of Affirmative Action

The pressure to appear politically correct can have important consequences for social life. In particular, the desire to appear politically correct, and to avoid being seen as racist, sexist, or culturally insensitive, can lead people to espouse publicly support for politically correct issues, such as support for affirmative action, despite privately held doubts. Such discrepancies between public behavior and private attitudes, when accompanied by divergent attributions for one's own behavior and the identical behavior of others, can lead to pluralistic ignorance. Two studies investigated pluralistic ignorance with respect to affirmative action among undergraduates. Their survey responses indicate that people overestimate their peers' support for affirmative action and underestimate their peers' opposition to affirmative action, that people's ratings of the political correctness of supporting affirmative action are correlated with their overestimation of support for affirmative action, and that people view their own attitudes toward affirmative action as unique.