Liberal democracy: An African critique

Despite the end of the Cold War and the ascendancy of liberal democracy, celebrated by Francis Fukuyama as “the end of history”, a growing number of scholars and political activists point to liberal democracy’s inherent shortcomings. However, they have tended to dismiss it on the basis of one or two of its salient weaknesses. While this is a justifiable way to proceed, it denies the searching reader an opportunity to see the broad basis for the growing rejection of liberal democracy among African political theorists. Consequently, in this article, I argue that from an African perspective, the almost hegemonic status of liberal democracy can be challenged on at least five grounds, namely logical inconsistency, impracticability due to the largely communalistic outlook of many Africans, inconsistency between affirmation and action, violation of the right to ethnic identity, and the moral imperative to assert the right to cultural emancipation. I conclude by calling upon African and Africanist political theorists to utilise indigenous African political thought, coupled with emancipatory aspects of political thought from other parts of the world, to design practicable models of democracy for contemporary African states. I further conclude that in order to promote genuine inter-cultural dialogue on democratisation, people from Western cultures ought to acknowledge the equality of all cultures, and to recognise that systems of governance are part and parcel of those cultures.     

A commentary on Gray's critique of Eysenck's theory

Gray (1982a) criticizes Eysenck's theory of personality and offers his own alternative theory. In this article it is suggested that, for the most part, Gray's criticisms are not substantial. Little damage is sustained by the ‘Eysenckian edifice’ although it is proposed that the means of testing Eysenck's ‘conditionability’ hypothesis should be re-examined. Consideration of Gray's theory leaves one with the conviction that it is coming under increasing pressure as evidence accumulates concerning the mechanisms of the ‘anti-anxiety’ drugs. Apart from this and other problems, Gray's formulation is constructed within a narrow and specialized universe of discourse that does not relate well to the more global concerns of those who study personality. Without reference to Eysenckian concepts, Gray's theory is really only concerned with ‘anxiety’. For this reason it can barely be termed a theory of personality let alone one that might replace the Eysenckian paradigm.     

Symmetry, gestalt and information theory: A critique

A criticism of a recent analysis of matrix pattern perception is advanced. It is pointed out that a fair test of the equivalence for performance of different forms of redundancy must be framed in terms of the measure of transmitted information.     

The motor theory of social cognition: a critique

Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. In humans, social cognition includes the ability to mindread, and many motor theorists of social cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we question the motor theory of social cognition and give reasons for our skepticism.     

The representational theory of phenomenal character: A phenomenological critique

According to a currently popular approach to the analysis of phenomenal character mandates that the phenomenal character of an experience is entirely determined by, and is in fact identical with, the experience’s representational content. Two underlying assumptions motivate this approach to phenomenal character: (1) that conscious experiences are diaphanous or transparent, in the sense that it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic features of an experience of x that are not experienced as features of x; and (2) that the immediate objects of consciousness are not objects per se, but rather properties. This paper explores these assumptions, advancing the thesis that each is rejectable on phenomenological grounds.     

The theory of psychological reversals: A review and critique

The main elements in the new theory of psychological reversals are examined. One application of the theory, in the crisis-counselling field, is explored to illustrate its practical implications. A number of problems associated with the recent development of the theory are identified.     

A behavior-analytic critique of Bandura's self-efficacy theory

A behavior-analytic critique of self-efficacy theory is presented. Self-efficacy theory asserts that efficacy expectations determine approach behavior and physiological arousal of phobics as well as numerous other clinically important behaviors. Evidence which is purported to support this assertion is reviewed. The evidence consists of correlations between self-efficacy ratings and other behaviors. Such response-response relationships do not unequivocally establish that one response causes another. A behavior-analytic alternative to self-efficacy theory explains these relationships in terms of environmental events. Correlations between self-efficacy rating behavior and other behavior may be due to the contingencies of reinforcement that establish a correspondence between such verbal predictions and the behavior to which they refer. Such a behavior-analytic account does not deny any of the empirical relationships presented in support of self-efficacy theory, but it points to environmental variables that could account for those relationships and that could be manipulated in the interest of developing more effective treatment procedures.     

The Buddhist empiricism thesis: An extensive critique

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the claim that early Buddhism could be interpreted as an empirical philosophy. Made in a time when verifiable foundations were thought to lend credence to a system of belief, the assertion served to differentiate Buddhism from a “mystical” Hinduism and even to give it a leg up over theistic religions. The position of this paper is that the Buddhist Empiricism Thesis is most certainly false. That position is arrived at via a close examination of Buddhist means to knowledge and doctrinal content, which unfortunately entails taking only the most shallow view of a deep subject matter. This superficiality is no reflection on Buddhist belief, but rather is the necessary effect of refuting empirical claims for beliefs which are much more than merely “verifiable”.     

An outline of a theory of action systems

It is argued that the traditional psychological construal of the distinction between central ("open loop") and peripheral ("closed loop") neural processes is no longer tenable. A review of the relevant psychobiological research on the control of movement shows that both the central-peripheral dichotomy and the distinction between sensory and motor systems derived from that dichotomy are incompatible with what is known about the processes underlying action. Based on experimental and comparative data, a new theory of action is proposed. The basic concept of this new theory is the action system: Unlike motor systems, action systems involve sensory as well as motor processes; action systems are not organized into response hierarchies, but rather in coalitional structures of adjustable movements and postures. The phylogeny of action systems is discussed, and the eight most important action systems are distinguished in terms of their evolved distinctive functions. The difficulties of developing a taxonomy of actions for functionally specific types of behavior made up of that can be controlled is resolved by showing how kinds of action are differentiated by the kinds of affordances their components help to realize.     

A critique of Habermas' theory of practical rationality

Habermas' theory of practical rationality is a significant theoretical attempt to preserve both rationality and democracy at the level of political decision making that transcends both technocratic and decisionistic theories of rationality. Habermas' theory of rationality accords with his epistemological, sociological, psychological, and linguistic premises. His theory, however, overlooks the interactions between instrumental action and symbolic interaction, the relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends, the conflict between the norms of efficiency and democracy, and the duality of subject and object in historical formation. The rational interest in reproduction of free communication, however, can be used to reformulate Habermas' theory of rationality.     

An idealist critique of naturalism

ABSTRACT

According to many naturalists, our ordinary conception of the world is in tension with the scientific image: the conception of the world provided by the natural sciences. But in this paper, I present a critique of naturalism with precedents in the post-Kantian idealist tradition. I argue that, when we consider our actual linguistic behavior, there is no evidence that the truth of our ordinary judgments hinges on what the scientific image turns out to be like. I then argue that the best explanation of this result is that the norms and presuppositions operating in ordinary discourse are different from the norms and presuppositions operating in scientific discourse. So naturalistic attempts to undermine the manifest image are illegitimate attempts to critique a practice ‘from the outside’.     

Science,reason, knowledge,and wisdom: A critique of Specialism

In this paper I argue for a kind of intellectual inquiry which has, as its basic aim, to help all of us to resolve rationally the most important problems that we encounter in our lives, problems that arise as we seek to discover and achieve that which is of value in life. Rational problem‐solving involves articulating our problems, proposing and criticizing possible solutions. It also involves breaking problems up into subordinate problems, creating a tradition of specialized problem‐solving ‐ specialized scientific, academic inquiry, in other words. It is vital, however, that specialized academic problem‐solving be subordinated to discussion of our more fundamental problems of living. At present specialized academic inquiry is dissociated from problems of living ‐ the sin of specialism, which I criticize.