Pragmatism and Philosophy of Science: A Critical Survey

After delineating the distinguishing features of pragmatism, and noting the resources that pragmatists have available to respond effectively as pragmatists to the two major objections to pragmatism, I examine and critically evaluate the various proposals that pragmatists have offered as a solution to the problem of induction, followed by a discussion of the pragmatic positions on the status of theoretical entities. Thereafter I discuss the pragmatic posture toward the nature of explanation in science. I conclude that pragmatism has (a) a generally compelling solution to Hume’s problem of induction; (b) no specific position on the status of theoretical entities, although something like the non‐realism of the sort developed by van Fraassen seems a defensible candidate for most pragmatists in general, even though there are non‐trivial objections to van Fraassen’s position; and (c) central to the pragmatic conception of scientific explanation is the abandonment of our common conception of truth as a necessary condition for sentences to provide adequate explanations, and a drift in the direction of a contextualist account of explanation.     

Against the Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science

This paper discusses the tenets of the politics of postmodern philosophy of science. At issue are Rouse’s version of naturalism and his reading of Quine’s distinction between the indeterminacy of translation and the underdetermination of theories by empirical evidence. I argue that the postmodern approach to science’s research practices as patterns of interaction within the world is not in line with the naturalistic account Rouse aims at. I focus also on Rouse’s readings of Heidegger’s existential conception of science and Kuhn’s concept of normal science. Finally, a strategy of defending science’s cognitive distinctiveness in terms of hermeneutic philosophy is suggested as an alternative to the postmodern philosophy of science.     

The Grammar of Politics, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy

Books reviewed:
Cressida J. Heyes (ed.), The Grammar of Politics, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy , Cornell University Press, 2003, xii + 259, no price. Reviewed by Peter Johnson, University of Southampton Department of Philosophy University of Southampton Highfield Southampton UK     

The Qualitative Revolution and Psychology: Science,Politics, and Ethics

Growing interest in qualitative research methods and methodological pluralism in psychology since the 1990s is placed in the historical contexts of long-standing philosophical and scientific rationales and the more recent “qualitative revolution” in other social sciences that began in the 1970s. An examination of areas in which qualitative methods have become most strongly established—applied, feminist, and multicultural psychologies—suggests practical and social motivations as primary and as energizing renewed expression of previously ignored ontological, epistemological, and scientific reasoning in the turn to qualitative methods. Methodological diversification in the arenas of human suffering, women's issues, and cultural politics is traced to psychologists' deeply rooted ethical obligations. The existential philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas articulates an implicit ethics at the heart psychology's increasing acceptance of qualitative methods and provides an understanding of how the emerging methodological diversity can contribute to social justice and human liberation as well as to an enhancement of rigorous scientific knowledge.     

The Politics of Science

ABSTRACT The myth that there is no politics of science is dangerous as it prevents the important and urgently needed institution of some democratic control of the existing system of politics within the commonwealth of learning. Feyerabend's attack on science makes sense only when understood in this way.     

The Science of Philosophy

If philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, is it thereby debarred from being a science? This article argues that it is not and that philosophy so conceived is a science. The argument takes the form of careful attention to the meaning of “science,” “experiment,” “empirical,” and related words. Philosophy is a formal science. This does not mean it is not part of the humanities. The role of observation in other kinds of science is investigated. There is more methodological homogeneity in the various sciences, including philosophy, than has been recognized, despite some clear differences. Seeing this helps restore philosophy to its rightful place in the academic firmament.     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.     

Hermeneutical Philosophy and Pragmatism: A Philosophy of Science

Two philosophical traditions with much in common, (classical) pragmatism and (Heidegger's) hermeneutic philosophy, are here compared with respect to their approach to the philosophy of science. Both emphasize action as a mode of interpreting experience. Both have developed important categories – inquiry, meaning, theory, praxis, coping, historicity, life-world – and each has offered an alternative to the more traditional philosophies of science stemming from Descartes, Hume, and Comte. Pragmatism's abduction works with the dual perspectives of theory (as explanation) and praxis (as culture). The hermeneutical circle depends in addition on the lifeworld as background source of ontological meaning and resource for strategies of inquiry. Thus a hermeneutical philosophy of research involves three components: lifeworld (as ontological and strategic), theory (as explanatory), and praxis (as constitutive of culture). This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

人类学:科学与哲学

设定人类学是一门科学根据哈里斯所说 ,博厄斯 以很简明的方式表述这个论题 :“人类学是一门科学 ,而科学是历史”。[1] 马林诺夫斯基 则寻求一种关于文化的科学的定义。在他死后发表的一部题为《科学的文化理论》的文本中 ,[2 ] 他为人文学者提供了一种关于“科学”的最低限度的定义 ,从而使科学得以有别于抽象思想和常识。“科学的论述不同于常识的表述 ,首先 ,在于一位某门科学的学者会以一种学术上合规则、有条理的方式 ,很为深入地扩展考察的完整性与精密性 ;其次 ,在于经过科学训练的心智 ,会将问题的探究循着和问题相关的思路推进 ,…     

The Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity: Sustainability Science and Problem-Feeding

Traditionally, interdisciplinarity has been taken to require conceptual or theoretical integration. However, in the emerging field of sustainability science this kind of integration is often lacking. Indeed sometimes it is regarded as an obstacle to interdisciplinarity. Drawing on examples from sustainability science, we show that problem-feeding, i.e. the transfer of problems, is a common and fruitful-looking way of connecting disparate disciplines and establishing interdisciplinarity. We identify two species of problem-feeding: unilateral and bilateral. Which of these is at issue depends on whether solutions to the problem are fed back to the discipline in which the problem originated. We suggest that there is an interesting difference between the problem-feeding approach to interdisciplinarity and the traditional integrative perspective suggested by among others Erich Jantsch and his colleagues. The interdisciplinarity resulting from problem-feeding between researchers can be local and temporary and does not require collaboration between proximate disciplines. By contrast, to make good sense of traditional integrative interdisciplinarity we must arguably associate it with a longer-term, global form of close, interdisciplinary collaboration.