Early and deep: two independent paradigms?

Did Winnicott replace or transform Freud's metapsychology? The author's aim is to explore more deeply the views developed in a previous paper based solely on Winnicott. Here the author draws on other studies to respond to two questions recently posed by Fulgencio concerning the meaning of the term metapsychology and the existence of a new topography in Winnicott's work. For many authors, Winnicott does not reject Freudian metapsychology and says nothing new in this field; in the field of paediatric anthropology, however, he focuses on dependence, and in the field of the living embodiment of the drives on being and self as different from ego. But Green notes the existence of a third topography, that of self/object, and also examines the vicissitudes of being by isolating the concept in Winnicott's work. For the author, however, being seems in continuity with his whole anthropological and ontological perspective; and when Winnicott introduces environmental factors of which the infant is unaware, he also introduces a heuristic distinction between early and deep: there is thus neither a rejection nor a reformulatation of the metapsychological theorization, but rather a coexistence of two paradigms.     

Understanding the object benefit in visual short-term memory: the roles of feature proximity and connectedness

Past research has identified visual objects as the units of information processing in visual short-term memory (VSTM) and has shown that two features from the same object can be remembered in VSTM as well (or almost as well) as one feature of that object and are much better remembered than the same two features from two spatially separated objects. It is not clear, however, what drives this object benefit in VSTM. Is it the shared spatial location (proximity), the connectedness among features of an object, or both? In six change detection experiments, both location/proximity and connectedness were found to be crucial in determining the magnitude of the object benefit in VSTM. Together, these results indicate that location/proximity and connectedness are essential elements in defining a coherent visual object representation in VSTM.     

Technology,Phenomenology and the Everyday World: A Phenomenological Analysis on How Technologies Mould Our World

Technology always provides a new perception of the world. However, it is not clear when technology produces “mere” new informations and when it provides something more such as a production of new objects in our world which start to “live” around us. The aim of this paper is to study how technology shapes our surrounding world. The questions which we are going to answer are: Is it really adding new objects to our world? If yes, does every technology have this potentiality? We are going to tackle the problem using a phenomenological and post-phenomenological approach focussing our attention on the perceptual level. Using Husserl’s philosophy we will study how technology are deeply involved in our perception and, thanks to post-phenomenology and its concept of “embodiment relations,” we will be able to determine which kind of technologies have the potentiality to change our surrounding world introducing and producing new objects in it.     

Duties to Make Friends

Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet widely recognised. Specifically, in certain situations, impartial principles generate duties to take actions and adopt attitudes in our personal lives that increase the chance of new or different special relationships being formed—new or different friendships, family-like relationships, relationships akin to co-nationality, and so on. In fact, even if one thinks partialism is the best justification of the duties we have once in special relationships, impartialist justifications for taking steps to form such relationships should have some sway. Moreover, a little reflection shows that these duties are not as demanding or counterintuitive as one might expect.     

Preschoolers favor the creator's label when reasoning about an artifact's function

The creator of an artifact, by virtue of having made the object, has privileged knowledge about its intended function. Do children recognize that the label an artifact's creator uses can convey this privileged information? 3- and 4-year-olds were presented with an object that looked like a member of one familiar artifact category, but which the speaker referred to with the label of a different familiar category (e.g. a key-like object was called a "spoon"). Children who heard the speaker refer to the object as something she made were more likely to assign its function on the basis of the anomalous label she used than those who heard it referred to as something the speaker found. Thus, even very young children expect a unique connection between the label the creator of an artifact uses and the function she intends it to have.     

Infant observation and the French model

Psychoanalytic training in the French Societies belonging to the International Psychoanalytic Association does not grant any place to the observation of babies as it exists in certain societies of other countries. Infant observation is even the object of sharp critiques by eminent French theoreticians. The reasons given for condemning infant observation and refusing to give it any place in the training programme lie in theoretical positions concerning the very nature of the Freudian discovery and its interpretation, which is more idealistic than empirical. The author discusses these reasons while drawing attention to the frequent confusion between a reference to empiricism and a reference to the experimental. The fear of a psychologizing deviation of metapsychology and of a denial of psychic reality leads, in the French model, to placing the emphasis on personal analytic experience during the candidate's psychoanalysis, prolonged by supervisions. It excludes any academic teaching of metapsychology or of related disciplines. The confusion between the empiricism of Esther Bick's method and the recourse to experimental procedures in developmental research stands in the way of making a place for infant observation and of recognizing its training value, not so much for the acquisition of new knowledge or the validation of metapsychological models, as for its usefulness in developing a mode of psychoanalytic observation and an increase in the candidates' containing capacities.     

Terminator or Super Mario: Human/Computer Hybrids, Actual and Virtual

Abstract: Is a human/computer hybrid feasible: If so, in what ways would such hybridization affect our concept of what it means to be human? There are two forms of such hybridization, the actual and the virtual. Actual hybridization involves the implantation of mechanical devices in the human body. In actual hybridization the computer comes to us and to our body to enhance our functioning in our world. In virtual hybridization we go to the computer, projecting our minds into the world of cyberspace and being formed there. Perhaps the most common form of virtual hybridization is the immersion our children experience in the world of video games. Both forms of hybridization encourage us to think of ourselves only in terms of function, just when most of our theologians find that humans reflect the image of God through our relationships. This emphasis on function best serves the military, but leaves us in the theological community with a dissatisfying concept of what it means to be human.     

The objects of bodily awareness

Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than is the body as a whole. I conclude with some reasons why this should lead us to think that bodily awareness, unlike introspection, is a form of perception.     

consulting the oracle

Abstract

Is it possible that even logic is not logical? Is it possible that our current belief in a rational and material world is no less a subjective point of view than any other mystical faith? Kurt Gödel in mathematics and Carl Jung in psychology independently established the limits of rationalism half a century ago. Yet the profound implications of their work for our own currently changing world view are not well understood. In this essay, Robertson introduces us to some of the basic themes that underlie the life works of both Gödel and Jung. These themes lead us to a new and startling comprehension of the paradox of self-reference and the limits of rationalism that are inherent in the way we construct our conceptions of reality.     

Exploring the tractability border in epistemic tasks

We analyse the computational complexity of comparing informational structures. Intuitively, we study the complexity of deciding queries such as the following: Is Alice’s epistemic information strictly coarser than Bob’s? Do Alice and Bob have the same knowledge about each other’s knowledge? Is it possible to manipulate Alice in a way that she will have the same beliefs as Bob? The results show that these problems lie on both sides of the border between tractability (P) and intractability (NP-hard). In particular, we investigate the impact of assuming information structures to be partition-based (rather than arbitrary relational structures) on the complexity of various problems. We focus on the tractability of concrete epistemic tasks and not on epistemic logics describing them.     

Postponing trauma: The dangers of telling

Surviving a major historical trauma has consequences that are difficult to live with. Survivors who remain silent are often condemned to a desiccated existence, a dried‐out life, a death in life. Survivors who speak out run an even greater risk. Telling their ghastly tale may trigger somatic consequences, psychotic episodes, or even suicide. As to the psychoanalytic cure, the free association it requires carries its own danger: negative therapeutic reaction in sometimes extreme forms. Avoidance of horror may turn into avoidance of life itself. Awful as it may seem, this avoidance of life may represent a victory over a menacing chaos. Should we as analysts accept the risk of endangering such a victory, no matter how unsatisfactory? The psychoanalytical injunction to speak out may trigger an upsurge of shame and terror. Is subjectivation always possible? This paper is about what happens when denial and splitting strategies are suspended, when ‘crypts’ are opened. Is there an analytic ‘poros’ allowing for a controlled return of affects? Is there a therapeutic solution to the problem of telling a wreckage without being caught in it? The dangers of ‘telling’ will be discussed in regard to new analytic strategies and new interpretive registers. When the ‘silent psychic sharing’ proves insufficient, some analysts go so far as to take part in the shame, share the grief, ‘lend their own psyche’, become a ‘double’ of the analysand, accept the existence of ‘sanctuaries’. To what effect?     

Binding object features to locations: Does the “spatial congruency bias” update with object movement?

One of the fundamental challenges of visual cognition is how our visual systems combine information about an object’s features with its spatial location. A recent phenomenon related to object–location binding, the “spatial congruency bias,” revealed that two objects are more likely to be perceived as having the same identity or features if they appear in the same spatial location, versus if the second object appears in a different location. The spatial congruency bias suggests that irrelevant location information is automatically encoded with and bound to other object properties, biasing perceptual judgments. Here we further explored this new phenomenon and its role in object–location binding by asking what happens when an object moves to a new location: Is the spatial congruency bias sensitive to spatiotemporal contiguity cues, or does it remain linked to the original object location? Across four experiments, we found that the spatial congruency bias remained strongly linked to the original object location. However, under certain circumstances—for instance, when the first object paused and remained visible for a brief time after the movement—the congruency bias was found at both the original location and the updated location. These data suggest that the spatial congruency bias is based more on low-level visual information than on spatiotemporal contiguity cues, and reflects a type of object–location binding that is primarily tied to the original object location and that may only update to the object’s new location if there is time for the features to be re-encoded and rebound following the movement.     

Is There a Philosophy of Information?

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.     

The relevance of attachment theory to a contemporary Jungian view of the internal world: internal working models, implicit memory and internal objects

In this paper I examine the various meanings of the term 'internal object' and the differences between various theoretical models for the formation of internal objects. I suggest that the idea in attachment theory of 'internal working models' emphasizes the internal world as one consisting of unconscious internalized patterns of emotional relationships. The term 'internal object' lacks this clarity and the different meanings it carries within differing theoretical frameworks are a source of confusion. I describe the role implicit memory plays in the formation of 'internal working model's and suggest that these offer us an alternative explanation for unconscious fantasy and for object relationships to that of instinctual drives. This model is then brought to bear on contemporary Jungian concepts of the internal world, with a suggestion that, seen in this light, Jung's formulation of the concept of the complex has many features in common with the 'internal working model' of attachment theory.     

When Love Hurts: Treating Abusive Relationships

This paper describes an integrative approach for treating couples in abusive relationships. Because of the power inequities that often obtain in such cases, the therapist faces special challenges. Both partners must be defined as clients, yet the two are not on equal footing. Sustaining moral clarity in a context of such psychological ambiguity is crucial, and it requires skills beyond those we typically associate with the art and craft of the interview. A mutative factor in any therapy requires bearing witness to injustices large and small—leading the author to raise questions about the place of the moral work of psychotherapy in our therapy-saturated society. She poses an urgent social question: Is it possible to intervene therapeutically in abusive relationships to make love safer for women and less threatening to men?     

Iconic and non-iconic stages in number development: the role of language

Is language the key to number? This article argues that the human language faculty provides the cognitive equipment that enables humans to develop a systematic number concept. Importantly, the number concept is based on non-iconic representations that involve relations between relations: relations between numbers are linked with relations between objects. In contrast to this, language-independent numerosity concepts provide only iconic representations. The pattern of forming relations between relations lies at the heart of our language faculty, suggesting that it is language that enables humans to make the step from these iconic representations, which we share with other species, to a generalized concept of number.     

A PREOCCUPATION WITH OBJECT-REPRESENTATION: THE BECKETT-BION CASE REVISITED

Taking issue with the notion of a profound reciprocal influence of Samuel Beckett and his analyst, Wilfred Bion, based on supposition all too often passed as fact, the author refutes the idea that Bion's ‘Attacks on linking’ was based on his later‐to‐be famous patient. Choosing, rather, to apply Bion's concepts of transformation and assaults on verbal thought to Beckett's remarkably visual and highly dissociative writing, she finds in the analyst's work a means of exploring a startling preoccupation with object representation and an anxiety of remembrance constant throughout the writer's texts. Is this fixation attributable only to aesthetic strategy or does it say something about the writer's own inner representational world? Relating the writer's obsession to Bion's concepts and, moreover, its dissociative expression to the decathexis and blank mourning explored by Green, she uncovers within it a reflection of the kind of evocative memory disturbance identified with primary dyadic dysfunction. This application of Bion and Green to Beckett veers distinctly less towards psychohistory, however, than to how sublimation has rendered this object‐relational failure an aesthetic success.     

Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity

I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of “perceptual normativity”. Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object as falling under a corresponding concept. I motivate the proposal through a criticism of Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition, which, I argue, rests on a confusion between the notion of a way something is perceived, and that of a way it is perceived as being. Whereas Peacocke's account of concept‐acquisition depends on an illicit slide between these two notions, the notion of perceptual normativity allows a legitimate transition between them: if someone's perceiving something a certain way involves her taking it that she ought to perceive it that way, then she perceives the thing as being a certain way, so that the corresponding concept is available to her in perceptual experience.     

Aesthetic experience

An initial clinical question, ‘Why does an analysand talk about his/her relationship with an aesthetic object?’ opens an investigation into the nature of aesthetic experience. Three principal aspects of the psychoanalytic approach are presented: sublimation, a Freudian concept concerning the vicissitudes of the drives; reparation, a Kleinian concept linked to depressive anxiety; and transformation, a concept of object‐relations theory about primitive ego‐states. The article discusses the psychic function of aesthetic feelings in mastering anxiety as related to ego, id and superego. The transformation of the experience of passivity is a common link underlying these aspects. Such transformation relies on tolerating ambiguous and contrary feelings within the self, fostered by contact with an aesthetic object. This balance can, however, be upset: two excessive forms of aesthetic experience ensue, namely, fascination and bewitchment. The first belongs to the experience of awe; the second can lead to claustrophobic anxiety. The initial clinical question requires an elaboration of aesthetic transference, a variant of the narcissistic transference, whereby the analysand invites the analyst to share his/her internal state as a common unspoken object.     

Being as Iconic: Aquinas on ‘He Who Is’ as the Name for God

Aquinas claims that ‘He Who Is’ is the most proper of the names we have for God. But this attempt to ‘describe’ God with a philosophical concept like ‘being’ can seem dangerously close to creating a false conception based on our limited understanding – an idol. A dominant criticism of Aquinas’ use of this term is that any attempt to use ‘being’ to describe God will inevitably make him merely some object in our ontology alongside other beings, unacceptably mitigating God's radical transcendence and otherness. I will argue that Aquinas has a very creative response to this charge: ‘being’ stands in a unique relationship as the only concept that can ensure we do not draw God under some particular creaturely limit and thus use divine names to create an ‘idol’. In other words, ‘being’ is a special paradigm concept/term which ensures that we preserve humility in our attempts to name God.