On What We are and How We Persist

This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio‐psycho‐continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.     

Chernobyl: We are the experiment

The Worst Accident in the World, edited by David Leith, William Heinemann & Pan Books, 1986, 208 pages, pb £2.95     

We are the Daily Bread of Each other

In this paper, I will attempt a cross-fertilization between some ideas of the Danish professor of ethics and philosophy of religion, K.E. Løgstrup and some of the therapeutic ideas of Sandor Ferenczi. I will especially discuss the phenomenon of trust, and the response it awakens in the person to whom the trust is directed, especially as evident in the thearapeutic relationship.     

We are All Bayesian,Everyone is Not a Bayesian

Medical research makes intensive use of statistics in order to support its claims. In this paper we make explicit an epistemological tension between the conduct of clinical trials and their interpretation: statistical evidence is sometimes discarded on the basis of an (often) underlined Bayesian reasoning. We suggest that acknowledging the potentiality of Bayesian statistics might contribute to clarify and improve comprehension of medical research. Nevertheless, despite Bayesianism may provide a better account for scientific inference with respect to the standard frequentist approach, Bayesian statistics is rarely adopted in clinical research. The main reason lies in the supposed subjective elements characterizing this perspective. Hence, we discuss this objection presenting the so-called Reference analysis, a formal method which has been developed in the context of objective Bayesian statistics in order to define priors which have a minimal or null impact on posterior probabilities. Furthermore, according to this method only available data are relevant sources of information, so that it resists the most common criticisms against Bayesianism.

     

We are made,not born: Empiricism is existentially useful

The perennial “nativist-empiricist” debate in developmental science has far-reaching relevance in our existence. Two studies conducted under the terror management framework tested whether the empiricist developmental conception serves distal defensive purposes. Experiment 1 highlights the palliative existential effect of the empiricist conception since participants who read an empiricist essay exhibited less death thoughts than participants who read a nativist essay or a control essay. Experiment 2 gives support to the distal defensive function of the empiricist conception by showing that, unlike with the nativist or the control essay, people under mortality salience exhibited a higher need to rely on empiricism than participants in the control pain condition. The existential advantage of empiricism is explained by the fact that human development is shaped by a meaningful cultural blueprint. Our results are discussed in terms of the ontological and existential benefits of contemplating human intrinsic identity, ranging from its biology to its social behaviors as primarily influenced by the cultural environment.     

We are told that marihuana is harmless,except…

Some recent research suggests that marihuana, used in limited doses, may be no more harmful to users than some of the more commonly consumed alcoholic malt beverages, used in limited doses. But a careful examination of the medical research literature reveals specifics—often only hinted at in many of the recent articles on marihuana use—concerning excessive damage to individuals who may have certain physical or psychological inabilities to handle this substance, who may use it in doses that are more than minimal, or who may use it over extended periods of time.     

Self-Doubt: Why We are not Identical to Things of Any Kind

There are two fundamental aspects of the notion of a self: (i) it is the owner of one’s experiences, that to which one’s experiences are properly attributed, and (ii) it perceives itself. (ii) is a condition on the self’s being capable of attributing experiences to itself or being introspectively aware of its experiences, which constitutes a third, higher‐order aspect of the self. I claim that it is a common sense assumption, enshrined in the use of ‘I’, that one’s body satisfies the first two aspects. I then argue that these two aspects are not really satisfied by one’s body, which is essentially a human organism. Nor are they satisfied by anything of any other kind. So we are not identical to things of any kind, since one can be identical only to that which is one’s self or is the referent of one’s uses of ‘I’.     

We are not a Healthcare Business: Our Inadvertent Vow of Poverty

Psychology has been fractionated from mainstream healthcare delivery and this schism has resulted in huge costs to psychologists and our intended customers. Psychology has also been naïve economically. The authors suggest three revolutions: (1) for clinical psychology to be better integrated into the healthcare delivery system; (2) for psychologists to better understand healthcare economics and business; and (3) for psychologists to become more entrepreneurial, i.e., see needs in healthcare (such as those of the elderly, obesity, improved access and value through ehealth) and systematically fill these. We note high quality businesses help many individuals (customers, family members, employees) not typically recognized by anti-business psychologists.     

Explaining False Uniqueness: Why We are Both Better and Worse Than Others

People see themselves as unique from others – as having better personalities and abilities, more desirable opinions, and brighter futures than almost everyone else. In the past, researchers attributed these ‘false uniqueness perceptions’ primarily to a need or desire to see oneself in the most charitable light possible (i.e., self‐enhancement). More recent findings – that oftentimes people claim to be worse off than others – call this view into question and raise the need to find explanations that can account for both positive and negative forms of uniqueness perceptions. This review describes several of the leading non‐motivated (cognitive) explanations for false uniqueness perceptions and discusses recent empirical findings that establish their role in these phenomena. The rationality of false uniqueness perceptions and the status of motivated reasoning are also briefly considered.     

We are furious (female) but we can shape our own development

“Society has not been meeting the self-development needs of women, and little has been done in the schools-one of the major socialization agents.     

"Although We are Catholic, We are Dutch"—The Transition of the Dutch Catholic Church from Sect to Church as an Explanation for its Growth and Decline

The Dutch Catholic Church has experienced an immense growth and an equal measure of decline in the last two centuries. This article explains this development by using the sect-to-church theory, as has been developed by the rational choice theory of religion. This theory explains the growth and decline of a church by the degree of tension it has with society. Historical evidence is used to test this theory with regard to the Dutch Catholic Church. As long as that church was in tension with society it kept growing, but as soon as the tension decreased, which was already taking place prior to 1960, it declined.     

We are what we eat: How food is represented in our mind/brain

Despite the essential role of food in our lives, we have little understanding of the way our knowledge about food is organized in the brain. At birth, human infants exhibit very few food preferences, and do not yet know much about what is edible and what is not. A multisensory learning development will eventually turn young infants into omnivore adults, for whom deciding what to eat becomes an effortful task. Recognizing food constitutes an essential step in this decisional process. In this paper we examine how concepts about food are represented in the human brain. More specifically, we first analyze how brain-damaged patients recognize natural and manufactured food, and then examine these patterns in the light of the sensory-functional hypothesis and the domain-specific hypothesis. Secondly, we discuss how concepts of food are represented depending on whether we embrace the embodied view or the disembodied view. We conclude that research on food recognition and on the organization of knowledge about food must also take into account some aspects specific to food category, the relevance of which has not been sufficiently recognized and investigated to date.     

Why We Do Not See What We Feel

Of all of Berkeley's claims about perception, perhaps the most unusual is his assertion that we do not see the numerically same objects we feel. Ideas are radically heterogeneous. The question I seek to answer is why Berkeley thought this thesis true. Traditional accounts hold that Berkeley was forced into accepting heterogeneity by his views concerning either distance or abstraction, but careful analysis reveals these to be mistaken. I conclude that how Berkeley thought of the ontic status of ideas finishes the incomplete picture provided by traditional accounts, and supplies us with a better under-standing of his views on perceptual heterogeneity.     

What We Deserve, and how We Reciprocate

Samuel Scheffler says, “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” To the extent that this is true, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism are mistaken. In particular, there is an aspect of what we do to make ourselves deserving that, although it has not been discussed in the literature, plays a central role in everyday moral life, and for good reason. As with desert, reciprocity inspires skepticism. What Allen Buchanan calls justice as reciprocity implies that duties of justice obtain only among those who can do each other favors. So characterized, justice as reciprocity is at best only a part of justice – a part that is silent on duties between people who have no favors to offer each other. Still, the more modest root idea of reciprocity – the idea that returning favors is at very least a good thing – remains compelling. What can we say on behalf of this root idea? This article is part of a larger work on the elements of justice. Both parts of it begin with and build on James Rachels’ seminal paper “What People Deserve.”     

We feel, therefore we are: emotion as a basis for self-categorization and social action

Building on intergroup emotion research, we test the idea that intergroup emotion influences self-categorization. We report two studies using minimal (Study 1) and natural (Study 2) groups in which we measured participants' emotional reactions to a group-relevant event before manipulating the emotional reactions of other ingroup members and outgroup members (anger vs. happiness in Study 1; anger vs. indifference in Study 2). Results supported the hypotheses that (a) the fit between participants' own emotional reactions and the reactions of ingroup members would influence self-categorization, and (b) the specific content of emotional reactions would shape participants' willingness to engage in collective action. This willingness was greater when emotional reactions were not only shared with other group members, but were of anger (consistent with group-based action) rather than happiness or indifference (inconsistent with group-based action). Implications for the relationship between emotion and social identities are discussed.     

We are not alone: The meaning motive,religiosity, and belief in extraterrestrial intelligence

We tested the proposals that paranormal beliefs about extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) are motivated, in part, by the need for meaning and that this existential motive helps explain the inverse relationship between religiosity and ETI beliefs. In Study 1, we experimentally establish that the motive to find meaning in life increases ETI beliefs. In Study 2, we replicate previous research demonstrating that low religiosity is associated with greater ETI beliefs. In Studies 3–4 we tested and found support for a model linking low religiosity to low presence of meaning, high search for meaning, and greater ETI beliefs. In all, our findings offer a motivational account of why people endorse paranormal beliefs about intelligent alien beings observing and influencing the lives of humans.