积极情绪对任务转换的影响

通过两个行为实验考察了积极情绪图片所诱发的情绪状态对任务转换的影响及其机制。研究任务是数字分类任务,分为保持和转换两个阶段。首先要求被试对靶刺激形成一定的习惯化反应,然后改变任务要求。实验1以53名大学生为被试,分别在积极情绪、消极情绪和中性条件下完成任务,发现在与中性条件相比时,积极情绪促进任务转换,消极情绪延缓任务转换。实验2以37名大学生为被试,增加了一种转换条件,考察积极情绪促进任务转换的心理原因,结果表明积极情绪因偏好新异刺激而促进任务转换     

Learned irrelevance and response perseveration in a total change dimensional shift task

Thirty-six healthy participants received a discrimination learning task requiring the identification of a relevant stimulus dimension. After successful learning, the relevant dimension was shifted unannounced. All exemplars of the two dimensions presented after the shift were novel, implying a 'total change' design. In three experimental conditions, participants could either make only errors reflecting perseveration of responding to the former relevant dimension, continued ignoring of the former irrelevant dimension, or both. After the shift, the participants in the perseveration condition made fewer errors than did those in the other two conditions, which did not differ. These results imply a predominance of the learned irrelevance mechanism even when any direct transfer of learning about exemplars in the pre-shift phase is precluded.     

Do learned irrelevance and perseveration play a role during discrimination learning?

In both healthy participants and various patient populations, performance on attentional set-shifting tasks has been found to be affected by learned irrelevance and/or perseveration. The present study examined whether or not these processes also play a role during the initial discrimination learning phase of those tasks. To this end, participants first solved a multidimensional discrimination learning task. Thereafter, they underwent three types of shift of relevant and/or irrelevant stimulus attributes, which enabled the assessment of the separate contribution of perseveration and learned irrelevance to post-shift task performance. Subsequent correlational analyses revealed that the number of errors during initial discrimination learning was significantly correlated with the number of errors in the learned irrelevance-shift but not the perseveration-shift. This suggests that processes underlying learned irrelevance in post-shift task performance also play a significant role during initial discrimination learning. The implications of these results for interpreting deficits in shifting are discussed.     

Does switching between strategies within the same task involve a cost?

In two experiments, participants had to switch regularly between two cognitive strategies of a different complexity in the context of a numerosity judgement task. Expt 1 comprised bivalent stimuli (i.e. allowing the application of the two strategies), whereas Expt 2 involved univalent stimuli (i.e. allowing the application of only one strategy). Both experiments revealed that switching between strategies entailed a cognitive cost that was reflected in longer response times on switch compared to non‐switch trials but not in reduced accuracy. The size of this switch cost did not differ as a function of strategy complexity but tended to diminish as a strategy became more appropriate for solving a particular problem. We discuss the extent to which current theories of task switching can account for these findings.     

The dual implication of dual affordance: stimulus-task binding and attentional focus changing during task preparation

In task switching experiments, comparing performance with bivalent stimuli (affording both tasks) to univalent stimuli (affording one task) confounds the need to change focus between dimensions and stimulus-task binding, because bivalent stimuli require focusing (and refocusing) but also appeared in the competing task before. To separate these influences, participants switched between vertical and horizontal judgments performed on bivalent (e.g., up-left) or univalent (e.g., left) actual locations or location words. In a critical condition involving bivalence without stimulus-task binding, actual locations and location words were each linked to a different task. Bivalence increased switch costs and preparation reduced switch costs only with bivalent stimuli. Stimulus-task binding affected performance in task repetitions, especially when little preparation time was afforded.     

No-go trials can modulate switch cost by interfering with effects of task preparation

It has recently been shown that the cost associated with switching tasks is eliminated following ‘no-go’ trials, in which response selection is not completed, suggesting that the switch cost depends on response selection. However, no-go trials may also affect switch costs by interfering with the effects of task preparation that precede response selection. To test this hypothesis we evaluated switch costs following standard go trials with those following two types of non-response trials: no-go trials, for which a stimulus is presented that indicates no response should be made (Experiment 1); and cue-only trials in which no stimulus is presented following the task cue (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that eliminating no-go stimuli would reveal effects of task preparation on the switch cost in cue-only trials. We found no switch cost following no-go trials (Experiment 1), but a reliable switch cost in cue-only trials (i.e., when no-go stimuli were removed; Experiment 2). We conclude that no-go trials can modulate the switch cost, independent of their effect on response selection, by interfering with task preparation, and that the effects of task preparation on switch cost are more directly assessed by cue-only trials.     

Disrupted attentional learning in high schizotypy: Evidence of aberrant salience

The relationship between learned variations in attention and schizotypy was examined in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants low on a negative subscale of schizotypy exhibited an explicit bias in overt attention towards stimuli that were established as predictive of a trial outcome, relative to stimuli that were irrelevant. The same participants also showed a bias in learning about these stimuli when they presented in a novel context. Neither of these effects was observed in participants high in schizotypy. In Experiment 2, participants low on the negative subscale of schizotypy exhibited faster reaction times towards a target that was cued by a stimulus that had a history of predictive validity relative to a stimulus that had a history of irrelevance. Again, this effect was not present in participants high in schizotypy. These results imply a disruption in the normal allocation of attention to cues that have predictive significance in schizotypy.     

The role of crossmodal competition and dimensional overlap in crossmodal attention switching

Crossmodal selective attention was investigated in a cued task switching paradigm using bimodal visual and auditory stimulation. A cue indicated the imperative modality. Three levels of spatial S–R associations were established following perceptual (location), structural (numerical), and conceptual (verbal) set-level compatibility. In Experiment 1, participants switched attention between the auditory and visual modality either with a spatial-location or spatial-numerical stimulus set. In the spatial-location set, participants performed a localization judgment on left vs. right presented stimuli, whereas the spatial-numerical set required a magnitude judgment about a visually or auditorily presented number word. Single-modality blocks with unimodal stimuli were included as a control condition. In Experiment 2, the spatial-numerical stimulus set was replaced by a spatial-verbal stimulus set using direction words (e.g., “left”). RT data showed modality switch costs, which were asymmetric across modalities in the spatial-numerical and spatial-verbal stimulus set (i.e., larger for auditory than for visual stimuli), and congruency effects, which were asymmetric primarily in the spatial-location stimulus set (i.e., larger for auditory than for visual stimuli). This pattern of effects suggests task-dependent visual dominance.     

Establishing equivalence–equivalence analogical relations via tact and listener training

We investigated the role of verbal behavior on the emergence of analogy-type responding as measured via equivalence–equivalence relations. In Experiment 1, 8 college students learned to label arbitrary stimuli as, “vek,” “zog,” and “paf”, and in Experiment 2, 8 additional participants learned to select these stimuli when hearing their names in an auditory–visual matching-to-sample (MTS) task. Experimenters tested for the emergence of relational tacts (i.e., “same” and “different”) and equivalence–equivalence relations (analogy tests) via visual–visual MTS. Half of the participants were exposed to a think-aloud procedure. Even though they all passed analogy tests while tacting stimuli relationally, only participants exposed to tact training (Experiment 1) did so without the need for remediation. The results of these experiments confirm that individual discriminative and relational control of stimuli established through verbal behavior training is sufficient to produce equivalence–equivalence analogical responding, advancing the analysis of complex cognitive (problem-solving) phenomena.     

The preparation effect in task switching: Carryover of SOA

A common finding in task-switching studies is switch preparation (commonly known as the preparation effect), in which a longer interval between task cue and trial stimulus (i.e., a longer stimulus onset asynchrony, or SOA) reduces the cost of switching to a different task. Three experiments link switch preparation to within-subjects manipulations of SOA. In Experiment 1, SOA was randomized within subjects, producing switch preparation that was more pronounced when the SOA switched from the previous trial than when the SOA repeated. In Experiment 2, SOA was blocked within subjects, producing switch preparation but not on the first block of trials. In Experiment 3, SOA was manipulated between subjects with sufficient statistical power to detect switch preparation, but the effect was absent. The results favor an encoding view of cognitive control, but show that any putative switching mechanism reacts lazily when exposed to only one SOA.     

Unmixing the mixing cost: contributions from dimensional relevance and stimulus-response suppression

When participants repeat the same task in a context in which the task may also switch (a mixed block), performance deteriorates compared to when there is only one task repeating (a pure block). Three experiments were designed to assess how perceptual and motor transitions influenced this mixing cost. Experiment 1 provided three pure block baselines for perceptual and motor transitions. Experiments 2 and 3 examined these transitions in a mixed block. Results show that most of the mixing cost comes from two factors: (a) episodic interference in the mixed block when the stimulus changes and the response repeats, and (b) increased suppression in mixed blocks affecting trials where stimulus-response mappings repeat. We propose that these mechanisms are strategically applied when adopting a sustained "switching set" in mixed blocks. The purpose of this set would be to avoid perseveration errors in the most demanding trials (the task-switching trials), but remaining active during task-repetitions. Results regarding the mixing cost are thus relevant to the assessment of models of task-switching, which at present mainly rely on data from task switch trials.     

Strategy switch costs in arithmetic problem solving

Three experiments tested whether switching between strategies involves a cost. In three experiments, participants had to give approximate products to two-digit multiplication problems (e.g., 47×76). They were told which strategy to use (Experiments 1 and 2) or could choose among strategies (Experiment 3). The participants showed poorer performance when they used different strategies on two consecutive trials than when they used the same strategy. They also used the same strategy over two consecutive problems more often than they used different strategies. These effects, termed strategy switch costs, were found when the participants executed the easiest strategy and when they solved easy problems. We discuss possible processes underlying these strategy switch costs and the implications of these strategy switch costs for models of strategy choices.     

Reactance in affective-evaluative learning: Outside of conscious control?

Recent studies have shown that the basic evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (originally neutral stimuli acquiring an affective value congruent with the valence of the affective stimulus they were paired with) seems to be limited to participants who are unaware of the stimulus pairings. If participants are aware of the pairings, reactance effects occur (i.e., changes in the opposite direction of the valence of the affective stimulus). To examine whether these reactance effects are due to processes of conscious countercontrol or whether the ratings reflect intrinsic feelings towards the stimuli, a new procedure was developed that included a bogus-pipeline condition. In this procedure, which was adapted from attitude research, participants were connected to bogus lie detector equipment leading them to believe that their "true" affective-evaluative responses were being observed. In Experiment 1, reactance effects occurred also in this procedure, suggesting that the effect is spontaneous and not due to processes of conscious countercontrol. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated using a between-subjects design in addition to the standard within-subjects control condition.     

The role of task rules and stimulus–response mappings in the task switching paradigm

Switch costs occur whenever participants are asked to switch between two or more task sets. In a typical task switching experiment, participants have to switch between two task sets composed of up to four different stimuli per task set. These 2 (task sets) x 4 (stimuli) contain only 8 different stimulus-response (S-R) mappings, and the question is why participants base their task performance on task sets instead of S-R mappings. The current experiments compared task performance based on task rules with performance based on single stimulus-response mappings. Participants were led to learn eight different S-R mappings with or without fore-knowledge about two underlying task sets. Without task set information no difference between shifts and repetitions occurred, whereas introducing task sets at the beginning led to significant switch costs. Most importantly, introducing task sets in the middle of the experiment also resulted in significant switch costs. Furthermore, introducing task rules at the beginning of the experiment lead to slower RTs when simple stimuli (Experiment 1) had to be processed. This detrimental effect disappeared with more complex stimuli (Experiment 2). Results will be discussed with respect to cognitive control.     

The nature of residual cost in regular switch response factors

Two experiments are presented that compare the residual cost found when switching from one task to another under predictable conditions. The aim of the study was to explore the roles played by the stimulus, the response, or both in the process of the mental set reconfiguration necessary to switch between two tasks. The experiments tested [Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Cost of a predictable switch between simple cognitive tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, 207-231] stimulus-cued-completion hypothesis and [Schuch, S., & Koch, I. (2003). The role of response selection for inhibition of task sets in task shifting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 29, 92-105] hypothesis of response selection as the key factor in the nature of switch cost. In the first experiment, two conditions were created that varied in terms of a Go/No-Go signal: The Go trials were a replication of [Tornay, F. J., & Milán, E. G. (2001). A more complete task-set reconfiguration in random than in predictable task switch. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54A, 785-803 Experiment 3]; The No-Go trials were identical to the first condition, except that participants did not execute a response in the trial n-1 (Schuch & Koch, 2003). In addition, the percentage of Go and No-Go trials was manipulated. The results showed that the cost was significant only in the high Go signal-frequency case (Experiment 2), with an abrupt offset in Go trials and a gradual offset in No-Go trials. Based on the results of these experiments, it was concluded that the crucial factor to complete a mental set reconfiguration is response-related and not stimulus-related.     

Suppression of emotional and nonemotional content in memory: effects of repetition on cognitive control

Two experiments utilized a think/no-think paradigm to examine whether cognitive control of memories differs depending on whether they contain information with negative or neutral emotional content. During a training phase, participants learned face-word pairs (Experiment 1) or face-picture pairs (Experiment 2). In a subsequent experimental phase, participants were shown faces and told to think of the items paired with some of the faces and to try not to think of the items paired with other faces. Finally, in a test phase, participants were again shown each face and asked to recall the item with which it had been paired previously. Results for both verbal (Experiment 1) and nonverbal (Experiment 2) items indicated that the facilitatory and inhibitory influences of cognitive control were larger for negative than neutral items.     

The influence of cue-task association and location on switch cost and alternating-switch cost.

Task-switching performance is strongly influenced by whether the imperative stimulus uniquely specifies which task to perform: Switch cost is substantial with bivalent stimuli but is greatly reduced with univalent stimuli, suggesting that available contextual information influences processing in task-switching situations. The present study examined whether task-relevant information provided by task cues influences the magnitude of switch cost in a parallel manner. Cues presented 500 ms prior to a trivalent stimulus indicated which of three tasks to perform. These cues either had a preexisting association with the to-be-performed task (verbal cues), or a recently learned association with the task (spatial and shape cues). The results paralleled the effects of stimulus bivalence: substantial switch cost with recently learned cue-task associations and greatly reduced switch cost with preexisting cue-task associations. This suggests that both stimulus-based and cue-based information can activate the relevant task set, possibly providing external support to endogenous control processes. Alternating-switch cost, a greater cost for switching back to a recently abandoned task, was also observed with both preexisting and recently learned cue-task associations, but only when all tasks were presented in a consistent spatial location. When spatial location was used to cue the to-be-performed tasks, no alternating-switch cost was observed, suggesting that different processes may be involved when tasks are uniquely located in space. Specification of the nature of these processes may prove to be complex, as post-hoc inspection of the data suggested that for the spatial cue condition, the alternating-switch cost may oscillate between cost and benefit, depending on the relevant task.     

Exploring task-set reconfiguration with random task sequences

Switching between two different tasks normally results in an impairment in people's performance known as a switch cost, typically measured as an increase in reaction time (RT) and errors compared to a situation in which no task switch is required. Researchers in task switching have suggested that this switch cost is the behavioural manifestation of the task set reconfiguration processes that are necessary to perform the upcoming task. However, an examination of the literature in task switching reveals apparently contradictory results about the nature of task set reconfiguration processes. In Experiment 1, we addressed this issue by comparing participants' performance in two different experimental conditions: predictable task switching and random task switching. In the predictable switch condition the switch cost completely vanished after the first repetition of the new task. However, in the random switch condition, while the difference between switch and repetition trials was not significant, we observed a significant reduction in RT between the first and second repetition of the new task. In Experiment 2, we further investigated the pattern of task set reconfiguration in the random switch situation. The results showed a progressive reduction of participants' response latencies across repetitions of the same task. The present study demonstrates that, whereas the results in predictable switching conditions are compatible with an exogenous-reconfiguration hypothesis, random task switching produces a more gradual, decay-like switch cost reduction with task repetition.     

Are seductive details seductive only when you think they are relevant? An experimental test of the moderating role of perceived relevance

We investigated whether seductive details (i.e., interesting but irrelevant adjuncts) are harmful to learning only when students (mistakenly) think that they are relevant. We therefore conducted a study in which participants (N = 86) learned either without seductive details (control condition) or with seductive details—in the latter case with or without being informed about the seductive details' irrelevance. In line with our hypotheses, only participants who were not informed about the irrelevance of seductive details revealed worse learning outcomes than those in the control condition, thereby revealing a seductive details effect. Extraneous cognitive load, but not perceived time pressure, mediated the negative effects of being uninformed about the irrelevance of seductive details on learning outcomes. Taken together, our results suggest that the perceived relevance of seductive details is a boundary condition of the seductive details effect.     

Ageing and switching of the focus of attention in working memory: results from a modified N-back task.

We conducted two experiments using a modified version of the N-Back task. For younger adults, there was an abrupt increase in reaction time of about 250 ms in passing from N = 1 to N > 1, indicating a cost associated with switching of the focus of attention within working memory. Response time costs remained constant over the range N = 2 to N = 5. Accuracy declined steadily over the full range of N (Experiment 1). Focus switch costs did not interact with either working memory updating (Experiment 1), or global task switching (Experiment 2). There were no age differences in RT costs once general slowing was taken into account, but there was a larger focus-switch-related accuracy cost in older adults than in younger adults. No age sensitivity was found for either updating or global task switching. The results suggest (a) that focus switching is a cognitive primitive, distinct from task switching and updating, and (b) that focus switching shows a specific age-related deficit in the accuracy domain.