Rationalism and empiricism: A new perspective

Though classical and twentieth-century versions of empiricism and rationalism fail in their aims, as does the Kantian attempt at a compromise between those views, there are residues of those views that play important roles in the scientific enterprise. Those residue, and their scientific roles, are examined in this paper.     

The Buddhist empiricism thesis: An extensive critique

The purpose of this paper is to critically examine the claim that early Buddhism could be interpreted as an empirical philosophy. Made in a time when verifiable foundations were thought to lend credence to a system of belief, the assertion served to differentiate Buddhism from a “mystical” Hinduism and even to give it a leg up over theistic religions. The position of this paper is that the Buddhist Empiricism Thesis is most certainly false. That position is arrived at via a close examination of Buddhist means to knowledge and doctrinal content, which unfortunately entails taking only the most shallow view of a deep subject matter. This superficiality is no reflection on Buddhist belief, but rather is the necessary effect of refuting empirical claims for beliefs which are much more than merely “verifiable”.     

Concept empiricism: a methodological critique

Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.     

Transcendental empiricism: Deleuze''s response to Hegel

Funding for the research leading to this article was generously provided by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Post-Doctoral Fellowship. I would like to thank Andrew Irvine and Steve Savitt for criticisms of an earlier version of this paper, as well as the anonymousMan and World referee.     

A problem concerning the word order in the new testament

Beginning with a critical evaluation of the expression “post-secular society” by Habermas, I continue to a presentation of four recent genealogies of the secular (Asad, Lilla, Taylor and Agamben) and a short deliberation on their consequences for theological discourse. Proceeding from this debate, I suggest a new approach to the question of secularity that combines the genealogical perspective with a topological inquiry into the conditions for social space, geographical space, and power relations, including their origin and emergence (geneatopics). I argue that it will also have to take into account the problem of the unplaceable and the unclassifiable (the atopia). Hence I offer a contribution to the geneatopology of secularity and religion, based on examples from the Nordic context.     

Agnostic empiricism versus scientific realism: Belief in truth matters

This paper aims to defend scientific realism against two versions of agnostic empiricism: a naive agnostic position, which suggests that the only rational option is to remain agnostic as to the truth of theoretical assertions, and van Fraassen's more sophisticated agnostic empiricism - which may be called "Hypercritical Empiricism". It first argues that given semantic realism, naive agnostic empiricism cannot be maintained: there is no relevant epistemic difference between theoretical assertions and observational ones. It then focuses on van Fraassen's more sophisticated alternative to scientific realism and suggests that an attitude towards science which involves less than aiming at theoretical truth and believing in theories would be, in some concrete respect that empiricists should recognize, worse off than the recommended realist attitude. To this end, the paper develops the so-called conjunction argument into a diachronic argument for scientific realism.     

Pure experience revisited: A critical reassessment of Nishida Kitaro's radicalization of William James' empiricism

In this paper, we will revisit the relation between the respective conceptions of pure experience of Nishida Kitaro and William James. As various authors have previously shown, comparing Nishida and James can not only help us better understand both of their specific understandings of pure experience, and consequently its position within their respective enterprises, but also give a platform with which to see how these two authors could contribute to contemporary discussions on philosophical methodology. However, despite the long history of comparative research on these two thinkers, there is still no consensus about the extent to which Nishida's philosophy actually resembles James' work at all. Was Nishida's interest in James' work found only in superficial similarities between two authors interested in overcoming the subject–object distinction? Or did Nishida attempt to somehow develop or radicalize James' work, taking his notion of pure experience into the realm of religion and metaphysics? In this contribution, we will agree with previous authors who have argued that Nishida is best understood as trying to go beyond or develop James' work. However, we will make this claim with the caveat that James had good reason not to take the avenues Nishida pursued, and that Nishida's attempt to radicalize some ideas in James may have led to some difficult points within his early philosophy.     

Healthy marriage initiatives: on the need for empiricism in policy implementation

The association between marriage and well-being has led to policies that promote marital interventions and discourage divorce. These include federal initiatives specifically targeting poor couples and couples of color. While there are many prospective studies on marriage that have informed some couple interventions, the studies that are included in this literature sampled predominantly White and middle-class couples. By comparison, far less is known about the longitudinal predictors of relationship satisfaction and status for poor couples and couples of color. Therefore, it is unsurprising that preliminary data on applying current interventions to the couples targeted by these federal initiatives have been disappointing. In this article, I detail three concerns with these initiatives, propose a course of psychological research to address deficits in what is known about poor couples and couples of color, and make specific recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of these initiatives.     

Advancing the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism: A comment on O’Nualláin

In a recent contribution to New Ideas in Psychology, Seán O’Nualláin draws out a distinction between inner and outer empiricism, and suggests that consciousness research can benefit from analysis in both directions, that is, via the exploration of facts and relations that facilitate a third-person understanding of consciousness (by reference to an analysis of the structures, processes, and functions of the brain) and via the direct exploration of conscious experience itself, both in terms of its computational (content filled) and non-computational (content empty) aspects. In positing a substrate of subjectivity independent of the contents of consciousness (and, more specifically, a state of “nothingness”), Ò’Nualláin follows a long tradition deeply rooted in mythical, religious, and esoteric schools of belief and practice. Although there is considerable debate amongst philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists as to whether or not a non-computational view of consciousness is viable, O’Nualláin accepts that such a possibility does exist. Further, he suggests that a dialogue between the inner and outer empiricists will be fruitful. In this comment I, critique Ò’Nualláin's initial thoughts on the subject and draw out a series of useful distinctions that will help to advance the dialogue between inner and outer empiricism. Critical amongst these distinctions is explicit reference to (1) ontological and epistemological interdependencies in consciousness research, and (2) states of consciousness that describe the transition from “mindfulness” through “nothingness” to “no-mind”.     

The earliest recollection: A new survey

High school (N= 150) and college (N= 164) students completed a survey of their earliest personal recollection (ER). These memories typically were of events occurring in the fourth year of life, and varied widely in terms of content and associated affect. The ERs of the high school sample were dated significantly later, contained more traumatic content, and were more likely to possess the qualities of a “screen memory” than were those of the college sample. Upon retest three months later, 58% of the high school students recalled the same ER as on the first trial. For those recalling a different ER, the second was rated as more pleasant than the first, and was less likely to contain traumatic content. In the college sample, those subjects whose ERs were of events occurring after the fourth birthday or which fit the definition of “screen” memories scored higher on the PRF Harmavoidance scale. Implications of these findings for future research are discussed.     

The effect of spatial order on piecemeal shape recognition: A developmental study

Stationary shapes were displayed piecemeal by moving an aperture from one place to another around their contours. Shape recognition was poorer with an unpredictable order of display. This result is more consistent with hypothesis-testing than with either eye-movement or visual information models of shape recognition. Shape recognition was poorer for 9- and 11-year-old children than for adults.