Nader Versus ETS: Who Should We Believe?

Nairn, A., & Associates. The Reign of ETS. Today's Education, 1980, 69, 58G–64G. Kaplan, R.M. Nader's Raid on the Testing Industry: Is it in the Best Interest of the Consumer? American Psychologist, 1982, 37, 15–23.     

Vagueness: Why Do We Believe in Tolerance?

The tolerance principle, the idea that vague predicates are insensitive to sufficiently small changes, remains the main bone of contention between theories of vagueness. In this paper I examine three sources behind our ordinary belief in the tolerance principle, to establish whether any of them might give us a good reason to revise classical logic. First, I compare our understanding of tolerance in the case of precise predicates and in the case of vague predicates. While tolerance in the case of precise predicates results from approximation, tolerance in the case of vague predicates appears to originate from two more specific sources: semantic indeterminacy on the one hand, and epistemic indiscriminability on the other. Both give us good and coherent grounds to revise classical logic. Epistemic indiscriminability, it is argued, may be more fundamental than semantic indeterminacy to justify the intuition that vague predicates are tolerant.     

Why Believe Infinite Sets Exist?

The axiom of infinity states that infinite sets exist. I will argue that this axiom lacks justification. I start by showing that the axiom is not self-evident, so it needs separate justification. Following Maddy’s (J Symb Log 53(2):481–511, 1988) distinction, I argue that the axiom of infinity lacks both intrinsic and extrinsic justification. Crucial to my project is Skolem’s (in: van Heijnoort (ed) From Frege to Gödel: a source book in mathematical logic, 1879–1931, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 290–301, 1922) distinction between a theory of real sets, and a theory of objects that theory calls “sets”. While Dedekind’s (in: Essays on the theory of numbers, pp. 14–58, 1888. http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/21016) argument fails, his approach was correct: the axiom of infinity needs a justification it currently lacks. This epistemic situation is at variance with everyday mathematical practice. A dilemma ensues: should we relax epistemic standards or insist, in a skeptical vein, that a foundational problem has been ignored?     

Why Should We Lower Our Defenses About Defense Mechanisms?

Personality and social psychologists already use ideas that are closely related to defense mechanisms, but few of our paradigms include extensive theoretical or empirical treatment of such mechanisms. Yet defense mechanisms focus on negative affect and protection of the self, and many of the controversies, issues, and impasses contemporary researchers confront also concern negative affect and self-protection. This article discusses whether we might find systematic consideration of defense mechanisms and defensive processing to be broadly useful across several related areas of personality and social psychology in which the relationships between self and affect are implicated. Areas considered include positive illusions and adaptation, the interpretation of reports of negative affect, and related concepts from the coping, self-regulation, affect regulation, and goals literature. Thinking about defense mechanisms would seem to have both specific value for sharpening our understanding of different possible interpretations of our data, and broad heuristic value for thinking about personality integration and social behavior.     

The Social Determinants of Health: Why Should We Care?

A growing body of empirical research examines the effects of the so-called “social determinants of health” (SDH) on health and health inequalities. Several high-profile publications have issued policy recommendations to reduce health inequalities based on a specific interpretation of this empirical research as well as a set of normative assumptions. This article questions the framework defined by these assumptions by focusing on two issues: first, the normative judgments about the (un)fairness of particular health inequalities; and second, the policy recommendations issued on this basis. We argue that the normative underpinnings of the approach are insufficiently supported and that the policy recommendations do not necessarily follow from the arguments provided. Furthermore, while many of the policies recommended—such as improving people's living conditions and reducing inequalities in wealth and power—are justified in their own right, the way these recommendations are tied to health is problematic.     

Self-Judgments of Accuracy as Indicators of Performance Evaluation Quality: Should We Believe Them?

Purpose  

This paper explores how well raters’ self-judgments of their rating and behavioral accuracy reflect reality. We also explore the role of motivation in determining the quality of raters’ self-judgments and their rating and behavioral accuracy.     

Should We Teach Patriotism?

This article examines a particular debate between Eamonn Callan and William Galston concerning the need for a civic education which counters the divisive pull of pluralism by uniting the citizenry in patriotic allegiance to a single national identity.The article offers a preliminary understanding of nationalism and patriotism before setting out the terms of the debate. It then critically evaluates the central idea of Callan that one might be under an obligation morally to improve one's own patriotic inheritance, pointing to the ineliminable tension between the valuation of one's own patria by its own terms and a detached critical reason.It concludes by suggesting that we are, in advance of our education, members of a particular patria and that any education must be particularistic. Finally, the danger is noted of presuming that, in each case, there is a single, determinate national tradition.     

Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self‐reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito.     

Should We Write Off Graphology?

The scientific study of graphology (handwriting analysis) has had a long history. Many practitioners believe that graphology is a valuable selection aid and use this technique in a selection context, and in some European countries it is quite well thought of. While a few articles have proposed that graphology is a valid and useful selection technique, the overwhelming results of well-controlled empirical studies have been that the technique has not demonstrated acceptable validity. A review of relevant literature regarding both theory and research indicates that, while the procedure may have an intuitive appeal, graphology should not be used in a selection context.     

Should We Tolerate Holocaust Denial?

Holocaust denial (HD) is the activity of denying the occurrence of key events and processes which constitute the Holocaust. Should it be tolerated? HD brings into particularly sharp focus many difficult questions faced by defenders of content-neutral liberal principles protecting freedom of expression. I argue that there are insufficient grounds for the legal prohibition of HD, but that society has the right and the duty to expel and exclude deniers from the Academy.     

Why Should a Knower Care?

This paper argues that the concept of care is significant not only for ethics, but for epistemology as well. After elucidating caring as a five‐step dyadic relation, I go on to show its epistemic significance within the general framework of virtue epistemology as developed by Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, and Linda Zagzebski. The notions of “care‐knowing” and “care‐based epistemology” emerge from construing caring (respectively) as a reliabilist and responsibilist virtue.     

Why Should We Care About Nietzsche's ‘Higher Men’?

This paper offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche's ‘higher men’ doctrine, which explains how he can simultaneously hold the following two positions: first, that higher types are especially important or valuable; and second, that all moral claims are false (i.e. a crude error theory regarding morality). Nietzsche can coherently subscribe to both views by arguing that higher types have wide inter‐subjective (prudential) value to lower types. More specifically, higher men, who are mainly characterized by their strong, commanding nature, fulfill a psychological need, common in most humans—the need to obey. The paper develops this conception of higher types and shows how it relates to Nietzsche's insights on culture, nihilism, and becoming.