G. E. Moore and Bad Faith

Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith.     

G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.     

G.E. Moore and the relation between intrinsic value and human activity

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Breathing Life into a Dead Argument: G.E. Moore and the Open Question

A century after its publication, G.E. Moore'sPrincipia Ethica stands as one of theclassic statements of anti-naturalism inethics. Moore claimed that the most basic ethicalproperties were denoted by `good' and `bad' andthat all naturalist accounts of thoseproperties were inadequate. His open-questionargument aimed to refute any proposedidentification of good with some naturalproperty, and Moore concluded from theargument that good must be a nonnaturalproperty.The received view is that the open-questionargument is a failure. In this paper,my aim is to breathe some life back intoMoore's argument. My plan for doing so beginsby presenting the standard interpretation ofthe argument and then showing that there isan alternative to that interpretation. Thealternative is not developed at any length byMoore and stands in need of some elaboration. Isuggest a way of elaborating theargument and then show that the standardcriticisms of Moore fail to undermine thisalternative version of the open-questionargument.     

确立"哲学创作"与"哲学研究"的良性循环关系——对哲学发展中一个前提性问题的思考

一“哲学创作”与“哲学研究”的良性循环关系是哲学健康发展的必要条件完整的哲学活动应该包括既相对独立、又不可分离的两个方面:一是“哲学研究”,二是“哲学创作”。哲学的健康发展有赖于“哲学研究”和“哲学创作”的良性循环关系的建立。在两者关系中,前者是后者的基础和准备,而后者则是前者的源泉和目的。两者既相对独立,同时又良性互动,从而形成一种双方相互支撑和促进的“理论生态”,这是哲学健康发展的必要条件。从基本次序而言,“哲学创作”应该先于“哲学研究”。哲学所“研究”者为何?最主要的无疑是哲学史上由哲学家所创造出…     

卢卡奇对马克思哲学本体论的建构

西方马克思主义创始人卢卡奇在《关于社会存在的本体论》中,以劳动为本体,对马克思主义哲学进行了新的思考。卢卡奇确定了劳动的本质性内涵:作为目的论设定过程、作为社会实践模式以及作为类自由模式的劳动。以历史性对存在类型进行了划分,以劳动为本体建构的关于社会存在的劳动本体论的基本内涵表现为,自然本体论是社会存在本体论的前提,劳动创造着人及其本质,目的性劳动驱动人类社会的发展。卢卡奇的劳动本体论学说对重建与发展马克思实践哲学具有重要启示。     

G.E.摩尔的实践伦理学

虽然G.E.摩尔是现代西方元伦理学的开创者,但在他的伦理体系中包含了丰富的实践伦理学的内容。他的实践伦理学具有后果论的性质和明显的功利主义色彩;不仅如此,摩尔还试图在行为功利主义和准则功利主义之间进行折中;最后,摩尔的实践伦理学具有怀疑论、不可知论的性质。实际上他是以元伦理学(分析伦理学)的方式来研究这些内容的。     

The Virtues of Metaphysics: A Review of Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Writings

Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy has long influenced contemporary ethics, yet it has not, in general, received the kind of sustained critical attention that it deserves. Existentialists and Mystics and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals provide new access to most of Murdoch's philosophical writings and make possible a deeper appreciation of her contribution to current thought. After assessing the recent critical reception of Murdoch's thought, this review places her moral philosophy in the context of contemporary trends in ethics by tracing her influence on the work of Charles Taylor, highlights the distinctive features of her moral philosophy (especially her analysis of consciousness), and suggests future directions for Murdochian ethics.     

The Virtues of Metaphysics: A Review of Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Writings

Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy has long influenced contemporary ethics, yet it has not, in general, received the kind of sustained critical attention that it deserves. Existentialists and Mystics and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals provide new access to most of Murdoch's philosophical writings and make possible a deeper appreciation of her contribution to current thought. After assessing the recent critical reception of Murdoch's thought, this review places her moral philosophy in the context of contemporary trends in ethics by tracing her influence on the work of Charles Taylor, highlights the distinctive features of her moral philosophy (especially her analysis of consciousness), and suggests future directions for Murdochian ethics.