G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.     

G.E. Moore and the relation between intrinsic value and human activity

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Breathing Life into a Dead Argument: G.E. Moore and the Open Question

A century after its publication, G.E. Moore'sPrincipia Ethica stands as one of theclassic statements of anti-naturalism inethics. Moore claimed that the most basic ethicalproperties were denoted by `good' and `bad' andthat all naturalist accounts of thoseproperties were inadequate. His open-questionargument aimed to refute any proposedidentification of good with some naturalproperty, and Moore concluded from theargument that good must be a nonnaturalproperty.The received view is that the open-questionargument is a failure. In this paper,my aim is to breathe some life back intoMoore's argument. My plan for doing so beginsby presenting the standard interpretation ofthe argument and then showing that there isan alternative to that interpretation. Thealternative is not developed at any length byMoore and stands in need of some elaboration. Isuggest a way of elaborating theargument and then show that the standardcriticisms of Moore fail to undermine thisalternative version of the open-questionargument.     

确立"哲学创作"与"哲学研究"的良性循环关系——对哲学发展中一个前提性问题的思考

一“哲学创作”与“哲学研究”的良性循环关系是哲学健康发展的必要条件完整的哲学活动应该包括既相对独立、又不可分离的两个方面:一是“哲学研究”,二是“哲学创作”。哲学的健康发展有赖于“哲学研究”和“哲学创作”的良性循环关系的建立。在两者关系中,前者是后者的基础和准备,而后者则是前者的源泉和目的。两者既相对独立,同时又良性互动,从而形成一种双方相互支撑和促进的“理论生态”,这是哲学健康发展的必要条件。从基本次序而言,“哲学创作”应该先于“哲学研究”。哲学所“研究”者为何?最主要的无疑是哲学史上由哲学家所创造出…     

卢卡奇对马克思哲学本体论的建构

西方马克思主义创始人卢卡奇在《关于社会存在的本体论》中,以劳动为本体,对马克思主义哲学进行了新的思考。卢卡奇确定了劳动的本质性内涵:作为目的论设定过程、作为社会实践模式以及作为类自由模式的劳动。以历史性对存在类型进行了划分,以劳动为本体建构的关于社会存在的劳动本体论的基本内涵表现为,自然本体论是社会存在本体论的前提,劳动创造着人及其本质,目的性劳动驱动人类社会的发展。卢卡奇的劳动本体论学说对重建与发展马克思实践哲学具有重要启示。     

The Virtues of Metaphysics: A Review of Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Writings

Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy has long influenced contemporary ethics, yet it has not, in general, received the kind of sustained critical attention that it deserves. Existentialists and Mystics and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals provide new access to most of Murdoch's philosophical writings and make possible a deeper appreciation of her contribution to current thought. After assessing the recent critical reception of Murdoch's thought, this review places her moral philosophy in the context of contemporary trends in ethics by tracing her influence on the work of Charles Taylor, highlights the distinctive features of her moral philosophy (especially her analysis of consciousness), and suggests future directions for Murdochian ethics.     

The Virtues of Metaphysics: A Review of Iris Murdoch's Philosophical Writings

Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy has long influenced contemporary ethics, yet it has not, in general, received the kind of sustained critical attention that it deserves. Existentialists and Mystics and Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals provide new access to most of Murdoch's philosophical writings and make possible a deeper appreciation of her contribution to current thought. After assessing the recent critical reception of Murdoch's thought, this review places her moral philosophy in the context of contemporary trends in ethics by tracing her influence on the work of Charles Taylor, highlights the distinctive features of her moral philosophy (especially her analysis of consciousness), and suggests future directions for Murdochian ethics.     

Fixing Descartes: Ethical Intellectualism in Spinoza's Early Writings

This paper aims at reconstructing the ethical issues raised by Spinoza's early Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Specifically, I argue that Spinoza takes issue with Descartes’ epistemology in order to support a form of “ethical intellectualism” in which knowledge is envisaged as both necessary and sufficient to reach the supreme good. First, I reconstruct how Descartes exploits the distinction between truth and certainty in his Discourse on the Method. On the one hand, this distinction acts as the basis for Descartes’ epistemological rules while, on the other hand, it implies a “morale par provision” in which adequate knowledge is not strictly necessary to practice virtue. Second, I show that Spinoza rejects the distinction between truth and certainty and thus the methodological doubt. This move leads Spinoza to substitute the Cartesian Cogito with the idea of God as the only adequate standard of knowledge, through which the mind can attain the rules to reach the supreme good. Third, I demonstrate that in the Short Treatise Spinoza develops this view by equating intellect and will and thus maintaining that only adequate knowledge can help to contrast affects. However, I also insist that Spinoza's early epistemology is unable to explain why human beings drop conceive of the idea of God inadequately. Thus, I suggest that in his later writings Spinoza accounts for the insufficiency of adequate knowledge in opposing the power of the imagination and passions by reconnecting the nature of ideas with the mind's conatus.     

G.E.摩尔的问题意识

哲学的产生和发展总是与思想者对问题的探求紧密相连。在现代西方哲学和伦理学的发展历程中,哲学家和伦理学家对问题的发掘和探究尤为明显。作为现代西方元伦理学的开创者,G.E.摩尔(G.E.Moore)即表现出了强烈的问题意识,他以问题为契机展开其伦理学体系的理论进程;这一点对我们具有重要的借鉴意义。综观摩尔的伦理学,给人留下深刻印象的地方主要有两点,即问题和分析。摩尔伦理学研究的突出特色首先表现在他对问题的重视上。经粗略统计,摩尔在《伦理学原理》一书中至少提出了114个问题(当然包括那些重复的提问),或者说至少有114处采取了疑…