Proxytypes and Linguistic Nativism

Prinz (Perceptual the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis, MIT Press, 2002) presents a new species of concept empiricism, under which concepts are off-line long-term memory networks of representations that are ‘copies’ of perceptual representations – proxytypes. An apparent obstacle to any such empiricism is the prevailing nativism of generative linguistics. The paper critically assesses Prinz’s attempt to overcome this obstacle. The paper argues that, prima facie, proxytypes are as incapable of accounting for the structure of the linguistic mind as are the more traditional species of empiricism. This position is then confirmed by looking in detail at two suggestions (one derived from recent connectionist research) from Prinz of how certain aspects of syntactic structure might be accommodated by the proxytype theory. It is shown that the suggestions fail to come to terms with both the data and theory of contemporary linguistics.     

Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls’ Political Liberalism Versus Gaus’ Justificatory Liberalism

Public justification-based accounts of liberal legitimacy rely on the idea that a polity’s basic structure should, in some sense, be acceptable to its citizens. In this paper I discuss the prospects of that approach through the lens of Gerald Gaus’ critique of John Rawls’ paradigmatic account of democratic public justification. I argue that Gaus does succeed in pointing out some significant problems for Rawls’ political liberalism; yet his alternative, justificatory liberalism, is not voluntaristic enough to satisfy the desiderata of a genuinely democratic theory of public justification. So I contend that—pace Gaus, but also Rawls—rather than simply amending political liberalism, the claims of justificatory liberalism bring out fatal tensions between the desiderata of any theory of liberal-democratic legitimacy through public justification.     

Abstract concepts,compositionality, and the contextualism-invariantism debate

Invariantists argue that the notion of concept in psychology should be reserved for knowledge that is retrieved in a context-insensitive manner. Contextualists argue that concepts are to be understood in terms of context-sensitive ad hoc constructions. I review the central empirical evidence for and against both views and show that their conclusions are based on a common mischaracterization of both theories. When the difference between contextualism and invariantism is properly understood, it becomes apparent that the way the question of stability is currently investigated will not lead to a consensus. Instead of focusing directly on stability, we should turn our attention to other desiderata on a theory of concepts. In particular, I show that invariantism, but not contextualism, fails to account for compositionality and abstract concepts.     

Creative value

Free agents can create and destroy value, for how much value is realized may well depend on what such agents choose to do. Not only may such agents create and destroy value, but such creation and destruction seem to involve a dimension of value: I call it creative value. An explication of the twin concepts of creating value and creative value is given, motivated by two desiderata. It is then shown that creative value turns out to be equivalent to what Nozick has dubbed originative value, when his suggestive remarks are given a rigorous, although very natural, interpretation. Thus two highly plausible, but quite different, ways of characterizing creative value converge on a single concept. Furthermore, the account throws considerable light on two further areas of moral theory (namely, moral satisficing and the comparison principle) which turn out, rather unexpectedly, to be linked.     

Concept empiricism, content, and compositionality

Concepts are the constituents of thoughts. Therefore, concepts are vital to any theory of cognition. However, despite their widely accepted importance, there is little consensus about the nature and origin of concepts. Thanks to the work of Lawrence Barsalou, Jesse Prinz and others concept empiricism has been gaining momentum within the philosophy and psychology literature. Concept empiricism maintains that all concepts are copies, or combinations of copies, of perceptual representations—that is, all concepts are couched in the codes of perceptual representation systems. It is widely agreed that any satisfactory theory of concepts must account for how concepts semantically compose (the compositionality requirement) and explain how their intentional content is determined (the content determination requirement). In this paper, I argue that concept empiricism has serious problems satisfying these two requirements. Therefore, although stored perceptual representations may facilitate some traditionally conceptual tasks, concepts should not be identified with copies of perceptual representations.     

Alston's Anti‐Justificationism as a Strategy to Resolve the Conflict Between Internalism and Externalism

After a justificationist period, William P. Alston has tried to eliminate justification from the epistemology of belief. He introduced a list of epistemic desiderata all of which contribute to the positive status of beliefs and none of which has an exclusive and decisive role so that it could be isolated as the property of being justified. Careful examination reveals, however, that this list includes fewer desiderata than advertised. Truth‐conducive desiderata are most important for Alston, and these are five; during his discussion, however, Alston reduces these desiderata to only one, the reliability of process, which has an externalist character. Besides this desideratum, there is one other group of desiderata, all of which have an internalist character. What Alston has in fact done, then, through the presentation of his anti‐justificationist list, is to separate externalist and internalist elements for the positive status of belief and to give an independent role to each. Since Alston regards the truth‐conducive group as the most important, however, and since he has failed to show a real pluralism in this group, we may conclude that he continues to have a monistic approach to the evaluation of beliefs, which belies his alleged pluralism.     

Psychoanalysis and Biology: An Epistemological Re-Discussion

This paper discusses Freud's theory in the context of the most significant redefinitions in contemporary biology. Freud's ideas in general, as well as his conception of mental illness, were deeply grounded in the paradigm of evolutionist biology, which prevailed during his lifetime. Over the last four decades, another paradigm emerged in this field and became dominant, i.e., the informational paradigm. For this reason, some of the implications of this new paradigm for resignifying Freud's concepts like repetition, death drive and anxiety will be outlined.     

Problems in recent tests of two cognitive theories of panic.

Four problems in five recent tests of two cognitive theories of panic are discussed: (a) the ambiguity and indistinguishability of the 'body sensations' and 'cognitions' concepts; (b) the uncertain meaning of 'meaningful relationships'; (c) problems arising from differences in Clark's (Behaviour Research and Therapy, 24, 461-470, 1986) theory and Goldstein and Chambless' (Behavior Therapy, 9, 47-59, 1978) theory; (d) the ambiguity of correlational data. Some desiderata for future research on these theories are proposed.     

BEFORE ATTACHMENT THEORY: SEPARATION RESEARCH AT THE TAVISTOCK CLINIC, 1948–1956

This article traces the formation of attachment theory to the pioneering research program of Bowlby and his colleagues at the Tavistock Clinic between 1948 and 1956. Through a discussion of the concepts and practices that informed Bowlby's program, I examine the efforts of his team to reconstruct psychoanalytic objects according to preventive objectives and operational criteria. I discuss how the exploratory techniques that Bowlby and his colleagues were developing during these years ultimately led to the establishment of a hybrid investigative framework, in which the prophylactic requirements of mental hygiene, the psychometric model of personality disturbances, the psychoanalytic theory of object relations, and a direct‐observational methodology were brought to bear on the problem of the psychological consequences of early separation experiences. I further claim that this shift in investigative practice was crucial for the succeeding theoretical developments that eventually gave rise to the statistically validated constructs of attachment theory.     

The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn't able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren't emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.     

Arrow’s theorem and theory choice

In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83–115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow’s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow’s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow’s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow’s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow’s theorem may be dismissed as a problem.     

Feedback in discriminative avoidance learning: Mechanistic versus cognitive views

Presentation of a feedback stimulus, a non-aversive event never paired with shock, following an avoidance response has been found to be an effective reinforcer in avoidance learning. Alternative formulations of the feedback effect, one a version of the traditional S-R mechanistic, two-factor theory and the other a cognitive (informational) theory, were evaluated with a view toward determining which type of formulation provides a more viable explanation of avoidance learning. The conclusion reached, however, was that both informational and fear-reduction positions operationalize their critical concepts in the same manner, and to date there are no empirical grounds for distinguishing these different views.     

The cognitive foundations of visual consciousness: Why should we favour a processing approach?

How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness. . Our aim, in this paper, is to develop arguments for the latter approach. We focus on a criticism of Jesse Prinz’s AIR theory of consciousness. We have chosen Prinz’s theory because it incorporates features of both the content and processing approaches, and discussing it will therefore allow us to compare the advantages and downsides of both. Our argument will focus in particular on the notion of intermediate-level. We will discuss how Prinz characterizes the intermediate-level according to a content approach, and argue that such a characterization is inadequate. Finally, we will argue in favor of processing approach to the problem of consciousness, which also accounts for the massive interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes in the brain. Even though consciousness remains an unsolved riddle, we claim that this is the best path towards a solution.     

Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information‐Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information‐theoretic framework of Dretske (1981) , we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so‐called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so‐called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them.     

Motivating Emotions: Emotionism and the Internalist Connection

Axiomathes - I outline a theory of moral motivation which is compatible with the metaphysical claims of strong emotionism—a sentimentalist account of morality first outlined by Jesse Prinz...     

Kovesi and the Formal and Material Elements of Concepts

In his seminal work Moral Notions, Julius Kovesi presents a novel account of concept formation. At the heart of this account is a distinction between what he terms the material element and the formal element of concepts. This paper elucidates his distinction in detail and contrasts it with other distinctions such as form-matter, universal-particular, genus-difference, necessary-sufficient, and open texture-closed texture. We situate Kovesi’s distinction within his general philosophical method, outlining his views on concept formation in general and explain how his theory of concept formation is applied in moral philosophy.     

Relationships,attachment, and culture: A tribute to John Bowlby

As a tribute to John Bowlby, some of the work that he stimulated and facilitated is reviewed. In rhesus monkeys, the behavior of individuals is much influenced by social companions. Dyadic relationships and group structure are crucial. A few days' separation between mother and infant can produce long-term effects, but the outcome depends on a large number of factors. The need to maintain a proper balance between a research focus on the individual, the relationship, and the family or group is stressed. John Bowlby's use of comparative data is discussed. This perspective shed light on many aspects of infant and child behavior and was crucial in the development of attachment theory. The dangers of equating what is “natural” with what is “best” are stressed: Cultural desiderata interact with the biological desiderata on which natural selection operated in our environment of evolutionary adaptedness.     

On the asymmetrical dissociation of Lomer dislocations

Abstract

Using anisotropic elasticity theory, Korner, Schmid and Prinz have shown that Lomer-Cottrell dislocations in the f.c.c. structure have asymmetrical equilibrium positions. This is also true for the isotropic theory, but in addition it can also be demonstrated in a very simple way that the ratio of the dissociation widths on the two {111} planes is material independent. This result seems to be general even for the anisotropic case. However, careful observations of Lomer dislocations in copper by weak-beam transmission electron microscopy indicate clearly that they are not dissociated.