Non-branching personal persistence

Philosophical Studies - Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can...     

Features,as well as space and time,guide object persistence

What role do surface features (e.g., color) play in the establishment and maintenance of episodic representations of objects (object files)? Mitroff and Alvarez (2007) showed that stimuli that were linked by a continuous spatiotemporal history yielded object-specific preview benefits—a standard index of object files—whereas stimuli linked only by shared surface features did not. Here, it is shown that abruptly changing the features of an object that has been established on the basis of spatiotemporal history can disrupt object-specific preview benefits (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, under some conditions, feature match alone can give rise to the preview benefits (Experiment 3). These results indicate that surface features, as well as spatiotemporal factors, play an important role in establishing and maintaining episodic object representations.     

Time as a guide to cause

How do people learn causal structure? In 2 studies, the authors investigated the interplay between temporal-order, intervention, and covariational cues. In Study 1, temporal order overrode covariation information, leading to spurious causal inferences when the temporal cues were misleading. In Study 2, both temporal order and intervention contributed to accurate causal inference well beyond that achievable through covariational data alone. Together, the studies show that people use both temporal-order and interventional cues to infer causal structure and that these cues dominate the available statistical information. A hypothesis-driven account of learning is endorsed, whereby people use cues such as temporal order to generate initial models and then test these models against the incoming covariational data.     

A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence

Philosophical Studies - When it comes to personal identity, two approaches have long ruled the roost. The first is the psychological approach, which has it that our persistence through time...     

The polar unities as a guide to psychotherapy

The author recognizes the need for a psychotherapy that aims to be either spiritual or wholistic to ground itself in appropriate philosophical and theological constructs. As one small step in this direction, the ontological elements as discussed by Paul Tillich are applied to some specific therapeutic issues. Striking parallels are found between Tillich's first two ontological elements (individualization-participation, and dynamics-form) and the two dimensions (cohesion and adaptability) of the circumplex model of family therapy. It is suggested that Tillich's third ontological element (freedom-destiny) throws useful light on the educational and psychotherapeutic issue of permissiveness versus authoritarianism.     

Counterfactuals versus conceivability as a guide to modal knowledge

Philosophical Studies - I compare two prominent approaches to knowledge of metaphysical modality, the more traditional approach via conceiving viz. imagining a scenario and a more recent approach...     

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.     

Perceptual Consciousness as a Mental Activity

I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind‐independent properties, propositions, sense‐data, qualia, or intentional objects.     

Purpose as personal

Ethics and Education R. S. Peters London: George Allen &; Unwin, Ltd., 1966 Pp. 333, $4.50     

The Rosenzweig picture-frustration study as a measure of reaction to personal Evaluation

The P-F Study was given to three groups of incarcerated delinquents categorized as to parole evaluation status. The hypothesis tested was that those Ss who were being evaluated for parole would give significantly fewer extrapunitive (E) responses than matched Ss who were not being evaluated for parole. Statistical analyses of the data supported the hypothesis.

It was suggested that the probability of external reinforcement may be a basic determinant of responses to the P-F Study and perhaps to projective tests generally.     

Space and time,not surface features,guide object persistence

Successful visual perception relies on the ability to keep track of distinct entities as the same persisting objects from one moment to the next. This is a computationally difficult process and its underlying nature remains unclear. Here we use the object file framework to explore whether surface feature information (e.g., color, shape) can be used to compute such object persistence. From six experiments we find that spatiotemporal information (location as a function of time) easily determines object files, but surface features do not. The results suggest an unexpectedly strong constraint on the visual system’s ability to compute online object persistence.     

Cohesion as a constraint on object persistence in infancy

A critical challenge for visual perception is to represent objects as the same persisting individuals over time and motion. Across several areas of cognitive science, researchers have identified cohesion as among the most important theoretical principles of object persistence: An object must maintain a single bounded contour over time. Drawing inspiration from recent work in adult visual cognition, the present study tested the power of cohesion as a constraint as it operates early in development. In particular, we tested whether the most minimal cohesion violation - a single object splitting into two - would destroy infants' ability to represent a quantity of objects over occlusion. In a forced-choice crawling paradigm, 10- and 12-month-old infants witnessed crackers being sequentially placed into containers, and typically crawled toward the container with the greater cracker quantity. When one of the crackers was visibly split in half, however, infants failed to represent the relative quantities, despite controls for the overall quantities and the motions involved. This result helps to characterize the fidelity and specificity of cohesion as a fundamental principle of object persistence, suggesting that even the simplest possible cohesion violation can dramatically impair infants' object representations and influence their overt behavior.     

Action selection as a guide for visual attention

We plan our actions in order to fulfil certain sensory goals. It is generally believed, therefore, that anticipation of sensory action-outcomes plays an essential role in action selection. In this study, we examined the role of action selection, prior to action execution, in the guidance of visual attention. The experiments began with an initial acquisition phase, in which participants learned to associate two actions (left/right keypress) with two visual outcomes (red/green colour). Next, participants performed in a test phase, in which they continued to select and perform the same actions while their attentional bias was measured for items that resembled the anticipated action-outcome. The findings indicate that learned action-outcome association contributes to the guidance of attention. This guidance, furthermore, was short-lived and disappeared with larger delays between action selection and execution. The findings help situate processes of visual attention in a context that includes action selection and action-outcome associative learning.