An experimental comparison of three- versus four-surface phenomenal transparency

The three-surface transparency occurs when an object seen through a transparency does not jut out under the transparent surface. The four-surface transparency occurs when the object juts out. Observers rated the density of the transparent surface in both kinds of transparency. The results seem to show that the topological diversity between the two kinds of transparency has no functional significance. The stimulus conditions ruling the generation of judgments were detected and expressed in terms of an algebraic model.     

Mentalist evidentialism vindicated (and a super-blooper epistemic design problem for proper function justification)

Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of that input, and, relatedly, that mentalist evidentialism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of doxastic response B to evidence E is an essential property of B–E; and (iii) mentalist evidentialism is “unmotivated”. I object to each argument. The argument for (i) begs the question. The argument for (ii) suffers from the fact that mentalist evidentialists are not committed to the consequences claimed for them; nevertheless, I show that there is, in the neighborhood, a substantive dispute concerning the nature of doxastic epistemic fittingness. That dispute involves what I call “Necessary Fittingness”, the view that, necessarily, exactly one (at most) doxastic attitude (belief, or disbelief, or suspension of judgment) toward a proposition is epistemically fitting with respect to a person’s total evidence at any time. Reflection on my super-blooper epistemic design counterexamples to Bergmann’s proper function theory reveals both the plausibility of Necessary Fittingness and a good reason to deny (iii). Mentalist evidentialism is thus vindicated against the objections.     

Problems for factive accounts of assertion

The knowledge account of assertion construes assertion as subject to constitutive norms. In its standard version, it combines a wide scope obligation not to assert p without knowing p, with narrow scope principles specifying conditions under which it is permissible to assert p, where the notions of obligation and permission are duals and behave uniformly for variable p. It is argued that, given natural assumptions about the logic of ‘ought’, the account proves incoherent. The argument generalizes to accounts that substitute other factive notions for knowledge. A recent non-standard version of the knowledge account employs proposition-relative norms and circumvents the problem. However, it still leads to intolerable combinations of verdicts. Again, the problem arises because knowledge is factive, and it generalizes to other factive notions. It is shown that non-factive accounts face none of the diagnosed difficulties and can do much of the explanatory work that the knowledge account is alleged to do.     

Restricting factiveness

In discussions of Fitch’s paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p, then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim. There are two kinds of reason for this suspicion. One is that unrestricted factiveness leads to paradoxes and unexpected results, the other is that the usual arguments for factiveness are not as compelling as is commonly thought. There may in fact be some kinds of contexts, where factiveness doesn’t hold for knowledge—the usual arguments for factiveness don’t suffice to support the claim that knowledge is unrestrictedly factive. Perhaps all that can be shown is that knowledge is at times factive, or that it is default factive, as it were: this doesn’t show that there can’t be counterexamples, however. Certain aspects of knowledge without unrestricted factiveness are examined briefly.     

Compound fracture: the role of semantic transparency and morphological headedness

This paper explores the role of semantic transparency in the representation and processing of English compounds. We focus on the question of whether semantic transparency is best viewed as a property of the entire multimorphemic string or as a property of constituent morphemes. Accordingly, we investigated the processing of English compound nouns that were categorized in terms of the semantic transparency of each of their constituents. Fully transparent such as bedroom are those in which the meanings of each of the constituents are transparently represented in the meaning of the compound as a whole. These compounds were contrasted with compounds such as strawberry, in which only the second constituent is semantically transparent, jailbird, in which only the first constituent is transparent, and hogwash, in which neither constituent is semantically transparent. We propose that significant insights can be achieved through such analysis of the transparency of individual morphemes. The two experiments that we report present evidence that both semantically transparent compounds and semantically opaque compounds show morphological constituency. The semantic transparency of the morphological head (the second constituent in a morphologically right-headed language such as English) was found to play a significant role in overall lexical decision latencies, in patterns of decomposition, and in the effects of stimulus repetition within the experiment.     

Searle on the unity of the world

According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s objections to it.

Epistemic expressivism and the argument from motivation

This paper explores in detail an argument for epistemic expressivism, what we call the Argument from Motivation. While the Argument from Motivation has sometimes been anticipated, it has never been set out in detail. The argument has three premises, roughly, that certain judgments expressed in attributions of knowledge are intrinsically motivating in a distinct way (P1); that motivation for action requires desire-like states or conative attitudes (HTM); and that the semantic content of knowledge attributions cannot be specified without reference to the intrinsically motivating judgments that such attributions express (P2). We argue that these premises entail a version of ecumenical expressivism. Since the argument from motivation has not been explicitly stated before, there is no current discussion of the argument. In this paper we therefore consider and reject various objections that one might propose to the argument, including some that stem from the idea that knowledge is factive, or that knowledge involves evidence that rules out relevant alternatives. Other objections to (P1) specifically might be derived from cases of apparent lack of epistemic motivation considered in in Kvanvig (The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003) and Brown (Nous 42(2):167–189, 2008), as well as from general forms of externalism about epistemic motivation. We consider these and find them wanting. Finally, the paper offers some critical remarks about the prospect of denying (P2).     

A purely temporal transparency mechanism in the visual system.

I report evidence for a purely temporal perceptual transparency mechanism. Rapid alternation of two images in the same location can result in the simultaneous experience of both, accompanied by a sense of transparency. This is true even when the sum of the two images does not appear transparent, which suggests that the percept is not mediated by the static transparency processes. At slow rates, alternating gratings were experienced as successive. As the rate was increased, by 8 Hz observers experienced the gratings as simultaneous. The rapidly alternating gratings are apparently processed separately before being combined for awareness by a process that integrates over about 120 ms. A final experiment tested whether the common presentation time of different parts of an image in alternation with another would cause the parts to perceptually bind. Observers did not distinguish between a rapidly alternating intact grating display and one in which halves of the display were exchanged in time. In other words, temporal binding across space did not occur. The temporal transparency phenomenon, in addition to informing theories of transparency and the dynamics of visual processing, may also be useful for the creation of transparent displays for electronic devices.     

Quine's Naturalism and Behaviorisms

This paper investigates the complicated relations between various versions of naturalism, behaviorism, and mentalism within the framework of W. V. O. Quine's thinking. It begins with Roger Gibson's reconstruction of Quine's behaviorisms and argues that it lacks a crucial ontological element and misconstrues the relation between philosophy and science. After getting clear of Quine's naturalism, the paper distinguishes between evidential, methodological, and ontological behaviorisms. The evidential and methodological versions are often conflated, but they need to be clearly distinguished in order to see whether Quine's argument against mentalism is cogent. The paper argues that Quine's naturalism supports only the weakest version of behaviorism, that is, the evidential one, but this version is compatible with mentalistic semantics. Quine's opposition to mentalism is an overreaction against the behaviorist camp. By contrast, Jerry Fodor's objection to José Luis Bermúdez is an overreaction from the opposite direction.     

On the nature and systematic role of evidence: Husserl as a proponent of mentalist evidentialism?

In this paper, I shall show that for Husserl, (a) evidence determines epistemic justification and (b) evidence is linked to originary givenness in the sense that one's ultimate evidence consists of one's originary presentive intuitions. This means that in contemporary analytic terminology, Husserl is a proponent of evidentialism and mentalism. Evidentialism and mentalism have been introduced into current debates by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Finally, I shall highlight that there is one significant difference between Husserl and Earl Conee and Richard Feldman. Although Conee and Feldman argue that the fundamental principles of epistemology are principles of best explanation, Husserl opts for phenomenological principles as the most fundamental epistemic principles. The main difference is that for Husserl, experiences gain their justificatory force by virtue of their phenomenal character, namely, their originary givenness.     

From nihilism to monism

McDowell has argued that external world scepticism is a pressing problem only in so far as we accept, on the basis of the argument from illusion, the claim that perceiving that p and hallucinating that p involve a highest common factor--something which functions, in the manner of the classical 'veil of ideas', as a perceptual intermediary. McDowell traces the power of this argument to disputable Cartesian assumptions about the transparency of subjectivity to itself. I argue, contra McDowell, that the reflections to be found in, paradigmatically, Descartes's First Meditation are better interpreted as offering a causal argument for scepticism that depends upon a naturalistic conception of sense experience. This is more powerful than the argument from illusion, since it requires no commitment to a highest common factor in perception, nor to the transparency of the mental. The availability of this alternative route to scepticism raises serious problems for McDowell's quietism, which aims to earn the right to avoid, rather than answer, the sceptic. Since the appeal to externalism about content cannot settle the matter, I conclude that there is, at present, an unsatisfactory stand-off between the sceptic and McDowell's position.     

Visual perception of thick transparent materials

Under typical viewing conditions, human observers readily distinguish between materials such as silk, marmalade, or granite, an achievement of the visual system that is poorly understood. Recognizing transparent materials is especially challenging. Previous work on the perception of transparency has focused on objects composed of flat, infinitely thin filters. In the experiments reported here, we considered thick transparent objects, such as ice cubes, which are irregular in shape and can vary in refractive index. An important part of the visual evidence signaling the presence of such objects is distortions in the perceived shape of other objects in the scene. We propose a new class of visual cues derived from the distortion field induced by thick transparent objects, and we provide experimental evidence that cues arising from the distortion field predict both the successes and the failures of human perception in judging refractive indices.     

Transparency of Assessment Centers: Lower Criterion‐related Validity but Greater Opportunity to Perform?

Assessment centers (ACs) are popular selection devices in which assessees are assessed on several dimensions during different exercises. Surveys indicate that ACs vary with regard to the transparency of the targeted dimensions and that the number of transparent ACs has increased during recent years. Furthermore, research on this design feature has put conceptual arguments forward regarding the effects of transparency on criterion‐related validity, impression management, and fairness perceptions. This study is the first to examine these effects using supervisor‐rated job performance data as the criterion. We conducted simulated ACs with transparency as a between‐subjects factor. The sample consisted of part‐time employed participants who would soon be applying for a new job. In line with our hypothesis, results showed that ratings from an AC with nontransparent dimensions were more criterion valid than ratings from an AC with transparent dimensions. Concerning impression management, our results supported the hypothesis that transparency moderates the relationship between self‐promotion and job performance, such that self‐promotion in the nontransparent AC was more positively related to job performance than self‐promotion in the transparent AC. The data lent no support for the hypothesis that participants’ perceptions of their opportunity to perform are higher in the transparent AC.     

On noticing transparent states: A compatibilist approach to transparency

According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner-awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, they are merely translucent. Here, I first argue that this understanding of transparency is too weak to qualify as a compatibilist view. Drawing on insights from Franz Brentano, I then describe a middle road between strong and weak transparency. The crucial idea is that, although transparent states cannot be attended to, they can be noticed (under suitable conditions). This view, I submit, allows supporters of inner awareness to commit themselves to a more interesting understanding of transparency—moderate transparency—that preserves the initial intuition underlying the transparency metaphor.     

Is there a phenomenological argument for higher-order representationalism?

In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences to the claim that all experiences are accompanied by peripheral awareness of those very experiences. This inference is inadequately defended, for the explanandum may also be given a straightforward evolutionary explanation. Second, contra Kriegel, I argue that phenomenological investigation does not support the thesis that we are always peripherally aware of our experiences. Instead, it delivers no verdict on this thesis. Kriegel’s phenomenological mistake may be explained via a highly diluted version of the famous transparency thesis about experience.     

Word imageability effects on naming: a pilot investigation of beginning readers of Turkish

Word imageability, a semantic variable, in naming by beginning readers of English is well documented particularly with poor readers naming high imageable words more accurately than low imageable words. The present study examined the role of imageability on word naming by 20 good and 20 poor beginning readers as a function of orthographic transparency by utilizing the peculiarities of the transparent Turkish writing system. Neither good nor poor beginning readers show any evidence of imageability for Turkish suggesting that the contribution of imageability to word naming may indeed be determined by orthographic transparency. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Transparency in Structured Interviews: Consequences for Construct and Criterion-Related Validity

Although researchers agree on the use of structured interviews in personnel selection, past research has been undecided on whether these interviews need to be conducted nontransparently (i.e., without giving interviewees any indication of the evaluated criteria) or transparently (i.e., by revealing to interviewees the dimensions assessed in the interview). This article presents two independent studies examining the effects of interview transparency on interviewees' performance and on the interview's construct and criterion-related validity in the context of an application training program. Results from both Study 1 (N = 123) and Study 2 (N = 269) indicate an improvement in interviewees' performance under transparent interview conditions. Both studies further support the assumption that transparent interviews show satisfactory construct validity, whereas nontransparent interviews do not. Moreover, Study 2 showed no significant difference between the interview's criterion-related validity under transparent versus nontransparent conditions. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

A New Argument for Evidentialism?

In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.     

Test of models of achromatic transparency

Consider an achromatic disk transparent on an achromatic background formed by two adjoining rectangles, with the common border of the rectangles dividing the disk in half. Current models of achromatic transparency contend that the perceived extent of transparency of the disk depends on the luminance contrast inside the disk and on the luminance contrast in the background outside the disk. Here, a model is proposed which contends that this perceived extent is determined only by the luminance contrasts inherent in the disk: inside the disk and between the disk and the background. Two experiments were designed to determine which luminance contrasts influence transparency. In the first experiment, subjects rated the perceived extent of transparency of the disk for different combinations of the luminances of the disk and of the background. The results strengthen the view that the perceived extent of transparency depends on the luminance contrasts inherent in the disk. In the second experiment, a test was made of the possibility that luminance contrasts between adjoining areas of the background outside the disk are nonessential for transparency. The results show that transparency occurred both when the areas of the background outside the transparent region adjoined one another and when they were separated, confirming that the perceived extent of transparency depended only on luminance contrasts between adjoining areas inherent in the disk.     

The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion

Assertion is fundamental to our lives as social and cognitive beings. Philosophers have recently built an impressive case that the norm of assertion is factive. That is, you should make an assertion only if it is true. Thus far the case for a factive norm of assertion been based on observational data. This paper adds experimental evidence in favor of a factive norm from six studies. In these studies, an assertion’s truth value dramatically affects whether people think it should be made. Whereas nearly everyone agreed that a true assertion supported by good evidence should be made, most people judged that a false assertion supported by good evidence should not be made. The studies also suggest that people are consciously aware of criteria that guide their evaluation of assertions. Evidence is also presented that some intuitive support for a non-factive norm of assertion comes from a surprising tendency people have to misdescribe cases of blameless rule-breaking as cases where no rule is broken.