Kripke's sole route to the necessary a posteriori

In ‘Kripke on epistemic and metaphysical possibility: two routes to the necessary a posteriori’, Scott Soames identifies two arguments for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths in Naming and Necessity (NN). He argues that Kripke's second argument relies on either of two principles, each of which leads to contradiction. He also claims that it has led to ‘two-dimensionalist’ approaches to the necessary a posteriori which are fundamentally at odds with the insights about meaning and modality expressed in NN. I argue that the alleged second argument is not in NN. I identify the mistakes that lead to Soames' misinterpretation.     

Deflationism about the necessary a posteriori and Twin Earth

Some necessary truths are a posteriori. That’s widely agreed and is presumed here. Their existence might appear to show that discoveries about how things are in fact—about how things actually are—can lead to discoveries about all the ways things might be, about the nature of logical space. I detail one way of resisting this conclusion for a number of examples, and the implications of Twin Earth for the issue. Central is the notion of a Cambridge discovery.

     

Schaffer on laws of nature

In ‘Quiddistic Knowledge’ (Schaffer in Philos Stud 123:1–32, 2005), Jonathan Schaffer argued influentially against the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. In this reply I aim to show how a coherent and well-motivated form of necessitarianism can withstand his critique. Modal necessitarianism—the view that the actual laws are the laws of all possible worlds—can do justice to some intuitive motivations for necessitarianism, and it has the resources to respond to all of Schaffer’s objections. It also has certain advantages over contingentism in the domain of modal epistemology. I conclude that necessitarianism about laws remains a live option.     

On the nature of scientific laws and theories

Ist der Unterschied zwischen wissenschaftlichen Gesetzen und Theorien ein qualitativer oder lediglich von quantitativer Art? Der Autor versucht zu zeigen, daß Gesetze und Theorien fundamental verschieden sind und daß die Kenntnis ihrer verschiedenen Natur notwendig für ein richtiges Wissenschaftsverständnis ist. Aus seiner Sicht sind Theorien geistigeKonstruktionen mit dem Ziel,kausale Erklärungen von empirischen Gesetzen zu geben, während diese Gesetze auf der Grundlage von Messungenentdeckt werden und dieTatsachen der Wissenschaft konstituieren. Erkenntnistheoretisch sind daher Theorien und (der Ausdruck der) Gesetze auf verschiedenen Ebenen anzusiedeln: während GesetzeWissen liefern, liefern TheorienVerstehen. Der Kern der Theorien besteht ausModellen, die idealisierte Abstraktionen aus Zustandsarten darstellen. Theoretische Modelle konstituierenOntologien, die kausale Mechanismen aufzeigen. SolcheOntologien betreffen den Bedeutungsaspekt (real aspect) des Gegenstandsbereichs, auf den die Theorie angewendet wird, während empirische Gesetze den Ausdrucksaspekt (nominal aspect) des gleichen Gegenstandsbereichs betreffen. Theorien erklären Gesetze, indem sie zeigen, wie der Ausdrucksaspekt lediglich der natürliche Ausdruck der Auswirkungen der Kausalmechanismen im Bedeutungsaspekt sind.     

The governance of laws of nature: guidance and production

Philosophical Studies - Realists about laws of nature and their Humean opponents disagree on whether laws ‘govern’. An independent commitment to the ‘governing conception’...     

Arbitrariness in nature: synergetics and evolutionary laws of prohibition

The philosophical consequences of synergetics, the interdisciplinary theory of evolution and self-organization of complex systems, are being drawn in the paper. The idea of discreteness of evolutionary paths is in the focus of attention. Although the future is open, and there are many alternative evolutionary paths for complex systems, not any arbitrary (either conceivable or desirable) evolutionary path is feasible in a given system. There are discrete spectra of possible evolutionary paths which are determined exclusively by inner properties of the corresponding systems. Synergetics allows us to reveal general laws of self-organization and, therefore, certain limits of arbitrariness of nature in choosing possible paths of evolution as well as in constructing of a complex evolutionary whole. A comparative analysis between the modern synergetic notions and a few ideas of the Western philosophy (F. Nietzsche, N. Hartmann, M. Heidegger) and of the Eastern teachings (Taoism, Buddhism) is made. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

On the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities

We argue that in spite of their apparent dissimilarity, the methodologies employed in the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities can both be justified by appeal to a single principle of inductive reasoning, viz., the principle of symmetry. The difference between these two methodologies consists in the way in which information about the single-trial probabilities in a repeatable chance process is extracted from the constraints imposed by this principle. In the case of a posteriori reasoning, these constraints inform the analysis by fixing an a posteriori determinant of the probabilities, whereas, in the case of a priori reasoning, they imply certain claims which then serve as the basis for subsequent probabilistic deductions. In a given context of inquiry, the particular form which a priori or a posteriori reason may take depends, in large part, on the strength of the underlying symmetry assumed: the stronger the symmetry, the more information can be acquired a priori and the less information about the long-run behavior of the process is needed for an a posteriori assessment of the probabilities. In the context of this framework, frequency-based reasoning emerges as a limiting case of a posteriori reasoning, and reasoning about simple games of chance, as a limiting case of a priori reasoning. Between these two extremes, both a priori and a posteriori reasoning can take a variety of intermediate forms.     

The oldest solution to the circularity problem for Humeanism about the laws of nature

According to Humeanism about the laws, the laws of nature are nothing over and above certain kinds of regularities about particular facts (the “Humean mosaic”). Humeanism has often been accused of circularity: according to scientific practice laws often explain their instances, but on the Humean view they also reduce to the mosaic, which includes those instances. In this paper I formulate the circularity problem in a way that avoids a number of controversial assumptions routinely taken for granted in the literature, and against which many extant responses are therefore ineffective. I then propose a solution that denies the alleged Humean commitment that laws are explained by their instances. The solution satisfies three desiderata that other solutions don’t: it provides independent motivation against the idea that Humean laws are explained by their instances; it specifies the sense in which Humean laws are nonetheless “nothing over and above” their instances; and it gives an alternative account of what does explain the laws, if not their instances. This solution, I will argue, is not only the simplest but also the oldest one: it appeals only to tools and theses whose first appearance predates the earliest statements of the circularity problem itself.

     

Luc ferry's critique of deep ecology,nazi nature protection laws,and environmental anti-semitism

Neo-Humanist Luc Ferry (1995) has compared deep ecology's declarations of intrinsic value in nature to the Third Reich's nature protection laws, which prohibit maltreatment of animals having “worth in themselves.” Ferry's questionable approach fails to document the relationship between Nazi environmentalism and Nazi racism. German high art and mass media historically presented nature as dualistic, and portrayed Untermenschen as unnatural or inorganic. Nazi propaganda excluded Jews from nature, and identified traditional Jews as cruel to animals. Ferry's idealization of Humanism under reports the pervasiveness of anti-Semitism in European thought, including the French Enlightenment.