Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time

I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by thistheory. In addressing this question, I take theessential idea of endurantism, that objects are whollypresent at single moments of time, and argue that itcommits one to unacceptable conclusions regardingcoexistence, in the context of SR. I then propose anddiscuss a plausible account of coexistence forperduring objects, which is free of these defects. This leaves the endurantist room for some maneuvers. I consider them and show that they do not really helpthe endurantist out. She can accommodate the notionof coexistence in the relativistic framework only atthe cost of renouncing central endurantist intuitions.     

Endurantism and Paradox

Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) and Beebee and Rush (2003) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, contra to prior analyses.     

Why Four-Dimensionalism Explains Coincidence

In ‘Does Four-Dimensionalism Explain Coincidence?’ Mark Moyer argues that there is no reason to prefer the four-dimensionalist (or perdurantist) explanation of coincidence to the three-dimensionalist (or endurantist) explanation. I argue that Moyer's formulations of perdurantism and endurantism lead him to overlook the perdurantist's advantage. A more satisfactory formulation of these views reveals a puzzle of coincidence that Moyer does not consider, and the perdurantist's treatment of this puzzle is clearly preferable.     

Lewis,Change and Temporary Intrinsics

This is an attempt to sort out what is it that makes many of us uncomfortable with the perdurantist solution to the problem of change. Lewis argues that only perdurantism can reconcile change with persistence over time, while neither presentism nor endurantism can. So, first, I defend the endurantist solution to the problem of change, by arguing that what is relative to time are not properties, but their possession. Second, I explore the anti-perdurantist strategy of arguing that Lewis cannot solve the problem of change, for he cannot account for how some properties are possessed by objects in time. However, I argue that this strategy fails, for if by saying that objects in time can have properties ‘timelessly’ we mean “at no particular time” and “tenselessly”, only objects outside time can have properties in that way; but if we mean “for all the time they exist”, or “essentially”, perdurantists can account for this. Finally, I argue that actually perdurantism cannot solve the problem, but for different reasons: for either it sweeps the problem under the carpet, denying change, and in general subverting our conceptual scheme in a dangerous way, or it becomes equivalent to the endurantist picture that properties are had at times. Nor perdurantism is justified by the Relativity Theory or the B-theory of time, because while endurantism is certainly comfortable with presentism, it need not be committed to it; and even if it were, presentism need not be refuted by the Relativity Theory.     

Endurantist and perdurantist accounts of persistence

In this paper, I focus on three issues intertwined in current debates between endurantists and perdurantists—(i) the dimension of persisting objects, (ii) whether persisting objects have timeless, or only time-relative, parts, and (iii) whether persisting objects have proper temporal parts. I argue that one standard endurantist position on the first issue is compatible with standard perdurantist positions on parthood and temporal parts. I further argue that different accounts of persistence depend on the claims about objects’ dimensions and not on the auxiliary claims about parthood and temporal parts.     

PRESENTISM AND PERSISTENCE

In this paper, I examine various theories of persistence through time under presentism. In Part I, I argue that both perdurantist views (namely, the worm view and the stage view) suffer, in combination with presentism, from serious difficulties and should be rejected. In Part II, I discuss the presentist endurantist view, to see that it does avoid the difficulties of the perdurantist views, and consequently that it does work, but at a price that some may consider as being very high: its ontological commitments to platonic universals and to the substratum theory, that as we shall see follow from the combination of endurantism with presentism, will perhaps not be to everyone's taste.     

Why would people want to travel more with automated cars?

The use of automated vehicles (AVs) may enable drivers to focus on non-driving related activities while travelling and reduce the unwanted efforts of the driving task. This is expected to make using a car more attractive, or at least less unpleasant compared to manually driven vehicles. Consequently, the number and length of car trips may increase. The aim of this study was to identify the main contributors to travelling more by AV.We analysed the L3Pilot project’s pilot site questionnaire data from 359 respondents who had ridden in a conditionally automated car (SAE level 3) either as a driver or as a passenger. The questionnaire queried the respondents’ user experience with the automated driving function, current barriers of travelling by car, previous experience with advanced driving assistance systems, and general priorities in travelling. The answers to these questions were used to predict willingness to travel more or longer trips by AV, and to use AVs on currently undertaken trips. The most predictive subset of variables was identified using Bayesian cumulative ordinal regression with a shrinkage prior (regularised horseshoe).The current study found that conditionally automated cars have a substantial potential to increase travelling by car once they become available. Willingness to perform leisure activities during automated driving, experienced usefulness of the system, and unmet travel needs, which AVs could address by making travelling easier, were the main contributors to expecting to travel more by AV. For using AVs on current trips, leisure activities, trust in AVs, satisfaction with the system, and traffic jams as barriers to current car use were important contributors. In other words, perceived usefulness motivated travelling more by AV and using AVs on current trips, but also other factors were important for using them on current trips. This suggests that one way to limit the growth of traffic with private AVs could be to address currently unmet travel needs with alternative, more sustainable travel modes.     

Modal Persistence and Modal Travel

We argue that there is an interesting modal analogue of temporal persistence, namely modal persistence, and an interesting modal analogue of time travel, namely modal travel. We explicate each of these notions and then argue that there are plausible conditions under which some ordinary objects modally persist. We go on to consider whether it is plausible that any modally persistent objects also modally travel. 1     

An unwelcome consequence of the Multiverse Thesis

The Multiverse Thesis is a proposed solution to the Grandfather Paradox. It is popular and well promulgated, found in fiction, philosophy and (most importantly) physics. I first offer a short explanation on behalf of its advocates as to why it qualifies as a theory of time travel (as opposed to mere ‘universe hopping’). Then I argue that the thesis nevertheless has an unwelcome consequence: that extended objects cannot travel in time. Whilst this does not demonstrate that the Multiverse Thesis is false, the consequence should give pause for concern. Even if it does not lead one to reject the thesis, I briefly detail some reasons to think it is interesting nonetheless.     

Internal-External Control and beliefs about automobile travel

It was hypothesized that the Internal-External Locus of Control dimension (Rotter, 1966) would predict reported feelings about automobile travel and attribution of responsibility for automobile accidents. Relative to Externals, Internals were found (a) to attribute responsibility for automobile accidents more to internal, controllable causes; (b) to report less anxiety when travelling via automobile; (c) to report wearing seatbelts more often; and (d) to experience automobile travel as more interesting and involving.     

On the Road: The Appeal of Buddhism to Travellers

Buddhism has been associated with travel and transportation since its inception. The Buddha himself led a peripatetic life wandering from town to town preaching his dharma, and King A?oka sent missionaries travelling far and wide. Travelling merchants were the most prominent early converts to Buddhism and their prominence in the religion continued for a long time. This article explores the importance of travel in the acceptance of Buddhist ideas, and will show that the changes in worldview undergone by one travelling from place to place, encountering along the road different ways of thinking, dressing, speaking and living are likely to foster in such a person an interest in some of the seminal ideas embodied in Buddhism. The psychological effects of travel force people to wrestle with their previously accepted local truths, drawing them instead to Buddhism’s universal outlook, its teaching of compassion for all beings and rejection of culturally specific social restrictions.     

Using a three-stage model of change to understand people’s use of bicycle,public transport,and car

More active ways of travelling (e.g., walking, cycling, and public transport) would benefit both individuals and society. To encourage people’s transition to more active travelling, it is important to understand the decision-making process regarding modal choice. The first aim of this study is therefore to combine a three-stage version of the transtheoretical model of change (TTM; Prochaska & DiClemente, 1983) with the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991) to advance our understanding of the nature of the TTM stages. The second aim is to examine certain characteristics (i.e., age, gender, importance of everyday exercise, importance of environmental issues, perceived accessibility, and satisfaction with travel) of these three stages of change. The study used a web-based questionnaire, an app-based questionnaire, and an app-based travel diary completed by 306 people in the Stockholm area. The observed behaviour measured using the app-based travel diary showed that the three-stage model used in this study was consistent with the participants’ self-reported travel behaviour in using bicycles, public transport, and cars. Interventions focusing on attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control appear to have potential to move people from one stage to another regardless of initial stage. To make interventions as effective as possible, the stage of change as well as the behavioural, normative, and control beliefs underpinning attitude, subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control must be considered. Finally, more research is needed to advance our knowledge of the relationship between the three stages of change and other variables.     

Alternative motivation: a new challenge to moral judgment internalism

Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases. I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior that accords with the content of the moral judgment but that has been performed not because of the moral judgment. Instead it is due to some other source of motivation. I call these alternative motivation cases. I distinguish two sorts of alternative motivation cases, and I argue that externalists have natural explanations of these cases. By contrast, extant internalist accounts of failure cases are inadequate when applied to alternative motivation cases.     

Ecumenical Engagement with Eastern Minority Churches in Muslim States: Pro Oriente’s Encounters and Legacies in Syria and Egypt

The former Viennese Cardinal Franz König and his foundation Pro Oriente have been prominent actors in the establishment of ecumenical relations between the Catholic Church and Oriental Orthodox Churches since the Second Vatican Council. This article discusses the Christian-Muslim relations dimension of this ecumenical engagement with Middle Eastern churches in the practical field of ecumenical travel to Syria and Egypt. This intertwining of ecumenical and inter-religious engagement is studied on the basis of archival collections and journalistic accounts that make it possible to grasp the administrative process of ‘travelling diplomacy’. The analysis links the practical work of ecumenical relations to the historical legacies of the Western encounter with Islam in the post-Ottoman area. I shall argue that Pro Oriente’s approach was based on a new post-Vatican II theological vision of Islam. Although this did include reorientation with regard to traditional orientalist perceptions, ecumenism also became caught up in political dilemmas that were connected to either an orientalist perception of ecumenical relations (Egypt) or religious legitimization of an authoritarian regime (Syria).     

How to Change the Past in One‐Dimensional Time

The possibility of changing the past by means of time‐travel appears to depend on the possibility of distinguishing the past as it is ‘before’ and ‘after’ the time‐travel. So far, all the metaphysical models that have been proposed to account for the possibility of past‐changing time‐travels operate this distinction by conceiving of time as multi‐dimensional, and thus by significantly inflating our metaphysics of time. The aim of this article is to argue that there is an intuitive sense in which past‐changing time‐travels are metaphysically possible also in one‐dimensional time.     

Closed Causal Loops and the Bilking Argument

The most potentially powerful objection to the possibility oftime travel stems from the fact that it can, under the right conditions, give rise to closedcausal loops, and closed causal loops can be turned into self-defeating causal chains;folks killing their infant selves, setting out to destroy the world before they were born,and the like. It used to be thought that such chains present paradoxes; the receivedwisdom nowadays is that they give rise to physical anomalies in the form of inexplicably correlated events. I argue against the received wisdom. I can find nothing in them that argues against the possibility (even, the probability) of time travel.     

Mereology and time travel

Philosophical Studies - Core principles of mereology have been questioned by appealing to time travel scenarios. This paper questions the methodology of employing time travel scenarios to argue...     

Telling Others to Do What You Believe Is Morally Wrong: The Case of Confucius and Zai Wo

Can it ever be morally justifiable to tell others to do what we ourselves believe is morally wrong to do? The common sense answer is no. It seems that we should never tell others to do something if we think it is morally wrong to do that act. My first goal is to argue that in Analects 17.21, Confucius tells his disciple not to observe a ritual even though Confucius himself believes that it is morally wrong that one does not observe the ritual. My second goal is to argue against the common sense answer and explain how Confucius can be justified in telling his disciple to do what Confucius thought was wrong. The first justification has to do with telling someone to do what is second best when the person cannot do what is morally best. The second justification has to do with the role of a moral advisor.