Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility

The author argued elsewhere that a necessary condition that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza offer for moral responsibility is too strong and that the sufficient conditions they offer are too weak. This article is a critical examination of their reply. Topics discussed include blameworthiness, irresistible desires, moral responsibility, reactive attitudes, and reasons responsiveness.     

Particularism and Default Reasons

This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion, and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’.     

学前儿童道德责任意识的发展研究

该文通过个别访谈的方法,考察了96名3～5岁幼儿依据允许性、可变性、权成依赖性以及规则依赖性四种判断标准对同伴、以及成人主人公的道德行为判断及其归因。结果显示,多数学前儿童都能根据不同的判断标准对主人公行为做出符合道德规则的判断,表现出较强的道德责任意识,且这一意识在3～4、5岁之间获得了较为显著的发展,尤其是在权威依赖性标准上。归因分析显示近1／4的幼儿明确采用相应的道德规则对主人公的行为作出解释。这些结果支持认知发展的领域特殊论,揭示出学前儿童很早就发展起来的道德责任,这对当前的道德教育和公民教育实践具有一定启示意义。     

Interpersonal Judgments: Moral Responsibility and Blame

A deterministic perspective, believing choices are a function of hereditary and environmental factors, could theoretically impact perceived moral responsibility and lead to decreased blame in judging others. However, little consistent support has been found relating individual differences in deterministic attitudes to blame/tolerance for others. Perhaps, though, providing information regarding past background hardships affecting an individual's current lifestyle could potentially mediate harsh moralistic judgments of that individual. In the two studies reported here, we further explored the relation of free will/determinism scales to attitudes toward others as well as the effect of manipulating background information on the assignment of blame. As in previous research, little support was found for the relation of deterministic attitudes to tolerance toward others. However, judgments following manipulated information about hypothetical target persons supported the conclusion that target individuals are blamed less and given more sympathy if more information related to previous hardships is provided. In addition, in the second study perceived similarity to a target individual was associated with decreased blame/greater sympathy for a target with alcohol abuse problems.     

Responsibility, Control, and Omissions

Previously, I have argued that moral responsibility for actions is associated with guidance control. This sort of control does not necessarily involve the freedom to do otherwise. In this paper I extend the view to apply to omissions. That is, moral responsibility for an omission is associated with guidance control of that omission. This helps to provide a systematic, unified account of moral responsibility.     

论技术主义对人类道德责任的消解

技术主义流行于 2 0世纪的工业社会之中 ,成为支配人们思维方式和生活方式的意识形态。“知识就是力量”的技术主义知识立论 ,在学理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;技术意志取代人的自由意志 ,在伦理层面上消解了人的道德责任 ;社会生产领域和政治领域的标准化和科层制 ,在操作层面上颠覆了人的道德责任 ;人与自然关系问题上的人类中心主义拒斥了对自然的道德责任。     

Responsibility and Self-Expression

I present two different models of moral responsibility -- two different accounts of what we value in behavior for which the agent can legitimately be held morally responsible. On the first model, what we value is making a certain sort of difference to the world. On the second model, which I favor, we value a certain kind of self-expression. I argue that if one adopts the self-expression view, then one will be inclined to accept that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities.     

Responsibility and Manipulation

I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

网上虚拟医院的责任伦理探讨

网上虚拟医院利用互联网、信息与计算机技术,辅助实体医院开展医疗、健康宣传和教育等,它具有数字化、虚拟化等诊疗特点。在现实操作中,网上虚拟医院由于交互主体的不在场,存在信任、交往、价值和情感等方面的诸多伦理道德困境。但网上虚拟医院是通过高科技来实现的新型医疗模式,蕴含在网上虚拟医院中的各种伦理关系是客观存在的。在加强技术管理的同时,提升医疗机构与医务人员乃至全体社会成员的责任伦理意识和道德主体性,是促进网上虚拟医院成立与完善的前提。     

Situationism and Moral Responsibility

In section 1, I will describe how moral responsibility requires normative competence. In section 2, I will introduce an influential social psychology experiment and consider one of its philosophical interpretations, situationism. In section 3, I will discuss the possession response in defense of normative competence. This is an approach to save normative competence via possession, and in turn the concept of the morally responsible agent, by relinquishing the need for exercising normative competence. After discussing its pros and cons, section 4 will focus on the exercise response, which emphasizes each singular exercise of normative competence. Given these two responses, I will argue that we are faced with a dilemma. If we admit that the concept of the morally responsible agent is grounded in the mere possession of normative competence, then the concept becomes useless in a practical sense, forcing us to embrace a concept that is tied to the exercise of normative competence. If we admit that the morally responsible agent is grounded in only the exercise of normative competence, the concept of the morally responsible agent no longer aligns with common sense.     

传统美德认同和责任情境对大学生责任行为倾向的影响

责任行为是个体在特定责任情境下履行责任和承担后果的行为。本研究采用问卷调查方法着重探讨大学生的传统美德认同和责任情境因素对责任行为倾向的影响。结果表明,传统美德认同,以及责任情境中的责任性质和责任对象都对大学生的责任行为倾向有显著影响,且三者的交互作用显著：（1）传统美德认同高的大学生在履行责任情境中,其责任行为倾向显著强于美德认同低的大学生;（2）履行责任时的责任行为倾向显著强于承担后果时的责任行为倾向,但低美德认同者的两种行为倾向在他人责任情境中无差异;（3）在履行责任情境中,大学生对自我的责任行为倾向显著强于对他人的责任行为倾向;但美德认同低的大学生在承担后果情境中则相反。     

和谐医患关系建构中患者的道德责任

患者具有正常的理性自觉能力决定了其应当承担相应的道德责任。导致患者在医患关系中失责的原因在于患者的病人角色意识强化了患者无责的心理,制度设计中价值标准失衡导致患者的愿望错位以及媒体“妖魔化”医院和医生的形象加剧了患者的对医疗机构的不信任情绪。患者在和谐医惠关系建构中应当承担的道德责任主要有：提高认知水平,尊重医学技术发展规律和医护人员的劳动,宽容对待具体情境中的问题。     

伦理学视野中的企业社会责任理由解读

企业社会责任是指企业在突破仅对股东负责的传统理念限制后,以社会本位为着眼点,对非股东的利害关系人之权益承担的一定责任。企业社会责任具有特定的内涵与种类。企业应当承担社会责任,这不仅仅是社会正义的要求,同时,社会责任的承担对企业而言,并非只是负担。利税不能成为企业回避社会责任的借口。     

Blame and Responsibility

This paper looks at judgments of guilt in the face of alleged wrong-doing, be it in public or in private discourse. Its concern is not the truth of such judgments, although the complexity and contestability of such claims will be stressed. The topic, instead, is what sort of activities we are engaged in, when we make our judgments on others' conduct. To examine judging as an activity it focuses on a series of problems that can occur when we blame others. On analysis, we see that these problems take the form of performative contradictions, so that the ostensible purposes of assigning guilt to others are undermined.There is clear evidence from social psychology that blame is especially frequently and inappropriately attributed to individuals in modern Western societies. On the other hand, it has often been observed how suspicious we are about the activity of judging – thus a widespread perception that a refusal to judge is somehow virtuous. My suggestion is that the sheer difficulty of attributions of responsibility, in the face of a complex and often arbitrary moral reality, frequently defeats us. This leads to a characteristic set of distortions when we blame, so that it is no surprise that we have become suspicious of all blaming activities.Yet, the paper argues, these problems need not arise when we hold others responsible. This paper therefore investigates what, exactly, can be questionable about attempts to assign guilt, and the structural logic that lies behind these problems – what will be called, adapting a term from social psychology, a belief in a just world. Such a belief takes for granted what needs to be worked for through human activity, and therefore tends to be counter-productive in dealing with misdeeds and adverse outcomes.     

Responsibility and Obligation: Some Kantian Directions

Abstract

This paper asks how we should conceptualize the relationship between responsibility and obligation. Its central concern is the relevance of considerations of obligation to the attribution of responsibility for what we do or bring about. The paper approaches this issue through an examination of Kant’s complex, challenging and instructive theory of responsibility, in which strict obligation plays a pivotal role in attributions of responsibility for the outcomes of our actions. Even if we do not accept Kant’s strongly juridical concept of responsibility, his theory provides insight into the way in which we should see the connection between responsibility and obligation.     

Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.     

Epistemic Responsibility and Critical Thinking

Should we always engage in critical thinking about issues of public policy, such as health care, gun control, and LGBT rights? Michael Huemer (2005) has argued for the claim that in some cases it is not epistemically responsible to engage in critical thinking on these issues. His argument is based on a reliabilist conception of the value of critical thinking. This article analyzes Huemer's argument against the epistemic responsibility of critical thinking by engaging it critically. It presents an alternative account of the value of critical thinking that is tied to the notion of forming and deploying a critical identity. And it develops an account of our epistemic responsibility to engage in critical thinking that is not dependent on reliability considerations alone. The primary purpose of the article is to provide critical thinking students, or those that wish to reflect on the value of critical thinking, with an opportunity to think metacritically about critical thinking by examining an argument that engages the question of whether it is epistemically responsible for one to engage in critical thinking.     

基于身体理论的脑机接口技术道德责任审视

道德责任问题在脑机接口的伦理讨论中显得尤为重要和突出。在身体理论的理解下,脑机接口设备只能作为人的身体部分和依附,不具有成为道德主体的能力,人应该作为最终责任主体而存在。人的自主、身份认同等可能会对脑机接口应用中的道德责任认定带来一定的困惑,但是并不能对责任认定带来根本性影响,脑机接口技术应用的道德责任依然明确。脑机接口技术具有身体延伸特性,但延伸的特性也意味着延伸的道德责任,在道德责任分配中应该明确和细化相关道德责任。

     

Identification and Responsibility

Real-self accounts of moral responsibility distinguish between various types of motivational elements. They claim that an agent is responsible for acts suitably related to elements that constitute the agent's real self. While such accounts have certain advantages from a compatibilist perspective, they are problematic in various ways. First, in it, authority and authenticity conceptions of the real self are often inadequately distinguished. Both of these conceptions inform discourse on identification, but only the former is relevant to moral responsibility. Second, authority and authenticity real-self theories are unable to accommodate cases in which the agent neither identifies nor disidentifies with his action and yet seems morally responsible for what he does. Third, authority and authenticity real-self theories are vulnerable to counterexamples in which the provenance of the agent's real self undermines responsibility.