信念、知识与行为

哲学家休谟曾经发出过这样的感叹:信念“似乎从来是哲学中最大的神秘之一”。[1]休谟的哲学思考,以眼光敏锐,善于发现问题为其特征。在他26岁即已出版的天才著作《人性论》中,因果关系的必然性问题(归纳问题)的提出,事实与价值问题的发现,引发了后来包括康德、罗素等哲学宗师的思考,它们构成了哲学史上影响深远的问题。笔者相信,对这一休谟感到困惑的信念问题进行探讨,当也是一件很有学术价值与意义的事情。由于信念论在国内的知识论研究中,尚未得到应有的关注,因此本文拟首先进行一番理论上的梳理,尤其着重于对休谟与罗素的相关学说的开掘,…     

The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott

In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.     

Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion,Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account

Here I advance a unified account of the structure of the epistemic normativity of assertion, action, and belief. According to my Teleological Account , all of these are epistemically successful just in case they fulfill the primary aim of knowledgeability, an aim which in turn generates a host of secondary epistemic norms. The central features of the Teleological Account are these: it is compact in its reliance on a single central explanatory posit, knowledge‐centered in its insistence that knowledge sets the fundamental epistemic norm, and yet fiercely pluralistic in its acknowledgment of the legitimacy and value of a rich range of epistemic norms distinct from knowledge. Largely in virtue of this pluralist character, I argue, the Teleological Account is far superior to extant knowledge‐centered accounts.     

Stability, Strength and Sensitivity:Converting Belief into Knowledge

In this paper I discuss the relation between various properties that have been regarded as important for determining whether or not a belief constitutes a piece of knowledge: its stability, strength and sensitivity to truth, as well as the strength of the epistemic position in which the subject is with respect to this belief. Attempts to explicate the relevant concepts more formally with the help of systems of spheres of possible worlds (à la Lewis and Grove) must take care to keep apart the very different roles that systems of spheres can play. Nozicks sensitivity account turns out to be closer to the stability analysis of knowledge (versions of which I identify in Plato, Descartes, Klein and Lehrer) than one might have suspected.     

Experimental Studies of Belief Dependence of Observations and of Resistance to Conceptual Change

Natural scientists were invited to evaluate a rediscovery-based written manual for teaching high school science and math. The first session refamiliarized participants with the concepts this experiment presupposed, reinforced the legitimacy of the instructional setup, and fostered tolerance for unconventional mathematical formulas. The session also used a cylinder for a hands-on confirmation that the two ways of measuring the volume of geometrical solids-theoretical (through length measurements and the use of a formula) and experimental (through capacity measurements)-yield similar values. In the second individual session, an artificial clash was created: Participants were given an incorrect theoretical formula that ted them to believe that spheres are 50% larger than they are. They were then asked to compare expectations created by this formula to their own capacity measurements of two actual 10-cm and 20-cm spheres. The discrepancies between theoretical and experimental volumes frequently led to doubt, discomfort, adjustment of measurements, and ad hoc explanations. They rarely ted to the abandonment of belief in the false formula. Based on these experimental results, several stages in the process of conceptual change are proposed, including discomfort, ad hoc explanations, adjustment of observations and measurements to fit expectations, doubt, vacillation, and- finally-conceptual shift.     

Knowledge,Safety, and Meta‐Epistemic Belief

This article raises problems both for the view that safe belief is necessary for knowledge and for the view that it is sufficient. Focusing on ‘meta‐epistemic beliefs,’ or beliefs about the epistemic status of one's own beliefs, it is shown that the necessity claim has counterintuitive implications and that the sufficiency claim implies a contradiction. It is then shown that meta‐epistemic beliefs raise similar problems for a wide range of accounts of knowledge, and hence that they provide a powerful test for theories of knowledge.     

A Theory of Belief for Scientific Refutations

A probability function on an algebra of events is assumed. Some of the events are scientific refutations in the sense that the assumption of their occurrence leads to a contradiction. It is shown that the scientific refutations form a a boolean sublattice in terms of the subset ordering. In general, the restriction of to the sublattice is not a probability function on the sublattice. It does, however, have many interesting properties. In particular, (i) it captures probabilistic ideas inherent in some legal procedures; and (ii) it is used to argue against the commonly held view that behavioral violations of certain basic conditions for qualitative probability are indicative of irrationality. Also discussed are (iii) the relationship between the formal development of scientific refutations presented here and intuitionistic logic, and (iv) an interpretation of a belief function used in the behavioral sciences to explain empirical results about subjective, probabilistic estimation, including the Ellsberg paradox.     

Perspectives on Systems Change Among Local Change Agents: A Comparative Study

Community organizers and activists draw on multiple traditions of community building and collective action in attempts to galvanize change. The diversity of perspectives on social change processes indicates corresponding differences in perspectives on systems and what is required to change them. Twenty‐two in‐depth interviews with community organizers and activists in the Midwestern USA were conducted to identify differences in perspectives on systems change efforts. Four models used by organizers were identified: action/issue‐centric, identity‐centric, relationship‐centric, and organizing‐development. Strategies for recruitment, issue selection, leadership determination, and action were compared across models. Analyses revealed that some models might be better suited to action on certain issues (e.g. identity‐centric models when organizing around homelessness), whereas others may have advantages for use in certain settings (e.g. relationship‐centric models in congregations). These findings suggest that practitioners and scholars should pay close attention to contextual factors and focal issues when determining strategies for creating systems change. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.     

医务社会工作介入的灵性视角：理论、实践与展望

灵性健康被学者视为所有健康层面中最深沉、最核心的部分,可以支持和影响其他的健康层面。不过,在当前中国的医务社会工作实践中,灵性资源相对匮乏,还没有得到应有的重视。在不同历史时期,医务社会工作中的灵性视角有着多层次、多维度的丰富内涵。在医务社会工作实践中,灵性视角的运用体现在非线性的介入策略、丰富的实务技术,重视服务对象的生命意义问题。灵性视角具有独特的意义和价值,与医务社会工作有较强的契合性。在医务社会工作实务、研究和教育中,需要加强对灵性视角的理解和自觉应用。

     

A Theory of Natural Change Revisited: Theology,Psychology, and Pastoral Counseling

To whatever school of psychology we lay claim, it makes modest sense as pastors engaging in counseling as an act of faithfulness to the God who created the creature with the capacity to change, that we remain first and foremost the theologians we are called to be. We may lament that legions of priests and priestesses from the pantheon of classical and popular psychology have bowed the knee to an unknown God as though there were no God, and turned Psyche herself into a fragmented oracle. This reflects the pride of human achievement and the limitation of human learning. Nonetheless, it is this believer's persuasion that from cradle to grave, at the crossroads of suffering and thresholds of pain, at the heights of development and depths of regression, the beginning of wisdom is the confession of faith in the living God. Any thoroughgoing psychological theory of natural change encompasses more than psychology. Nature, including human nature, is never bereft of the forming and transforming presence of the Holy. is adjunct in philosophy and theology at     

从人格特质角度看管理人员应付组织变革

人们常常从宏观角度看待组织变革,但证据和经验均显示,组织管理者个人的个性特质对组织变革有着不同的反应,从而亦对组织变革带来程度不等的影响。因此,以个体为主要对象的人格心理学在组织变革中发挥着重要作用。研究揭示,能够成功应对组织变革的管理人员应具有这样的人格特质他们的自我认识和自我评价是积极、正面的,对世界保持一种开放的心态,对新鲜事物及其所蕴涵着的风险有足够的容纳和忍受能力。并且勇于承担责任,使自己的思想影响周围的人,从而进一步提升组织效能,以适应环境的新变化。     

The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley’s claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling the playing field. The burden of proof then lies with those who seek to deny Foley’s radical suggestion.