Ontological Commitment And Reconstructivism

Some forms of analytic reconstructivism take natural language (and common sense at large) to be ontologically opaque: ordinary sentences must be suitably rewritten or paraphrased before questions of ontological commitment may be raised. Other forms of reconstructivism take the commitment of ordinary language at face value, but regard it as metaphysically misleading: common-sense objects exist, but they are not what we normally think they are. This paper is an attempt to clarify and critically assess some common limits of these two reconstructivist strategies.     

Open‐endedness,Schemas and Ontological Commitment

Second‐order axiomatizations of certain important mathematical theories—such as arithmetic and real analysis—can be shown to be categorical. Categoricity implies semantic completeness, and semantic completeness in turn implies determinacy of truth‐value. Second‐order axiomatizations are thus appealing to realists as they sometimes seem to offer support for the realist thesis that mathematical statements have determinate truth‐values. The status of second‐order logic is a controversial issue, however. Worries about ontological commitment have been influential in the debate. Recently, Vann McGee has argued that one can get some of the technical advantages of second‐order axiomatizations—categoricity, in particular—while walking free of worries about ontological commitment. In so arguing he appeals to the notion of an open‐ended schema—a schema that holds no matter how the language of the relevant theory is extended. Contra McGee, we argue that second‐order quantification and open‐ended schemas are on a par when it comes to ontological commitment.     

奎因、怀曼与布里丹:本体论约定的三种方法

本文对本体论约定(ontological commitment)问题的三种根本不同方法进行了比较。认为尽管它们具有表面上的相似性,但中世纪晚期的唯名论哲学家布里丹(约1300-1361)的方法,是比以迈农和奎因为代表的其他两种被普遍认同的现代方法更具吸引力的第三种选择。本文同时指出,只有基于其关于真与逻辑有效性的语义观念的截然不同的前现代方法,布里丹的方法才是可能的。     

Modal Platonism: an Easy Way to Avoid Ontological Commitment to Abstract Entities

Modal Platonism utilizes “weak” logical possibility, such that it is logically possible there are abstract entities, and logically possible there are none. Modal Platonism also utilizes a non-indexical actuality operator. Modal Platonism is the EASY WAY, neither reductionist nor eliminativist, but embracing the Platonistic language of abstract entities while eliminating ontological commitment to them. STATEMENT OF MODAL PLATONISM. Any consistent statement B ontologically committed to abstract entities may be replaced by an empirically equivalent modalization, MOD(B), not so ontologically committed. This equivalence is provable using Modal/Actuality Logic S5@. Let MAX be a strong set theory with individuals. Then the following Schematic Bombshell Result (SBR) can be shown: MAX logically yields [T is true if and only if MOD(T) is true], for scientific theories T. The proof utilizes Stephen Neale’s clever model-theoretic interpretation of Quantified Lewis S5, which I extend to S5@.     

Contextual Factors Affecting the Organizational Commitment of Diverse Police Officers: A Levels of Analysis Perspective

This study examined the relationship of contextual factors to organizational commitment among 372 police officers in 13 police commands in New York City's public housing projects. Setting-level variables were formed by aggregating officers' perceptions of management support and fairness and management sensitivity to diversity within commands and within three subgroups formed by gender and ethnicity. Individual-level measures were deviations from these subgroup means within commands as well as perceptions of support from family and social support and negative interactions within commands. Overall, path analyses, confirmed by hierarchical linear modeling, showed direct setting-level effects for management support and fairness, but not for sensitivity to diversity, on organizational commitment. Both women and minority men experienced more negative social interactions than white men; support from management, co-workers, and family were important predictors of commitment. Family support was particularly important for women.     

Physicalism and Ontological Holism

The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, realization of higher-order properties by basic physical properties, and reduction.     

本体论的相对性（节译）

一 1931年春季,当我读研究生的时候,我听了杜威论作为经验的艺术的讲演.那时,杜威是哈佛大学威廉·詹姆斯讲座的首任讲演人.现在,使我感到骄傲的是,我作为杜威讲座的首任讲演人出现在哥伦比亚大学.     

Scepticism: Epistemic and Ontological

It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make – or doubt – particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moore's basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.     

Idealism and the Ontological Argument

The ontological proof became something of a signature argument for the British Idealist movement and this paper examines how and why that was so. Beginning with an account of Hegel's understanding of the argument, it looks at how the thesis was picked up, developed and criticized by the Cairds, Bradley, Pringle-Pattison and others. The importance of Bradley's reading in particular is stressed. Lastly, consideration is given to Collingwood's lifelong interest in the proof and it is argued that his attention is best understood as a direct continuation of theirs. In view of the fact that recent commentators have tried to draw a sharp line between Collingwood's approach to metaphysics and ontology and that of his predecessors, the establishment of this connection calls for a measure of reassessment on both sides.