What Could It Mean to Say That Today's Stand-Up Audiences Are Too Sensitive?

Contemporary comedy audiences are accused by some comedians of being too morally sensitive to appreciate humor. To get closer to an answer, I will first briefly present the argument over audience sensitivity as found in the nonphilosophical literature. Second, I then turn to the philosophical literature and begin from the idea that “funny” is a response-dependent property. I present a criticism of this response-dependence account of “funny” based in the claim that funniness is not determined by what normal audiences actually laugh at, but by what merits laughter. Third, I argue that excessive or deficient moral sensitivity distorts audience receptivity to humor. Fourth, I turn to candidates for ideally sensitive audiences. I conclude by returning to the particular cases of supposed oversensitivity or undersensitivity to jokes to see how we might judge them.     

Are Exact Calculation and Computational Estimation Categorically Different?

This study examined, through the problem‐size effect, whether exact calculation and computational estimation are categorically different. In Experiment 1, 26 teacher candidates, most of whom were female, Caucasian, and in their early 20s, estimated 27 randomly generated double‐digit multiplication problems. In Experiment 2, 44 similar participants estimated and calculated a common set of double‐digit multiplication problems. Analysis of reaction times and error rates indicates that the problem‐size effect holds true for exact calculation but not for estimation. In estimation, as problem size increases, reaction times do not increase, nor does the rate of unreasonable estimates. Instead, the difference between a factor's unit digit and the nearest ten to be rounded to was a primary contributor to the variance of reaction times. It is concluded that exact calculation and computational estimation are computationally, cognitively, and structurally different processes. Furthermore, it is suggested that estimation skills be given separate, dedicated attention in schools. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can Semantics Guide Ontology?

Since the linguistic turn, many have taken semantics to guide ontology. Here, I argue that semantics can, at best, serve as a partial guide to ontological commitment. If semantics were to be our guide, semantic data and semantic treatments would need to be taken seriously. Through an examination of plurals and their treatments, I argue that there can be multiple, equally semantically adequate, treatments of a natural language theory. Further, such treatments can attribute different ontological commitments to a theory. Given this, I argue that semantics can fail to deliver determinate ontological commitments and determinate answers to ontological questions, more generally.     

Are intrusive thoughts subject to habituation?

The main question was addressed by studying three groups of non-psychiatric subjects who experienced intrusive and distressing thoughts. The effects of one of three forms of habituation training (massed, spaced and spaced combined with relaxation) on selected thoughts were assessed on a range of measures including latency, duration, discomfort, fading and so on.It appears that intrusive thoughts are subject to habituation. Broad decrements of significant magnitude were observed after each of three forms of habitation training. However, the occurrence of unpredicted decrements attributable to practice effects and to relaxation, presents some problems of interpretation.     

When Are Clients Ready to Terminate?

Termination of psychotherapy has received less attention in the research literature than other aspects of the treatment process. This paper presents a structured framework emphasizing observable markers to indicate when termination with a client is appropriate during cognitive behavioral treatment. The 7 criteria that indicate when a client is ready for termination are: (a) decrease in symptoms as assessed by sound measures; (b) decrease in symptoms that is stable and maintained for 8 weeks; (c) decrease in functional impairment; (d) evidence that the decrease in symptoms is not a spontaneous remission, such as lower symptoms associated with the use of new skills; (e) usage of the new skills, particularly at times or on themes of former vulnerability; (f) sense of pride regarding the new skills, in contrast to initial doubt regarding whether the techniques would work; and (g) carryover of decrease in symptoms to other areas. A case report and discussion regarding the clinical application of the framework is presented.     

Are you free? Invitations to theology

Books reviewed in this article:
David Ford, Theology: A Very Short Introduction
Gareth Jones, Christian Theology: A Brief Introduction     

Are transposition effects specific to letters?

Recent research has consistently shown that pseudowords created by transposing two letters are perceptually similar to their corresponding base words (e.g., jugde–judge). In the framework of the overlap model (Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2008), this effect is due to a noisy process in the localization of the “objects” (e.g., letters, kana syllables). In the present study, we examine whether this effect is specific to letter strings or whether it also occurs with other “objects” (namely, digits, symbols, and pseudoletters). To that end, we conducted a series of five masked priming experiments using the same–different task. Results showed robust effects of transposition for all objects, except for pseudoletters. This is consistent with the view that locations of familiar objects (i.e., letters, numbers, and symbols) can be best understood as distributions along a dimension rather than as precise points.     

Is 7300 m Equal to 7.3 km? Same Semantics but Different Anchoring Effects

Anchoring effect (AE) refers to a phenomenon that an arbitrary number (i.e., the anchor) biases a subsequent numerical judgment. Three experiments were conducted to examine how the anchor is represented in short-term memory. Experiment 1 showed that despite the semantic equivalence of two anchors, the anchor with a larger absolute value (i.e., 7300 m) induced a greater numerical estimate than did the anchor with a smaller absolute value (i.e., 7.3 km). Experiment 2 showed that an anchor 228 could serve as both a high and a low anchor, depending on the absolute value to be judged in the numerical judgment. By including anchors with negative signs, Experiment 3 further demonstrated that it was the absolute value but not the semantics of the anchors that exerted an effect on the subsequent numerical estimate. The three experiments provided converging support for the hypothesis that an anchor is superficially represented as absolute value plus affix in short-term memory. The processes leading to AE and the practical implications are discussed.     

Are Mathematical Theories Reducible to Non-analytic Foundations?

In this article I intend to show that certain aspects of the axiomatical structure of mathematical theories can be, by a phenomenologically motivated approach, reduced to two distinct types of idealization, the first-level idealization associated with the concrete intuition of the objects of mathematical theories as discrete, finite sign-configurations and the second-level idealization associated with the intuition of infinite mathematical objects as extensions over constituted temporality. This is the main standpoint from which I review Cantor’s conception of infinite cardinalities and also the metatheoretical content of some later well-known theorems of mathematical foundations. These are, the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem which, except for its importance as such, it is also chosen for an interpretation of the associated metatheoretical paradox (Skolem Paradox), and Gödel’s (first) incompleteness result which, notwithstanding its obvious influence in the mathematical foundations, is still open to philosophical inquiry. On the phenomenological level, first-level and second-level idealizations, as above, are associated respectively with intentional acts carried out in actual present and with certain modes of a temporal constitution process.     

Are There Moral Limits to Military Deception?

It is widely agreed that deception of the enemy can be morally permissible in war. However, the question of the morally acceptable limits to deception in war has barely been explored in contemporary ethics. This paper defends the thesis that there are no moral limits on military deception per se, that is, no limits based on the ethics of truthfulness. Rather, all moral restriction against deception in war is based on another moral principle: military deception is morally unacceptable only when it violates the principle of not harming those who do not intend to harm us.     

Are University Professors Qualified to Teach Ethics?

In the light of recent talk in Canadian business schools about the importance of teaching courses in business ethics, the authors ask whether business professors have the qualifications required to teach business ethics. They point to various ethical dilemmas that arise in a collegial setting and argue that academics who teach business ethics have to first understand the complex ethical situations in which they find themselves if business ethics is to be taught in a meaningful way.     

Acceptable Contradictions: Pragmatics or Semantics? A Reply to Cobreros et al.

Naive speakers find some logical contradictions acceptable, specifically borderline contradictions involving vague predicates such as Joe is and isn’t tall. In a recent paper, Cobreros et al. (J Philos Logic, 2012) suggest a pragmatic account of the acceptability of borderline contradictions. We show, however, that the pragmatic account predicts the wrong truth conditions for some examples with disjunction. As a remedy, we propose a semantic analysis instead. The analysis is close to a variant of fuzzy logic, but conjunction and disjunction are interpreted as intensional operators.     

Some Notes on Boolos’ Semantics: Genesis,Ontological Quests and Model-Theoretic Equivalence to Standard Semantics

The main aim of this work is to evaluate whether Boolos’ semantics for second-order languages is model-theoretically equivalent to standard model-theoretic semantics. Such an equivalence result is, actually, directly proved in the “Appendix”. I argue that Boolos’ intent in developing such a semantics is not to avoid set-theoretic notions in favor of pluralities. It is, rather, to prevent that predicates, in the sense of functions, refer to classes of classes. Boolos’ formal semantics differs from a semantics of pluralities for Boolos’ plural reading of second-order quantifiers, for the notion of plurality is much more general, not only of that set, but also of class. In fact, by showing that a plurality is equivalent to sub-sets of a power set, the notion of plurality comes to suffer a loss of generality. Despite of this equivalence result, I maintain that Boolos’ formal semantics does not committ (directly) second-order languages (theories) to second-order entities (and to set theory), contrary to standard semantics. Further, such an equivalence result provides a rationale for many criticisms to Boolos’ formal semantics, in particular those by Resnik and Parsons against its alleged ontological innocence and on its Platonistic presupposition. The key set-theoretic notion involved in the equivalence proof is that of many-valued function. But, first, I will provide a clarification of the philosophical context and theoretical grounds of the genesis of Boolos’ formal semantics.     

Are shy people reluctant to ask for help?

Examined the help-seeking behaviors of shy and not-shy men and women. In Study 1, Ss worked on an impossible task in the presence of a male or female confederate whom they were told had just successfully completed the task. Shy Ss asked for help no less frequently than did not-shy Ss overall, but they did seek help less frequently from opposite-sex confederates than from same-sex confederates. In Study 2, shy and not-shy men and women were required to call a man and a woman and ask them to complete a questionnaire. All respondents agreed to return the questionnaire. However, when shy Ss (compared with not-shy Ss) called opposite-sex respondents, fewer of the questionnaires were actually returned. When making their calls, shy Ss sounded somewhat less warm and confident than did not-shy Ss, and they also spoke less fluently. Fluency, in turn, predicted response rate for the shy subjects calling respondents of the opposite sex.     

Are monkeys able to plan for future exchange?

Whether or not non-human animals can plan for the future is a hotly debated issue. We investigate this question further and use a planning-to-exchange task to study future planning in the cooperative domain in two species of monkeys: the brown capuchin (Cebus apella) and the Tonkean macaque (Macaca tonkeana). The rationale required subjects to plan for a future opportunity to exchange tokens for food by collecting tokens several minutes in advance. Subjects who successfully planned for the exchange task were expected to select suitable tokens during a collection period (5/10?min), save them for a fixed period of time (20/30?min), then take them into an adjacent compartment and exchange them for food with an experimenter. Monkeys mostly failed to transport tokens when entering the testing compartment; hence, they do not seem able to plan for a future exchange with a human partner. Three subjects did however manage to solve the task several times, albeit at very low rates. They brought the correct version of three possible token types, but rarely transported more than one suitable token at a time. Given that the frequency of token manipulation predicted transport, success might have occurred by chance. This was not the case, however, since in most cases subjects were not already holding the token in their hands before they entered the testing compartment. Instead, these results may reflect subjects' strengths and weaknesses in their time-related comprehension of the task.     

Are psychology's tribes ready to form a nation?

Collaboration between social psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists is giving rise to a new approach that its practitioners call 'social cognitive neuroscience'. Scientists from each discipline are using the theories and techniques of the other to generate new answers to fundamental questions about attitudes, beliefs, the self, moral judgment, and other issues. Is this interdisciplinary endeavor an exercise in wishful thinking and good intentions, or is it a preview of psychology's future?