An epistemological history of time: From technology to representations

Abstract

This paper attempts to link the social history of the mechanization of time with the history of the psychological notion of time. Historical processes such as the mechanization of tower clocks from the Middle Ages onwards, the reform of the Gregorian calendar and the quarrel of the Christian and Chinese calendars characterized the modern representation of time on three points: isochrony, desacralization and abstraction. While Western societies learned to domesticate the practical aspects of time, the scholars of the Enlightenment naturalized time. They considered it a concept only related to man and used quantified time for scientific purposes. Empiricists saw time as a product of the succession of thought while idealists considered it a form necessary for the human experience to occur. Both trends agreed in removing time from nature and accepted isochrony, desaralization and abstraction as the necessary foundation for the modern notion of time.     

From human to artificial cognition and back: New perspectives on cognitively inspired AI systems

We overview the main historical and technological elements characterising the rise, the fall and the recent renaissance of the cognitive approaches to Artificial Intelligence and provide some insights and suggestions about the future directions and challenges that, in our opinion, this discipline needs to face in the next years.     

New Roles for Rhetoric: From Academic Critique to Civic Affirmation

The classical conception of rhetoric as the method of reasoned political judgment survived into the Renaissance but was reduced to academic critiques of style and "empty" public rhetoric with the rise of modern science and its representationalist theories of language. Recently, however, rhetoric, textuality, and the "linguistic turn" generally, have become central metaphors in the human sciences. This renewed rhetorical perspective not only fosters a critique of positive philosophy and of scientism in public discourse, it also offers affirmative methods by which persons can construct their civic lives.     

From the Terrible Loneliness to the Wonderful Agreement of Human Beings

What would be the “terrible loneliness” and what would be the “wonderful agreement” in the present paper? The “terrible loneliness” is the only reality that a person perceives and/or thinks during the now going on. For the person, an enormous quantity of occurrences is in the present moment absent. A very small quantity of occurrences is present. The person is the only being in having this. And, this is only during a little moment. The person never thinks about his loneliness in this moment. On the contrary, he thinks he is plenty of people and full of occurrences. But, if he were thinking about reality, he would live in a terrible loneliness. How does he escape himself from this loneliness? He thinks that the probable occurrences are real occurrences. He may be right in a plenty of times. Going through what I call opening hypotheses—basic hypotheses and non-basic but important hypotheses—and going through what I call simply hypotheses he is able to sanction a wonderful agreement of human beings about the known parts of the Universe. However, they are hypotheses, not absolute realities.     

Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence

The study investigates the hypothesis that children's ability to attribute second-order beliefs facilitates their understanding of evidence, as seen in the ability to distinguish between causes and reasons. Seventy-four children 5–7 yr old were given belief and evidence tests. The belief tests assessed their ability to represent and reason from second-order false-beliefs, and the evidence tests assessed their ability to distinguish between the cause of a situation and a person's reason for believing it. The relation between performance on the two tests was determined, taking into account general language and non-verbal reasoning abilities. Results show that performance on the belief test and on the evidence part of the evidence test improved significantly over the age range, and that a significant proportion of variance in the evidence test scores is accounted for by second-order false-belief understanding, over and above that accounted for by general language and non-verbal abilities. The argument is made that second-order false-belief understanding is fundamental to children's epistemological development, underlying not just their understanding of evidence, but also their understanding of inference and truth.     

Facts and meaning: An examination of their role in psychological research from a phenomenological perspective

It is argued that mainstream psychological research has prioritized observable facts over meaning. The theoretical foundation in psychology, according to mainstream psychology, is such that meaningful experience is considered to be less primordial than natural scientific constructions about the world. The methodological procedure of mainstream psychology entails a prioritization of facts over meaning. However, in this article it is argued that subjective meaning is already in play in psychological discussions of "facts".
An epistemological examination of the notions of "facts" and "meaning" from a phenomenological perspective leads to a prioritization of meaning over facts. Implications of such an analysis for psychological research are discussed. One implication is that psychological research must give up its aim to establish causa! laws. A phenomenological approach to studies of meaning is presented.     

Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work

We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims. First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.

From facts to God: An onto-cosmological argument

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Social epistemology and reflexivity: Two versions of how to be really useful

This essay argues that the really useful character of reflexivity is that it enables a radical critique of representation and its conventional material and rhetorical practices. It is uniquely able to produce paradox and thus disrupt discourses by undermining authorial privilege. Because Fuller's social epistemology is insensitive to its own reflexive implications, and limits itself to normative questions about knowledge policy, it is too limited — and limiting — to provide a context that can nurture reflexivity.     

从世界到生活形式--维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变原因探析

一般认为,维特根斯坦前后期哲学转变的原因是语言观的变化。本文结合维特根斯坦跨越两种哲学传统的背景,认为哲学转变的根本原因是由于前期本体论的内在缺陷而导致的本体论变化,维特根斯坦前期哲学本体论只局限于可说的“世界”,而不可说的神秘之物则被排除在世界之外,这与维特根斯坦珍视神秘之物的初衷相悖,这种内在矛盾促成了前期本体论向后期本体论的转变,这一转变的重大意义在于后期本体论消泯了可说与不可说的界限,是人类社会实践的坚实基础。     

The Humean Way to China: Beyond the Stereotype

David Hume seems to receive several stereotypes and commonplace sentiments about China regarding its religion, national character, government, practices and economy, that he goes on to dismantle. Doing so, he allows the eighteenth-century reader to look at China from a different perspective. This perspective can still be useful especially today, when the “immense distance” between China and Europe has been reduced and, as Hume would say, almost everything we use is Chinese. In the name of an ambivalent European tradition, we are often inclined to revive these commonplace sentiments (for example, the uniformity of Chinese character) and neglect that part of our own tradition that tries to understand what is behind them and that also offers us the tools to go beyond them. This study endeavors to assemble an array of Hume’s scattered remarks, consider them in their context, and explore their possible sources in order to obtain not only a more Humean China, but also a more Chinese Hume.     

意向性分析:从胡塞尔到塞尔

在当代西方哲学界,塞尔的意向性分析经常被认为在追随或重复胡塞尔的工作。塞尔本人固然不同意这样的说法,但如果对两人的意向性分析进行详细的对比考察,就会发现,塞尔的确在很多方面重复了胡塞尔的工作。不过,胡塞尔和塞尔的意向性分析在结论上的惊人相似掩饰不了其哲学方法上的根本差异:前者运用的是"先验还原"和"本质直观"的现象学方法,后者运用的是分析哲学的"逻辑分析"方法。将这两种根本不同的哲学方法,用于讨论同一个哲学问题,却可以得出大致相同的结论,这足以表明:现象学传统和分析哲学传统之间的关系完全可以是一种非竞争性的甚至是互补性的关系。     

From Products to Process: An Ecological Approach to Bias Detection

Researchers from a range of disciplines (Faigley, 1995; Hamp-Lyons, 1994; Huot, 1996; Kirshner & Whitson, 1997; Lemke, 1995) have argued that to draw valid inferences from tests, more than the analysis of factors in isolation (e.g., items-test scores, rater consistency) should be investigated. The complex, interconnected, or "proximal"(Bronfenbrenner, 1994) relationships that form as a result of the processes and practices of testing activity should also become a focus of investigation. The study reported here is offered as an example of the application of an ecological approach in the investigation of the proximal relationship of raters (n = 12) and test takers (n = 423), formed during the trialling of a new science version of a high-stakes, topic-based language test. The study reveals a source of test bias that might otherwise have remained undetected by traditional methods, such as those that are common to differential item functioning studies. Systematically focusing on stakeholders' accounts of tests reveals more about how tests function, adds to the validity of the inferences drawn from test performance, and increases fairness.     

Autonomy as Social Independence: Reply to Weimer

I defend my pure social account of global autonomy from Steven Weimer's recent criticisms. In particular, I argue that it does not implicitly rely upon the very kind of nonsocial conception of autonomy that it hopes to replace.     

Contrast Effects and Approval Voting: An Illustration of a Systematic Violation of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Condition

In approval voting, voters indicate all alternatives acceptable to them, instead of indicating their most preferred alternative. This study sought to examine the hypothesis that, under certain conditions, approval voting systematically violates a rationality condition of social choice: the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. Given a well-known psychological phenomenon, the contrast effect, it was hypothesized that sets of acceptable alternatives might be changed as a result of changes in unacceptable alternatives. This hypothesis was tested in a sample of undergraduates who were presented with fictional profiles of juvenile delinquents and then were asked whether they should be granted parole. The outcomes of approval voting changed merely as the result of a change in an alternative least preferred by all voters.     

Three challenges (and three replies) to the ethics of belief

In this paper I look at three challenges to the very possibility of an ethics of belief and then show how they can be met. The first challenge, from Thomas Kelly, says that epistemic rationality is not (merely) a form of instrumental rationality. If this claim is true, then it will be difficult to develop an ethics of belief that does not run afoul of naturalism. The second challenge is the Non-Voluntarism Argument, which holds that because we cannot believe at will and because ought implies can, there can be no ethics of belief. The third challenge comes from Richard Feldman, who claims that there is no such thing as ought all-things-considered. He says, for example, that moral oughts can be weighed against other moral oughts and that epistemic oughts can be compared to each other, but that there is no way to weigh moral oughts against epistemic oughts. If this is true, then norms about what one ought to believe are not nearly as important as one might have hoped or as philosophers have traditionally thought. In answering these three challenges, I try to show how and why the project of developing epistemic norms might be a promising avenue of research, despite claims to the contrary.     

From steroids to nation states: An integrated evolutionary approach to violent crime

Most evolutionary psychologists emphasize the individual level of analysis concerning violent crime and other dependent variables. This paper outlines a strategy for evolutionary explanation of societal variation across time as well as space and applies it to crimes of violence. The central idea is that individual adaptations for reproductive competition play out differently depending both on developmental context and societal conditions, including the marriage market. Violent crimes (murders, rapes, and assaults) are substantially higher in countries with a relative scarcity of men according to research using INTERPOL and World Health Organization data [Barber, N. (2000a). The sex ratio as a predictor of cross-national variation in violent crime. Cross-Cultural Research, 34, 264–282, Barber, N. (2009). Countries with fewer males have more violent crime: Marriage markets and mating aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 35, 49–56]. This is an apparent contradiction given that males are more criminally violent and likely reflects increased direct mating competition that evokes increased testosterone production for humans as for other species. The empirical evidence is discussed in terms of direct reproductive competition and various alternative explanations, particularly the “culture of violence” and socialization experiences are considered.