A WAR OF MEMORIES

This article discusses Renzo De Felice’s Intervista sul Fascismo, published in 1975, as representative of a particular memory in the Italy of that time and considers its influence and impact on the subsequent historiographical and political discourse in Italy about fascism, the War of Liberation, and the Shoah. The starting point is the existence of many competing memories that battle with one another for supremacy. The very diversity of these memories – silent, always contemporary but different – sends one back to the agent par excellence of memory formation: politics. Because the memories of fascism, the war, the Resistance, and the Shoah represent essentially political structures, they are fated to vary in response to the definitions of the diverse identity groups that are dominant in a society in the struggle for the emergence of one memory at the expense of the others.     

Proactive Responding to Anticipated Discrimination Based on Chronic Illness: Double-Edged Sword?

Purpose

Proactive strategies for avoiding stigmatization may prevent work-related discrimination (Singletary and Hebl J Appl Psychol 94:797–805, 2009), yet these strategies may also cause strain in the stigmatized. We tested a model in which previous workplace discrimination experiences and anticipated future workplace discrimination related to proactive responses (compensatory behaviors and concealing behaviors), which, in turn, related to job tension.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Survey data were obtained from 332 workers with chronic illnesses. Structural equation modeling was used to test the proposed relationships.

Findings

Perceived previous discrimination directly related to anticipated future discrimination and indirectly related to compensatory and concealing behaviors. Anticipated discrimination directly related to compensatory and concealing behaviors, and indirectly related to job tension through compensatory behaviors. Compensatory behaviors were, but concealing behaviors were not, related to job tension.

Implications

Workers with chronic illness should be educated on ways to mitigate the negative effects of compensatory behaviors, including ensuring adequate opportunities to replenish resources. Organizations should provide assistance to these workers through Employee Assistance Programs or other types of job counseling. Organization leaders and supervisors have a responsibility to build an environment of acceptance for those with chronic illness in order to reduce potential discrimination.

Originality/Value

While proactive strategies are effective in reducing negative outcomes of stigmatization, little research has explored their potential downsides. We highlight the “double-edged sword” nature of compensatory behaviors. In addition, while a large proportion of U.S. workers are managing chronic illness, this population is understudied.     

Subjunctive Conditional Probability

There seem to be two ways of supposing a proposition: supposing “indicatively” that Shakespeare didn’t write Hamlet, it is likely that someone else did; supposing “subjunctively” that Shakespeare hadn’t written Hamlet, it is likely that nobody would have written the play. Let P(B//A) be the probability of B on the subjunctive supposition that A. Is P(B//A) equal to the probability of the corresponding counterfactual, A □→B? I review recent triviality arguments against this hypothesis and argue that they do not succeed. On the other hand, I argue that even if we can equate P(B//A) with P(A □→B), we still need an account of how subjunctive conditional probabilities are related to unconditional probabilities. The triviality arguments reveal that the connection is not as straightforward as one might have hoped.     

The epistemology of absence-based inference

Our main aim in this paper is to contribute towards a better understanding of the epistemology of absence-based inferences. Many absence-based inferences are classified as fallacies. There are exceptions, however. We investigate what features make absence-based inferences epistemically good or reliable. In Section 2 we present Sanford Goldberg’s account of the reliability of absence-based inference, introducing the central notion of epistemic coverage. In Section 3 we approach the idea of epistemic coverage through a comparison of alethic and evidential principles. The Equivalence Schema–a well-known alethic principle–says that it is true that $p$ if and only if $p$ . We take epistemic coverage to underwrite a suitably qualified evidential analogue of the Equivalence Schema: for a high proportion of values of $p$ , subject $S$ has evidence that $p$ due to her reliance on source $S^{*}$ if and only if $p$ . We show how this evidential version of the Equivalence Schema suffices for the reliability of certain absence-based inferences. Section 4 is dedicated to exploring consequences of the Evidential Equivalence Schema. The slogan ‘absence of evidence is evidence of absence’ has received a lot of bad press. More elaborately, what has received a lot of bad press is something like the following idea: absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $p$ is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . A striking consequence of the Evidential Equivalence Schema is that absence of evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in p is evidence sufficiently good to justify belief in $\sim p$ . We establish this claim in Section 4 and show how this supports the reliability of an additional type of absence-based inference. Section 4 immediately raises the following question: how can we make philosophically good sense of the idea that absence of evidence is evidence of absence? We address this question in Section 5. Section 6 contains some summary remarks.     

Confucius's Aesthetic Concept of Noble Man: Beyond Moralism

The prevailing interpretation of ren (humanness) in the Analects is ethical. One consequence of this interpretation is the one-dimensional image of the Confucian junzi (noble man) as a rigid moralist, a fastidious observer of li (ritual). But there are numerous passages in the Analects that resist such a one-sided representation of the junzi, especially Confucius's remarks related to the (Book of) Songs and music. My basic thesis is that Confucius's concept of junji is aesthetic. This is implied by his notion of junji ru (noble scholar) as opposed to xiaoren ru (common scholar). The noble man is one awakened to the beauty of humanness. It is because of this awareness that he ‘sets his mind on the Way, depends on virtue, relies on ren and enjoys the arts.’ Confucius included the Songs and music in his curriculum precisely for the purpose of cultivating in his pupils this aesthetic sensibility.     

Grounding and the explanatory role of generalizations

According to Hempel’s (Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays. The Free Press, New York, 1965) influential theory of explanation, explaining why some a is G consists in showing that the truth that a is G follows from a law-like generalization to the effect that all Fs are G together with the initial condition that a is F. While Hempel’s overall account is now widely considered to be deeply flawed, the idea that some generalizations play the explanatory role that the account predicts is still often endorsed by contemporary philosophers of science. This idea, however, conflicts with widely shared views in metaphysics according to which the generalization that all Fs are G is partially explained by the fact that a is G. I discuss two solutions to this conflict that have been proposed recently, argue that they are unsatisfactory, and offer an alternative.     

Book Reviews

It is a common complaint that the syllogism commits a petitio principii. This is discussed extensively by John Stuart Mill in ‘A System of Logic’ [1882. Eighth Edition, New York: Harper and Brothers] but is much older, being reported in Sextus Empiricus in chapter 17 of the ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’ [1933 Sextus Empiricus. 1933. ‘Outlines of Pyrrhonism’, in R. G. Bury, Works, London and New York: Loeb Classical Library. [Google Scholar]. in R. G. Bury, Works, London and New York: Loeb Classical Library]. Current wisdom has it that Mill gives an account of the syllogism that avoids being a petitio by virtue of construing the universal premise as an inference-rule. I will show that both the problem and the role of inference-rules in its solution have been misunderstood. Inference-rules have very little to do with this problem, and I will argue further that nothing is gained with regard to this problem by the introduction of inference-rules in preference to premises.     

Feminist Relational Discourse Analysis: putting the personal in the political in feminist research

Discourse analysis is a useful and flexible method for exploring power and identity. While there are many forms of discourse analysis, all agree that discourse is the central site of identity construction. However, recent feminist concerns over power, agency, and resistance have drawn attention to the absence of participants’ first-hand experiences within broad discursive accounts (Lafrance &; McKenzie-Mohr 2014 Boonzaier, F 2014, ‘Talking against dominance: South African women resisting dominant discourse in narratives of violence’, in S McKenzie-Mohr &; MN Lafrance (eds.), Women voicing resistance: discursive and narrative explorations, Routledge, Hove, pp. 102–20.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Saukko 2008 Saukko, P 2008, The anorexic self: a personal, political analysis of a diagnostic discourse, State University of New York Press, Albany. [Google Scholar]). For those with an interest in power relations, such as feminist researchers, this is a problematic silence which renders the personal functions of discourse invisible. In this article, we argue that the “personal” and “political” are inextricable, and we make a case for putting the “personal” into broader discursive frameworks of understanding. Further, we assert that feminist research seeking to account for identity must more explicitly aim to capture this interplay. To this end, we argue that voice is the key site of meaning where this interplay can be captured, but that no clear analytical framework currently exists for producing such an account. In response, we propose Feminist Relational Discourse Analysis (FRDA) as a voice-centered analytical approach for engaging with experience and discourse in talk. We then set out clear guidance on how to do FRDA, as applied in the context of women working in U.K. policing. Finally, we conclude that by prioritizing voice, FRDA invites new and politicized feminist readings of power, agency, and resistance, where the voices of participants remain central to the discursive accounts of researchers.     

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Kraut (Against absolute goodness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin (in Sect. 2) by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind (in Sect. 3) and good for something (in Sect. 4) can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue (in Sect. 5) contra Gotthelf (2012) that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus (in Sect. 6) on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture.     

Nikolai Lossky’s Reception and Criticism of Husserl

Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia. He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents, situates Lossky within the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism. According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings (in Plato’s sense) and the realm of real beings (i.e., the world of becoming) are mind-independent. Per his epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism, he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology.     

Information closure and the sceptical objection

In this article, I define and then defend the principle of information closure (pic) against a sceptical objection similar to the one discussed by Dretske in relation to the principle of epistemic closure. If I am successful, given that pic is equivalent to the axiom of distribution and that the latter is one of the conditions that discriminate between normal and non-normal modal logics, a main result of such a defence is that one potentially good reason to look for a formalization of the logic of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ” among the non-normal modal logics, which reject the axiom, is also removed. This is not to argue that the logic of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ” should be a normal modal logic, but that it could still be insofar as the objection that it could not be, based on the sceptical objection against pic, has been removed. In other word, I shall argue that the sceptical objection against pic fails, so such an objection provides no ground to abandon the normal modal logic B (also known as KTB) as a formalization of “ $S$ is informed that $p$ ”, which remains plausible insofar as this specific obstacle is concerned.     

Islamophobia and the therapeutic dialogue: Some reflections

In the atmosphere of fear and controversy that surrounds Muslims at this moment in time it is hardly surprising that they feel unable to voice their fears and concerns openly. Added to this is the fact that Muslims already underutilize mental health services (Patel et al., 2000 Patel, N, Bennett, E, Dennis, M, Dosanjh, N, Matitani, A, Miller, A and Nadirshaw, Z. 2000. Clinical Psychology: ‘Race’ and ‘Culture’: A training manual, Leicester: The British Psychological Society.  [Google Scholar]). In the counselling arena four distinct aspects of the counselling relationship are affected. First, the therapeutic alliance, second, the socio-political context in which counselling occurs, third, the awareness of personal characteristics and competencies that facilitate multicultural counselling and, finally, the training requirements of multicultural counsellors. This paper seeks to consider each of these aspects of the therapeutic encounter with regard to Muslim clients.     

Epistemic and Ethical Constraints in Personal and Social Constructions: A Response to Raskin and Debany

In response to Raskin and Debany's lead article (this issue Raskin, J. D., &; Debany, A. E. (this issue). The inescapability of ethics and the impossibility of “anything goes”: A constructivist model of ethical meaning making. Journal of Constructivist Psychology. (Reprinted from Ethics in action: Dialogue between knowledge and practice, pp. 13–32, by S. Cipolletta &; E. Gius (Eds.), 2012, Milan, Italy: LED) [Google Scholar]), I offer support for their general conclusion that ethical implications are inescapable in relation to any version of constructionism, and concur that the frequent characterization of constructivism as ultimately reducing to a position of “anything goes” is not sustainable. I depart from Raskin and Debany on the question of whether an integrative framework for constructivist positions is possible, especially in relation to questions concerning the ethical dimension. I suggest that the reasons for considering the anything goes charge inappropriate are different for different versions of constructivism, and illustrate with analysis of the ethical dimensions of personal construct theory and social constructionism.     

The Metaphysics of Meaning: Hopkins on Wittgenstein

Abstract

Jim Hopkins (2012 Hopkins, Jim (2012) ‘Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism’, in Jonathan Ellis and Daniel Guevara (eds) Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) defends a ‘straight’ (non-skeptical) response to Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, a response he ascribes to Wittgenstein himself. According to this response, what makes it the case that A means that P is that it is possible for another to (correctly) interpret A as meaning that P. Hopkins thus advances a form of interpretivist judgment-dependence about meaning. I argue that this response, as well as a variant, does not succeed.     

The Age of Imagination

Galileo once said that one cannot understand the universe without comprehending its language: mathematics. Unfortunately, most individuals will approach physical sciences with dread, due in part to the difficulty with speaking the language of the universe, and for this reason may fail to perceive its breathtaking beauty. When we look deeper than the letter of reason, we encounter a flow of imagination that appears to be integral to the cosmos. The Enlightenment of the 18th century was an Age of Reason that deeply shaped our modern society. By following the movement of ideas from classical physics to quantum mechanics, passing by chaos theory and Einstein’s special and general relativity, it is argued that a new Enlightenment might be in sight, an Age of Imagination, wherein the creatures that we are will consciously re-enter the flow of imagination. This exploration concerns classical physics and its repression of imagination; the difficult emergence of deterministic chaos is viewed as a return of what was left behind, so to speak: the shadow of reason.

The one-after-another is a bearable prelude to the deeper knowledge of the side-by-side, for this is an incomparably more difficult problem.—C. G. Jung (1970 Jung, C.G. (1970). The collected works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 14: Mysterium coniunctionis (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.; H. Read, M. Fordham, G. Adler, &; W. McGuire, eds.). Bollingen Series XX. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar], par. 206)     

Reconsidering the Value of Equality

Some people believe that the equality of people's well-being makes an outcome better, other things being constant. Call this Telic Egalitarianism. In this paper I will propose a new interpretation of Telic Egalitarianism, and compare it with the interpretation that is proposed by Derek Parfit 1995 Parfit, Derek. 1995. Equality or Priority? University of Kansas: Lindley Lecture. Reprinted in Clayton and Williams [2000: 81–125] [Google Scholar] and widely accepted by many philosophers. I will argue that my proposed interpretation is more plausible than Parfit's. One of the virtues in my interpretation is that it shows his Levelling Down Objection does not undermine Telic Egalitarianism. I also believe that my interpretation better explains the important similarity and difference between Telic Egalitarianism and his proposed Priority View.     

Mind,Body, and World: Todes and McDowell on Bodies and Language

Dreyfus presents Todes's (2001 Todes S 2001 Body and World Cambridge MA MIT Press  ) republished Body and World as an anticipatory response to McDowell (1994 McDowell J 1994 Mind and World Cambridge MA Harvard University Press  ) which shows how preconceptual perception can ground conceptual thought. I argue that Dreyfus is mistaken on this point: Todes's claim that perceptual experience is preconceptual presupposes an untenable account of conceptual thought. I then show that Todes nevertheless makes two important contributions to McDowell's project. First, he develops an account of perception as bodily second nature, and as a practical‐perceptual openness to the world, which constructively develops McDowell's view. Second, and more important, this account highlights the practical and perceptual dimension of linguistic competence. The result is that perception is conceptual “all the way down” only because discursive conceptualization is perceptual and practical “all the way up”. This conjunction of McDowell and Todes on the bodily dimensions of discursive practice also vindicates Davidson's and Brandom's criticisms of McDowell's version of empiricism.