Hilary Putnam And Immanuel Kant: Two `Internal Realists'?

Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has drawn parallels between his `internal',`pragmatic', `natural' or `common-sense' realism and Kant's transcendentalidealism. Putnam reads Kant as rejecting the then current metaphysicalpicture with its in-built assumptions of a unique, mind-independent world,and truth understood as correspondence between the mind and that ready-madeworld. Putnam reads Kant as overcoming the false dichotomies inherent inthat picture and even finds some glimmerings of conceptual relativity inKant's proposed solution. Furthermore, Putnam reads Kant as overcoming thepernicious scientific realist distinction between primary and secondaryqualities, between things that really exist and their projections, adistinction that haunts modern philosophy. Putnam's revitalisation of Kantis not just of historical interest, but challenges contemporary versions ofscientific realism. Furthermore, Putnam has highlighted themes which havenot received the attention they deserve in Kantian exegesis, namely, theproblematic role of primary and secondary qualities in Kant's empiricalrealism, and the extent of Kant's commitment to conceptual pluralism.However, I argue that Putnam's qualified allegiance to Kant exposes him tosome of the same metaphysical problems that affected Kant, namely, thefamiliar problem of postulating an absolute reality (Ding an sich), while atthe same time disavowing the meaningfulness of so doing. In conclusion Isuggest that Putnam might consider Hegel's attempts to solve this problem inKant as a way of furthering his own natural realism.     

The World War against the spirit of Immanuel Kant: philosophical Germanophobia in Russia in 1914–1915 and the birth of cultural racism

During the First World War the radical nationalist sentiments were widespread in different European countries involved in military activities, including the Russian Empire. In Russia this rise united the features of Russian ethnonationalism and imperial enthusiasm. The Russian philosopher Vladimir Ern (1882–1917) in his article “From Kant to Krupp” (1914) attempted “to ground” the hostility between Russia and its allies, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other hand. This attempt turned Ern’s article into one of the earliest manifestoes of cultural racism in Russia, maybe the very first one. Discussing this article in the context of other works by Ern of 1910–1917, one can see that Ern applied Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical method for the political interpretation of “the problem of technology” causing the aggressive approach to the human’s environment. Nevertheless, Ern’s cultural racism and aggressive rhetoric blocked further development and even reception of his methodological innovations. The psychological compensatory pragmatic of his rhetoric seems to resemble the analogical function of rigid opposition between “Russia” and “West” in speeches of contemporary Russia’s official ideologues.     

Gödel,Kant, and the Path of a Science

Gödel's philosophical views were to a significant extent influenced by the study not only of Leibniz and Husserl, but also of Kant. Both Gödel and Kant aimed at the secure foundation of philosophy, the certainty of knowledge and the solvability of all meaningful problems in philosophy. In this paper, parallels between the foundational crisis of metaphysics in Kant's view and the foundational crisis of mathematics in Gödel's view are elaborated, especially regarding the problem of finding the “secure path of a science” for both mathematics and philosophy. Gödel's temporal subjectivism and metaphysical conceptual objectivism are presented as positively or negatively motivated by Kant's viewpoints. A remark on Gödel's collapse of modalities (in accordance with the collapse of objective time) is added.     

Foucault’s Kant

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Kant’s Racism

After a long period of comparative neglect, in the last few decades growing numbers of philosophers have been paying attention to the startling contrast presented between Kant’s universal moral theory, with its inspiring enlightenment ideas of human autonomy, equality and dignity and Kant’s racism. Against Charles Mills, who argues that the way to make Kant consistent is by attributing to him a threshold notion of moral personhood, according to which some races do not qualify for consideration under the categorical imperative, I argue that Kant cannot be made consistent on race, and that rather than trying to make him so, we should use the example of Kant’s racism to tell us something about the nature of racism. I argue that Kant’s own moral philosophy and moral psychology in fact give some materials for thinking about his racism, and about racism.     

Kant’s hands,spatial orientation,and the Copernican turn

In this paper we want to show how far the early, pre-critical Kant develops a theory of the constitution of space that not only anticipates insights usually attributed to the phenomenological theory of lived space with its emphasis on the constitutively central role of the human lived-body, but which also establishes the foundation for Kant’s Copernican turn according to which space is understood as ‘form of intuition’, implied in the activity of the transcendental subject. The key to understand this role of the body lies in Kant’s understanding of the asymmetrical nature of a pair of hands, which despite being equal in size and structure, remain incongruent counterparts, and thus evade integration into a homogenous and purely self-referential form of space.     

Subjectivist – observing and objective – participant perspectives on the world: Kant,aquinas and quantum mechanics

Theological thinking is influenced by perspectives on the relation of scientific knowledge to reality. Two paradigms for understanding the nature of human knowledge are considered in relation to quantum mechanics: the subjective-observing perspective of Kant, and the objective-participant perspective of Thomas Aquinas. I discuss whether quantum mechanics necessarily implies a subject centered perspective on reality, and argue, with reference to d'Espagnat's notion of veiled reality, that quantum non-separability challenges this view. I then explore whether the objective-participant perspective of Thomas Aquinas provides a more fruitful context for understanding quantum mechanics. I discuss quantum measurement in terms of the transition from potentiality to actuality, and knowledge as the latent intelligibility of the world realized. However, the negative nature of our knowledge of quantum non-separability also challenges this perspective. Our theological thinking in response to quantum knowledge must therefore proceed tentatively, balancing a via positiva, with a via negativa.     

Was Kant a nonconceptualist?

I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought and judgment.

Kant’s Moral Panentheism

Although Kant is often interpreted as an Enlightenment Deist, Kant scholars are increasingly recognizing aspects of his philosophy that are more amenable to theism. If Kant regarded himself as a theist, what kind of theist was he? The theological approach that best fits Kant’s model of God is panentheism, whereby God is viewed as a living being pervading the entire natural world, present ‘in’ every part of nature, yet going beyond the physical world. The purpose of Kant’s restrictions on our knowledge of God is not to cast doubt on God’s existence, but to preserve a mystery in God’s reality so that God is always more than the world as we experience it. The same God who is theoretically unknowable is also an aspect of the moral substratum of the physical world. Kant’s moral Trinity (God as righteous Lawgiver, benevolent Ruler, and just Judge) permeates everything, as the ultimate unifier of reason and nature. This Paper was delivered during the 2007 APA Pacific Mini-Conference on Models of God, together with papers published in Philosophia 35:3–4.     

Moral Foundations,Shared Civic Projects and Rossi’s Kant

Philosophia - Although I quickly review Philip Rossi’s larger argument in The Ethical Commonwealth in History, my focus in this article is on the implications of Rossi’s work for our...     

The theological virtues. Aquinas did,but did Kant?

Recent studies in virtue ethics devote little attention to the theological virtues. After a short introduction into the history of the theological virtues a comparative investigation of realist and constructivist ethics is carried out. Using Thomas Aquinas as point of reference the author discusses possible Kantian vindication of the theological virtues through Onora O'Neills constructivist ethics. In conclusion the authors holds that there are surprising convergences concerning Kant's notion of hope and that of Aquinas in regard to the function of the theological virtues.     

Some Eighteenth Century Contributions to the Mind–Body Problem (Wolff, Taurellus, Knutzen, Bülfiger and the Pre-Critical Kant)

This work speaks about very special solution of the mind–body problem. This solution based on the so-called Principle of Co-existence stands out as one of the most interesting attempts at solving the mind–body problem. It states that substances can only exert a mutual influence on one another if they have something in common. This does not have to be a common property but rather, a binding relationship. Thus, substances co-exist when they remain bound by a common relationship, for instance, to an external subject. The Principle of Co-existence played an extremely important role in Kant’s philosophy, not only since it provided a framework for solving the mind–body problem, but since it captured the very basis of its existence. The Principle found also reflection in the works of Kant’s successors, such as Fichte, Schelling, Hegel or Feuerbach. It had significant—though often hidden—repercussions on later philosophy of mind. The notion of force and the principle of its operation became key concepts in resolving the mind–body problem. As a result, philosophy of mind concentrated on the search for a principle explaining the occurrence of two complementary types of phenomena. This established a tradition which, to a greater or lesser extent, has survived to our day.     

Sources of Kant’s Cosmopolitanism: Basedow,Rousseau, and Cosmopolitan Education

The goal of this essay is to analyse the influence of Johann Bernhard Basedow and Rousseau on Kant’s cosmopolitanism and concept of cosmopolitan education. It argues that both Basedow and Kant defined cosmopolitan education as non-denominational moral formation or Bildung, encompassing—in different forms—a thin version of moral religion following the core tenets of Christianity. Kant’s encounter with Basedow and the Philanthropinum in Dessau helps to understand the development of Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism and educational theory ‘in weltbürgerlicher Absicht’. Rousseau’s role is more complex: he clearly influenced Kant; he is usually considered a precursor of modern nationalism and national education; and recent studies have stressed the cosmopolitan dimension of his educational programme. I claim that the dilemma of education according to Rousseau is that one has to choose between education of homme or education of citoyen, and that there is no way to avoid or go beyond this stark alternative. Kant’s reinterpretation of Rousseau is favourable and creative and has found many followers up to the present, but is misleading, as he ignores the dilemma and imposes his own conception of cosmopolitanism, of cosmopolitan education and of (possible) progress in history on Rousseau while claiming that this was actually Rousseau’s message.     

Did Kant Respect Persons?

The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Formalizing Kant’s Rules

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper formalizes part of the cognitive architecture that Kant develops in the Critique of Pure Reason. The central Kantian notion that we formalize is the...