Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?

Abstract: Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be 'backed up' by a prior categorical imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both as an interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a premise within the reasoning. An alternative to this assumption will be offered. I will conclude that while instrumentalism may well be false, there is no reason to believe it is incoherent.     

How Do We Know Necessary Truths? Kant's Answer

It is traditionally held that our knowledge of necessity is a priori ; but the familiar theories of a priori knowledge – platonism and conventionalism – have now been discredited, and replaced by either modal skepticism or a posteriori essentialism. The main thesis of this paper is that Kant's theory of a priori knowledge, when detached from his transcendental idealism, offers a genuine alternative to these unpalatable options. According to Kant's doctrine, all epistemic necessity (which he calls "conviction" ( Ueberzeugung ) is grounded directly or indirectly on our capacity for clear and distinct rational intuition (which he calls "insight" ( Einsicht ). Insight, in turn, depends upon functions of the imagination for creating "mental models" of necessary truths. This doctrine is well exemplified by Kant's account of our knowledge of simple analytic truths.     

“What Would You Do if You Were Me?” Effects of Counselor Self-Disclosure Versus Non-disclosure in a Hypothetical Genetic Counseling Session

Two prior studies suggest genetic counselors self-disclose primarily because patients ask them to do so (Peters et al., 2004; Thomas et al., 2006). However, scant research has investigated effects of counselor disclosure on genetic counseling processes and outcomes. In this study, 151 students (98 undergraduates, 53 graduates) completed one of three surveys describing a hypothetical genetic counseling session in which a patient at risk for FAP was considering whether to pursue testing or surveillance procedures. Dialogue was identical in all surveys, except for a final response to the question: “What would you do if you were me?” The counselor either revealed what she would do (Personal Disclosure), what other patients have done (Professional Disclosure), or deflected the question (No Disclosure). Imagining themselves as the patient, participants wrote a response to the counselor and indicated their perceptions of her. Participants rated the non-disclosing counselor significantly lower in social attractiveness than either disclosing counselor, and less satisfying than the professional disclosing counselor. Analysis of written responses yielded four themes: Made Decision, Sought Information, Expressed Thoughts/Feelings, and No Decision. Practice implications and research recommendations are provided.     

Might Intentions be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives?

I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to the position I defend, genuine practical deliberation and genuine practical imperatives take as their starting point the agent's intentions and only the agent's intentions.Given my loose usage, the Humean position Bernard Williams defends in his seminal article “Internal and External Reasons” (1981) counts as a version of instrumentalism about practical reason, since it incorporates the idea that every genuine practical imperative takes as its starting point some existing motivation(s) of the agent. It deviates from strict instrumentalism in that it leaves room for specificationist reasoning (reasoning aimed at moving from general ends to specific ends) in addition to means-end reasoning. For example, it leaves room for practical reasoning that is focused on “finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment” or on “thinking how the satisfaction of elements in [one's subjective motivational set] can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering” (Williams, 1981, p. 104).     

Two Reagans? Genre Imperatives,Ghostwriters, and Presidential Personality Profiling

Attempts to gauge presidential personality on the basis of speeches and other public statements are subject to several potential validity threats. This paper presents a test of the genre imperative of the tendency to make the president sound "presidential," in combination with the fact that most presidential addresses are drafted by ghostwriters. The test involves comparing the "activity" and "positivity" levels of 235 syndicated radio commentaries that Ronald Reagan wrote and delivered during the years immediately before he became president and 299 weekly radio addresses that he delivered while he was president. The two Reagans were by no means fundamentally different, but the differences between them nonetheless sound a note of caution about basing personality assessments on presidents' public statements.     

Global government or global governance? Realism and idealism in Kant's legal theory

Did Kant believe we need a world government? It has been a matter of controversy in Kant scholarship whether Kant endorsed the creation of a world state or merely a voluntary federation of states with no coercive power. I argue that Kant's main concern was with a global juridical condition, which he regarded as a rational requirement given the equal freedom and equality of individuals. However, he recognized that implementing this rational ideal requires sensitivity to contingent aspects of world politics. I will argue that Kant offers an ideal theory not disentangled from realist considerations and that he adopts what I will call methodological realism: the attempt to realize the requirements of Right (Recht) in a world governed by its own laws and mechanisms. I will illustrate this interpretation with Kant's discussion of the right of nations (Völkerrecht). The confusion in regard to Kant's actual position on the matter, I will argue, is a direct consequence of Kant's methodological realism. The article concludes by showing how Kant’'s ideas and methods can inspire us to rethink global institutions for our current global challenges.     

‘What Would You Say if You Were Guilty?’ Suspects' Strategies During a Hypothetical Behavior Analysis Interview Concerning a Serious Crime

Previous research has shown that the Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI) indicators of guilt or innocence are merely commonsense notions. In this study, we examined whether this would lead suspects of a serious crime to try to manipulate their behavior during a BAI in order to look innocent. A serious crime was described to 74 undergraduates who were asked to imagine that they were guilty or innocent. They then completed a questionnaire about the strategies that they would use during a BAI. Both guilty and innocent suspects were more willing to show the innocence rather than guilt indicators of the BAI. Innocent suspects had a blind faith in the power of innocence to demonstrate that they were not guilty. The general (non‐BAI) strategies coincided with those of previous studies; this indicates that prior findings on strategies can be generalized to serious crimes and that strategies can be examined with uncomplicated procedures such as the one used in this study. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Wei ZHANG,What Is Enlightenment: Can China Answer Kant's Question?

What is Enlightenment? Can China Answer Kant's question? This is the title and subtitle,respectively,of Wei Zhang's book.An ambitious project due to two factors:the difficulty of answering the question anywhere,not only in China,and the difficulty of translating that question into Chinese reality.The problem that Zhang will try to resolve is whether or not the May Fourth movement could be considered the Chinese Enlightenment.Prior to digging into that answer I will start by analyzing the first,titular question.     

Kant's transcendental idealism and contemporary anti‐realism

This paper compares Kant's transcendental idealism with three main groups of contemporary anti‐realism, associated with Wittgenstein, Putnam, and Dummett, respectively. The kind of anti‐realism associated with Wittgenstein has it that there is no deep sense in which our concepts are answerable to reality. Associated with Putnam is the rejection of four main ideas: theoryindependent reality, the idea of a uniquely true theory, a correspondence theory of truth, and bivalence. While there are superficial similarities between both views and Kant's, I find more significant differences. Dummettian anti‐realism, too, clearly differs from Kant's position: Kant believes in verification‐transcendent reality, and transcendental idealism is not a theory of meaning or truth. However, I argue that part of the Dummettian position is extremely useful for understanding part of Kant's position – his idealism about the appearances of things. I argue that Kant's idealism about appearances can be expressed as the rejection of experiencetranscendent reality with respect to appearances.     

Eckart Förster and Kant's Opus postumum

A number of philosophers are committed to the view that sense experiences, in so far as they have contents, have propositional contents, but this is more often tacitly accepted than argued for in the literature. This paper explains the propositional account and presents a basic case in support of it in a simple and straightforward way which does not involve commitment to any specific philosophical theory of perception.     

Quantifying Inner Experience?—Kant's Mathematical Principles in the Context of Empirical Psychology

This paper shows why Kant's critique of empirical psychology should not be read as a scathing criticism of quantitative scientific psychology, but has valuable lessons to teach in support of it. By analysing Kant's alleged objections in the light of his critical theory of cognition, it provides a fresh look at the problem of quantifying first‐person experiences, such as emotions and sense‐perceptions. An in‐depth discussion of applying the mathematical principles, which are defined in the Critique of Pure Reason as the constitutive conditions for mathematical‐numerical experience in general, to inner sense will demonstrate why it is in principle possible to justify a quantitative structure of psychological judgments on the grounds of Kant's critical thinking. In conclusion, it will propose how Kant's critique could be used in a constructive way to develop first steps towards a transcendental foundation of psychological knowledge.     

Developing Together: Parents Meeting Children��s Developmental Imperatives

It is well known that the parent influences the child, but few realize how much the child changes the adult. This paper reports research that explored how adults change when they learn to nurture their child??s developmental needs. It also explores how empathy with the child impacts an adult??s ability to move through his or her own unresolved childhood issues into new meaning and relationships. Using qualitative methods and quantitative measures, the research captures perspectives of 20 parents about their own development from using child development principles. Analysis resulted in the identification of five themes: (a) cognitive development in perspective, differentiation from past ways, and new meaning-making; (b) emotional development of trust, empathy, and affective complexity; (c) personal agency of intentional effort and use of critical self-inquiry; (d) adult well-being; and (e) emergence of wisdom. More research is needed to determine the association between child development competence and adult development.