Touching at depth: The potential of feeling and connection

The senses are often talked of as bodily senses. Although more recently there has been valuable work on the cross-over of the senses, it is still common for our understanding of the senses to be located in the finite body: the body that hears, smells, sees, tastes and touches. There is a defined subjectivity and identity logic here which ontologically impacts on how we feel, particularly in the context of touch. For example, if it is my body that touches, it must be my body that feels. Or, if my body touches another, that body feels my touch and vice versa. Emphasis is on intersubjectivity and separate bodies/senses rather than on feeling, connection and emotion. This paper explores affective and embodied meanings of touch. It moves beyond common assumptions underlying most literature on touch, assumptions which regard touch as physical and visible. Touch cannot be viewed primarily as a bodily sense for it then emanates from a finite body, a body which is separate, subjective and contained. This type of touch (or body) stifles the potential for feeling and connection. When touch is viewed as ‘flesh’ or ‘mi’, however, we become aware of a non-finite logic of the world which helps us reassess touch. There is a sensuous and embodied connection in flesh that is at the ‘heart’ of this type of touch. This paper develops the notion of a ‘touching at depth’ which helps us move beyond the senses in a bodily (and therefore finite) capacity and explore an encompassing space and relationship in touch that brings out the potential of feeling, connection and emotion.     

Modality-constrained statistical learning of tactile, visual, and auditory sequences

The authors investigated the extent to which touch, vision, and audition mediate the processing of statistical regularities within sequential input. Few researchers have conducted rigorous comparisons across sensory modalities; in particular, the sense of touch has been virtually ignored. The current data reveal not only commonalities but also modality constraints affecting statistical learning across the senses. To be specific, the authors found that the auditory modality displayed a quantitative learning advantage compared with vision and touch. In addition, they discovered qualitative learning biases among the senses: Primarily, audition afforded better learning for the final part of input sequences. These findings are discussed in terms of whether statistical learning is likely to consist of a single, unitary mechanism or multiple, modality-constrained ones.     

Tactual perception: a review of experimental variables and procedures

This paper reviews the literature on tactual perception. Throughout this review, we will highlight some of the most relevant aspects in the touch literature: type of stimuli; type of participants; type of tactile exploration; and finally, the interaction between touch and other senses. Regarding type of stimuli, we will analyse studies with abstract stimuli such as vibrations, with two- and three-dimensional stimuli, and also concrete stimuli, considering the relation between familiar and unfamiliar stimuli and the haptic perception of faces. Under the "type of participants" topic, we separated studies with blind participants, studies with children and adults, and also performed an overview of sex differences in performance. The type of tactile exploration is explored considering conditions of active and passive touch, the relevance of movement in touch and the relation between haptic exploration and time. Finally, interactions between touch and vision, touch and smell and touch and taste are explored in the last topic. The review ends with an overall conclusion on the state of the art for the tactual perception literature. With this work, we intend to present an organised overview of the main variables in touch experiments, compiling aspects reported in the tactual literature, and attempting to provide both a summary of previous findings, and a guide to the design of future works on tactual perception and memory, through a presentation of implications from previous studies.     

Multisensory Information in the Control of Complex Motor Actions

ABSTRACT— For many of the complex motor actions we perform, perceptual information is available from several different senses including vision, touch, hearing, and the vestibular system. Here I discuss the use of multisensory information for the control of motor action in three particular domains: aviation, sports, and driving. It is shown that performers in these domains use information from multiple senses—frequently with beneficial effects on performance but sometimes with dangerous consequences. Applied psychologists have taken advantage of our natural tendency to integrate sensory information by designing multimodal displays that compensate for situations in which information from one or more of our senses is unreliable or is unattended due to distraction.     

Bodily Awareness, Imagination and the Self

Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in ways in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title ‘bodily awareness’. The legitimacy of grouping together these ways of gaining information is shown by the fact that they are unified phenomenologically; they provide the subject with an awareness of his or her body ‘from the inside’. Bodily awareness is an awareness of our own bodies from within. This perspective on our own bodies does not, cannot, vary. As Merleau‐Ponty writes, ‘my own body…is always presented to me from the same angle’ (1962: 90). It has recently been claimed by a number of philosophers that, in bodily awareness, one is not simply aware of one's body as one's body, but one is aware of one's body as oneself. That is, when I attend to the object of bodily awareness I am presented not just with my body, but with my ‘bodily self’. The contention of the present paper is that such a view is misguided. In the first section I clarify just what is at issue here. In the remainder of the paper I present an argument, based on two claims about the nature of the imagination, against the view that the bodily self is presented in bodily awareness. Section two defends the dependency thesis; a claim about the relation between perception and sensory imagination. Section three defends a certain view about our capacity to imagine being other people. Section four presents the main argument against the bodily self awareness view and section five addresses some objections.     

On the Concept of a Sense

Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated in neuroethology and other relevant sciences. I suggest substantial modifications to Keeley’s account which would both solve the problem cases and make better sense of the actual classifications made by scientists. I conclude by noting some limits to the way of classifying the senses that I suggest. I conclude by suggesting that the problem I identify in Keeley’s account has arisen from a confusion that sometimes arises in the philosophical literature between how we individuate the senses and what constitutes a sense.     

Tactless scientists: Ignoring touch in the study of joint attention

Since the 1970s, researchers have focused on visual joint attention as a way to observe and operationalize joint attention (JA). I will argue that this methodological choice has neglected other modalities and as a consequence might be missing important elements in the account of the development of JA and the evolutionary history of JA. I argue that by including other modes of interaction, such as touch, we open the possibility of finding that non-human primates and younger human infants engage in basic forms of JA. Moreover, I argue that touch, as a proximal mode of perception, is the ontogenetic precursor of social communication.     

The Sense of Touch: From Tactility to Tactual Probing

Because philosophical reflections on touch usually start from our ability to perceive properties of objects, they tend to overlook features of touch that are crucial to correct understanding of tactual perception. This paper brings out these features and uses them to develop a general reconception of the sense of touch. I start by taking a fresh look at our ability to feel, in order to reveal its vital role. This sheds a different light on the skin's perceptual potential. While it is commonly observed that tactile experiences have two intentional objects, an external object and one's own body, I will advance a more accurate alternative: in tactile experiences, one becomes aware of what one's body undergoes. This alternative not only fits better with tactility's vital role; it is also key to explaining how active touching provides for a unique contribution to our perceptual relation to material objects. By thus connecting tactility's vital role to the way we rely on touch while manipulating objects, this essay offers a cross-sectional survey of our tactile powers that reveals the interplay between sensing and touching.     

Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control

According to what I will call ‘the disanalogy thesis,’ beliefs differ from actions in at least the following important way: while cognitively healthy people often exhibit direct control over their actions, there is no possible scenario where a cognitively healthy person exhibits direct control over her beliefs. Recent arguments against the disanalogy thesis maintain that, if you find yourself in what I will call a ‘permissive situation’ with respect to p, then you can have direct control over whether you believe p, and you can do so without manifesting any cognitive defect. These arguments focus primarily on the idea that we can have direct doxastic control in permissive situations, but they provide insufficient reason for thinking that permissive situations are actually possible, since they pay inadequate attention to the following worries: permissive situations seem inconsistent with the uniqueness thesis, permissive situations seem inconsistent with natural thoughts about epistemic akrasia, and vagueness threatens even if we push these worries aside. In this paper I argue that, on the understanding of permissive situations that is most useful for evaluating the disanalogy thesis, permissive situations clearly are possible.     

Nietzsche's Sensualism

Abstract: The late Nietzsche defended a position which he sometimes to refers as ‘sensualism’ and which consists of two main theses: senses ‘do not lie’ (T1) and sense organs are ‘causes’ (T2). Two influential interpretations of this position have been proposed by Clark and Hussain, who also address the question whether Nietzsche's late sensualism is (Hussain) or not (Clark) compatible with the epistemological view which he held in his previous work and which has been dubbed the ‘falsification thesis’ (FT). In my paper I will show that both readings raise substantial difficulties and propose an alternative account of Nietzsche's sensualism. In particular, I will argue: (a) that according to Nietzsche the representational content of sensory experience ‘does not lie’ since it is physically grounded in causal exchanges with the external world which are mediated by sense organs; (b) that Nietzsche believes that the claim that senses ‘do not lie’ is also true of the phenomenal, qualitative content of sensory experience; and (c) that FT, despite its prima facie tension with (a) and (b), fit well Nietzsche's sensualism.     

Ethical considerations in the use of nonerotic touch in psychotherapy with children

Although touch frequently occurs in psychotherapy with children, there is little written on the ethical considerations of therapeutic touch. Because physical contact does occur, therapists must consider if, how, and when it is used, for both their clients' safety and their own. In this review, I further develop the issues suggested by Aquino and Lee (2000) in the use of nurturing touch in therapy by considering many types of touch that occur in psychotherapy with children; the possible positive role of touch; clients' perception of touch in therapy; considerations related to the therapist, the child's safety, and any history of abuse in the child's and family's background; and other practical considerations. I list guidelines.     

Touched by Time: Some Critical Reflections on Derrida’s Engagement with Merleau-Ponty in Le Toucher

This essay raises some critical questions about the interpretation that Derrida offers of Merleau-Ponty in his recent book, On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy, where Derrida implies that the latter’s work remains mired in theological prejudices. As well as defending Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the senses and inter-subjectivity against such claims, this essay is also concerned to examine Derrida’s transcendental philosophy of time (or philosophy of the contretemps that breaks open time but nonetheless pertains to it) that undergirds and motivates his engagement with various philosophies of touch. In this latter respect, I will argue that Derrida’s philosophy is itself ‘touched’ by time, in the peculiar sense of ‘touched’ that connotes affected and wounded. His work instantiates an ethics of non-presentist time (which is also the transcendental condition for any event of touch) and I ask whether there is reason to look for a different understanding of both time and the transcendental to Derrida’s.

Touching the Spirit: Re-enchanting the Person in the Body

In this essay, we argue that touch constitutes a sacred connection between the patient and practitioner. When touch is avoided or overlooked, the enigmatic inner workings of the body are ignored as those aspects of the body that can be quantified and ultimately controlled are emphasized. In utilizing touch as a fundamental way of opening up space for the sacred, the practitioner affirms the humanity for both the patient and herself. Only by returning to the senses can practitioners resist the dehumanizing effects of machinery and re-enchant the health-care profession in caring for persons they have sworn to serve.     

II—The Significance of the Senses

Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count five senses (the counting question); none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the significance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question.     

Geographies of Meaningful Living

Because it is significantly unclear what ‘meaningful’ does or should pick out when applied to a life, any account of meaningful living will be constructive and not merely clarificatory. Where in our conceptual geography is ‘meaningful’ best located? What conceptual work do we want the concept to do? What I call agent‐independent and agent‐independent‐plus conceptions of meaningfulness locate ‘meaningful’ within the conceptual geography of agent‐independent evaluative standards and assign ‘meaningful’ the work of commending lives. I argue that the not wholly welcome implications of these more dominant approaches to meaningfulness make it plausible to locate ‘meaningful’ on an alternative conceptual geography — that of agents as end‐setters and of agent‐dependent value assessments — and to assign it the work of picking out lives whose time‐expenditures are intelligible to the agent. I respond to the challenge confronting any subjectivist conception of meaningfulness that it is overly permissive.     

The Two Faces of Mental Imagery

Mental imagery has often been taken to be equivalent to “sensory imagination”, the perception-like type of imagination at play when, for example, one visually imagines a flower when none is there, or auditorily imagines a music passage while wearing earplugs. I contend that the equation of mental imagery with sensory imagination stems from a confusion between two senses of mental imagery. In the first sense, mental imagery is used to refer to a psychological attitude, which is perception-like in nature. In the second sense, mental imagery refers to a mental content, which can be grasped via different attitudes. I will show that failure to acknowledge the distinction between these senses of mental imagery has muddled philosophical discussion. This distinction brings much needed clarity to debates where sensory imagination and mental imagery are invoked, shedding light on issues such as the nature of imagistic mental states, and the representational powers and limits of mental imagery. I will conclude by sketching a general attitudinal account of imagination that does justice to both senses of mental imagery, outlining a promising framework for understanding imagination.     

Touching matters: Embodiments of intimacy

Touch is, I propose, a foundational, “intercorporeal” form of intimacy. Such intercorporeal intimacy precedes developmentally and undergirds permanently the “intersubjective” intimacy that is possible between adult subjects. For, it is in the affective intimacy of touching and being touched that we first realize (i.e., make real, actualize) both a coexistence or participation with other bodies, and an organization and differentiation of ourselves as embodied beings. Section 1 lays out phenomena of interpersonal (and interanimal) relations that require thinking touch as much more than either the exploration of a physical surface by an embodied subject or a conventional form of communication: I note the powerful existential effects of being or not being touched. In Section 2, I recall philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment, focusing on features that provide resources for understanding touch. I argue that touching must be understood as potentially transformative of the toucher, that “being touched” can equally be transformative, and that touching and being touched are inherently intertwined. This intertwining and transformative power is what makes touch an intercorporeal form of intimacy and accounts for its ability to inaugurate and enliven, at the affective level, our sense of self as differentiated from and in relation to others.     

The Number of Senses

Many philosophers still countenance senses or meanings in the broadly Fregean vein.However, it is difficult to posit the existence of senses without positing quite a lot ofthem, including at least one presenting every entity in existence. I discuss a number ofCantorian paradoxes that seem to result from an overly large metaphysics of senses, and various possible solutions. Certain more deflationary and non-traditional understandings of senses, and to what extent they fare better in solving the problems, are also discussed. In the end, it is concluded that one must divide senses into various ramified-orders in order to avoid antinomy, but that the philosophical justification of such orders is, as yet, still somewhat problematic.