Remembering entails knowing

In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p. An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson’s view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker’s attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker’s attacks on RK and develop a new argument for RK. In Sects. 4 and 5, I develop two more new arguments for RK.     

Remembering versus knowing during face recognition in unilateral temporal lobe epilepsy patients with or without hippocampal sclerosis

Recognition memory involves knowing an item was learned (familiarity) and remembering contextual details about the prior learning episode (recollection). We tested three competing hypotheses about the role of the hippocampus in recollection and familiarity. It mediates either recollection or familiarity, or serves both processes. We further tested whether the left temporal lobe mediates recollection and the right temporal lobe familiarity (modes of processing view), or whether the two temporal lobes mediate remembering material specifically (material specificity view). We investigated 24-h face recognition using the "remember-know" procedure. We studied 23 left and 24 right temporal lobe epilepsy (LTLE/RTLE) patients with and without hippocampal sclerosis (HS+/HS-) and 31 healthy participants. HS+ patients made fewer know responses than HS- patients or healthy participants. RTLE was related to fewer remember responses than LTLE. Our results suggest the hippocampus has a critical role in familiarity. Further, our findings support the material specificity hypothesis of laterality.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

Remembering and knowing personality traits: figure/ground asymmetries in person-related retrieval experience

In two experiments, the effect of category salience on retrieval experience was investigated. In Experiment 1, participants rated typicality or concreteness of personality traits that differed in stereotype reference (i.e., consistent, inconsistent, and neutral in relation to the age stereotype). More remember judgments were given for consistent and inconsistent traits in contrast to neutral traits, thereby indicating a figure/ground asymmetry. In Experiment 2, neutral traits were excluded and a classical figure/ground phenomenon was demonstrated for the retrieval experience of traits (i.e., reversibility of an ambiguous figure after typicality and untypicality ratings). Altogether, the results suggest that metacognitive trait representations depend on principles of figure/ground asymmetries rather than on functional principles of social information processing.     

Memory for unattended events: Remembering with and without awareness

The effects of memory for unattended events—for example, events that occur while a person is asleep, anesthetized, or selectively attending to other ongoing events, as in a speech-shadowing task—are rarely revealed in tests of retention that require remembering to be deliberate or intentional. Might such effects become evident in tests that do not demand awareness of remembering? Results of the present shadowing study, involving the recognition and spelling of previously unattended homophones, suggest an affirmative answer to this question.     

Learning without consciously knowing: Evidence from event-related potentials in sequence learning

This paper investigated how implicit and explicit knowledge is reflected in event-related potentials (ERPs) in sequence learning. ERPs were recorded during a serial reaction time task. The results showed that there were greater RT benefits for standard compared with deviant stimuli later than early on, indicating sequence learning. After training, more standard triplets were generated under inclusion than exclusion tests and more standard triplets under exclusion than chance level, indicating that participants acquired both explicit and implicit knowledge. However, deviant targets elicited enhanced N2 and P3 components for targets with explicit knowledge but a larger N2 effect for targets with implicit knowledge, revealing that implicit knowledge expresses itself in relatively early components (N2) and explicit knowledge in additional P3 components. The results help resolve current debate about the neural substrates supporting implicit and explicit learning.     

Remembering and Remembering to Forget

To navigate our lives we all need to find ways both to remember and sometimes to forget aspects of our experiences that threaten us or cause us anxiety. Often patients need help in developing a capacity to hold in some dialectical tension, both remembering and forgetting. Some people are so frightened by the harsher realities of their lives that they turn to us to take on the remembering side of this dialectic, and, sometimes, to take on the forgetting side. Part of the work of their therapy is to help them develop the capacity to do more of both for themselves. Other patients come better prepared to take on this challenge and use us to witness and support their own efforts. This paper considers how patients use their hours with us to remember and to forget and ways in which psychoanalysts might participate in this undertaking.     

Grabbing attention without knowing: Automatic capture of attention by subliminal spatial cues

The present study shows that an abrupt onset cue that is not consciously perceived can cause attentional facilitation followed by inhibition at the cued location. The observation of this classic biphasic effect of facilitation followed by inhibition of return (IOR) suggests that the subliminal cue captured attention in a purely exogenous way. Since IOR is not observed following endogenous shifts of spatial attention, but is observed following exogenous, stimulus-driven shifts of spatial attention, it is unlikely that top-down control settings or other non-attentional effects played a role. The current findings are interpreted in terms of a neurobiological model of visual awareness.     

Bodily knowing

This paper questions the view that knowledge must be articulable or at least experiential. It asserts that what distinguishes habitual yet intentional action from a mechanistic response is its grounding in a suitable claim to knowledge. However, it denies that a necessary condition for knowing how to perform an action is the ability of the subject to either articulate the particulars of that act, or experience it as appropriate.     

Judgments for inaccessible targets: Comparing recognition without identification and the feeling of knowing

Both the recognition-without-identification (RWI) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK) paradigms attempt to tap participants?? sense about a target that is inaccessible. In the case of RWI, participants judge the likelihood that the inaccessible target was studied. In the case of FOKs, participants judge the likelihood that the inaccessible target will be recognized at a later point in time. The present study compared the two using a hybrid paradigm. The patterns of responding differed depending on whether the judgment was of the RWI type or the FOK type. For the former, ratings were significantly higher for studied than for unstudied inaccessible targets (the typical RWI effect). For the latter, ratings were significantly lower for studied than for unstudied inaccessible targets (a reversal of the usual RWI effect). Similarity of the targets and distractors diminished the usual RWI effect, but not its reversal in the FOK situation, suggesting that the bases of the two effects differ. A potential explanation is that when participants judge whether an inaccessible target was presented earlier, they are oriented toward relying on cue familiarity, which should be greater for cues of studied targets, whereas when they judge whether they will recognize an inaccessible target later on, they are oriented toward relying on the accessibility of information, which is greater in the unstudied condition, due to the lack of priming of the targets.     

Remembering without a past: individuals with anterograde memory impairment talk about their lives

This paper describes the linguistic resources people with anterograde amnesia draw on in conversational narratives. Because of their problems in recollecting post-morbid memories, it is particularly challenging for such individuals to refer to personal experiences. Seven patients with anterograde memory impairments due to neurotrauma were interviewed one year post-event. Among other topics, they were asked to talk about their new lives and selves, which was expected to be a precarious affair given that they did not have many or any autobiographical memories. Microanalyses of their narratives identified three readily available linguistic resources that participants used to facilitate their storytelling. These were categorized as "memory importation" (transplanting a past memory into the present), "memory appropriation" (taking another's memory as one's own), and "memory compensation" (searching for memories). It is argued that although these resources were not always efficiently used by participants and their use often violated conversational expectations, these linguistic techniques provided a helpful means to sustain the production of personal narratives, even in the absence of autobiographical memory.     

Remembering remembering

We developed a laboratory analogue of the "forgot-it-all-along" effect that J. W. Schooler, M. Bendiksen, and Z. Ambadar (1997) proposed for cases of "recovered memories" in which individuals had forgotten episodes of talking about the abuse when they were supposedly amnestic for it. In Experiment 1, participants studied homographs with disambiguating context words; in Test 1 they received studied- or other-context words as cues; and in Test 2 they received studied-context cues and judged whether they had recalled each item during Test 1. In Experiment 2, retrieval cues were manipulated on both tests. In Experiment 3, both the studied- and other-context cues corresponded to the same meaning of each homograph. In Experiment 4, Test 1 was free recall, and studied- versus other-context cues were presented in Test 2. Participants more often forgot that they had previously recalled an item if they were cued to think of it differently on the two tests.     

Remembering operations

Two commonplace assumptions about encoding are that sentences are encoded and recognized on the basis of their semantic features primarily and that information regarding form features such as typography is typically ignored or discarded. These assumptions were tested m the present experiment where, within a signal-detection paradigm, S sorted sentences according to whether he had seen them before or not (old vs new) and, if they were old, whether their reappearance was in the same typography as on the first occurrence or a different one. Of the two typographies, one was familiar and the other unfamiliar. Results show that a considerable amount of information regarding surface features is stored for many minutes and that ease of initial encoding is inversely related to likelihood of subsequent recognition: sentences in the unfamiliar typography were remembered better. The results are probably not due to time spent encoding; control tests suggest that time spent encoding a difficult typography does not by itself increase recognition of the semantic content embodied in the typography. Other control tests show that pictorial features or images of the sentences play no significant role in their subsequent recognition. One interpretation of the results is that the analytic activities or cognitive operations that characterize initial acquisition play a significant role in subsequent recognition.     

Remembering democracy

A proper sense of history and the past is often held to be essential to democracy. Current attitudes to history and the past in the United Kingdom, particularly but not only in the context of formal education, show signs of strain, just as many other aspects of democracy do. Conceptions of history as heritage or as a site for the exercise of skills deserve critical examination. We need to look for a fresh basis for the relationship of democracies with their past. Perhaps this can be found in the essentially oppositional or ironical structure that both democracy and remembering require for their full flourishing.     

Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.     

Remembering Gorbachev

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - Since the middle of last century the so-called “rational actor” models in international and domestic affairs (von Rochau, 1853) supported the...