Concepts of Consciousness,Kinds of Consciousness,Meanings of `Consciousness'

The use of expressions like `concepts of consciousness', `kinds ofconsciousness', and `meanings of `consciousness' ' interchangeablyis ubiquitous within the consciousness literature. It is arguedthat this practice can be made sense of in only two ways. The firstinvolves interpreting `concepts of consciousness' and `kinds ofconsciousness' metalinguistically to mean, roughly, conceptsexpressed by `consciousness' and kinds expressed by`consciousness'; and the second involves certain literal,though semantically deviant, interpretations of those expressions.The trouble is that researchers frequently use the above expressionsinterchangeably without satisfying either way of doing so coherently.The result is considerable error and confusion, which is demonstratedin the works of philosophers currently writing on consciousness.     

Consciousness,Vorticity, and Dipoles

As spin is a fundamental feature of the universe, preliminary evidence suggests that its study could help in understanding consciousness. Research detailed in this article further develops the author's work in Keen (2005) Keen, J. 2005. Consciousness, intent, and the structure of the universe, Canada: Trafford. Available at http://www.trafford.com/robots/04-2320.html [Google Scholar]. The findings demonstrate that rotating objects generate fields that are also associated with mind-generated fields. Numerous quantitative properties of these fields generated by rotation are shown to be very different to fields associated with static objects. Dipole antenna radiation patterns are also discovered. The conclusions suggest that vorticity is not only involved in consciousness, but also has wider implications in understanding our universe, and therefore the subject warrants further research.     

Values,Consciousness, and Language

Two seminal thinkers, Edelman and Damasio, offer neurophysiological models of brain development and functioning that correspond with a contemporary psychoanalytic focus on dynamic experiential intersubjective systems. I describe their respective contributions under three headings derived from Edelman: values, consciousness, and language. I consider the scope of each of these topics as it abuts related psychoanalytic concepts.     

Consciousness,self-consciousness,and meditation

Many spiritual traditions employ certain mental techniques (meditation) which consist in inhibiting mental activity whilst nonetheless remaining fully conscious, which is supposed to lead to a realisation of one’s own true nature prior to habitual self-substantialisation. In this paper I propose that this practice can be understood as a special means of becoming aware of consciousness itself as such. To explain this claim I conduct some phenomenologically oriented considerations about the nature of consciousness qua presence and the problem of self-presence of this presence.

意识、觉知与反思

一、引言在日常的意识体验中,体验总有特定的体验内容。然而,意识不但关指某物,它也与特定的我粘连着。例如,你正在看一本书,你一边阅读一边建构着你读到的文本的意思;但对文本的知觉和对文本意思的理解并没有涵盖你心智中发生的一切。除了这些感知和体验的内容之外,在你的心     

Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness

I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of total evidence—are given a weight in attentive consciousness which does not correspond to our reflective judgement of their weight. Successful interpretation does not involve ascribing beliefs and desires by reference to what a subject ought to believe and desire, contrary to what Interpretists suggest.     

Mind,Consciousness, and Free Will

This commentary discusses how philosophy and science can collaborate to understand the human mind, considering dialogues involving three philosophers and three cognitive scientists. Their topics include the relation of philosophy and science, the nature of mind, the problem of consciousness, and the existence of free will. I argue that philosophy is more general and normative than science, but they are interdependent. Philosophy can build on the cognitive sciences to develop a theory of mind I call “multilevel materialism,” which integrates molecular, neural, mental, and social mechanisms. Consciousness is increasingly being understood as resulting from neural mechanisms. Scientific advances make the traditional concept of free will implausible, but “freeish” will is consistent with new theories of decision making and action resulting from brain processes. Philosophers should work closely with scientists to address profound problems about knowledge, reality, and values.     

Agency,Consciousness, and Executive Control

On the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), internal proper parts of an agent such as desires and intentions are causally responsible for actions. CTA has increasingly come under attack for its alleged failure to account for agency. A recent version of this criticism due to François Schroeter proposes that CTA cannot provide an adequate account of either the executive control or the autonomous control involved in full-fledged agency. Schroeter offers as an alternative a revised understanding of the proper role of consciousness in agency. In this paper we criticize Schroeter’s analysis of the type of consciousness involved in executive control and examine the way in which the conscious self allegedly intervenes in action. We argue that Schroeter’s proposal should not be preferred over recent versions of CTA.     

意识、当代神经科学与哲学

意识问题一直是个古老的哲学和心理学问题.20世纪以来随着科学和技术的发展特别是神经科学和技术的发展,意识研究已受到国际学术界的广泛关注.现已有大量意识产生的假说提出,艾克尔斯、克里克、艾德尔曼等都提出了自己的理论.目前的研究主要集中于克里克的"视觉意识".但是除了实验科学方法之外,意识的研究还需要依赖哲学思维方法的帮助,如此的"二元论"将对于意识的研究大有裨益.     

Consciousness operationalized,a debate realigned

This paper revisits the debate about cognitive phenomenology. It elaborates, defends, and improves on our earlier proposal for resolving that debate, according to which the test for irreducible phenomenology is the presence of explanatory gaps. After showing how proposals like ours have been misunderstood or misused by others, we deploy our operationalization to argue that the correct way to align the debate over cognitive phenomenology is not between sensory and (alleged) cognitive phenomenology, but rather between non-conceptual and (alleged) conceptual or propositional phenomenology. In doing so we defend three varieties of non-sensory (amodal)¹ non-conceptual phenomenology: valence, a sense of approximate number, and a sense of elapsed time.