Matching Topological and Frame Products of Modal Logics

The simplest combination of unimodal logics \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\) into a bimodal logic is their fusion, \({\mathrm{L}_1 \otimes \mathrm{L}_2}\), axiomatized by the theorems of \({\mathrm{L}_1 \rm for \square_1 \rm and of \mathrm{L}_2 \rm for \square_{2}}\). Shehtman introduced combinations that are not only bimodal, but two-dimensional: he defined 2-d Cartesian products of 1-d Kripke frames, using these Cartesian products to define the frame product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm of \mathrm{L}_1 \rm and \mathrm{L}_2}\). Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac generalized Shehtman’s idea and introduced the topological product\({\mathrm{L}_1 \times_{t}\mathrm{L}_2}\), using Cartesian products of topological spaces rather than of Kripke frames. Frame products have been extensively studied, but much less is known about topological products. The goal of the current paper is to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the topological product to match the frame product, for Kripke complete extensions of \({\mathrm{S}4: \mathrm{L}_1 \times_t \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{L}_1 \times \mathrm{L}_2 \rm iff \mathrm{L}_1 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_2 \supsetneq \mathrm{S}5 \rm or \mathrm{L}_1, \mathrm{L}_2 = \mathrm{S}5}\).     

Topological-Frame Products of Modal Logics

The simplest bimodal combination of unimodal logics \(\text {L} _1\) and \(\text {L} _2\) is their fusion, \(\text {L} _1 \otimes \text {L} _2\), axiomatized by the theorems of \(\text {L} _1\) for \(\square _1\) and of \(\text {L} _2\) for \(\square _2\), and the rules of modus ponens, necessitation for \(\square _1\) and for \(\square _2\), and substitution. Shehtman introduced the frame product \(\text {L} _1 \times \text {L} _2\), as the logic of the products of certain Kripke frames: these logics are two-dimensional as well as bimodal. Van Benthem, Bezhanishvili, ten Cate and Sarenac transposed Shehtman’s idea to the topological semantics and introduced the topological product \(\text {L} _1 \times _t \text {L} _2\), as the logic of the products of certain topological spaces. For almost all well-studies logics, we have \(\text {L} _1 \otimes \text {L} _2 \subsetneq \text {L} _1 \times \text {L} _2\), for example, \(\text {S4} \otimes \text {S4} \subsetneq \text {S4} \times \text {S4} \). Van Benthem et al. show, by contrast, that \(\text {S4} \times _t \text {S4} = \text {S4} \otimes \text {S4} \). It is straightforward to define the product of a topological space and a frame: the result is a topologized frame, i.e., a set together with a topology and a binary relation. In this paper, we introduce topological-frame products \(\text {L} _1 \times _ tf \text {L} _2\) of modal logics, providing a complete axiomatization of \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {L} \), whenever \(\text {L} \) is a Kripke complete Horn axiomatizable extension of the modal logic D: these extensions include \(\text {T} , \text {S4} \) and \(\text {S5} \), but not \(\text {K} \) or \(\text {K4} \). We leave open the problem of axiomatizing \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {K} \), \(\text {S4} \times _ tf \text {K4} \), and other related logics. When \(\text {L} = \text {S4} \), our result confirms a conjecture of van Benthem et al. concerning the logic of products of Alexandrov spaces with arbitrary topological spaces.     

Completeness theorems for some intermediate predicate calculi

We give completeness results — with respect to Kripke's semantic — for the negation-free intermediate predicate calculi: (1) $$\begin{gathered} BD = positive predicate calculus PQ + B:(\alpha \to \beta )v(\beta \to \alpha ) \hfill \\ + D:\forall x\left( {a\left( x \right)v\beta } \right) \to \forall xav\beta \hfill \\ \end{gathered}$$ (2) $$T_n D = PQ + T_n :\left( {a_0 \to a_1 } \right)v \ldots v\left( {a_n \to a_{n + 1} } \right) + D\left( {n \geqslant 0} \right)$$ and the superintuitionistic predicate calculus: (3) $$B^1 DH_2^ \urcorner = BD + intuitionistic negation + H_2^ \urcorner : \urcorner \forall xa \to \exists x \urcorner a.$$ The central point is the completeness proof for (1), which is obtained modifying Klemke's construction [3]. For a general account on negation-free intermediate predicate calculi — see Casari-Minari [1]; for an algebraic treatment of some superintuitionistic predicate calculi involving schemasB andD — see Horn [4] and Görnemann [2].     

On Birkhoff’s Common Abstraction Problem

In his milestone textbook Lattice Theory, Garrett Birkhoff challenged his readers to develop a ??common abstraction?? that includes Boolean algebras and latticeordered groups as special cases. In this paper, after reviewing the past attempts to solve the problem, we provide our own answer by selecting as common generalization of ${\mathcal{B} \mathcal{A}}$ and ${\mathcal{L} \mathcal{G}}$ their join ${\mathcal{B} \mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{L} \mathcal{G}}$ in the lattice of subvarieties of ${\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}}$ (the variety of FL-algebras); we argue that such a solution is optimal under several respects and we give an explicit equational basis for ${\mathcal{B} \mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{L} \mathcal{G}}$ relative to ${\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}}$ . Finally, we prove a Holland-type representation theorem for a variety of FL-algebras containing ${\mathcal{B} \mathcal{A} \vee \mathcal{L} \mathcal{G}}$ .     

Pre- and Post-head Processing for Single- and Double-Scrambled Sentences of a Head-Final Language as Measured by the Eye Tracking Method

Using the eye-tracking method, the present study depicted pre- and post-head processing for simple scrambled sentences of head-final languages. Three versions of simple Japanese active sentences with ditransitive verbs were used: namely, (1) $\text{ SO }_{\!1\!}\text{ O }_{\!2\!}\text{ V }$ canonical, (2) $\text{ SO }_{\!2\!}\text{ O }_{\!1\!}\text{ V }$ single-scrambled, and (3) $\text{ O }_{\!1\!}\text{ O }_{\!2\!}\text{ SV }$ double-scrambled order. First pass reading times indicated that the third noun phrase just before the verb in both single- and double-scrambled sentences required longer reading times compared to canonical sentences. Re-reading times (the sum of all fixations minus the first pass reading) showed that all noun phrases including the crucial phrase before the verb in double-scrambled sentences required longer re-reading times than those required for single-scrambled sentences; single-scrambled sentences had no difference from canonical ones. Therefore, a single filler-gap dependency can be resolved in pre-head anticipatory processing whereas two filler-gap dependencies require much greater cognitive loading than a single case. These two dependencies can be resolved in post-head processing using verb agreement information.     

Dependence and Independence

We introduce an atomic formula ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ intuitively saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are independent from the variables ${\vec{z}}$ if the variables ${\vec{x}}$ are kept constant. We contrast this with dependence logic ${\mathcal{D}}$ based on the atomic formula = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ , actually equivalent to ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{y}}$ , saying that the variables ${\vec{y}}$ are totally determined by the variables ${\vec{x}}$ . We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ gives rise to a natural logic capable of formalizing basic intuitions about independence and dependence. We show that ${\vec{y} \bot_{\vec{x}}\vec{z}}$ can be used to give partially ordered quantifiers and IF-logic an alternative interpretation without some of the shortcomings related to so called signaling that interpretations using = ${(\vec{x}, \vec{y})}$ have.     

What is Nominalistic Mereology?

Hybrid languages are introduced in order to evaluate the strength of “minimal” mereologies with relatively strong frame definability properties. Appealing to a robust form of nominalism, I claim that one investigated language $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {m}}$ is maximally acceptable for nominalistic mereology. In an extension $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {gem}}$ of $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {m}}$ , a modal analog for the classical systems of Leonard and Goodman (J Symb Log 5:45–55, 1940) and Le?niewski (1916) is introduced and shown to be complete with respect to 0-deleted Boolean algebras. We characterize the formulas of first-order logic invariant for $\mathcal {H}_{\textsf {gem}}$ -bisimulations.     

A symmetric and an asymmetric model for the equal-sensation function in olfaction

Data from various intramodel matching experiments in olfaction were analyzed with regard to a symmetric and an asymmetric model for the equal-sensation function. The asymmetric model was discussed in relation to the symmetric model. In all, 11 equal-sensation functions were investigated, and of these 9 were with different pairs of odorants. The following odorants were investigated: hydrogen sulfide, pyridine, dimethyl disulfide, and five odorants obtained by different combustion procedures of animal manure. It was found that the equal-sensation function can be written in the following asymmetric form: $$\varphi _i = b_{ik} \lambda \cdot \varphi _k ^{b_{ik} } ,\psi _i = \psi _k $$ or symmetric form: $$\varphi _i = C^{I - b_{ik} } \cdot \varphi _k ^{b_{ik} } ,\psi _i = \psi _k ,$$ where ?_i and ?_k are stimuli expressed in multiples of respective absolute thresholds, λ and C are general constants invariant of experimental matching method and matched attribute (perceived unpleasantness or intensity). The constants λ and C were calculated both for group data and individual data. The asymmetric form of the equal-sensation function was interpreted in terms of relativity and the symmetric form in terms of measurement.     

Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning

This paper concerns the extent to which uncertain propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, and addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method ${\sf B}_{p}$ , which specifies an initial belief state ${\sf B}_{p}(\top)$ that is revised to the new propositional belief state ${\sf B}(E)$ upon receipt of information E. An acceptance rule tracks Bayesian conditioning when ${\sf B}_{p}(E) = {\sf B}_{p|_{E}}(\top)$ , for every E such that p(E)?>?0; namely, when acceptance by propositional belief revision equals Bayesian conditioning followed by acceptance. Standard proposals for uncertain acceptance and belief revision do not track Bayesian conditioning. The ??Lockean?? rule that accepts propositions above a probability threshold is subject to the familiar lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961), and we show that it is also subject to new and more stubborn paradoxes when the tracking property is taken into account. Moreover, we show that the familiar AGM approach to belief revision (Harper, Synthese 30(1?C2):221?C262, 1975; Alchourrón et al., J Symb Log 50:510?C530, 1985) cannot be realized in a sensible way by any uncertain acceptance rule that tracks Bayesian conditioning. Finally, we present a plausible, alternative approach that tracks Bayesian conditioning and avoids all of the paradoxes. It combines an odds-based acceptance rule proposed originally by Levi (1996) with a non-AGM belief revision method proposed originally by Shoham (1987).     

On All Strong Kleene Generalizations of Classical Logic

By using the notions of exact truth (‘true and not false’) and exact falsity (‘false and not true’), one can give 16 distinct definitions of classical consequence. This paper studies the class of relations that results from these definitions in settings that are paracomplete, paraconsistent or both and that are governed by the (extended) Strong Kleene schema. Besides familiar logics such as Strong Kleene logic (K3), the Logic of Paradox (LP) and First Degree Entailment (FDE), the resulting class of all Strong Kleene generalizations of classical logic also contains a host of unfamiliar logics. We first study the members of our class semantically, after which we present a uniform sequent calculus (the SK calculus) that is sound and complete with respect to all of them. Two further sequent calculi (the \({{\bf SK}^\mathcal{P}}\) and \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{N}}\) calculus) will be considered, which serve the same purpose and which are obtained by applying general methods (due to Baaz et al.) to construct sequent calculi for many-valued logics. Rules and proofs in the SK calculus are much simpler and shorter than those of the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{P}}\) and the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{N}}\) calculus, which is one of the reasons to prefer the SK calculus over the latter two. Besides favourably comparing the SK calculus to both the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{P}}\) and the \({\bf SK}^{\mathcal{N}}\) calculus, we also hint at its philosophical significance.     

Cathodoluminescence-mode imaging of dislocations in zinc oxide

Abstract

The cathodoluminescence mode in the scanning electron microscope has been used to image bands of dislocations in zinc oxide. It has been shown that dislocations lying on pyramidal, {1012}, planes are generated beneath indentations on {0001} surfaces. Basal plane dislocations lying parallel to the surface are also observed. Indentations on {1100} prismatic surfaces result in slip on {0001} and {0110} planes.     

Presupposition and the a priori

This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with ‘ $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}$ ’ abbreviating ‘it is knowable a priori that’).

(AK) For all ?, ψ such that ? semantically presupposes ψ: if $\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\phi, \,\mathcal{K}_\mathcal{A}\psi .$

Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative items of knowledge are made explicit. Likewise, certain kinds of analytic truth turn out to carry semantic presuppositions that make them ineligible as items of a priori knowledge. On a happier note, I argue that (AK) offers an appealing, theory-neutral explanation of the a posteriori character of certain necessary identities, as well as an interesting rationalization for a commonplace linguistic maneuver in philosophical work on the a priori.     

Analytic Calculi for Circular Concepts by Finite Revision

The paper introduces Hilbert– and Gentzen-style calculi which correspond to systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ from Gupta and Belnap [3]. Systems ${\mathsf{C}_{n}}$ were shown to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics of finite revision. Here, it is shown that Gentzen-style systems ${\mathsf{GC}_{n}}$ admit a syntactic proof of cut elimination. As a consequence, it follows that they are consistent.     

The representation of Takeuti's\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} -operator

Gaisi Takeuti has recently proposed a new operation on orthomodular latticesL, \(\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} \) :P(L)»L. The properties of \(\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} \) suggest that the value of \(\begin{array}{*{20}c} \parallel \\ \_ \\ \end{array} \) (A) (A) \( \subseteq \) L) corresponds to the degree in which the elements ofA behave classically. To make this idea precise, we investigate the connection between structural properties of orthomodular latticesL and the existence of two-valued homomorphisms onL.     

The Church–Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory

Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$ , by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$ (KP). The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$ (OP). A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the Church–Fitch paradox is presented following a labelled approach to sequent calculi. First, a cut-free system for classical (resp. intuitionistic) bimodal logic is introduced as the logical basis for the Church–Fitch paradox and the relationships between ${\mathcal {K}}$ and ${\diamondsuit}$ are taken into account. Afterwards, by exploiting the structural properties of the system, in particular cut elimination, the semantic frame conditions that correspond to KP are determined and added in the form of a block of nonlogical inference rules. Within this new system for classical and intuitionistic “knowability logic”, it is possible to give a satisfactory cut-free reconstruction of the Church–Fitch derivation and to confirm that OP is only classically derivable, but neither intuitionistically derivable nor intuitionistically admissible. Finally, it is shown that in classical knowability logic, the Church–Fitch derivation is nothing else but a fallacy and does not represent a real threat for anti-realism.