Expressivism,representation, and the nature of conceptual analysis

Philosophers often hold that the aim of conceptual analysis is to discover the representational content of a given concept such as free will, belief, or law. In From Metaphysics to Ethics and other recent work, Frank Jackson has developed a theory of conceptual analysis that is one of the most advanced systematizations of this widespread idea. I argue that this influential way of characterizing conceptual analysis is too narrow. I argue that it is possible that an expressivist account could turn out to be correct as a genuine conceptual analysis of a genuine concept. I claim that since an expressivist analysis does not aim to discover the representational content of a given concept—and, indeed, might itself be based on the idea that the concept in question is not even representational in nature—the possibility of expressivist conceptual analysis shows that Jackson’s theory of conceptual analysis is incomplete as it currently stands. I conclude that Jackson needs to either shift his basic understanding of the nature of conceptual analysis or commit to a particular normative reinterpretation of his project.     

Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds

We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of language to the world but rather as a mapping between individual meaning spaces. The meanings of linguistic entities are established via a “meeting of minds.” The concepts in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled as convex regions in conceptual spaces. We outline a mathematical framework, based on fixpoints in continuous mappings between conceptual spaces, that can be used to model such a semantics. If concepts are convex, it will in general be possible for interactors to agree on joint meaning even if they start out from different representational spaces. Language is discrete, while mental representations tend to be continuous—posing a seeming paradox. We show that the convexity assumption allows us to address this problem. Using examples, we further show that our approach helps explain the semantic processes involved in the composition of expressions.     

Pictorial and conceptual representation of glimpsed pictures

Pictures seen in a rapid sequence are remembered briefly, but most are forgotten within a few seconds (M. C. Potter. A. Staub, J. Rado. & D. H. O'Connor. 2002). The authors investigated the pictorial and conceptual components of this fleeting memory by presenting 5 pictured scenes and immediately testing recognition of verbal titles (e.g., people at a table) or recognition of the pictures themselves. Recognition declined during testing, but initial performance was higher and the decline steeper when pictures were tested. A final experiment included test decoy pictures that were conceptually similar to but visually distinct from the original pictures. Yeses to decoys were higher than yeses to other distractors. Fleeting memory for glimpsed pictures has a strong conceptual component (conceptual short-term memory), but there is additional highly volatile pictorial memory (pictorial short-term memory) that is not tapped hy a gist title or decoy picture.     

Mental colors,conceptual overlap,and discriminating knowledge of particulars

I respond to the separate commentaries by Jacob Berger, Charlie Pelling, and David Pereplyotchik on my paper, “Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.” I resist Berger’s suggestion that mental colors ever enter consciousness without accompaniment by deployments of concepts of their extra-mental counterparts. I express concerns about Pelling’s proposal that a more uniform conceptualist treatment of phenomenal sorites can be gained by a simple appeal to the partial overlap of the extensions of some concepts. I question the relevance to perceptual consciousness of the arguments for demonstrative concepts that Pereplyotchik attacks.     

A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization

This article presents a theory of categorization that accounts for the effects of causal knowledge that relates the features of categories. According to causal-model theory, people explicitly represent the probabilistic causal mechanisms that link category features and classify objects by evaluating whether they were likely to have been generated by those mechanisms. In 3 experiments, participants were taught causal knowledge that related the features of a novel category. Causal-model theory provided a good quantitative account of the effect of this knowledge on the importance of both individual features and interfeature correlations to classification. By enabling precise model fits and interpretable parameter estimates, causal-model theory helps place the theory-based approach to conceptual representation on equal footing with the well-known similarity-based approaches.     

Communication,representation, and scientific knowledge: A conceptual framework and case study

What is the significance of communication in science? Though the question has been addressed by researchers in a number of fields, most have tended to see communication as an intermediary step on the way to some other phenomenon of interest, aprocess that is only interesting insofar as it produces some other structural or functionalproduct, e.g., documents, organizations, or social groups. From a communication research perspective, however, the communication processes themselves are the object of study. The diversity and flexibility of scientists’ communication behavior, and the complexity of their communication channels, styles, messages and networks, have not been assessed as a set of related phenomena. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to draw together several analytical concepts regarding scientific communication processes that have been proposed by the author elsewhere, including the issue of social representations (Lievrouw, 1990), the scientific communication cycle (Lievrouw and Carley, 1991), and the scholarly research narrative (Lievrouw, 1989, and Mokros and Lievrouw, 1991). The concepts are combined here into one conceptual framework and applied to the case of a single biomedical specialty, lipid metabolism research, which has developed from an esoteric biochemical subfield to a large and well-funded specializaiton with a great deal of influence on American culture’s preoccupation with heart disease.     

Natural predicates and topological structures of conceptual spaces

In the framework of set theory we cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural predicates. To avoid this shortcoming one can use mathematical structures as conceptual spaces such that natural predicates are characterized as structurally nice subsets. In this paper topological and related structures are used for this purpose. We shall discuss several examples taken from conceptual spaces of quantum mechanics (orthoframes), and the geometric logic of refutative and affirmable assertions. In particular we deal with the problem of structurally distinguishing between natural colour predicates and Goodmanian predicates like grue and bleen. Moreover the problem of characterizing natural predicates is reformulated in such a way that its connection with the classical problem of geometric conventionalism becomes manifest. This can be used to shed some new light on Goodman's remarks on the relative entrenchment of predicates as a criterion of projectibility.     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.     

Quality spaces: Mental and physical

Perceptual-role theories of mental qualities hold that we can discover the nature of a being’s mental qualities by investigating that being’s capacity to make perceptual discriminations. Many advocates of perceptual-role theories hold that the best explanation of these capacities is that mental quality spaces are homomorphic to the spaces of the physical properties that they help to discriminate. This paper disputes this thesis on largely empirical grounds, and offers an alternative. The alternative explains interesting patterns in our perception of color differences and similarities across edges, emphasizing the importance of visual discontinuities. Further, it provides a simple explanation of the intransitivity of indiscriminability. The homomorphism thesis can explain this intransitivity only with the addition of an independently unsupported empirical hypothesis. Also, in contrast to the homomorphism thesis, the alternative view is perfectly consistent with empirical data that suggest (a) that the visual system uses the dynamic allocation of a limited range of responses in order to discriminate a wider range of physical stimuli and (b) that we are much better at detecting changes in relative luminance than changes in absolute luminance. Moreover, it does all this while using a more efficient strategy for encoding sensory information.     

Mental representation and two kinds of eliminativism

The battle over the proper place of mental representation in cognitive science is often portrayed as a clash between realism and eliminativism. But this simple dichotomy belies the variety of different ontological positions available. This article investigates the various stances that one can adopt toward the ontology of mental representation, and in so doing, shows that eliminativism is in fact best understood as two distinct positions: a posteriori eliminativism and a priori eliminativism. Furthermore, I show that a priori eliminativism faces two crippling challenges. I argue that once we put a priori eliminativism aside, determining the ultimate ontological status of representation can be postponed while we assess its utility across different domains of cognitive science—something all remaining positions can agree on.     

Myths,metaphors, and mentors

This article begins with a discussion of myths as visions that transform life. The primary myth is that of death and rebirth. Metaphors are images which illumine our myths. Therapists are thus both scientists and poets. The process of being a mentor occurs in a variety of relationships. Our search is for an understanding of this process which then transcends the positions of master and disciple. Mentors need to have a sufficient degree of self-transcendence to enable the focus to be on the person's own unique vision. Mentors light sparks which ignite our myths and metaphors and thereby expand our understanding of ourselves. Mentors become catalysts for our growth and thereby facilitate the process of transformation.The author would like to express his gratitude to Anne Nelson, who helped with editing this article.     

Mental representation from the bottom up

Commonsense psychology and cognitive science both regularly assume the existence of representational states. I propose a naturalistic theory of representation sufficient to meet the pretheoretical constraints of a folk theory of representation, constraints including the capacities for accuracy and inaccuracy, selectivity of proper objects of representation, perspective, articulation, and efficacy or content-determined functionality. The proposed model states that a representing device is a device which changes state when information is received over multiple information channels originating at a single source. The changed state of a representing device is a representation. The unitary information source which would give rise to the information impinging on the representing device, and hence, give rise to the representation, is the content of the representation. The model meets the pretheoretic constraints, and also conforms to available neurobiological data for two invertebrate species.     

ERP evidence for conceptual mappings and comparison processes during the comprehension of conventional and novel metaphors

Cognitive linguists suggest that understanding metaphors requires activation of conceptual mappings between the involved concepts. We tested whether mappings are indeed in use during metaphor comprehension, and what mapping means as a cognitive process with Event-Related Potentials. Participants read literal, conventional metaphorical, novel metaphorical, and anomalous target sentences preceded by primes with related or unrelated mappings. Experiment 1 used sentence-primes to activate related mappings, and Experiment 2 used simile-primes to induce comparison thinking. In the unprimed conditions of both experiments, metaphors elicited N400s more negative than the literals. In Experiment 1, related sentence-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in conventional, but not in novel metaphors. In Experiment 2, related simile-primes reduced the metaphor-literal N400 difference in novel, but not clearly in conventional metaphors. We suggest that mapping as a process occurs in metaphors, and the ways in which it can be facilitated by comparison differ between conventional and novel metaphors.     

Philosophical intuitions,heuristics, and metaphors

Psychological explanations of philosophical intuitions can help us assess their evidentiary value, and our warrant for accepting them. To explain and assess conceptual or classificatory intuitions about specific situations, some philosophers have suggested explanations which invoke heuristic rules proposed by cognitive psychologists. The present paper extends this approach of intuition assessment by heuristics-based explanation, in two ways: It motivates the proposal of a new heuristic, and shows that this metaphor heuristic helps explain important but neglected intuitions: general factual intuitions which have been highly influential in the philosophies of mind and perception but neglected in ongoing debates in the epistemology of philosophy. To do so, the paper integrates results from three philosophically pertinent but hitherto largely unconnected strands of psychological research: research on intuitive judgement, analogy and metaphor, and memory-based processing, respectively. The paper shows that the heuristics-based explanation thus obtained satisfies the key requirements cognitive psychologists impose on such explanations, that it can explain the philosophical intuitions targeted, and that this explanation supports normative assessment of the intuitions’ evidentiary value: It reveals whether particular intuitions are due to proper exercise of cognitive competencies or constitute cognitive illusions.     

Refraining, metaphors, myths and fairy-tales

Consideration is given to the question as to whether the change produced by refraining is mere sophistry or reflects a more fundamental alteration in the way in which a situation is construed. However, such philosophical questions touching on the nature of reality can be avoided if actions, rather than the problematical situation, are made the subject of interest. The nature of metaphor is briefly explored, exhibiting the manner in which it may be regarded as an example of refraining. Myths and fairytales may be employed as extended metaphors and can then function as vehicles for refraining. As an illustration, a case of anorexia is described where refraining occurs around a fairy-tale.