青少年风险决策的发展认知神经机制

随着认知神经科学技术的发展, 青少年风险决策的发展认知神经机制成为了新近的一个热点课题。从双系统理论模型(社会情感神经网络系统、认知控制神经网络系统)出发, 对与青少年风险决策相关的大脑结构、功能的变化进行了阐述, 重点分析了新近的大脑功能连接、脑网络的研究; 阐述了青少年风险决策认知神经机制的主要理论模型：双系统模型和三角模型。未来研究还应加强对认知神经机制理论模型的检验、整合和创新, 从社会认知神经科学的角度深入研究社会参照系统(同伴关系、亚文化等)在青少年风险决策中的作用及机制, 以及从认知神经层面如何预防和干预青少年高风险行为。     

New scanner data for brand marketers: How neuroscience can help better understand differences in brand preferences

A core goal for marketers is effective segmentation: partitioning a brand's or product's consumer base into distinct and meaningful groups with differing needs. Traditional segmentation data include factors like geographic location, demographics, and shopping history. Yet, research into the cognitive and affective processes underlying consumption decisions shows that these variables can improve the matching of consumers with products beyond traditional demographic and benefit approaches. We propose, using managing a brand as an example, that neuroscience provides a novel way to establish mappings between cognitive processes and traditional marketing data. An improved understanding of the neural mechanisms of decision making will enhance the ability of marketers to effectively market their products. Just as neuroscience can model potential influences on the decision process—including pricing, choice strategy, context, experience, and memory—it can also provide new insights into individual differences in consumption behavior and brand preferences. We outline such a research agenda for incorporating neuroscience data into future attempts to match consumers to brands.     

Goal-directed decision making as probabilistic inference: a computational framework and potential neural correlates

Recent work has given rise to the view that reward-based decision making is governed by two key controllers: a habit system, which stores stimulus-response associations shaped by past reward, and a goal-oriented system that selects actions based on their anticipated outcomes. The current literature provides a rich body of computational theory addressing habit formation, centering on temporal-difference learning mechanisms. Less progress has been made toward formalizing the processes involved in goal-directed decision making. We draw on recent work in cognitive neuroscience, animal conditioning, cognitive and developmental psychology, and machine learning to outline a new theory of goal-directed decision making. Our basic proposal is that the brain, within an identifiable network of cortical and subcortical structures, implements a probabilistic generative model of reward, and that goal-directed decision making is effected through Bayesian inversion of this model. We present a set of simulations implementing the account, which address benchmark behavioral and neuroscientific findings, and give rise to a set of testable predictions. We also discuss the relationship between the proposed framework and other models of decision making, including recent models of perceptual choice, to which our theory bears a direct connection.     

Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation

It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system (System 1) is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other (System 2) is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher‐order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision‐making. This is not to suggest that System 2 must operate alone in forming our moral decisions, but that it plays a normatively ineliminable role. In this paper, I discuss arguments that have been offered in defense of reflectivism. These arguments fit into two broad categories; let us think of them as two sides of a coin. On the first side are arguments about the efficaciousness of conscious reasoning—for example, without conscious deliberation we will make bad moral judgments and decisions. On the other side of the coin are arguments about the centrality of conscious deliberation to normative actions—for example, without conscious deliberation we are no more agential than animals or automatons. Despite their attractiveness, I argue that these arguments do not successfully establish that reflection is a necessary component of good moral judgment and decision‐making. If I am right, the idea that good moral judgment and decision‐making can result from entirely automatic and subconscious processes gains traction. My goal in this paper is to show that reflectivism fails to include the full range of cases of moral decision‐making and that a theory of automaticity may do a better job. I briefly discuss at the end of the paper how an account of successful automatic moral judgment and decision‐making might begin to take shape.     

Modeling adaptive cooperative and competitive metaphors as mental models for joint decision making

In this paper, joint decision making processes are studied and the role of cognitive metaphors as mental models in them. A second-order self-modeling network model is introduced based on mechanisms known from cognitive and social neuroscience and cognitive metaphor and mental model literature. The cognitive metaphors were modeled as specific forms of mental models providing a form of modulation within the joint decision making process. The model addresses not only the use of these mental models in the decision making, but also their hebbian learning and the control over the learning. The obtained self-modeling network model was applied to two types of metaphors that affect joint decision making in different manners: a cooperative metaphor and a competitive metaphor. By a number of scenarios it was shown how the obtained self-modeling network model can be used to simulate and analyze joint decision processes and how they are influenced by such cognitive metaphors.     

Multi-attribute utility analysis using the promes approach

Traditional utility analyses have focused on the economic value of increased job performance. While providing a great deal of information to decision makers, such approaches fail to account for other potentially critical outcomes of implementing a selection system (e.g. legal exposure). This paper proposes a new method for incorporating multiple outcomes in utility analysis. An example shows how to incorporate economic gains due to job performance, legal exposure, effect on protected groups, and organizational image in the decision to implement a new selection system. Integrating these four outcomes into utility analysis captures managerial policy that will allow examination of the process of using utility information to aid decision making. In addition, the method is amenable to use of sensitivity, breakeven, and Monte Carlo analyses advocated by utility researchers (Boudreau, 1991).     

Responsibility and the Brain Sciences

Some theorists think that the more we get to know about the neural underpinnings of our behaviors, the less likely we will be to hold people responsible for their actions. This intuition has driven some to suspect that as neuroscience gains insight into the neurological causes of our actions, people will cease to view others as morally responsible for their actions, thus creating a troubling quandary for our legal system. This paper provides empirical evidence against such intuitions. Particularly, our studies of folk intuitions suggest that (1) when the causes of an action are described in neurological terms, they are not found to be any more exculpatory than when described in psychological terms, and (2) agents are not held fully responsible even for actions that are fully neurologically caused.     

Not only in the brain: Cabanis and the Montpellierian tradition of localization

Antonio Damasio (1995) has recently presented evidence to the effect that we are perhaps wrong in thinking that it is only the brain that thinks. Rational decision making involves emotional reactions as a necessary condition and background. And since emotions involve bodily reactions which are not limited to the brain but which embrace the autonomous nervous system and the viscera, one could say that we actually think with our bodies and not merely with our brains. According to Damasio the incapacity of patients with frontal lobe pathology in decision making could be explained by a disturbance in emotional reactions involving the whole organism. Philosophical discussions concerning brains in a vat have completely forgotten these aspects of our mental life. Despite the fact that the idea that we think exclusively with our brains has during the modern age been a rather widely held "received view," there is a physiological and philosophical tradition which regarded mental functions as the result of the interaction of several organs, instead of seeing them as the result of the activity of the brain alone.     

Ethical Concepts and Future Challenges of Neuroimaging: An Islamic Perspective

Neuroscience is advancing at a rapid pace, with new technologies and approaches that are creating ethical challenges not easily addressed by current ethical frameworks and guidelines. One fascinating technology is neuroimaging, especially functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). Although still in its infancy, fMRI is breaking new ground in neuroscience, potentially offering increased understanding of brain function. Different populations and faith traditions will likely have different reactions to these new technologies and the ethical challenges they bring with them. Muslims are approximately one-fifth of world population and they have a specific and highly regulated ethical and moral code, which helps them deal with scientific advances and decision making processes in an Islamically ethical manner. From this ethical perspective, in light of the relevant tenets of Islam, neuroimaging poses various challenges. The privacy of spirituality and the thought process, the requirement to put community interest before individual interest, and emphasis on conscious confession in legal situations are Islamic concepts that can pose a challenge for the use of something intrusive such as an fMRI. Muslim moral concepts such as There shall be no harm inflicted or reciprocated in Islam and Necessities overrule prohibitions are some of the criteria that might appropriately be used to guide advancing neuroscience. Neuroscientists should be particularly prudent and well prepared in implementing neuroscience advances that are breaking new scientific and ethical ground. Neuroscientists should also be prepared to assist in setting the ethical frameworks in place in advance of what might be perceived as runaway applications of technology.     

What do infants understand of others’ action? A theoretical account of early social cognition

Intention reading and action understanding have been reported in ever-younger infants. However, the notions of intention attribution and action understanding, as well as their relation to each other, are surrounded by much confusion, making it difficult to assess the meaning and value of such findings. In this paper we set out to clarify the notions of ‘action understanding’ and ‘intention attribution’. We will show that what is commonly referred to as ‘action understanding’ in fact encompasses various heterogeneous association and prediction mechanisms. In general, these forms of action understanding will not result in the attribution of an intention to an observed actor. By detaching intention attribution from action understanding, and by exposing the latter as an umbrella notion, we provide a theoretical framework on early social cognition that allows for better comparison of findings from different experimental paradigms, and better assessment of infant action understanding abilities. Taking into account the plurality of forms that action understanding can adopt will help cognitive neuroscience to gain a full understanding of the early roots of social cognition.     

对影响“临床决策”负面因素的剖析与探讨

临床决策是医疗实践过程中的中心环节,直接关系到病人的治疗效果。在决策形成和实施过程中受到各方面因素的制约,主要包括两个方面医生自身方面因素,如医生素质、技术水平、决策思维能力等;医生自身以外的因素,如卫生政策、药品及其它医疗器材的流通环节、医保制度、医院经营方针,其它因素如社会、伦理、法律、经济等无不影响着医疗决策的正确实施。因此,要排除干扰,努力实施科学的临床决策,不仅要加强医生本身的素质和技术层面的培养和提高,更需要全社会、患者和广大公众给予理解和支持。     

神经科学偏见效应：可重复性及其心理机制的探索

神经科学的发展对其他学科以及社会产生了重要的影响。虽然神经科学方法与行为研究方法都是探索人类心理与行为的有效手段并各有所长, 但神经科学的研究结果却可能引起人们过度的解读和信任。研究者发现, 当某一结论使用神经科学结果作为证据时, 比使用行为科学结果或者心理生理学指标作为证据时更加让人信服, 即使神经科学结果与该结论之间毫无关系, 这种现象被称为神经科学偏见(neuroscience bias)。通过系统回顾近年来关于神经科学偏见的研究, 我们发现：(1)虽然神经科学偏见存在可重复性的争论, 但该效应确实存在; (2)神经科学偏见的产生可能是因为个体倾向于还原论的解释(即使用低层次、简单的机制来解释更高层次上的现象)及心理本质主义的影响(即人们认为心理与行为的本质是神经活动)。神经科学偏见反映了公众对科学结果解读的偏见, 未来研究需要探讨这种偏见的心理机制, 从而引导科学结果的正确解读和运用。     

The path to epigenetic treatment of memory disorders

A new line of neuroscience research suggests that epigenetics may be the site of nature and nurture integration by providing the environment with a mechanism to directly influence the read-out of our genome. Epigenetic mechanisms in the brain are a series of post-translational chromatin and DNA modifications driven by external input. Given the critical hub that epigenetics appears to be, neuroscientists have come to suspect its fundamental influence on how our minds change in response to our unique environment and, in turn, how these changes can then impact our future interactions with the environment. The field of learning and memory is becoming particularly interested in understanding the cognitive influence of epigenetics. With the majority of us working with an eye toward therapeutics, the question naturally arises: "Has neuroepigenetics gotten us closer to treating memory disorders and if so, where do we go from here?" This review will begin with a brief exploration of recent advances in our understanding of how epigenetic mechanisms contribute to learning and memory processes that are susceptible to failure. Next the implications for disorders of cognition, such as Alzheimer's disease, will be discussed. Finally, we will use parallels from the field of cancer to speculate on where we should consider heading from here in the pursuit of therapeutics.     

Cortico-limbic-striatal circuits subserving different forms of cost-benefit decision making

Research on the neural basis that underlies decision making in humans has revealed that these processes are mediated by distributed neural networks that incorporate different regions of the frontal lobes, the amygdala, the ventral striatum, and the dopamine system. In the present article, we review recent studies in rodents investigating the contribution of these systems to different forms of cost-benefit decision making and focus on evaluations related to delays, effort, or risks associated with certain rewards. Anatomically distinct regions of the medial and orbital prefrontal cortex make dissociable contributions to different forms of decision making, although lesions of these regions can induce variable effects, depending on the type of tasks used to assess these functions. The basolateral amygdala and the nucleus accumbens play a more fundamental role in these evaluations, helping an organism overcome different costs to obtain better rewards. Dopamine activity biases behavior toward more costly yet larger rewards, although abnormal increases in dopamine transmission can exert opposing actions on different types of decision making. The fact that similar neural circuits are recruited to solve these types of problems in both humans and animals suggests that animal models of decision making will prove useful in elucidating the mechanisms mediating these processes.     

The Relation Between Perception and Action: What Should Neuroscience Learn From Psychology?

Research in neuroscience is making progress toward understanding the "dorsal" mechanisms responsible for the fast modulation by optical information of actions such as reaching and grasping. The function of "ventral" visual pathways is not to support perception, as distinct from action. Instead, it is to control extended actions that unfold over longer time scales and draw on optical information over larger spatial scales, than simple, fast limb movements. Perception and sensation should be regarded as particular forms of extended communicative actions and not as alternative end points for the use of environmental information. The neural mechanisms involved in controlling extended actions are not yet understood, and psychological theory has a role to play in framing their investigation by neuroscience.     

Inaction inertia

Inaction inertia occurs when bypassing an initial action opportunity has the effect of decreasing the likelihood that subsequent similar action opportunities will be taken. This overview of the inaction inertia literature demonstrates the impact of inaction inertia on decision making. Based on research on the causes of inaction inertia, we show that it is a multi-determined phenomenon, explained by both valuation and regret considerations. Moreover, we demonstrate how a sour grapes explanation of inaction inertia might integrate these two accounts. Furthermore, we explain when inaction inertia is most likely to occur and how it can be prevented. We conclude that the inaction inertia literature does not only add to our understanding of this intriguing phenomenon, but also contributes to related social psychological phenomena, such as the sunk cost effect, sequential decision making, decision avoidance (e.g., choice deferral, status quo bias, decisional conflict), and procrastination.     

An integrated approach to estimating suicide risk

It is ironic that if we had a perfect predictive instrument we would not be able to recognize it because it could never be validated by its critical outcome criterion. Though some exceptions could occur, we would be obliged to take all available measures to prevent a suicidal outcome in cases where suicide was predicted. After the crisis we could have no way of knowing with certainty whether the person would have suicided or not. Even if we accepted the reality that people are not either 0% or 100% likely to suicide, and developed a perfect scale to estimate degree of risk, we would still be unable to validate it in individual cases. If it indicated "moderate" risk of 2.5-5.0%, for example, and no intervention were offered, we would have to observe one suicide in every 20-40 persons assessed at this level of risk to demonstrate its validity. The key to assessment is obtaining information, primarily regarding present or anticipated pain and the threshold of pain tolerance in the individual involved. Since different persons communicate in a variety of ways--verbal, nonverbal, symbolic, metaphoric, etc., eclecticism in approach is essential. For some clinicians communication will be facilitated most by one style; for others, a different method would be most effective. Thus, the "best" approach is the one that works best given the unique characteristics of the persons involved and under the conditions existing at the time. My own bias is that every assessment, whatever the approach, must include some form of direct inquiry regarding suicidal intent, and that the final decision in this regard must be a subjective and intuitive judgment. Contrary to possible assumptions in the legal world, accurate assessment does not necessarily mean safety. It can serve as a guide to the degree of risk that may be involved in a treatment program, but even low risk management measures may have an adverse outcome without implications of negligence or carelessness. There has been no mention here of biological markers of suicide, which are of much current interest but still in an investigational stage. Similarly, rational suicide has not been mentioned, though our aging population and the status of AIDS are making this issue progressively more important. The principles involved in assessment of risk are the same as with other forms of suicide, however. Finally, we can only presume that more precise assessment will operate to reduce suicidal deaths.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)