Semiotic transformations in psychoanalysis with infants and adults

The author addresses issues that emerge when we compare psychoanalytic experiences with adults and with infants. Two analyses-one with a 35 year-old woman and one with a 2 week-old boy and his mother-illustrate that infant psychoanalytic experiences help us understand and handle adult transference. However, we cannot extrapolate infant experiences to adult work. Truly, witnessing the baby's communication widens our sensitivity to non-verbal layers of the adult's communication. Infant work also offers a direct encounter with the container and the contained personified by a mother with her baby. But we need to conceptualize carefully the links between clinical experiences with babies and adults. When we call an adult transference pattern 'infantile', we imply that primeval experience has been transformed into present behaviour. However, if we view the analytical situation as one in which infantile invariants have transformed into adult symptoms, we face the impossible task of indicating the roots of the present symptoms. The author rather suggests that what is transformed is not an invariant infantile essence but signs denoting the patient's inner reality. He proposes we define transformation as a semiotic process instead of building it on an essentialist grounding. If we view the analytic situation as a map of signs that we translate during our psychoanalytic work, we can proceed into defining containment as a semiotic process. This idea will be linked with a conceptualization of the mother-infant relation in semiotic terms.     

Translating the Stuttering Severity Instrument (SSI-3) into Persian: Response to Karimi, Nilipour, Shafiei and Howell

Karimi, Nilipour, Shafiei and Howell have raised some issues in regards to a study of which we were authors (Bakhtiar, Seifpanahi, Hossein, Ghanadzade & Packman, 2010). In that study, we reported the translation of the Stuttering Severity Instrument-3 (SSI-3) into Persian and reported its reliability when used with 12 Persian speaking preschool children who stutter, in Iran. Karimi et al. criticize our methods and claim that we did not specify that the translated test be used with preschoolers. In this response, we maintain that their criticisms of our methods are largely unfounded, especially the suggestion that we did not follow the WHO guidelines for translating questionnaires in our translation procedure. In addition, we show that we did in fact stipulate in our paper that the Persian SSI-3 should be used with preschoolers and that Karimi et al. misquoted us in their claim that we did not.     

Effective Psychotherapy With Low-income Clients: The Importance of Attending to Social Class

The purpose of this article is to explore some of the issues associated with conducting psychotherapy with low-income clients. Throughout the article, we draw from our specific clinical experiences working with low-income Latina mothers in a depression prevention program. The themes that we address regarding class and psychotherapy are in the areas of assessment of social class, integration of class issues into the therapy process, and managing differences in social class between therapists and clients. As we discuss these themes, we provide concrete recommendations in order to advance awareness and effectiveness in working with economically disadvantaged populations.     

The Psychology of Inspiration

Inspiration is a concept of longstanding interest in diverse areas of academia, but it has only recently become the subject of rigorous scientific investigation. In this article, we review the emerging scientific literature on inspiration, with a focus on both theory and findings. First, we present a general definition of inspiration based on an integrative literature review, and we outline approaches to differentiating the general inspiration construct into specific types. Second, we review the literature on construct validity. Third, we present substantive theory and findings, with an emphasis on the role of inspiration in promoting attainment of elusive goods, such as creativity, productivity, and happiness. Finally, we respond to frequent questions and misconceptions about inspiration, and we offer recommendations about how to promote inspiration in others or oneself.     

The Relation of Social Support to Depression in Massively Multiplayer Online Role‐Playing Games

It has been suggested that involvement in massively multiplayer online role‐playing games (MMORPGs) provides users with a sense of support and community. In the present study, we examined the possible buffering effects of MMORPGs on depression. First, we examined whether higher involvement in MMORPGs was associated with higher levels of perceived social support. Second, we examined whether, consistent with past research, higher levels of perceived social support were associated with lower levels of nonclinical depression. Using structural equation modeling, we found that involvement in MMORPGs was not associated with perceived social support. However, we further confirmed that a lack of perceived social support is associated with higher levels of depression. Implications for MMORPGs and its players are discussed.     

The Visual Role of Objects' Facing Surfaces

It is often assumed that when we see common opaque objects in standard light this is in virtue of seeing their facing surfaces. Here I argue that we should reject that claim. Either we don't see objects' facing surfaces, or—if we hold on to the claim that we do see such things—it is at least not in virtue of seeing them that we see common opaque objects. I end by showing how this conclusion squares both with our intuitions and with the facts of vision science.     

Doing without Desert

The idea of 'moral responsibility' is typically linked with praise and blame, and with the notion of 'the voluntary'. It is often thought that if we are free, in the relevant sense, we may "deserve" praise or blame; otherwise, we do not. But when we look at whether and why we need the notions of praise and blame, we find that they are not as intimately connected with desert as many philosophers have thought. In particular, this paper challenges the idea that forms of evaluation and behavior tied to our "reactive attitudes" (especially resentment) best further morality's aims, properly understood.     

Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy and Psychological Treatments in Australia

In this article, we focus on the various recent healthcare reforms in Australia and their implication for cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT). Specifically, we focus on three areas relevant to CBT in Australia. After discussing the background of mental healthcare in Australia, we highlight the impact that recent health reforms have had on the foregrounding of evidence-based treatment, with CBT as a focus. Second, we consider the limitations to therapy in this country, in particular the 10-session limit within the Medicare system acting as a limitation on therapy. Finally, we discuss the impact of the acceptance of psychological treatment, and mental illness more generally in Australia.     

Countertransference and the Erotic

Eros is like a huge spark that ignites our passion and then confronts us with the problem of living out this fire in ordinary space and time. What do we each know of this spark, this flame? Who or what was it’s object? Where have we felt this force for unity in ourselves, with another person, with life itself? Where are we unlived erotically? Where are the chinks in our erotic life? In focusing on the erotic in clinical work, we usually begin with the analysand’s transference. I want to explore eros in the life of the analyst for our relation to eros influences the clinical work we do. When eros is constellated, two possibilities of relationship present themselves: to an actual other who must be reckoned with as real, and to a psychic content, equally real, which we do not invent or control. How do we experience this electricity? What is our desire like? What does it take us back to, and toward what unseen purpose does it propel us? Eros brings with it a sense of purpose, of going somewhere important, something that enlists body, soul, and spirit.     

Knowing The World By Knowing One's Mind

This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledgeunderlying this argument presupposes that we canlearn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughtsare propositional attitudes rather than contentlessstates. If, however, externalism is correct andthought content consists in the systematic dependencyof internal states on relational properties, we cannotknow non-empirically whether or not we havepropositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (apropositional attitude) is consistent with us lackingthe ability to rule out, via introspection, thepossibility that we don't have any propositionalattitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledgeof what is in our minds, but not that we haveminds. Hence, the combination of externalism with thedoctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allowfor an a priori refutation of skepticism and istherefore unproblematic.     

The self and eating disorders

In our review, we focus on self-related constructs in the context of eating disorders with four aims. First, we examine a variety of self-related constructs that have been theoretically and empirically linked to the development and course of eating disorders. In addition to the more well-researched constructs of self-esteem and self-efficacy, we also report on findings related to selflessness, contingent self-worth, self-objectification, ego-syntonicity, self-concept clarity, self-compassion, social comparison, self-oriented perfectionism/self-criticism, and narcissism. Second, we discuss self-related constructs that may be especially relevant to comorbidities common among those with eating disorders. Third, we review intervention and prevention programs where self-related constructs play a prominent role. Lastly, we share future research directions regarding self-related constructs and eating disorders that we believe will advance a deeper understanding of the role of the self in the eating disorders.     

On Alienation from the Built Environment

If “environment” means “that which environs us,” it isn’t clear why environmentalist thinkers so often identify it with nature and not with the built environment that a quick glance around would reveal is what we’re actually environed by. It’s a familiar claim that we’re “alienated from nature,” but I argue that what we’re really alienated from is the built environment itself. Typically talk of alienation from nature involves the claim that we fail to acknowledge nature’s otherness, but the built environment is just as other from us as the natural one. And just as we are said to fail to recognize the role of nature as the origin of everything with which we have to do in the world, so too we fail to recognize the role of socially organized human labor in the objects that surround us. Overcoming alienation would require acknowledging the builtness and the sociality of the world we inhabit.     

Responsible to whom? Responsible for what? Some ethical issues in community intervention

Conclusion Each ethical decision is a blend of general principles and contextual features. Many require compromises between competing values, must be made in the absence of perfect information, and require the courage to confront mistakes.In community intervention, we have seen that adopting a collaborative paradigm imposes the freedom to determine to whom we are responsible for our actions. A rationale was offered for giving priority to the most vulnerable group, even though this strategy leaves us with an accountability gap in which the group to whom we owe primary loyality is least likely to be able to call us to account.When we reject the professional-client paradigm in community psychology, we lose the formal contract as a device for setting the terms and limiting the scope of our responsibility. We do the best reconnaissance we can, but even with careful data-gathering we are condemned to act on the basis of imperfect information. We must follow through on unforseen consequences even when we have no formal role to mandate our perseverence.The community as a setting for psychological intervention faces us, then, with ethical challenges: we work for the well-being of groups too broad to give informed consent to our interventions; we act in collaboration with others, but collaborative action does not free us from professional obligation; we reconnoiter, but reconnaissance does not provide us with perfect information; we may advise while others act, but we cannot walk away from the consequences of their actions. Ethical decision making, in the community as elsewhere, is a creative act in which we invent our profession choice by choice. Editor's Note: The subject of ethics, in the specific context of Community Psychology, deserves our attention. This paper provided us with an opportunity for such attention. My own reactions to it were of sufficient range to lead me to invite commentary from individuals with a range of views. Thanks is extended to the eight authors whose comments immediately follow.The cases in this paper were first presented in talks given to the Canadian Psychological Association and the Ontario Psychological Association. On both occasions, Carole Sinclair made valuable comments on the material; Elaine Campbell and David Colquhoun also contributed to the present formulation of these issues. In the editorial process, three anonymous reviewers made many valuable suggestions. The paper was written while the author was Invited Professor at the University of Montreal.     

Solidarity and Social Moral Rules

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us.     

Being moved

In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode is a distinct emotion. Indeed, being moved, we claim, is the experience of a positive core value (particular object) perceived by the moved subject as standing out (formal object) in the circumstances triggering the emotion. Drawing on numerous examples, we describe the distinctively rich phenomenology characteristic of the experience as well as the far-reaching action-tendencies and functions associated with it. Having thus shown that the candidate emotion seem to satisfy the five criteria, we go on, in section three, to compare it with sadness and joy, arguing that it should not be confused with either. Finally, in section four, we illustrate the explanatory power of our account of “being moved” by showing how it can shed light on, and maybe even justify, the widespread distrust we feel towards the exhibition of ‘sentimentality’. On the whole and if we are right, we have uncovered an emotion which, though never or rarely talked about, is of great interest and no small importance.     

'Deny Yourself and Take up Your Cross': John Calvin on the Christian Life

John Calvin's vision of the Christian life is guided by the fundamental insight that what distorts our lives more than anything else is our blind self-love. This self-love is the reason why we love to hear things that flatter us, and hate to hear things that truly reveal who we are. Our self-love also provides the driving engine behind our pride, ambition and arrogance, whereby we seek the meaning of our lives in power, wealth and honor, so that we may despise those we consider to be inferior to us. If we are to be transformed more and more into the image and likeness of God, so that we may at the end be united with God in eternal life, we must eradicate this blind self-love from our hearts. Although there is much in Calvin's vision of the Christian life that may strike us as odd or even as alien, it is hard to disagree with his insight that blind self-love is the primary reason our lives do not express the image and likeness of God.     

Luck, Evidence and War

abstract   We seem to have conflicting intuitions regarding luck and war, and we seem to be faced with a dilemma. Either, we deny that a war can be made just or unjust as a result of luck, and we accept that we should not appeal to the outcome when claiming that the war was or was not justified. Or, alternatively, we allow that it is legitimate to base our judgements on the outcome, but as a result we must accept that luck can make a war just or unjust. Traditionally, these have been taken to be the two forks of the dilemma, but, in this paper, I argue that they are not the only options. Rather, we can appeal to the outcome of our actions without claiming that this is, in anyway, an appeal to moral luck. Rather, the outcome provides us with evidence.     

Mediation in discrimination transfers: A reply to Cole and Medin

In replying to Cole and Medin we agree with their main point that a demonstration of the existence of mediation in young children no longer constitutes an important theoretical contribution. However, we emphasize the features of the Brown and Scott study which we believe make it more than an existence demonstration. Furthermore, we have some quarrels with Cole and Medin's general assessment of the problems in the area and wish to raise a further question: Do the shift paradigms thus far employed deal with mediated learning or mediated transfer?     

Discrimination based on gender and ethnicity in English and Polish housing markets

Discrimination in the housing market is associated with decreased social integration and is costly at both social and individual levels. Here, we studied discrimination in English and Polish housing markets. In line with previous research, we expected ethnic‐ and gender‐based discrimination to occur in both housing markets. Conducting a preregistered field experiment of discrimination in the housing market, we sent e‐mails with inquiries about advertisements for 960 rentals in England and Poland. Inquiries were signed with Arabic‐, English‐, or Polish‐sounding male and female names. As a measure of discrimination, we calculated the proportion of answers that we received. In the English housing market, there was no statistically significant difference between the proportions of responses received for inquiries signed with Arabic, English, or Polish male or female names. In the Polish housing market, we received fewer responses to inquiries signed with Arabic male names than inquiries signed with any other names. The study shows discrimination against Arabic men in the Polish housing market, but there was no evidence of ethnic‐ or gender‐based discrimination in the English housing market. The results are discussed against the subordinate male target hypothesis as well as the current social and political situations in both countries.     

UK occupational/organizational psychology,applied science and applied humanism: Some further thoughts on what we have forgotten

We argue that if we lose the essentially humanistic orientation of early psychology we risk becoming ‘servants of power’. If we focus on technique, we risk becoming technicians. If we ignore the political we risk powerlessness. We maintain our position that applied psychology has immense potential in serving humanity, but wastes energy seeking legitimacy through pursuing an outdated notion of science. Finally, we continue to believe that psychology may be in danger of forgetting pioneering work, with consequent neglect of much that is valuable, not least our values and raison d'etre.