A direct comparison of infants' use of featural and spatiotemporal information when individuating objects in a non-occlusion event-monitoring design

A central issue within the field of object individuation concerns the kind of information that infants rely on when they succeed in individuating objects. By means of the violation-of-expectation strategy, the present study reports a comparison of 8.0- and 6.5-month-old infants' use of featural and spatiotemporal information in a new non-occlusion event-monitoring design. Using a mirror setup the memory demands were minimized, because all apparent changes in the unexpected test events took place in full view of the infants. The results indicate that the 8.0- and 6.5-month-old infants individuated objects successfully regardless of whether they were provided with featural or spatiotemporal information. The results are discussed in relation to the relevant literature.     

Use of kind information for object individuation in young domestic chicks

In this paper, we studied the ability of newborn chicks to use kind information (sortal objects) provided by social and food attractors to determine the number of distinct objects present in an event (object individuation). Newly hatched chicks were reared with five imprinting objects and were fed mealworms. Chicks’ spontaneous tendency to approach the larger group of items was exploited. At test, on day 2 post-hatching, chicks observed two events in which objects, differing in kind, were each hidden behind one of two identical screens. Approaching either screen was considered a preferential choice. In Experiment 1, chicks presented with two social versus two food attractors did not exhibit any preference. In contrast, in Experiment 2, when chicks saw two different attractors (one social and one food) hidden behind a screen and one attractor hidden twice (i.e. moved back and forth two times) behind the other screen, they spontaneously approached the two different attractors rather than the single one seen twice. An explanation based on the preference for the more varied set was ruled out in Experiment 3: chicks did not preferentially choose between two different versus two identical objects when both groups were simultaneously presented. Results suggest for the first time that a non-human species uses kind information for individuating objects in a cross-basic-level contrast (i.e. food and social items) with minimal experience. As social and food stimuli differ in property as well as in kind information, the alternative explanation accounting for use of property information alone is also discussed.     

Primates do not spontaneously use shape properties for object individuation: a competence or a performance problem?

Several recent studies have documented that non-human primates can individuate objects according to property and/or kind information in much the same way as human infants do from around one year of age when they begin to acquire language. Some studies suggest, however, that only some properties are used for the individuation of food items: color, but not shape. The present study investigated whether these findings reveal a true competence problem with shape properties in the food domain or whether they merely reveal a performance problem (e.g., lack of attention to shapes). We tested 25 great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas) in two food individuation tasks. We manipulated subjects’ experience with differences in color and shape properties of food items. Results indicated (i) that all subjects, regardless of their prior experience, solved the color-based object individuation task and (ii) that only the group with previous experience with different shape properties succeeded in the shape-based individuation task. Great apes can thus be primed to take shape into account for individuating food objects, and this results clearly speaks in favor of a performance (rather than a competence) problem in using shape for object individuation of food items.     

The emergence of kind-based object individuation in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 12-month-old infants use perceptual property information in a complex object individuation task, using the violation-of-expectancy looking time method (Xu, 2002; Xu & Carey, 1996). Infants were shown two objects with different properties emerge and return behind an occluder, one at a time. The occluder was then removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome, if property differences support individuation) or one object (unexpected outcome). In Experiments 1-3, infants failed to use color, size, or a combination of color, size, and pattern differences to establish a representation of two distinct objects behind an occluder. In Experiment 4, infants succeeded in using cross-basic-level-kind shape differences to establish a representation of two objects but failed to do so using within-basic-level-kind shape differences. Control conditions found that the methods were sensitive. Infants succeeded when provided unambiguous spatiotemporal information for two objects, and they encoded the property differences during these experiments. These findings suggest that by 12 months, different properties play different roles in a complex object individuation task. Certain salient shape differences enter into the computation of numerical distinctness of objects before other property differences such as color or size. Since shape differences are often correlated with object kind differences, these results converge with others in the literature that suggest that by the end of the first year of life, infants' representational systems begin to distinguish kinds and properties.     

Object manipulation facilitates kind-based object individuation of shape-similar objects

Five experiments investigated the importance of shape and object manipulation when 12-month-olds were given the task of individuating objects representing exemplars of kinds in an event-mapping design. In Experiments 1 and 2, results of the study from Xu, Carey, and Quint (2004, Experiment 4) were partially replicated, showing that infants were able to individuate two natural-looking exemplars from different categories, but not two exemplars from the same category. In Experiment 3, infants failed to individuate two shape-similar exemplars (from Pauen, 2002a) from different categories. However, Experiment 4 revealed that allowing infants to manipulate objects shortly before the individuation task enabled them to individuate shape-similar objects from different categories. In Experiment 5, allowing object manipulation did not induce infants to individuate natural-looking objects from the same category. These findings suggest that object manipulation facilitates kind-based individuation of shape-similar objects by 12-month-olds.     

Object individuation and labelling in 6-month-old infants

The ability to determine how many objects are involved in physical events is fundamental for reasoning about the world that surrounds us. Previous studies suggest that infants can fail to individuate objects in ambiguous occlusion events until their first birthday and that learning words for the objects may play a crucial role in the development of this ability. The present eye-tracking study tested whether the classical object individuation experiments underestimate young infants’ ability to individuate objects and the role word learning plays in this process. Three groups of 6-month-old infants (N = 72) saw two opaque boxes side by side on the eye-tracker screen so that the content of the boxes was not visible. During a familiarization phase, two visually identical objects emerged sequentially from one box and two visually different objects from the other box. For one group of infants the familiarization was silent (Visual Only condition). For a second group of infants the objects were accompanied with nonsense words so that objects’ shape and linguistic labels indicated the same number of objects in the two boxes (Visual & Language condition). For the third group of infants, objects’ shape and linguistic labels were in conflict (Visual vs. Language condition). Following the familiarization, it was revealed that both boxes contained the same number of objects (e.g. one or two). In the Visual Only condition, infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects at test, showing that they could individuate objects using visual cues alone. In the Visual & Language condition infants showed the same looking pattern. However, in the Visual vs Language condition infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects according to linguistic labels. The results show that infants can individuate objects in a complex object individuation paradigm considerably earlier than previously thought and that linguistic cues enforce their own preference in object individuation. The results are consistent with the idea that when language and visual information are in conflict, language can exert an influence on how young infants reason about the visual world.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

There has been some debate about whether infants 10 months and younger can use featural information to individuate objects. The present research tested the hypothesis that negative results obtained with younger infants reflect limitations in information processing capacities rather than the inability to individuate objects based on featural differences. Infants aged 9.5 months saw one object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to opposite sides of an opaque occluder. Infants then saw a single ball either behind a transparent occluder or without an occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball behind the transparent occluder correctly judged that the one-ball display was inconsistent with the box-ball sequence. These results suggest that: (a) infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion) and (b) support the notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion).     

Object individuation in 3-day-old chicks: use of property and spatiotemporal information

Object individuation was investigated in newborn domestic chicks. Chicks' spontaneous tendency to approach the larger group of familiar objects was exploited in a series of five experiments. In the first experiment newborn chicks were reared for 3 days with objects differing in either colour, shape or size. At test, each chick was presented with two groups of events: two objects differing in one property vs. two presentations of the same object. In both cases, all objects involved in the same group of events were sequentially presented and eventually concealed in a different spatial location, and the number of events taking place at each location was equalized. Chicks spontaneously approached the two different objects rather than the single object seen twice. Chicks did not just prefer the more varied set as they did not choose it when the two elements of each group of events were simultaneously presented (Experiment 2). Chicks succeeded when two different objects simultaneously presented were confronted with three identical ones simultaneously presented (Experiment 3), though they failed with sequential presentation of two different objects vs. one object presented three times if they had been familiarized with up to three identical objects (Experiment 4). Chicks instead succeeded if they had been familiarized with objects that were all different from one another (Experiment 5). These young birds thus proved able to use property and spatiotemporal information for object individuation.     

Are apes essentialists? Scope and limits of psychological essentialism in great apes

Human reasoning is characterized by psychological essentialism (Gelman in The essential child: origins of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford University Press, New York, 2003): when reasoning about objects, we distinguish between deep essential properties defining the object’s kind and identity, and merely superficial features that can be changed without altering the object’s identity. To date, it is unclear whether psychological essentialism is based on the acquisition of linguistic means (such as kind terms) and therefore uniquely human, or whether it is a more fundamental cognitive capacity which might be present also in the absence of language. In the present study, we addressed this question by testing whether, and if so, under which circumstances non-human apes also rely on psychological essentialism to identify objects. For this purpose, we adapted classical verbal transformation scenarios used in research on psychological essentialism (Keil in Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1989) and implemented them in two nonverbal tasks: first, a box task, typically used to test object individuation (Experiment 1), and second, an object choice task, typically used to test object discrimination, object preferences and logical inferences (Experiments 2–4). Taken together, the results of the four experiments suggest that under suitable circumstances (when memory and other task demands are minimized), great apes engage in basic forms of essentialist reasoning. Psychological essentialism is thus possible also in the absence of language.     

Memory load affects object individuation in 18-month-old infants

Accurate representation of a changing environment requires individuation-the ability to determine how many numerically distinct objects are present in a scene. Much research has characterized early individuation abilities by identifying which object features infants can use to individuate throughout development. However, despite the fact that without memory featural individuation would be impossible, little is known about how memory constrains object individuation. Here, we investigated infants' ability to individuate multiple objects at once and asked whether individuation performance changes as a function of memory load. In three experiments, 18-month-old infants saw one, two, or three objects hidden and always saw the correct number of objects retrieved. On some trials, one or more of these objects surreptitiously switched identity prior to retrieval. We asked whether infants would use this identity mismatch to individuate and, hence, continue searching for the missing object(s). We found that infants were less likely to individuate objects as memory load grew, but that infants individuated more successfully when the featural contrast between the hidden and retrieved objects increased. These results suggest that remembering more objects may result in a loss of representational precision, thereby decreasing the likelihood of successful individuation. We close by discussing possible links between our results and findings from adult working memory.     

Bases for Object Individuation in Infancy: Evidence From Manual Search

Two studies exploited a new manual search methodology to assess the bases on which 10- to 12-month-olds individuate objects. Infants saw 1 or 2 objects placed inside an opaque box, into which they could reach. Across conditions, the information specifying 2 objects differed. The dependent measures reflected persistence of reaching into a box that was empty regardless of whether an object should have remained. Success consists of little reaching after all objects are removed and persistent reaching for an object not yet retrieved. Given spatiotemporal information for 2 objects, both age groups succeeded. Given only property or kind information, only 12-month-olds succeeded. Despite disparate information-processing demands, this pattern converges with looking time data (Xu & Carey, 1996; Xu, Carey, & Welch, 1999), suggesting a developmental change orthogonal to that of executive function. This change may reflect the emergence of kind representations.     

Infants' ability to use object kind information for object individuation.

The present studies investigate infants reliance on object kind information in solving the problem of object individuation. Two experiments explored whether adults, 10- and 12-month-old infants could use their knowledge of ducks and cars to individuate an ambiguous array consisting of a toy duck perched on a toy car into two objects. A third experiment investigated whether 10-month-old infants could use their knowledge of cups and shoes to individuate an array consisting of a cup perched on a shoe into two objects. Ten-month-old infants failed to use object kind information alone to resolve the ambiguity with both pairs of objects. In contrast, infants this age succeeded in using spatiotemporal information to segment the array into two objects, i.e. they succeeded if shown that the duck moved independently relative to the car, or the cup relative to the shoe. Twelve-month-old infants, as well as adults, succeeded at object individuation on the basis of object kind information alone. These findings shed light on the developmental course of object individuation and provide converging evidence for the Object-first Hypothesis [Xu, F., Carey, S., 1996; Xu, F., 1997b]. Early on, infants may represent only one concept that provides criteria for individuation, namely physical object; kind concepts such as duck, car, cup, and shoe may be acquired later in the first year of life.     

Labeling guides object individuation in 12-month-old infants

A new manual search method was used to investigate the impact of naming on object individuation in 12-month-old infants. In Experiment 1, on a two-word trial, an experimenter looked into a box while the infant was watching and provided two labels (e.g., "Look, a fep!" and "Look, a wug!"). On a one-word trial, the experimenter instead repeated the same label (e.g., "Look, a zav!"). After the infant retrieved one object from the box, subsequent search behavior was recorded. Infants searched more persistently (i.e., for a longer duration) after hearing two labels than one, suggesting that hearing two labels led the infants to expect two objects inside the box. In Experiment 2, infants' search behavior did not differ depending on whether they heard one or two emotional expressions, suggesting that the facilitation effect observed in Experiment 1 may be specific to linguistic expressions. Thus, we provide the first evidence that infants as young as 12 months are able to use intentional and referential cues to guide their object representations. These findings also suggest that a rudimentary version of the mutual-exclusivity constraint may be functional by the end of the first year.     

Object individuation and object identity in infancy: the role of spatiotemporal information, object property information, and language.

Recent work on object individuation and object identity in infancy indicates that at least three sources of information may be used for object individuation and object identity: spatiotemporal information, object property information, and object kind information. Several experiments have shown that a major developmental change occurs between 10 and 12 months of age (Xu & Carey, 1996; Xu, Carey & Welch, in press; Van de Walle, Prevor & Carey, under review; Xu, Carey & Quint, in preparation): Infants at 10 months and younger readily use spatiotemporal information in object individuation and object identity tasks, but not until about 12 months of age are infants able to use object property or object kind information to do so. This paper proposes a two-part conjecture about the mechanism underlying this change. The first part borrows ideas from object-based attention and the distinction between "what" and "where" information in visual processing. The hypothesis is that (1) young infants encode object motion and location information separately from object property information; and (2) toward the end of the first year, infants integrate these two sources of information. The second part of the conjecture posits an important role for language. Infants may take distinct labels as referring to distinct kinds of objects from the onset of word learning, and infants use this information in solving the problem of object individuation and object identity. Evidence from human adults, infants, and non-human primates is reviewed to provide support for the conjecture.     

The role of language in acquiring object kind concepts in infancy

Four experiments investigated whether 9-month-old infants could use the presence of labels to help them establish a representation of two distinct objects in a complex object individuation task. We found that the presence of two distinct labels facilitated object individuation, but the presence of one label for both objects, two distinct tones, two distinct sounds, or two distinct emotional expressions did not. These findings suggest that language may play an important role in the acquisition of sortal/object kind concepts in infancy: words may serve as "essence placeholders". Implications for the relationship between language and conceptual development are discussed.     

Infants' individuation of agents and inert objects

Using the violation-of-expectancy method, we investigated 10-month-old infants' ability to rely on dynamic features in object individuation processes. Infants were first familiarized to events in which two different objects repeatedly appeared and disappeared, one at a time from behind a screen; at test, the screen was removed, revealing either one or two objects. In Experiment 1, one self-moving non-rigid agent and one inert object were involved in each trial, while in Experiment 2 two different agents were presented. Infants preferred to look at one-object outcomes in Experiment 1, but they did not show any preference for one- or two-object outcomes in Experiment 2. The results suggest that infants can use dynamic information to detect agents in complex individuation tasks before they can rely on shape or surface features. We propose that the sortals agent and inert object appear in development before 12 months without a substantial contribution of linguistic experience. These findings may motivate a revision of current theories on the development of kind-based individuation and object files.     

Four‐month‐old infants individuate and track simple tools following functional demonstrations

Two experiments examined whether 4‐month‐olds (n = 120) who were induced to assign two objects to different categories would then be able to take advantage of these contrastive categorical encodings to individuate and track the objects. In each experiment, infants first watched functional demonstrations of two tools, a masher and tongs (Experiment 1) or a marker and a knife (Experiment 2). Next, half the infants saw the two tools brought out alternately from behind a screen, which was then lowered to reveal only one of the tools (different‐objects condition); the other infants saw similar events except that the same tool was shown on either side of the screen (same‐object condition). In both experiments, infants in the different‐objects condition looked reliably longer than those in the same‐object condition, and this effect was eliminated if the demonstrations involved similar but non‐functional actions. Together, these results indicate that infants (a) were led by the functional demonstrations they observed to assign the two tools to distinct categories, (b) recruited these categorical encodings to individuate and track the tools, and hence (c) detected a violation in the different‐objects condition when the screen was lowered to reveal only one tool. Categorical information thus plays a privileged role in individuation and identity tracking from a very young age.     

Infants’ coding of location in continuous space

The ability to code location in continuous space is fundamental to spatial behavior. Existing evidence indicates a robust ability for such coding by 12 months, but systematic evidence on earlier origins is lacking. A series of studies investigated 5-month-olds’ ability to code the location of an object hidden in a sandbox, using a looking-time paradigm. In Experiment 1, after familiarization with a hiding-and-finding sequence at one location, infants looked longer at an object being disclosed from a location 12 inches (30 cm) away than at an object emerging from the hiding location, showing they were able to code location in continuous space. In Experiment 2, infants reacted with greater looking when objects emerged from locations 8 inches (20 cm) away from the hiding location, showing that location coding was more finely grained than could be inferred based on the first study. In Experiment 3, infants were familiarized with an object shown in hiding-and-finding sequences at two different locations. Infants looked longer at objects emerging 12 inches (30 cm) away from the most recent hiding location than to emergence from the other location, showing that infants could code location even when events had previously occurred at each location. In Experiment 4, after familiarization with two objects with different shapes, colors, and sounding characteristics, shown in hiding-and-finding sequences in two locations, infants reacted to location violations as they had in Experiment 3. However, they did not react to object violations, that is, events in which the wrong object emerged from a hiding location. Experiment 5 also found no effect of object violation, even when the infants initially saw the two objects side by side. Spatiotemporal characteristics may play a more central role in early object individuation than they do later, although further study is required.     

Evidence for kind representations in the absence of language: experiments with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta)

How do we come to recognize and represent different kinds of objects in the world? Some developmental psychologists have hypothesized that learning language plays a crucial role in this capacity. If this hypothesis were correct, then non-linguistic animals should lack the capacity to represent objects as kinds. Previous research with rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) has shown that this species can successfully individuate different kinds of objects - monkeys who saw one kind of object hidden inside a box searched longer after finding a different kind of object. However, in these studies and the infant studies on which they were based, the objects to be individuated differed both in kind and in properties. Thus, subjects in these experiments may not be representing the kinds of objects per se, but instead only their immediate perceptual properties. Here, we show that rhesus monkeys successfully individuate different kinds of objects even when their perceptual properties are held constant. Although these data provide the best evidence to date that language is not necessary to represent kinds, we discuss our findings in terms of possible associative hypotheses as well.