Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining

In two experiments we investigated the relation between power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Results showed that recipients of an ultimatum used deception to obtain better offers and that more recipients did so in a low power position. Further analyses showed that the recipient’s use of deception was mediated by concerns about receiving a low offer. For allocators, being in a low power position did not increase the use of deception. Instead, allocators increased their offer when they were in a low power position. The results are discussed in terms of an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) may refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals.     

New perspectives in assessing deception: The evolution of the truth machine

In recent years a growing interest has arisen in the development of tools for the detection of deception. Since William M. Marston's first publication (1917) on the use of the polygraph as a lie detector, the application of this tool, commonly known as the truth machine, has evolved. Modern technologies are now trying to push the issue further, investigating brain activity during deception using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). The aim of this paper is to summarise the evolution of research from the original use of the polygraph to the use of new technologies in detecting deception, in order to provide an overview of the recent developments on the use of measurements of deception, and promote new research in this highly important domain of applied cognitive psychology.     

Machiavellianism and sexual behavior: Motivations,deception and infidelity

The current study investigated the influence of Machiavellianism, a personality trait characterized by a manipulative interpersonal style and willingness to exploit others (Christie & Geis, 1970), on three areas of sexual behavior. Men (N = 90) and women (N = 192) aged 18–81 years (M = 25.82, SD = 9.85) completed the Mach IV (Christie & Geis, 1970), YSEX Questionnaire (Meston & Buss, 2007), Sexual Deception Scale (Marelich, Lundquist, Painter, & Mechanic, 2008) and Intentions Towards Infidelity Scale (Jones, Olderbak, & Figueredo, 2011). Those with high levels of Machiavellianism were more likely to engage in sexual behavior for physical reasons, goal attainment and insecurity. In particular, Machiavellian men and women endorsed stress reduction, experience seeking, resources, social status, revenge, utilitarian reasons, boosting self-esteem, duty/pressure, and mate guarding as motivations for sexual behavior. Machiavellianism was also a significant predictor of each form of sexual deception investigated (blatant lying, self-serving and avoiding confrontation) and intentions to engage in infidelity. Sex did not moderate the influence of Machiavellianism on sexual behavior.     

To be or not to be trusted: The influence of media richness on defection and deception

When business transactions take place between strangers, individuals rely on the cues during communication to determine whether they can trust others’ intentions. How that process occurs in the context of computer-mediated, video-mediated, and face-to-face interactions is still somewhat unknown. We examine how media richness influences both affective-based and cognitive-based trust in the context of two studies with two different social dilemma scenarios. Further, we explore how these two types of trust influence not only non-cooperative behavior (defection) but also lying (deception). Results from the first study suggest cognitive-based trust mediates the relationship between media richness and defection, while results from both studies suggest that affective-based trust mediates the relationship between media richness and deception. Video-mediated communication solves some, but not all, of the problems inherent when interacting via communication technology.     

The effects of culture and friendship on rewarding honesty and punishing deception

The present research explores whether the type of relationship one holds with deceptive or honest actors influences cross-cultural differences in reward and punishment. Research suggests that Americans reward honest actors more than they punish deceptive perpetrators, whereas East Asians reward and punish equally (Wang & Leung, 2010). Our research suggests that the type of relationship with the actor matters for East Asians, but not for Americans. East Asians exhibit favoritism toward their friends by rewarding more than punishing them, but reward and punish equally when the actors are strangers (Experiment 1 and 2); Americans reward more than they punish regardless of the type of relationship (Experiment 2). Furthermore, the findings were replicated when the proposed mechanism – social mobility – was manipulated within the same culture (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how friends versus strangers are rewarded and punished in an increasingly relationally complex world.     

Me, myself, and lie: The role of self-awareness in deception

Deception has been studied extensively but still little is known about individual differences in deception ability. We investigated the relationship between self-awareness and deception ability. We enlisted novice actors to portray varying levels of deception. Forty-two undergraduates viewed the videotaped portrayals and rated the actors’ believability. Actors with high private self-awareness were more effective deceivers, suggesting that high self-monitors are more effective at deceiving. Self-awareness may lead to knowledge of another’s mental state (i.e., Theory of Mind), which may improve an individual’s deception ability.     

Theory as metaphor: clinical knowledge and its communication

Abstract :  This paper investigates the relationship between clinical knowledge and psychological theory and considers the implications for clinical writing. I argue that clinical knowledge is a way of understanding rather than a body of facts and compare clinical material to 'texts' that generate multiple and indeterminate meanings. Analytic theories, which represent the crystallization of ways of understanding clinical phenomena, have an inherently metaphorical 'as if' quality since they are derived from and adapted to the clinical process of making meaning by representing psychic states in symbolic form. Thus good clinical writing demonstrates an integration of theory and clinical material into a unified network of symbolic meanings. Redfearn's paper, 'The captive, the treasure, the hero and the "anal" stage of development' (1979), is discussed as an exemplar of such integration. It is suggested that clinical knowledge is equivalent to the skill of making effective interpretations.     

Planning, motivation, and evaluation in orientation to the future: A latent structure analysis

The paper presents a model of orientation to the future in terms of three processes; motivation, planning, and evaluation. To test this model a total of 154 11-, 15- and 18-year-old adolescents were interviewed about their goals and hopes for the future. Seven observed variables were estimated and a model including three latent constructs was tested using the LISREL VI computer program. The planning construct consisted of the amount of knowledge, the complexity of plans and their level of realization. The evaluation construct included internality, estimation of the likelihood that the goals would be realized and an overall emotional evaluation of the future. The motivation construct consisted of one observed variable, extension. Confirmatory factor analysis showed that the model fitted the data, thus providing support for the theoretical model.     

Detecting true and false opinions: The Devil's Advocate approach as a lie detection aid

We examined the efficacy of a new approach to detect truths and lies in expressing opinions: the Devil's Advocate approach. Interviewees are first asked an opinion eliciting question that asks participants to argue in favour of their personal view. This is followed by a Devil's Advocate question that asks participants to argue against their personal view. People normally think more about reasons that support rather than oppose their opinion. Therefore we expected truth tellers to provide more information and shorter latency times in their responses to the opinion eliciting question than to the Devil's Advocate question. Liars are expected to reveal the opposite pattern as the Devil's Advocate question is more compatible with their beliefs than is the opinion eliciting question. In Experiment 1, we interviewed seventeen truth tellers and liars via the Devil's Advocate approach and measured the difference in number of words and latency times to the two questions. Our hypotheses were supported. In Experiment 2, 25 observers were shown these interviews, and made qualitative judgements about the statements. Truth tellers' opinion eliciting answers were seen as more immediate and plausible and revealed more emotional involvement than their Devil's Advocate answers. No clear differences emerged in liars' answers to the two types of question. We conclude that the Devil's Advocate approach is a promising lie detection approach that deserves attention in future research.     

Simulated thought insertion: Influencing the sense of agency using deception and magic

In order to study the feeling of control over decisions, we told 60 participants that a neuroimaging machine could read and influence their thoughts. While inside a mock brain scanner, participants chose arbitrary numbers in two similar tasks. In the Mind-Reading Task, the scanner appeared to guess the participants’ numbers; in the Mind-Influencing Task, it appeared to influence their choice of numbers. We predicted that participants would feel less voluntary control over their decisions when they believed that the scanner was influencing their choices. As predicted, participants felt less control and made slower decisions in the Mind-Influencing Task compared to the Mind-Reading Task. A second study replicated these findings. Participants’ experience of the ostensible influence varied, with some reporting an unknown source directing them towards specific numbers. This simulated thought insertion paradigm can therefore influence feelings of voluntary control and may help model symptoms of mental disorders.     

Motivational cues: The role of perceived senders' self‐control ability in raters' deception judgements

Previous studies have found that senders' personal traits may be used by others to make judgements about the senders' truthfulness. Two studies were conducted to examine whether perceived self‐control ability has an effect on deception judgement. Perceived self‐control was hypothesized to act as a motivational cue that participants would use to assess the sender's motivation to lie, which in turn would influence their deception judgement. Results revealed that when participants assessed the sender as having higher self‐control ability, they would consider the sender to be less motivated to lie in daily life (Study 1), and judge the sender more truthful in a text‐based deception judgement task (Study 2). However, the effect of perceived self‐control ability disappeared in a video‐based task (Study 2), likely due to the multitude of various cues available in audio‐visual stimuli. The theoretical and applied implications of the results are discussed.     

The moral, epistemic, and mindreading components of children’s vigilance towards deception

Vigilance towards deception is investigated in 3- to-5-year-old children: (i) In Study 1, children as young as 3 years of age prefer the testimony of a benevolent rather than of a malevolent communicator. (ii) In Study 2, only at the age of four do children show understanding of the falsity of a lie uttered by a communicator described as a liar. (iii) In Study 3, the ability to recognize a lie when the communicator is described as intending to deceive the child emerges around four and improves throughout the fifth and sixth year of life. On the basis of this evidence, we suggest that preference for the testimony of a benevolent communicator, understanding of the epistemic aspects of deception, and understanding of its intentional aspects are three functionally and developmentally distinct components of epistemic vigilance.     

Moral Realism and Program Explanation: A Very Short Symposium 1: Reply to Nelson

Donald Davidson once suggested that a liar ‘must intend to represent himself as believing what he does not’. In this paper I argue that, while Davidson was mistaken about lying in a few important respects, his main insight yields a very attractive definition of lying. Namely, you lie if and only if you say something that you do not believe and you intend to represent yourself as believing what you say. Moreover, I show that this Davidsonian definition can handle counter-examples that undercut four prominent definitions of lying: viz., the traditional intend-to-deceive definition, Thomas Carson's definition, Don Fallis's definition, and Andreas Stokke's definition.     

Proposing,Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis

This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. Responding to the objection brings out important features of this view of discourse and of assertion.     

Catching the liar as a matter of justice: Effects of belief in a just world on deception detection accuracy and the moderating role of mortality salience

Belief in a just world has been linked to high interpersonal trust and less suspicion of deception. We therefore predicted people with a strong dispositional belief in a just world to have low motivation to accurately detect deception. Accordingly, we hypothesized such a belief to be negatively related to accuracy in deception detection. Furthermore, research on Terror Management Theory has indicated that culturally shared values, such as justice, become more important after mortality salience. Thus, we assumed engaging in justice concerns after a death threat is especially relevant for people with a strong belief in a just world, and further, that accurate deception detection is a matter of justice. Based on this reasoning, we expected people with a strong belief in a just world to have an increased motivation to accurately detect deception after mortality salience. Consequently, we hypothesized dispositional differences in belief in a just world to be unrelated to accuracy in deception detection after mortality salience. In line with these predictions, our study revealed that participants with a strong (vs. weak) belief in a just world were worse in deception detection unless they had first been reminded of their mortality.     

The role of motivation to avoid detection in reaction time-based concealed information detection

Do motivated liars lie more successfully? The motivational effort hypothesis predicts that higher motivation effectively diminishes the chance of being detected, whereas the motivational impairment hypothesis predicts that the higher the motivation to go undetected, the greater the chance of being detected. We manipulated motivation in two online reaction time-based Concealed Information Test studies in which participants tried to hide their identity. Detection of concealed identity information in Experiment 1 (n = 259) was successful and a small financial incentive to avoid detection did not impact upon validity. Despite a greater financial incentive and a manipulation check showing that motivation was increased, Experiment 2 (n = 233) did not impact upon the test's validity either. A financial incentive to avoid detection did not decrease the validity of concealed information detection.     

The price of deceptive behavior: Disliking and lying to people who lie to us

We hypothesized that frequency and quality of deception influences how people perceive those who lie to them and that people subsequently increase deceptive behavior as a consequence of being lied to. In Study 1, participants were covertly videotaped conversing with a partner. Following the conversation, participants evaluated partners, and partners reviewed the videotape, identifying deceptions that they told. Findings indicated that partner’s frequency of deception was inversely related to likeability. In Study 2, participants watched a videotape of a confederate who appeared to produce one or four exaggerated or minimized lies, and then evaluated the confederate. Participants and confederates subsequently engaged in a conversation. When participants witnessed either one exaggerated lie, one or four minimal lies, or no lies they trusted and liked the confederate more than when witnessing four exaggerated lies. Moreover, participants increased their own use of deception as a function of the severity and quantity of confederate’s lies.     

The dimensions of deception detection: Self‐reported deception cue use is underpinned by two broad factors

Many perceived cues to deception have been reported in the literature, but little attention has been paid to how they are combined when making deception judgments. The present research used a data‐driven approach to investigate how cues are integrated when evaluating veracity. Two hundred fifteen participants performed a deception detection task before completing a deception cue use questionnaire. A factor analysis of the questionnaire data produced two dimensions, one associated with nonverbal cues to anxiety and the other associated with detail and level of involvement. The present work extends our understanding of deception detection processes and underlines the importance of examining not only the cues that people use but also the way in which they use them.     

The dynamics of consumer behavior: A goal systemic perspective

Like most behavior, consumer behavior too is goal driven. In turn, goals constitute cognitive constructs that can be chronically active as well as primed by features of the environment. Goal systems theory outlines the principles that characterize the dynamics of goal pursuit and explores their implications for consumer behavior. In this vein, we discuss from a common, goal systemic, perspective a variety of well known phenomena in the realm of consumer behavior including brand loyalty, variety seeking, impulsive buying, preferences, choices and regret. The goal systemic perspective affords guidelines for subsequent research on the dynamic aspects of consummatory behavior as well as offering insights into practical matters in the area of marketing.