周易辨

“周易”一词最早见于《左传》。《左传》庄公二十二年“周史有以《周易》见陈侯者”;襄公九年记载“姜曰：‘亡,是以《周易》曰：隋,元亨利贞……”;昭公七年记载“孔成子以《周易》筮之”。可见《周易》之名在周代甚或更早便已经存在了。《周礼·春官》有云：“太人……掌三易之法,一曰连山,二曰归藏,三曰周易,其经卦皆八,其别皆六十有四。”汉郑玄在其《易赞》中便断定：“夏曰连山,殷曰归藏,周曰周易。”郑玄之影响极深,故而后人皆认为《周易》乃周朝之《易》。对此,笔者谈点个人看法。一、“周”之辨对于“周”、“易”之…     

三《易》名义考

所谓三《易》,即《周礼·太卜》最先揭举的《连山》、《归藏》、《周易》。这里所说的《周易》,就是今本《周易》中的《易经》部分。三《易》名义乃千古聚讼疑案,历代学者见仁见智莫衷一是,直接影响着人们从本源的角度对易事易理的理解和认识。阐明三《易》名义,是弘扬易学精蕴的关键所在,本文试就此问题探理如下。     

《周易》与"白马非马"--试论易学的对象和研究方法

《易》相传有三个版本《连山》、《归藏》和《周易》.秦汉以来,学界主流向以《周易》为《易》,"白马即马",结果常使易学研究偏离《易》的本来--卦爻画."周易学"主要是在卦爻辞的基础上以"象"的方式解《易》     

中国古代神话与《易经》

远古民族的神话,都与当时的宗教信仰有关。故事情节、人物特性,都反映了原始民族对于宇宙自然的认识,是同他们的哲学思想紧密结合在一起的。以《易经》为代表的阴阳数术之学,假鬼神而言天道,其基本思想起源于原始社会时期。《周礼·大卜》记古代卜官,掌三易之法,一日《连山》,二日《归藏》,三日《周易》。三易的编排,都是根据八卦以及由此重叠而成的六十四卦,表明它们本属于同一体系。三易分别创自夏商周三代,夏曰《连山》,殷曰《归藏》,周曰《周易》。占卜是决择国家大事的重要宗教活动,所以帝王改朝换代自然也要重新编纂卜筮的典籍,因此,三易分属三代的说法,应该是可信的。     

《周易·序卦传》爻象变化规律之试释

《周易·序卦传》爻象变化规律之试释刘蕙孙（一）《易》的卦序次第,古代《连山》、《归藏》、《周易》等三“易”文献无征,无可叙述,今言《易》序惟《周易》卦序及宋先天图卦序两种,先天图卦序完全是符号自然变化,简明易解,不论。《周易》卦序,则是两千年一个勘不...     

《周易》的道德教育思想探微

《周易》的道德教育思想探微杨昌勇《易》有《连山》、《归藏》和《周易》之分。《周易》为周代之《易》,在由孔子作传之后就被纳为儒家经典了,《周易》居儒家六经之首。《周易》包括经、传两部分。经由筮、卦、爻、辞四项构成,神秘的宗教形式与至理哲学浑然一体。经的...     

《归藏》卦名辨证

《归藏》卦名辨证王宁《归藏》是一部久佚的古《易》书,鉴于它对《易》学研究的重要价值,前人多有研究,但讹说较多,比如有人认为它和《连山》都是伪书￣①,现在有不少人都这么认为。其实,《连山》《归藏》这两名目是伪的￣②,其中《连山》是名、书俱伪,而《归藏》...     

《周易讲座》序

《周易》是卜筮之书,但又是哲学著作。卜筮产生于无知,同时又是对无知的反抗。巫在卜筮中输入有知因素。筮已不可考,可考见的只有卦。《连山》《归藏》二易久亡,仅存《周易》。《归藏》又名《坤乾》,孔子用以观殷道,而《史记》云“殷道亲亲,周道尊尊”,以《归藏》首坤次乾,《周易》首乾次坤,反映殷周二代历史的不同思想基础。孔子著《易大传》,对《周易》进行全面、深入的思想阐发,使卜筮在长期的发展过程中,发生了一次质变;并明确指出《周易》是“开物、成务,冒天下之道”的哲学著作。组成《周易》的四个要素是蓍、卦、爻、辞。《易大传》对这四个要素逐一作了详实的阐释。蓍的变化莫测,卦是蓍的记录,蓍与卦是形与影的关系。爻是对卦的进一步发挥。辞有卦辞(象)和爻辞(变)。在《易》的六十四卦的结构中,乾坤二卦居于特殊地位,是一个最大的矛盾统一体,六十四卦的变化发展都蕴藏在乾坤二卦之中。《易大传》的说明,可以看出六十四卦结构中存在着完整的思想体系。     

图数浅议

图数浅议赵春杰有关河图的记载，最早见于我国古籍《书经》和《周易》。《书经·顾命》载有“陈宝：赤刀，大训，弘壁，碗谈，在西序；大玉，夷玉，天球，河图，在东序。”《周易·系辞》云：“河出图，洛出书．圣人则之。”但是在宋代以前，河图只有其名，不见其图。直到...     

筮人"掌三易"及《周易》在先秦的传播

周代占筮《连山》、《归藏》、《周易》三易并用,但太卜、筮人、筮史之外的周人似更喜筮用《周易》．与此同时,周人大量语用《周易》,显示了《周易》在社会上超出卜筮职能范围的广泛传播、接受与应用．其传播方式除口耳相传外,已经出现书面传播,并伴有阐释文本,即《易》传,可见《易》学乃至《易》教的兴起．《周易》能够成为“六经”之一并传世至今,正与此有着直接的关系．     

Jung,the Wilderness,and the Call of the Wild

The publication of The Red Book reiterates how deeply connected to nature Jung was and how this connection emerged through his encounter with the spirit of the depths. This article reviews some of Jung's writings in regard to nature and suggests that the energy related to the earth that Jung expresses in The Red Book was continued in his ongoing work on his tower at Bolllingen. The author also reviews his own search for a deeper connection to nature and an understanding of his own ancestry. Reviewing the emergence of the value of wilderness in North America and the call to reclaim the wild, he considers the life of Englishman Archie Belaney, who took on the identity of a Native American, Grey Owl, and became one of Canada's first leading environmentalists.     

Consistency,mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind

G. Priest's anti-consistency argument (Priest 1979, 1984, 1987) and J. R. Lucas's anti-mechanist argument (Lucas 1961, 1968, 1970, 1984) both appeal to Gödel incompleteness. By way of refuting them, this paper defends the thesis of quartet compatibility, viz., that the logic of the mind can simultaneously be Gödel incomplete, consistent, mechanical, and recursion complete (capable of all means of recursion). A representational approach is pursued, which owes its origin to works by, among others, J. Myhill (1964), P. Benacerraf (1967), J. Webb (1980, 1983) and M. Arbib (1987). It is shown that the fallacy shared by the two arguments under discussion lies in misidentifying two systems, the one for which the Gödel sentence is constructable and to be proved, and the other in which the Gödel sentence in question is indeed provable. It follows that the logic of the mind can surpass its own Gödelian limitation not by being inconsistent or non-mechanistic, but by being capable of representing stronger systems in itself; and so can a proper machine. The concepts of representational provability, representational maximality, formal system capacity, etc., are discussed.     

Husserl,Givenness, and the Priority of the Self

This article argues that, despite its apparent radicality, Husserl's later, genetic phenomenology ends up confirming and consolidating a very orthodox transcendental egology. First, the article reconstructs an Husserlian phenomenology of givenness; but then, by considering the ambiguous role of intuition, it also establishes (a) the continued prestige of a 'classical' transcendental subject, and (b) the way in which a denial of ontology allows Husserl's transcendental subject to sublate the provocative challenge of primal Gegebenheit . Overall, the article argues that Husserl is subject to a deep egological faultline, brought about by the self-consciously anti-ontological nature of his project: 'givenness without Being', it suggests, necessitates a prioritized and privileged self.     

Badiou,Keyser, and the Theo-mathematics of the Infinite

Abstract

This paper discusses Alain Badiou's dissolution of theology in light of his equation of ontology and mathematics and his separation of the infinite from the one. I argue, however, that Badiou leaves open a place for theology, and I exploit this for theology by drawing on the work of the American mathematician Cassius Jackson Keyser. Keyser suggests a more positive relationship between mathematics, ontology, and theology, and his claim that theology is the science of idealization allows us to begin to think about how one might go about doing philosophical theology after Badiou.     

Husserl,Protention, and the Phenomenology of the Unexpected

Although there has been a great deal said about Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, little attention has been specifically paid to future-consciousness. This article gives an Husserlian account of future-consciousness. It begins by arguing that protention should be understood as a future-directed version of retention and so that future-consciousness should be understood as perception. This account is developed in two ways: (1) the future need not be determinately given in protention and so future-consciousness can be vague; (2) cases when the future turns out to be other than we perceived it to be (cases when the unexpected happens) can be understood as temporal illusions. This account of future-consciousness both illuminates some of Husserl’s more obscure remarks on time-consciousness and (more importantly) provides a means of understanding an often neglected phenomenon of independent philosophical interest: our awareness of the future.     

Indicatives,Subjunctives, and the Falsity of the Antecedent

It is widely held that there are important differences between indicative conditionals (e.g., “If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper”) and subjunctive conditionals (e.g., “If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics paper”). A central difference is that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances toward the truth of their antecedents. Indicatives (often) convey neutrality: for example, about whether the authors in question are linguists. Subjunctives (often) convey the falsity of the antecedent: for example, that the authors in question are not linguists. This paper tests prominent accounts of how these different stances are conveyed: whether by presupposition or conversational implicature. Experiment 1 tests the presupposition account by investigating whether the stances project—remain constant—when embedded under operators like negations, possibility modals, and interrogatives, a key characteristic of presuppositions. Experiment 2 tests the conversational-implicature account by investigating whether the stances can be cancelled without producing a contradiction, a key characteristic of implicatures. The results provide evidence that both stances—neutrality about the antecedent in indicatives and the falsity of the antecedent in subjunctives—are conveyed by conversational implicatures.