Reweighting sequential effects across different distributions of foreperiods: segregating elementary contributions to nonspecific preparation

In the study of nonspecific preparation, the response time (RT) to an imperative stimulus is analyzed as a function of the foreperiod (FP), the interval between a warning stimulus and the imperative stimulus. When FP is varied within blocks of trials, a downward sloping FP-RT function is usually observed. The slope of this function depends on the distribution of FPs (the more negative the skewness, the steeper the slope) and on intertrial sequences of FP (the longer the FP on the preceding trial, the steeper the slope). Because these determinants are confounded, we examined whether FP-RT functions, observed under three different FP distributions (i.e., uniform, exponential, and peaked) can be predicted, one from the other, by reweighting sequential effects. It turned out that reweighting explained very little variance of the difference between the FP-RT functions, suggesting a dominant role of temporal orienting strategies.     

Sequential effects within a short foreperiod context: evidence for the conditioning account of temporal preparation

Responses to an imperative stimulus (IS) are especially fast when they are preceded by a warning signal (WS). When the interval between WS and IS (the foreperiod, FP) is variable, reaction time (RT) is not only influenced by the current FP but also by the FP of the preceding trial. These sequential effects have recently been proposed to originate from a trace conditioning process, in which the individuals learn the temporal WS-IS relationship in a trial-by-trial manner. Research has shown that trace conditioning is maximal when the temporal interval between the conditioned and unconditioned stimulus is between 0.25 and 0.60 s. Consequently, one would predict that sequential effects occur especially within short FP contexts. However, this prediction is contradicted by Karlin [Karlin, L. (1959). Reaction time as a function of foreperiod duration and variability. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 185-191] who did not observe the typical sequential effects with short FPs. To investigate temporal preparation for short FPs, three experiments were conducted, examining the sequential FP effect comparably for short and long FP-sets (Experiment 1), assessing the influence of catch trials (Experiment 2) and the case of a very dense FP-range (Experiment 3) on sequential FP effects. The results provide strong evidence for sequential effects within a short FP context and thus support the trace conditioning account of temporal preparation.     

Mental fatigue and temporal preparation in simple reaction-time performance

Performance decrements attributed to mental fatigue have been found to be especially pronounced in tasks that involve the voluntary control of attention. Here we explored whether mental fatigue from prolonged time on task (TOT) also impairs temporal preparation for speeded action in a simple reaction-time task. Temporal preparation is enabled by a warning signal presented before the imperative stimulus and usually results in shorter reaction time (RT). When the delay between warning and imperative stimuli - the foreperiod (FP) - varies between trials, responses are faster with longer FPs. This pattern has been proposed to arise from either voluntary attentional processes (temporal orienting) or automatic trial-to-trial learning (trace conditioning). The former account suggests a selective RT increase on long-FP trials with fatigue; the latter account suggests no such change. Over a work period of 51 min, we found the typical increase in overall RT but no selective RT increase after long FPs. This additivity indicates that TOT-induced mental fatigue generally reduces cognitive efficiency but leaves temporal preparation under time uncertainty unaffected. We consider this result more consistent with the trace-conditioning account of temporal preparation.     

The foreperiod effect revisited: conditioning as a basis for nonspecific preparation

The foreperiod (FP) is the interval between a warning stimulus and the imperative stimulus. It is a classical finding that both the duration and the intertrial variability of FP considerably affects response time. These effects are invariably attributed to the participant's state of nonspecific preparation at the moment the imperative stimulus is presented. In this article, we examined a proposal by Los, S. A. (1996) [On the origin of mixing costs: exploring information processing in pure and mixed blocks of trials. Acta Psychologica, 94, 145-188] that the real-time development of nonspecific preparation during FP relies on the same principle as trace conditioning. To this end, we adjusted the formal conditioning model developed by Machado, A. (1997) [Learning the temporal dynamics of behavior. Psychological Review, 104 (2), 241-265], and fitted this model to a representative data set we obtained from nine participants. Although the model accounted for only a moderate proportion of the variance, it accurately reproduced several key features of the data. We therefore concluded that the model is a promising first step toward a theory of nonspecific preparation.     

Sources of Intertrial Proactive Interference in Rats’ Short-Term Memory in a Delayed Successive Matching-to-Sample Modality Discrimination

Rats were trained on a delayed successive matching-to-stimulus modality task consisting of onset of chamber lights or a tone for the sample stimulus, S1, and a comparison stimulus, S2. Lever pressing to S1 was reinforced as was lever pressing to its matching S2 (light–light or tone–tone pairs) but not to its mismatching S2 (light–tone, tone–light pairs). The interval between S1 and S2 within a trial, the retention interval (RI), was varied between 1 and 6 s within sessions while the interval between S2 and the next S1, the intertrial interval (ITI), was reduced from 24 to 12 s and finally to 6 s over blocks of sessions. In Experiment 1, where S1 was kept at 2 s and S2 at 10 s, rats’ matching accuracy declined over the longer RI, was slightly disrupted as ITIs were reduced to 6 s only over 1-s RIs, and was generally poorer to the tone than light S1. In Experiment 2, where both stimuli were 10 s increasing RIs caused steeper declines in matching accuracy to the tone S1 than light S1 and decreasing ITIs to 6 s disrupted rats performance over both RIs. Matching accuracy to the tone but not to the light S1 was also poorer when a preceding trial's S2 was a light S2 than when it was a tone S2 only during Experiment 2. Thisintertrial stimulus disagreementeffect was not influenced by ITI duration. These results suggest that intertrial proactive interference in delayed matching tasks consists of two separate and independent processes in rats similar to those found in pigeons (Edhouse & White, 1988).     

Functional dissociations in temporal preparation: Evidence from dual-task performance

Implicit preparation over time is a complex cognitive capacity important to optimize behavioral responses to a target occurring after a temporal interval, the so-called foreperiod (FP). If the FP occurs randomly and with the same a priori probability, shorter response times are usually observed with longer FPs than with shorter ones (FP effect). Moreover, responses are slower when the preceding FP was longer than the current one (sequential effects). It is still a matter of debate how different processes influence these temporal preparation phenomena. The present study used a dual-task procedure to understand how different processes, along the automatic-controlled continuum, may contribute to these temporal preparation phenomena. Dual-task demands were manipulated in two experiments using a subtraction task during the FP. This secondary task was administered in blocks (Experiment 1) or was embedded together with a baseline single-task in the same experimental session (Experiment 2). The results consistently showed that the size of the FP effect, but not that of sequential effects, is sensitive to dual-task manipulations. This functional dissociation unveils the multi-faceted nature of implicit temporal preparation: while the FP effect is due to a controlled, resource-consuming preparatory mechanism, a more automatic mechanism underlies sequential effects.     

The time-course of preparation with regular and irregular foreperiods

A previous experiment (Bertelson, 1967) had shown that the temporal information brought by a warning signal affected RT even after very short foreperiods (FPs). The present experiment was carried out to examine whether this result was contingent on the predictability of the FP. After a 5 sec. waiting delay, the subject heard a warning click which was followed after a predictable (regular procedure) or unpredictable FP (irregular procedure) by the visual signal calling for a choice reaction. The range of FPs was 0-300 msec, again. The time course of the adjustments triggered by the click was found to be similar under both procedures. The main conclusion is that a shift from preparation to reaction can occur at any time and need not be programmed before preparation is started.     

Developmental dissociations of preparation over time: deconstructing the variable foreperiod phenomena

In a variable foreperiod (FP) paradigm, reaction times (RTs) decrease as a function of FP on trial n (FP effect) but increase with FP on trial n - 1 (sequential effects). These phenomena have traditionally been ascribed to different strategic preparation processes. According to an alternative explanation, common conditioning laws underlie both effects. The present study aims to disentangle these opposite views using a developmental perspective. In Experiment 1A, 4- to 11-year-old children and a control group of adults performed a simple RT task with variable FPs (1, 3, and 5 s). Furthermore, 12 4- to 5-year-old children were retested after 14 months (Experiment 1B). In Experiment 2, a narrower pool of participants (4, 5, and 6 years old) performed a variable FP paradigm with different FPs (1, 2, and 3 s). The results consistently suggest different ontogenetic time courses for the two effects: The sequential effects are already present in the youngest group (4-5 years old), whereas the FP effect appears gradually some years later. These findings are not fully compatible with previous views. A dual-process account is proposed to explain the data.     

Orienting responses as a function of age and task complexity.

Aged-related differences in the elicitation and habituation of orienting responses to the onset and offset of stimuli have been suggested by several authors. Electrodermal and cardiac orienting responses to the onset and offset of a visual stimulus were measured in three age groups (4 yr., 7 yr., and undergraduate). Each S made one of three judgments: non-signal (observe stimulus), content (color of stimulus), and duration (length of time stimulus presented). Few age differences were found in elicitation or habituation of orienting responses to stimulus onset or offset. There was a trend for elicitation of orienting responses to stimulus offset to be age-related, but the failure to find any other age-related changes made this difference somewhat questionable. Instructions as to the judgement to be made by S were the primary determinants of orienting responses to stimulus onset and offset across all age groups.     

Felt presence: paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social imagery?

Cheyne and Girard characterize felt presence (FP) during sleep paralysis attacks as a pre-hallucinatory expression of a threat-activated vigilance system. While their results may be consistent with this interpretation, they are nonetheless correlational and do not address a parsimonious alternative explanation. This alternative stipulates that FP is a purely spatial, hallucinatory form of a common cognitive phenomenon—social imagery—that is often, but not necessarily, linked with threat and fear and that may induce distress among susceptible individuals. The occurrence of both fearful and non-fearful FPs in a multiplicity of situations other than sleep paralysis attacks supports the notion that FPs are hallucinatory variants of social imagery and that they are not necessarily bound to threat-activated vigilance. Evidence linking FPs with anxiety disorders supports the notion that the distress they evoke may be mediated by a more general affective distress personality factor. To illustrate the predominantly spatial character of FP hallucinations, similarities between FP and phantom limbs are summarized and the possibility that these two phenomena are parallel expressions (self- vs. other-presence) of a mirror neuron system is considered.     

Arousal modulates temporal preparation under increased time uncertainty: Evidence from higher-order sequential foreperiod effects

When the foreperiod (FP) is unpredictably varied in reaction-time tasks, responses are slow at short but fast at long FPs (variable-FP effect), and further vary asymmetrically as a function of FP sequence (sequential FP effect). A trace-conditioning model attributes these phenomena to time-related associative learning, while a dual-process model views them as resulting from combined effects of strategic preparation and trial-to-trial changes in arousal. Sometimes, responses are slower in long-long than in short-long FP sequences. This pattern is not predicted from the trace-conditioning account, since FP repetitions should speed up, rather than slow down, responses (due to reinforcement). The effect, however, might indicate the contribution of arousal, which according to the dual-process model, is heightened after a short FP(n-1) but decreased after a long FP(n-1). In five experiments, we examined higher-order sequential FP effects on performance, with a particular emphasis on analyzing performance in long-FP(n) trials as a function of FP length in the two preceding trials, varying temporal FP context (i.e. average FP length) and reaction mode (simple vs. choice reaction). Slower responses in long-long-long (compared with short-short-long) FP sequences were not found within a short-FP context (Exps. 1 & 2) but clearly emerged within a long-FP context (Exps. 3-5). This pattern supports the notion that transient arousal changes contribute to sequential performance effects in variable-FP tasks, in line with the dual-process account of temporal preparation.     

Contextual control of negative transfer produced by prior CS-US pairings

When a conditioned stimulus (CS) is repeatedly paired with a weak unconditioned stimulus (US) prior to being paired with a stronger US in a second conditioning phase, interference, or negative transfer, is often observed during Phase 2. Two conditioned suppression experiments with rat subjects examined the effect of a context switch between phases in this “Hall-Pearce negative transfer paradigm.” In Experiment 1, negative transfer was obtained when the context remained the same for both phases, but there was no evidence of negative transfer when the context was switched between phases. Experiment 2 was designed to control for familiarity with the Phase 2 context, and showed that a context switch between phases again attenuated negative transfer. The effect of context on negative transfer was also similar to its effect on latent inhibition produced under comparable conditions. The results are not consistent with a model proposed by J. M. Pearce and G. Hall (Psychological Review, 87, 532–555, 1980), which ascribes no major role to the context in this situation, but are consistent with A. R. Wagner's (In S. H. Hulse, H. Fowler, & W. K. Honig, Eds., Cognitive Processes in Animal Behavior, pp. 177–209. Hillsdale NJ: Erlbaum, 1978) short-term memory model of conditioning, or with the view that contexts may signal specific CS-US relations. The results extend previous research on other interference paradigms, like latent inhibition and extinction, where context may play a similar role.     

Gradations of awareness in a modified sequence learning task

We argue performance in the serial reaction time (SRT) task is associated with gradations of awareness that provide examples of fringe consciousness [Mangan, B. (1993b). Taking phenomenology seriously: the “fringe” and its implications for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 89–108, Mangan, B. (2003). The conscious “fringe”: Bringing William James up to date. In B. J. Baars, W. P. Banks & J. B. Newman (Eds.), Essential sources in the scientific study of consciousness (pp. 741–759). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.], and address limitations of the traditional SRT procedure, including criticism of exclusion generation tasks. Two experiments are conducted with a modified SRT procedure where irrelevant stimulus attributes obscure the sequence rule. Our modified paradigm, which includes a novel exclusion task, makes it easier to demonstrate a previously controversial influence of response stimulus interval (RSI) on awareness. It also allows identification of participants showing fringe consciousness rather than explicit sequence knowledge, as reflected by dissociations between different awareness measures. The NEO-PI-R variable Openness to Feelings influenced the diversity of subjective feelings reported during two awareness measures, but not the degree of learning and awareness as previously found with traditional SRT tasks [Norman, E., Price, M. C., & Duff, S. C. (2006). Fringe consciousness in sequence learning: the influence of individual differences. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(4), 723–760.]. This suggests possible distinctions between two components of fringe consciousness.     

Intentional and unintentional contributions to nonspecific preparation: electrophysiological evidence

The authors hypothesized that there are distinct intentional and unintentional influences on nonspecific preparation for a future event. In 2 experiments, participants responded to an imperative stimulus (S-sub-2) that was presented equiprobably either 400 ms or 1,200 ms after the offset of a warning stimulus (S-sub-1). During the S-sub-1-S-sub-2 interval, the authors measured the contingent negative variation (CNV), an event-related brain potential reflecting nonspecific preparation. S-sub-1 provided either no information or reliable information about the duration of the impending S-sub-1-S-sub-2 interval, thereby allowing an intentional influence on the state of preparation. The effect of S-sub-1 information on the CNV was approximately additive to the effect of the S-sub-1-S-sub-2 interval that was used on the preceding trial. This supports the view that the preceding S-sub-1-S-sub-2 interval contributes unintentionally to the state of nonspecific preparation guided by a process of trace conditioning.     

Time stamp in conditioned place avoidance can be set to different circadian phases

We have reported that the expression of conditioned place avoidance (CPA) in the golden hamster is regulated in a circadian pattern such that the preference is exhibited strongly at the circadian time of prior training but not at other circadian times [Cain, S. W., Chou, T., & Ralph, M. R. (2004a). Circadian modulation of performance on an aversion-based place learning task in hamsters. Behavioural Brain Research, 150(1–2), 201–205]. In that study, animals that were trained at a specific circadian time to discriminate between a “safe” context and one paired with foot shock, showed strong avoidance of the paired context at 24 and 48 h following the last training session, and showed no avoidance at 32 and 40 h following training. In the present study, we hypothesized that this “time stamp” effect is settable to any circadian phase. This was tested by training animals at one of two times of day (ZT13 or ZT4) and testing whether a time stamp would be observed, with avoidance occurring only when training and testing times match. Results confirmed our hypothesis, suggesting that the time stamp in the performance of learned tasks can be set to any circadian phase. Such an ability may allow animals in nature to predict the recurrence of 24 h events, regardless of the time of day the event was encountered.     

Autocontingencies: Suppressive and accelerative effects of pairs of shocks superimposed on a positively reinforced operant baseline

Previous research has shown that unsignaled shock may accelerate positively reinforced operant responding if each shock signals a subsequent shock-free period. In order to explore the boundary conditions of this effect, two experiments were performed. In Experiment 1, pairs of unsignaled shocks separated by 15, 30, 60, or 120 seconds resulted in suppressed responding during the briefest intershock interval, and in accelerated responding during the longer intervals. When the second shock in each pair signaled a shock-free period of at least 3 minutes, accelerated responding also followed offset of the second shock in all but the 30-second condition. In Experiment 2, the addition of a conditioned stimulus prior to each pair of shocks restored baseline responding, and eliminated accelerative control following the second shock only under the briefest inter-shock interval. The results are discussed in terms of the similarity between autocontingencies (shock/no-shock relations; Davis, Memmott, & Hurwitz, 1975) and recent modifications of the feature-positive procedure (e.g., Reberg & Memmott, 1979), which stress stimulus control by shock/no-shock relationships.     

The scope and precision of specific temporal expectancy: evidence from a variable foreperiod paradigm

Recent evidence from choice response time experiments with variable foreperiods (FPs) has shown that temporal expectancy can be event specific. When a certain target appears particularly frequent after one certain FP, participants tend to expect that target after that FP. This typically results in best performance for that target when it appears after that FP. In the present study, we investigated how temporally precise event-specific temporal expectancy is, and in which range of FPs it can be found. Two target stimuli were asymmetrically distributed over two "peak-FPs" and were equally distributed over 13 additional FPs. Event-specific expectancies were found for peak-FP pairs of 500/1,100?ms and 300/500?ms. Furthermore, the event expectancies generalized to a wide range of nonpeak FPs surrounding the peak FPs.     

General Learned Irrelevance and Its Prevention

Random presentation of a tone and an electric shock to rats interfered with subsequent acquisition of a light–shock association. This interference, or “general learned irrelevance” phenomenon, however, could be prevented by prior learning of a positive relationship between the tone and the shock or that between a noise and the shock. These results strongly support the ideas that animals learn irrelevant stimulus relationships and that prior experience of stimulus relevance prevents learning irrelevance. The similarity of this observed prevention effect to an immunization effect on learned helplessness phenomena is discussed.     

Parallel acquisition of awareness and trace eyeblink classical conditioning

Trace eyeblink conditioning (with a trace interval ≥500 msec) depends on the integrity of the hippocampus and requires that participants develop awareness of the stimulus contingencies (i.e., awareness that the conditioned stimulus [CS] predicts the unconditioned stimulus [US]). Previous investigations of the relationship between trace eyeblink conditioning and awareness of the stimulus contingencies have manipulated awareness or have assessed awareness at fixed intervals during and after the conditioning session. In this study, we tracked the development of knowledge about the stimulus contingencies trial by trial by asking participants to try to predict either the onset of the US or the onset of their eyeblinks during differential trace eyeblink conditioning. Asking participants to predict their eyeblinks inhibited both the acquisition of awareness and eyeblink conditioning. In contrast, asking participants to predict the onset of the US promoted awareness and facilitated conditioning. Acquisition of knowledge about the stimulus contingencies and acquisition of differential trace eyeblink conditioning developed approximately in parallel (i.e., concurrently).     

Modulating the attentional repulsion effect

The attentional repulsion effect refers to the perceived displacement of a visual stimulus in a direction that is opposite to a brief peripheral cue. If the spatial repulsion brought about by peripheral cues is in fact attentional in nature, then attentional manipulations that produce known effects on reaction time should have analogous spatial repulsions effects. Across three experiments, we show that the attentional repulsion effect does indeed mimic results obtained from temporal (i.e., reaction time) attentional tasks, including single onset, offset and onset-offset cue displays (Experiment 1), simultaneous onset and offset displays (Experiment 2), and pop-out color displays (Experiment 3). Thus, the attentional repulsion effect can be modulated by attentional manipulations. Moreover, it appears that attentional processes underlying changes related to when targets are perceived appear to be the same as those underlying changes related to perceiving where targets are.