A functionalist account of shame-induced behaviour

Recent research has shown that shame activates both a restore and a protect motive (De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010), explaining the hitherto unexpected finding that shame can lead to both approach and avoidance behaviours. In the present article we show a clear difference in priority and development of restore and protect motives over time. Our experiment reveals that shame mainly motivates approach behaviour to restore the damaged self, but that this restore motive decreases when situational factors make it too risky or difficult to restore. In contrast, the motive to protect one's damaged self from further harm is not influenced by such situational factors. As a consequence, the approach behaviour that shame activates may change over time. These findings add to our understanding of the motivational processes and behaviours following from shame.     

Understanding cognitive behaviour therapy: A retrieval competition account

Vulnerability to emotional disorders is thought to lie in memory representations (e.g. negative self-schemas) that are activated by triggering events and maintain negative mood. There has been considerable uncertainty about how the influence of these representations can be altered, prompted in part by the development of new metacognitive therapies. This article reviews research suggesting there are multiple memories involving the self that compete to be retrieved. It is proposed that CBT does not directly modify negative information in memory, but produces changes in the relative activation of positive and negative representations such that the positive ones are assisted to win the retrieval competition. This account is related to the treatment of common symptoms typical of emotional disorders, such as phobic reactions, rumination, and intrusive images and memories. It is shown to provide a parsimonious set of principles that have the potential to unify traditional and more modern variants of CBT.     

Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and...     

Analogic and abstraction strategies in synthetic grammar learning: A functionalist interpretation

Subjects learned artificial grammars under two conditions of acquisition: paired-associate learning and observation of exemplars. The former procedure was strongly associated with the establishment of a fairly concrete memorial space consisting of specific items and parts of items and the use of an analogic strategy for making decisions about novel stimuli. The observation procedure was strongly associated with the induction of an abstract representation of the rules of the grammar and the use of a correspondence strategy for decision making. Moreover, this latter procedure led to more robust knowledge and better overall performance. Analyses of both objective response patterns and subjective introspections yielded coordinated data in support of this distinction. The relationships between acquisition condition and cognitive strategy are discussed from a functionalist point of view.     

Demystifying the role of emotion in behaviour: toward a goal-directed account

ABSTRACT

The paper sketches the historical development from emotion as a mysterious entity and the source of maladaptive behaviour, to emotion as a collection of ingredients and the source of also adaptive behaviour. We argue, however, that the underlying mechanism proposed to take care of this adaptive behaviour is not entirely up for its task. We outline an alternative view that explains so-called emotional behaviour with the same mechanism as non-emotional behaviour, but that is at the same time more likely to produce adaptive behaviour. The phenomena that were initially seen as requiring a separate emotional mechanism to influence and cause behaviour can also be explained by a goal-directed mechanism provided that more goals and other complexities inherent in the goal-directed process are taken into account.     

A semantic account of rigidity

I would like to thank Thomas A. Blackson, David O. Brink, Ted Everett and an anonymous referee forPhilosophical Studies for helpful discussion and comments.     

A perceptual account of definitions

The traditional definition per genus et differentiam is argued to be cognitively grounded in perception and in order to avoid needless argument, definitions are stipulated to assert boundaries. An analysis of the notion of perspective shows that a boundary is a composite of two distinctions: similarity that includes and difference that excludes. The concept is applied to the type-token distinction and percepts are shown to be the result of a comparison between a token as representing some phenomenon and a type as representing the kind of object the phenomenon might be. The Principle of Connection is proposed as the mental architecture that gives rise to percepts. The value of a percept is shown to be one of Identical, Similar, Different or Contrary and its perceptual aspects represent the cognitive schema of Essence, Quality, Quantity and Relation. The two notions of similarity and difference are claimed to constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for definitions. Accordingly, the qualitative elements of a definition signify the genus as representing the similarity of the defined entity in terms of others of its kind and the quantitative elements signify the differentia as representing the difference it has from everything else. Paying proper attention to both qualitative and quantitative aspects will enable formulation of definitions that are ‘good’. This paper is based on my master’s thesis at Monash University (2003). I thank Keith Allan for commenting on an earlier draft—any remaining infelicities are mine only.     

A status-enhancement account of overconfidence

In explaining the prevalence of the overconfident belief that one is better than others, prior work has focused on the motive to maintain high self-esteem, abetted by biases in attention, memory, and cognition. An additional possibility is that overconfidence enhances the person's social status. We tested this status-enhancing account of overconfidence in 6 studies. Studies 1-3 found that overconfidence leads to higher social status in both short- and longer-term groups, using naturalistic and experimental designs. Study 4 applied a Brunswikian lens analysis (Brunswik, 1956) and found that overconfidence leads to a behavioral signature that makes the individual appear competent to others. Studies 5 and 6 measured and experimentally manipulated the desire for status and found that the status motive promotes overconfidence. Together, these studies suggest that people might so often believe they are better than others because it helps them achieve higher social status. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Why a scientific realist cannot be a functionalist

According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence that at least some mental state types consist not merely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states, but also in nonrelational properties that play a role in explaining functional relations. Consequently, a scientific realist of the sort I describe must reject functionalism.     

Eye movement inductions influence health behaviour: the working memory account of persuasion

Abstract

Objective: Because the working memory (WM) has a limited capacity, the cognitive reactions towards persuasive information in the WM might be disturbed by taxing it by other means, in this study, by inducing voluntary eye movements (EMi). This is expected to influence persuasion.

Methods: Participants (N?=?127) listened to an auditory persuasive message on fruit and vegetable consumption, that was either framed positively or negatively. Half of them was asked to keep following a regularly moving dot on their screen with their eyes. At pretest, cognitive self-affirmation inclination (CSAI) was assessed as individual difference to test possible moderation effects.

Results: The EMi significantly lowered the quality of the mental images that participants reported to have of the persuasive outcomes. With regard to self-reported fruit and vegetable consumption after two weeks, EMi significantly lowered consumption when CSAI was high but it significantly increased consumption when CSAI was low.

Conclusions: The results verify our earlier findings that induced EM can influence persuasion. Although it remains unclear whether the effects of EMi were caused by disturbing mental images of persuasive outcomes or self-regulative reactions to these images, or both, the WM account may provide new theoretical as well as practical angles on persuasion.     

The functionalist theory of stratification: Two decades of controversy

The author examines the 1945 and 1948 versions of the Davis‐Moore functionalist theory of stratification. The analysis explores the basic postulates, assumptions, and logical articulation of the theory and isolates its distinctively functionalist components. This is followed by a historical account of the major criticisms leveled at the theory. The critics have succeeded in showing the fallacious and tautologous character of the functionalist components, thus, in effect, destroying the theory as a theory. Despite this destruction, various portions of the Davis‐Moore theory are shown to be usable, to contain valuable insights, and to be capable of further development.     

Adaptive memory: nature's criterion and the functionalist agenda

Memory researchers traditionally ignore function in favor of largely structural analyses. For example, it is well known that forming a visual image improves retention, and various proximate mechanisms have been proposed to account for the advantage (e.g., elaboration of the memory trace), but next to nothing is known about why memory evolved such sensitivities. Why did nature craft a memory system that is sensitive to imagery or the processing of meaning? Functional analyses are critical to progress in memory research for two main reasons: First, as in applied research, functional analyses provide the necessary criteria for measuring progress; second, there are good reasons to believe that modern cognitive processes continue to bear the imprint of ancestral selection pressures (i.e., cognitive systems are functionally designed). We review empirical evidence supporting the idea that memory evolved to enhance reproductive fitness; as a consequence, to maximize retention in basic and applied settings it is useful to develop encoding techniques that are congruent with the natural design of memory systems.     

In defense of the one-factor doxastic account: A phenomenal account of delusions

According to the doxastic model, delusions are beliefs. In the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings mistaken for beliefs. I argue that endorsement of false second-order beliefs could also create unpleasant dissonance, that mentally healthy people often endorse irrational or conflicting beliefs, and that the lack of delusion-motivated action can be explained by the influence of nonbelief factors on action. The two-factor doxastic model posits irrationality as necessary, and one metric of rationality many scholars employ is whether a response is easily understood by folk psychology. A precedent for folk-psychological acceptance of contextually bizarre beliefs as a result of personal experience can already be found in the lack of imaginative resistance encountered not in response to the impossibilities portrayed in speculative fiction, but in response to the characters’ ability to incorporate these occurrences into their mental frameworks, despite them often being at odds with these characters’ bedrock understanding of the world.     

A structural account of phonological paraphasias

The aim of this study is to develop a partial theory of phonological paraphasias which has some cross-syndrome and cross-linguistic validity. It is based on the distinction between content and structural units and emphasizes the role of the latter. The notion of structure holds the key to an understanding of the differences among the following three types of data: slips of the tongue, slips of the pen (defined as errors committed by healthy, competent adults), and paraphasias. A comparison of these three data types reveals that slips of the pen and paraphasias display striking similarities whereas slips of the tongue stand apart. This pattern emerges very clearly in an analysis of nine empirical effects all of which are found to be of a structural nature. On the basis of these results, it is argued that both the written output of normals and the oral output of aphasics are generated under a reduced structural representation (i.e., weak activation of structural nodes). However, the reasons for the diminished sensitivity to structure are not the same in the two modalities. While the impoverished structural representation is a likely consequence of the relatively slow production rate in writing, it may stem from an impaired transmission of activation among structural nodes in aphasia. By contrast, the normal speaking process occurs under the sway of a full-fledged structural representation. Hence, slips of the tongue are highly sensitive to structural effects.     

A representational account of mutual belief

Although the notion of common or mutual belief plays a crucial role in game theory, economics and social philosophy, no thoroughly representational account of it has yet been developed. In this paper, I propose two desiderata for such an account, namely, that it take into account the possibility of inconsistent data without portraying the human mind as logically and mathematically omniscient. I then propose a definition of mutual belief which meets these criteria. This account takes seriously the existence of computational limitations. Finally, I point out that the epistemic logic (or theory) needed to make the definition work is subject to the Kaplan/Montague Paradox of the Knower. I argue that this is not a defect of the account, and I discuss briefly the bearing of recent work on the paradox of the Liar upon this problem.Much of this work was carried out with the support of a grant from the National Science Foundation to the Center for Cognitive Science at the University of Texas at Austin (Grant No. IRI-8719064). Much thanks to Tyler Burge, Nicholas Asher, and Brian Skyrms for their criticisms and suggestions.     

A relational account of intellectual autonomy

According to relational views of autonomy, some social relations or forms of dependence are necessary for autonomous agency. Recent relational theorists have primarily focused on autonomy of action or practical autonomy, and the result has been a shift away from individualistic conceptions of autonomy in the practical realm. Despite these trends, individualistic conceptions are still the default when it comes to autonomy of belief or intellectual autonomy. In this paper, I argue for a relational account of intellectual autonomy. Specifically, I claim that intellectual autonomy requires a sense of one’s standing as an equal member of the epistemic community.     

A normative account of epistemic luck

This paper develops a normative account of epistemic luck, according to which the luckiness of epistemic luck is analyzed in terms of the expectations a subject is entitled to have when she satisfies the standards of epistemic justification. This account enables us to distinguish three types of epistemic luck—bad, good, and sheer—and to model the roles they play e.g. in Gettierization. One controversial aspect of the proposed account is that it is non‐reductive. While other approaches analyze epistemic luck in non‐epistemic terms—either in modal terms (lack of safety) or in agential terms (lack of creditworthiness)—I argue that the non‐reductive nature of the normative account is actually a selling‐point relative to its competitors.     

A synchronization account of false recognition

We describe a computational model to explain a variety of results in both standard and false recognition. A key attribute of the model is that it uses plausible semantic representations for words, built through exposure to a linguistic corpus. A study list is encoded in the model as a gist trace, similar to the proposal of fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2002), but based on realistically structured semantic representations of the component words. The model uses a decision process based on the principles of neural synchronization and information accumulation. The decision process operates by synchronizing a probe with the gist trace of a study context, allowing information to be accumulated about whether the word did or did not occur on the study list, and the efficiency of synchronization determines recognition. We demonstrate that the model is capable of accounting for standard recognition results that are challenging for classic global memory models, and can also explain a wide variety of false recognition effects and make item-specific predictions for critical lures. The model demonstrates that both standard and false recognition results may be explained within a single formal framework by integrating realistic representation assumptions with a simple processing mechanism.