Review of Cultural Psychology,by Steven J. Heine

Summary

An A-B, B-C, A-C mediation paradigm was used to investigate observational learning of attitudes in a laboratory situation. The A-B stage involved the learning of dissyllables as responses to instances of three concepts. In the B-C stage, Ss observed a model apparently receiving different levels of shock in association with the dissyllables. In the A-C stage, Ss pulled a lever after the presentation of each of the previously learned concept instances and an equal number of new instances of the same concepts. During a second presentation, Ss gave evaluative ratings of the concept instances. The latency, speed, and amplitude of the lever pull response were not affected by the experimental manipulations. With respect to ratings, instances of concepts associated with shock to the model were significantly more disliked than instances of concepts not paired with shock to the model.     

现象学的存在论意义和生存论根基

在海德格尔那里,现象学已从“先验现象学”转变为“存在论的现象学”,这就是现象学的“存在论转向”。这种转向最为突出地表现在海德格尔对胡塞尔现象学的“三个重要发现”的存在论意义的揭示和生存论根基的追问上:1.胡塞尔把意识的意向性作为最后的根据,海德格尔则强调此在的生存论结构的超越性对一切意识行为和实践行为的意向性的奠基作用;2.与胡塞尔把感性直观作为范畴直观的最后根据不同,海德格尔认为无论是感性直观还是范畴直观都不具有源始性,因为它们都奠基于此在的“存在之理解”,都只有在生存论的“理解”的基础上才是可能的;3.与胡塞尔强调本质或范畴的先天性不同,海德格尔把先天与后天的区别最终归结为存在与存在者的“存在论区别”。     

Heidegger and Modern Science: Responding to Ontological Communication in the Anthropocene Epoch

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Martin Heidegger’s writings on modern science as well as his stray remarks on communication are important theoretical resources to...     

大圆满(Dzogchen)及海德格尔的四维时间

关于时间,我们有太多的疑问,比如过去的事情就不再有了吗?未来是不可预期的吗?现在存在吗?时光的流逝是不可逆转的吗?什么是永恒?它与时间的关系如何?本文以藏传佛教大圆满传统的龙清巴和西方现象学派的海德格尔为例讨论时间的经验。他们都没有去构想永恒的生命,而是深入到时间流逝的现象和经验之中,揭示了一个全新的时间维度,即所谓第四时间或时间的第四维度。本文首先介绍大圆满传统中处理时间经验的一种修行,然后分析龙清巴的四时概念及其在佛教史上的意义,接着讨论海德格尔的四维时间概念,以及其追随者对这一概念的进一步讨论。最后在结论中,我将简单说明四维时间在这两个传统中的同异点,并探讨其相似点后的可能原因。     

Time Scales of Observation and Ontological Levels of Reality

My goal is to conceive how the reality would look like for hypothetical creatures that supposedly perceive on time scales much faster or much slower than that of us humans. To attain the goal, I propose modelling in two steps. At step one, we have to single out a unified parameter that sets time scale of perception. Changing substantially the value of the parameter would mean changing scale. I argue that the required parameter is duration of discrete perceptive frames, or snapshots, whose sequencing constitutes perceptive process. I show that different standard durations of perceptive frames is the ground for differences in perceptive time scales of various animals. Abnormally changed duration of perceptive frames is the cause of the effect of distorted subjective time observed by humans under some conditions. Now comes step two of the modelling. By inserting some arbitrary duration of a perceptive frame, we set a hypothetical scale and thus emulate a viewpoint for virtual observation of the reality in a wider or narrower angle of embracing events in time. Like changing lenses of a microscope, viewing reality in different temporal scales makes certain features of reality manifested, others veiled. These are, in particular, features of life. If we observe an object in an inappropriate interval, we may not notice the very essence of a process it is undergoing.     

Leaping Ahead of Heidegger: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Being and Time

Abstract

This article challenges Honneth’s reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory (2001/2010). Focusing on Hegel’s method, I argue that this text hardly offers support for the theory of mutual recognition that Honneth purports to derive from it. After critically considering Honneth’s interpretation of Hegel’s account of the family and civil society, I argue that Hegel’s text does not warrant Honneth’s tacit identification of mutual recognition with symmetrical instances of mutual recognition, let alone his subsequent projection of symmetrical forms of mutual recognition onto the various spheres of the Philosophy of Right as a whole. I conclude by indicating an alternative way in which Hegel’s text might be used to understand contemporary society.     

The Ontological Import of Heidegger's Analysis of Anxiety in Being and Time

Heidegger's primary concern in Being and Time is the question of the meaning of being—a distinctly ontological concern. Yet, with discussions of death, guilt, conscience, anxiety, uncanniness, authenticity, and inauthenticity, Heidegger seems to end up in existential territory. The ontological import of these existential excursions is difficult to discern—indeed, it has not been identified in leading interpretations. In this paper, I aim to highlight the ontological import of Heidegger's analysis of anxiety—it manifests the inadequacy of Dasein's fallen and inauthentic self‐understanding, which is motivated by the inadequacy of Dasein's fallen and inauthentic, average understanding of being. In making this case, I will clarify the sense in which anxiety involves an experience of world‐collapse and show how it functions to reveal the possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity.     

Revisiting the Concept of Time: Archaic Perplexity in Bergson and Heidegger

Though the claims they make about temporality are markedly different, Henri Bergson and Martin Heidegger agree that time is a philosophically foundational phenomenon; indeed, they agree that time is, in certain respects, the basis for all discursively representable beings. This paper focuses not so much on their theories of temporality (i.e., their respective answers to the question “what is time?” and their justifications for these answers) but rather on the challenges involved in talking about this phenomenon at all. Both thinkers are highly sensitive to these challenges and to the problems involved in any attempt to represent time in a discursively straightforward manner. I will show that: (1) Bergson’s and Heidegger’s respective claims about time can be fully understood only if we keep this sensitivity in view and carefully note what they are—and aren’t—doing in “talking about time”; and (2) what is ultimately at stake in their analyses is not just the phenomenon of time but what it means to engage in rigorous philosophical praxis.     

Individual and Community in Early Heidegger: Situating das Man,the Man-self,and Self-ownership in Dasein's Ontological Structure

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger claims that (1) das Manis an 'existential' i.e. a necessary feature of Dasein's Being; and (2) Dasein need not always exist in the mode of the Man-self, but can also be eigentlich, which I translate as 'self-owningly'. These apparently contradictory statements have prompted a debate between Hubert Dreyfus, who recommends abandoning (2), and Frederick Olafson, who favors jettisoning (1). I offer an interpretation of the structure of Dasein's Being compatible with both (1) and (2), thus resolving the Dreyfus-Olafson debate. Central to this resolution is the distinction between das Manand the Man-self. Das Manis one of three existential 'horizons', or fields of possibilities; the other two horizons are the world and death. At any time, Dasein encounters entities in one of two basic modes: either by 'expressly seizing' possibilities of the horizon, or by occluding these possibilities. These modes are 'existentiell', i.e. features of Dasein's Being that are possible, but not essential. Self-ownership and the Man-self are the two basic existentiell modes of being oneself, i.e. projecting everyday possibilities of oneself appropriated from the horizon of das Man. What differentiates these two modes is the stance one takes to the possibility of death, the existential horizon of being oneself.