Margaret R. Miles’ Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter: An Eriksonian Perspective

My perspective on Margaret R. Miles’s Augustine and the Fundamentalist’s Daughter is informed by Erik H. Erikson’s life cycle model (Erikson 1950, 1959, 1963, 1964, 1968a, b, 1982; Erikson and Erikson 1997) and, more specifically, by my relocation of his life stages and their accompanying human strengths (Erikson 1964) according to decades (Capps 2008). I interpret Miles’s account of her life from birth to age forty as revealing the selves that comprise the composite Self (Erikson 1968a) that come into their own during the first four decades of the life cycle, i.e., the hopeful, willing, purposeful, and competent selves     

Keith Lehrer on the basing relation

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer??s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311?C313, 1971). We show that Lehrer??s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer??s account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer??s own account is more plausible.     

Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning

This paper concerns the extent to which uncertain propositional reasoning can track probabilistic reasoning, and addresses kinematic problems that extend the familiar Lottery paradox. An acceptance rule assigns to each Bayesian credal state p a propositional belief revision method ${\sf B}_{p}$ , which specifies an initial belief state ${\sf B}_{p}(\top)$ that is revised to the new propositional belief state ${\sf B}(E)$ upon receipt of information E. An acceptance rule tracks Bayesian conditioning when ${\sf B}_{p}(E) = {\sf B}_{p|_{E}}(\top)$ , for every E such that p(E)?>?0; namely, when acceptance by propositional belief revision equals Bayesian conditioning followed by acceptance. Standard proposals for uncertain acceptance and belief revision do not track Bayesian conditioning. The ??Lockean?? rule that accepts propositions above a probability threshold is subject to the familiar lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961), and we show that it is also subject to new and more stubborn paradoxes when the tracking property is taken into account. Moreover, we show that the familiar AGM approach to belief revision (Harper, Synthese 30(1?C2):221?C262, 1975; Alchourrón et al., J Symb Log 50:510?C530, 1985) cannot be realized in a sensible way by any uncertain acceptance rule that tracks Bayesian conditioning. Finally, we present a plausible, alternative approach that tracks Bayesian conditioning and avoids all of the paradoxes. It combines an odds-based acceptance rule proposed originally by Levi (1996) with a non-AGM belief revision method proposed originally by Shoham (1987).     

Exemplification as molecular function

Since the publication of Universals and Scientific Realism (Armstrong 1978a, b) until Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics (Armstrong 2010), via Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Armstrong 1989), a World of States of Affairs (Armstrong 1997), and Truth and Truthmakers (Armstrong 2004), David Armstrong has developed one of the most influential theories of instantiation in contemporary analytic metaphysics (see, for example, Lewis, in Aust J Phil 61(4), 343–377, 1983; Baxter in Aust J Phil, 79, 449–464, 2001; Forrest, in Aust J Phil, 83, 213–228, 2006). Instantiation has been advocated by Armstrong to give a solution to what he has called the “pressing problem” of “the multiple location of property universals” (Armstrong, in Universals: An opinionated introduction. University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 89–90). Here I argue that Armstrong’s theory of instantiation fails to solve the problem because it involves two kinds of instantiation to account for particulars “having” and “sharing” universals. As a viable alternative to Armstrong’s theory, I propose a theory of instantiation capable of accounting for both phenomena in a univocal way.     

Reasoning About Games

A mixture of propositional dynamic logic and epistemic logic that we call PDL + E is used to give a formalization of Artemov??s knowledge based reasoning approach to game theory, (KBR), [4, 5]. Epistemic states of players are represented explicitly and reasoned about formally. We give a detailed analysis of the Centipede game using both proof theoretic and semantic machinery. This helps make the case that PDL + E can be a useful basis for the logical investigation of game theory.     

25 years of research on the use of geometry in spatial reorientation: a current theoretical perspective

The purpose of this article is to review and evaluate the range of theories proposed to explain findings on the use of geometry in reorientation. We consider five key approaches and models associated with them and, in the course of reviewing each approach, five key issues. First, we take up modularity theory itself, as recently revised by Lee and Spelke (Cognitive Psychology, 61, 152–176, 2010a; Experimental Brain Research, 206, 179–188, 2010b). In this context, we discuss issues concerning the basic distinction between geometry and features. Second, we review the view-matching approach (Stürzl, Cheung, Cheng, & Zeil, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 1–14, 2008). In this context, we highlight the possibility of cross-species differences, as well as commonalities. Third, we review an associative theory (Miller & Shettleworth, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33, 191–212, 2007; Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 34, 419–422, 2008). In this context, we focus on phenomena of cue competition. Fourth, we take up adaptive combination theory (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2006). In this context, we focus on discussing development and the effects of experience. Fifth, we examine various neurally based approaches, including frameworks proposed by Doeller and Burgess (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5909–5914, 2008; Doeller, King, & Burgess, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105, 5915–5920, 2008) and by Sheynikhovich, Chavarriaga, Strösslin, Arleo, and Gerstner (Psychological Review, 116, 540–566, 2009). In this context, we examine the issue of the neural substrates of spatial navigation. We conclude that none of these approaches can account for all of the known phenomena concerning the use of geometry in reorientation and clarify what the challenges are for each approach.     

Beyond Original Sin: A Paradigm Shift for the Age of Neuroscience

In this article I explore the implications of Jesus?? location of the kingdom of heaven in the lived experience of the individual and of the findings of neuroscientific research for a paradigm shift in Christian theology, one that moves us beyond the Adamic myth and belief in original sin. Support for a theological paradigm shift based on lived experience is provided by Capps (1993) and for this particular paradigm shift by Pagels (1989) and Ricoeur (2004). I point out that the doctrine of original sin supports and fosters the negativity bias of the brain and inhibits the resculpting of the brain. Drawing on Hanson??s (2009) evidence in support of the brain??s neuroplasticity (i.e., its capacity to change itself) and on Brach??s (2003) critique of the ??trance of unworthiness,?? I make the case for meditative and mindful awareness practices in Christianity and other religious traditions as proven methods for the resculpting of the brain in order that individuals may experience greater joy, contentment, and awareness of the goodness of life and of God??s creation. A longitudinal neuroscientific research study of Roman Catholic nuns (Newberg and Waldman 2009) provides evidence in support of the role of contemplative prayer and meditation in generating the joy and serenity that Jesus?? allusion to the hidden treasure envisions.     

Disrupting the Coloniality of Being: Toward De-colonial Ontologies in Philosophy of Education

This essay works to bridge conversations in philosophy of education with decolonial theory. The author considers Margonis?? (1999, 2011a, b) use of Rousseau (1979) and Heidegger (1962) in developing an ontological attitude that counters social hierarchies and promotes anti-colonial relations. While affirming this effort, the essay outlines a coloniality of being at work in Rousseau and Heidegger through thier reliance on the colonial conceptualization of African Americans and Native Americans as savage and primitive. The essay turns to decolonial theory and the work of Maldenado-Torres (Cult Stud 21(2?C3):240?C270, 2007, 2009) to highlight how a decolonial attitude complicates, yet enriches Margonis?? philosophical framework.     

Philo’s Argument from Evil in Hume’s Dialogues X: A Semantic Interpretation

Philo's argument from evil in a much-discussed passage in Part X of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) has been interpreted in three main ways: as a logical argument from evil, as an evidential argument from evil, and as an argument against natural theology's inference of a benevolent and merciful God from the course of the world. I argue that Philo is not offering an argument of any of these sorts, but is arguing that there is a radical disanalogy between the meanings of terms like ‘merciful’ and ‘benevolent’ when applied to God and human beings respectively. Drawing on the new ‘Irreligious Interpretation’ of Hume's philosophy developed by Paul Russell (2002, 2008), I suggest that the underlying aim of Philo's argument appears to be to show, in opposition to Christian teaching, that these terms, when applied to God, are in effect meaningless.     

Importing Logics

The novel notion of importing logics is introduced, subsuming as special cases several kinds of asymmetric combination mechanisms, like temporalization [8, 9], modalization [7] and exogenous enrichment [13, 5, 12, 4, 1]. The graph-theoretic approach proposed in [15] is used, but formulas are identified with irreducible paths in the signature multi-graph instead of equivalence classes of such paths, facilitating proofs involving inductions on formulas. Importing is proved to be strongly conservative. Conservative results follow as corollaries for temporalization, modalization and exogenous enrichment.     

Method,Models, and Scholarly Types: Reflections on Thesis and Dissertation Writing in Pastoral Theology

This article concerns the methodological issues confronted by pastoral theology students in their writing of a master’s thesis or doctoral dissertation. I introduce H. Richard Niebuhr’s (1951) identification of five models (rejection, accommodation, synthesis, dualism, and conversionist) for relating the theological and psychological resources used in their writing. Then, by means of Rudolf Arnheim’s art theory (1986, 1988, 1996), I identify three additional models (convergence, juxtaposition, and structural uniformity) and note their affinities with and complications of three of Niebuhr’s models (synthesis, dualism, and accommodation). I argue that these complications can play a positive role in the writing of a thesis or dissertation as they promote a fuller engagement with the empirical reality that is the focus of study. I also note David W. Galenson’s (2006) view that his typology of artists as conceptualists and experimentalists is applicable to scholars and suggest that awareness of which type is most characteristic of oneself may enable one to minimize the frustrations that one is likely to experience in writing a thesis or dissertation. I conclude with a brief discussion of Erik H. Erikson’s consideration of Martin Luther’s redefinition of work in Young Man Luther (chapter 5) and suggest that it makes the case for understanding thesis and dissertation writing as an exercise in liberated craftsmanship.     

Incommensurability,slight pains and God

I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659–688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165–176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God’s non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one’s toe) and Leibniz’s reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz’s general position.     

Ambivalent Sexism and Religion: Connected Through Values

Sexist attitudes do not exist in a limbo; they are embedded in larger belief systems associated with specific hierarchies of values. In particular, manifestations of benevolent sexism (Glick and Fiske 1996, 1997, 2001) can be perceived as a social boon, not a social ill, both because they are experienced as positive, and because they reward behaviors that maintain social stability. One of the strongest social institutions that create and justify specific hierarchies of values is religion. In this paper, we examine how the values inherent in religious beliefs (perhaps inadvertently) propagate an unequal status quo between men and women through endorsement of ideologies linked to benevolent sexism. In a survey with a convenience sample of train passengers in Southern and Eastern Poland (N?=?180), we investigated the relationship between Catholic religiosity and sexist attitudes. In line with previous findings (Gaunt 2012; Glick et al. 2002a; Ta?demir and Sakall?-U?urlu 2010), results suggest that religiosity can be linked to endorsement of benevolent sexism. This relationship was mediated in our study by the values of conservatism and openness to change (Schwartz 1992): religious individuals appear to value the societal status quo, tradition, and conformity, which leads them to perceive women through the lens of traditional social roles. Adhering to the teachings of a religion that promotes family values in general seems to have as its byproduct an espousal of prejudicial attitudes toward specific members of the family.     

Regularity Theories Reassessed

For a long time, regularity accounts of causation have virtually vanished from the scene. Problems encountered within other theoretical frameworks have recently induced authors working on causation, laws of nature, or methodologies of causal reasoning – as e.g. May (Kausales Schliessen. Eine Untersuchung über kausale Erklärungen und Theorienbildung. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, 1999), Ragin (Fuzzy-set social science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Graßhoff and May (Causal regularities. In W. Spohn, M. Ledwig, &; M. Esfeld (Eds.), Current issues in causation (pp. 85–114). Paderborn: Mentis, 2001), Swartz (The concept of physical law (2nd ed.). http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/, 2003), Halpin (Erkenntnis, 58, 137–168, 2003) – to direct their attention back to regularity theoretic analyses. In light of the latest proposals of regularity theories, the paper at hand therefore reassesses the criticism raised against regularity accounts since the INUS theory of causation of Mackie (The cement of the universe. A study of causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). It is shown that most of these objections target strikingly over-simplified regularity theoretic sketches. By outlining ways to refute these objections it is argued that the prevalent conviction as to the overall failure of regularity theories has been hasty.     

Pereboom’s Frankfurt case and derivative culpability

Pereboom has formulated a Frankfurt-style counterexample in which an agent is alleged to be responsible despite the fact that there are only non-robust alternatives present (Pereboom, Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: essays on the importance of alternative possibilities, 2003; Phil Explor 12(2):109–118, 2009). I support Widerker’s objection to Pereboom’s Tax Evasion 2 example (Widerker, J Phil 103(4):163–187, 2006) (which rests on the worry that the agent in this example is derivatively culpable as opposed to directly responsible) against Pereboom’s recent counterarguments to this objection (Pereboom 2009). Building on work by Moya (J Phil 104:475–486, 2007; Critica 43(128):3–26, 2011) and Widerker (Widerker 2006), I argue that there is good reason to measure the robustness of alternatives in terms of comparative, rather than non-comparative likelihood of exemption, where the important factor for blame is whether the agent is “doing her reasonable best” to avoid blameworthy behaviour. I maintain that an agent only ever appears responsible when alternatives are robust in this sense. In Pereboom’s examples, both Tax Evasion 2, and his more recent version, Tax Evasion 3 (Pereboom 2009), I maintain the robustness of the alternatives, so understood, is unclear. We can clear up any ambiguity by sharpening the examples, and the result is that the agent appears responsible when the alternatives are made clearly robust, and does not appear responsible when alternatives appear clearly non-robust. The comparative nature of our judgements about blame, I maintain helps to explain the continuing appeal of the “leeway-incompatibilist” viewpoint.     

Gender and Leadership: A Frame Analysis of University Home Web Page Images

With calls for (business) leaders to contribute to greater global fairness and social justice (BAWB 2006; Maak and Pless Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 537–550, 2009), this paper considers gender equality on University home web page images as one means of communicating equal access to leadership roles for both men and women. Although there are many paths for leadership development, one important purpose of Universities is to create people who will potentially become leaders in our society (Shapiro 2005). We analyzed the home web pages at 24 leading universities to identify implicit messages about gender roles, building on implicit leadership theory and leadership prototypes. Using an adapted version of Goffman’s frame analysis (1979), our results suggest depiction of gender equality in university home web pages, in contrast to studies of print advertisements (cf., Kang Sex Roles, 37(11/12), 979–996, 1997; Lindner Sex Roles, 51(7/8), 409–421, 2004). Our results also identify specific opportunities to depict greater equity and to continue to expand the potential for both women and men to be seen as being capable and belonging on this leadership path.     

How Simple is it for Science to Acquire Wisdom According to its Choicest Aims?

Focusing on Nicholas Maxwell’s thesis that “science, properly understood, provides us the methodological key to the salvation of humanity”, the article discusses Maxwell’s aim oriented empiricism and his conception of Wisdom Inquiry as advocated in Maxwell’s (2009b, pp.1–56) essay entitled “How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World?” (in Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell 2009, edited by Leemon McHenry) and in Maxwell (2004 & 2009a).     

The Spiritual Well-Being of Elderly People: A Study of a French Sample

The aim of our research was to identify predictors of the spiritual well-being of elderly people. More specifically, we postulated that subjective well-being and its components would be predictors of spiritual well-being, and more so than age and health status. We invited 133 people aged 60–95 to complete a questionnaire that included the French adaptation (Velasco and Rioux in Revue Canadienne des Sciences du Comportement 41(2):102–128, 2009) of Paloutzian and Ellison’s (Loneliness: A sourcebook of current theory, research and therapy, Wiley-Interscience, New York, 1982) Spiritual Well-Being Scale, Ryff and Essex’s (Psychol Aging 7:507–517, 1992) Psychological Well-Being Scale (translated by Lapierre and Desrochers 1997), Salamon and Conte’s (Meas Eval Guid 15(3):194–200, 1982) Life Satisfaction in the Elderly Scale (validated by Rousseau and Dubé in 1993), and the French version (Blais et al. in Can J Behav Sci 21:210–223, 1989) of Diener et al. (J Pers Assess 49:71–75, 1985) Satisfaction with Life Scale. The results only partially confirm our hypothesis, because only satisfaction with life as a whole and two items in “Life Satisfaction in the Elderly Scale” make it possible to predict the spiritual well-being of elderly people. Moreover, neither health status nor age was found to be a significant predictor of spiritual well-being. This research helps understand better the links between the concept of spiritual well-being and that of subjective well-being of elderly people and could contribute to the development of a tool that could take into account the spiritual well-being of elderly people, whether they be believers, agnostic, or atheist.     

Monsters in Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives

Kaplan (1989a) insists that natural languages do not contain displacing devices that operate on character—such displacing devices are called monsters. This thesis has recently faced various empirical challenges (e.g., Schlenker 2003; Anand and Nevins 2004). In this note, the thesis is challenged on grounds of a more theoretical nature. It is argued that the standard compositional semantics of variable binding employs monstrous operations. As a dramatic first example, Kaplan’s formal language, the Logic of Demonstratives, is shown to contain monsters. For similar reasons, the orthodox lambda-calculus-based semantics for variable binding is argued to be monstrous. This technical point promises to provide some far-reaching implications for our understanding of semantic theory and content. The theoretical upshot of the discussion is at least threefold: (i) the Kaplanian thesis that “directly referential” terms are not shiftable/bindable is unmotivated, (ii) since monsters operate on something distinct from the assertoric content of their operands, we must distinguish ingredient sense from assertoric content (cf. Dummett 1973; Evans 1979; Stanley 1997), and (iii) since the case of variable binding provides a paradigm of semantic shift that differs from the other types, it is plausible to think that indexicals—which are standardly treated by means of the assignment function—might undergo the same kind of shift.     

On the Argument from Divine Arbitrariness

William Rowe in his Can God be Free? (2004) argues that God, if there is a God, necessarily chooses the best. Combined with the premise that there is no best act of creation, this provides an a priori argument for atheism. Rowe assumes that necessarily God is a ??morally unsurpassable?? being, and it is for that reason that God chooses the best. In this article I drop that assumption and I consider a successor to Rowe??s argument, the Argument from Arbitrariness, based on the premise that God does not act arbitrarily. My chief conclusion will be that this argument fails because, for all we know, there can be non-arbitrary divine choices even if there is no best act of creation.