Distinguishing between emotion and nonemotion: Judgments about experience

The conceptual distinction between emotion and nonemotion subjective states was investigated in a series of three studies. Three questions were addressed. First, is there high agreement among people in identifying labels for subjective states as either emotion or nonemotion? Second, in judgments of the similarity of subjective states is the emotion-nonemotion distinction more or less salient than other properties of experience? Third, what criteria are used to distinguish conceptually between emotion and nonemotion states? Results indicated that, for many feeling states, there is no substantial agreement as to whether the state should be considered emotion or nonemotion, that the affective dimension of experience is not as salient as are other specific properties of experience (physiological arousal, activity level, valence), and that, in general, people express their individual judgment of emotion-nonemotion on the basis of some nonspecific combination of physiological arousal and character of cognitive state.     

Do readers mentally represent characters' emotional states?

Abstract

Subjects read stories that described concrete actions, such as a main character stealing money from a store where his best friend worked and later learning that his friend had been fired. Following each story, subjects read a target sentence that contained an emotion word that either matched the emotional state implied by the story (e.g. guilt) or mismatched that emotional state. In Experiment 1, target sentences were read more slowly when the mismatched emotion words were the perceived opposites of the emotional states implied by the stories (e.g. pride). In Experiment 2, target sentences were read more slowly when the mismatched emotion words shared the affective valence of the implied emotional state; therefore, readers must represent more than simply the affective valence of the emotional states. Instead of reading target sentences that contained matching versus mismatching emotion words, subjects in Experiment 3 simply pronounced matching versus mismatching emotion words. Mismatching emotion words were pronounced more slowly. These experiments suggest that readers form explicit, lifelike, mental representations of fictional characters' emotional states, and readers form these representations as a normal part of reading comprehension.     

Mapping emotions through time: how affective trajectories inform the language of emotion

The words used to describe emotions can provide insight into the basic processes that contribute to emotional experience. We propose that emotions arise partly from interacting evaluations of one's current affective state, previous affective state, predictions for how these may change in the future, and the experienced outcomes following these predictions. These states can be represented and inferred from neural systems that encode shifts in outcomes and make predictions. In two studies, we demonstrate that emotion labels are reliably differentiated from one another using only simple cues about these affective trajectories through time. For example, when a worse-than-expected outcome follows the prediction that something good will happen, that situation is labeled as causing anger, whereas when a worse-than-expected outcome follows the prediction that something bad will happen, that situation is labeled as causing sadness. Emotion categories are more differentiated when participants are required to think categorically than when participants have the option to consider multiple emotions and degrees of emotions. This work indicates that information about affective movement through time and changes in affective trajectory may be a fundamental aspect of emotion categories. Future studies of emotion must account for the dynamic way that we absorb and process information.     

A multifactor-system dynamics theory of emotion

In multifactor individuality theory, emotion is treated as the product of the interaction of the cognitive and affective systems, where the cognitive system is defined as a multidimensional, hierarchical system that transforms information in order to detect environmental invariants, and the affective system is defined as a multidimensional hierarchical system that transforms information into arousal states. The highest order dimensions of the cognitive system are conceptual, perceptual, and symbolizing; the highest order dimensions of the affective system are emotional independence, introversion — extroversion, and emotional stability. The concept of arousal provides a key to understanding the complex interactions between cognition and affect. It is hypothesized that specifiable subsets of cognitive and affective dimensions conform to either the facilitative or decremental effects of arousal, and that the Yerkes-Dodson inverted-U function is a composite of both effects. An explanation for the differentiation of distinct emotional states is also presented. Essentially, emotions are differentiated by different weightings of the affective and cognitive dimensions. A theoretical framework for studying the temporal sequencing of phases of emotional behavior is presented as well.This research was supported by grant number S76-0908-RI, awarded to Joseph R. Royce by the Canada Council. Stephen R. Diamond is a research associate on the Individuality Project supported by the grant. We are grateful to Arnold Powell for assistance with the layout of Figure 7.     

A dynamical systems interpretation of a dimensional model of emotion

The dimensional structure of emotion was investigated using self reports of induced mood and idiographic and nomothetic analyses. Subjects attended four experimental sessions during which an array of affective states was induced via auditory, visual, and imaginal channels. For each of 118 stimulus events, subjects self-rated their response. Factor analysis yielded the predicted bipolar factors of valence and arousal: these were obtained in group-aggregated analysis and subsequently confirmed as change dimensions at the intraindividual level. Controversy over the fundamental dimensions of affective space was considered with respect to methodological issues such as factor rotation and sampling of data space. Valence and arousal are discussed as motivational, driving parameters of affective experience and a dynamical systems conceptualization of emotion is proposed.     

Reason and emotion,not reason or emotion in moral judgment

One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question assumes that reason and emotion are two fully independent cognitive faculties, whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that moral judgments are caused by a complex interplay of psychological mechanisms that are both cognitive and affective, but in a way that is not simply a function of the independent causal contributions of reason and emotion. The paper concludes by considering the implications of this view for metaethics.     

Jealousy: Compound emotion or label for a particular situation?

Individuals generally experience several emotions when confronted with an unfaithful mate. Such observations have led some scholars to propose that jealousy is a compound emotion. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the concept of jealousy as a combination of primary emotions is an artifact of the failure to control for the focus of concern. The subjects were 149 undergraduates who read jealousy and nonjealousy scenarios and indicated the emotions they believed the partner of a relationship experienced in response to the actions of the mate. The results indicated that manipulation of the focus of concern was a more parsimonious explanation of the results than the assumption that the subjects were basing their responses upon a subjective experience of a compound emotion.This paper was presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Anaheim, California, August 1983.     

Adults' emotional states and recognition of emotion in young children

This study addressed the degree to which adults' emotional states influence their perception of emotional states in children and their motivation to change such states. Happiness, sadness, anger, or a neutral state was induced in adults, who then viewed slides of 4-year-old children who were actually experiencing various emotional states. Adults' own emotional states had little impact on their accurate recognition of children's emotions or on their motives for social action to change such emotions. However, adults' states did influence the intensity they assigned to children's emotions, with happy adults tending to rate some emotions as more intense for black children (sadness) and for girls (anger and neutrality). The base rates with which adults used different emotion labels also influenced judgments, increasing it for the recognition of happiness and reducing it for anger. The results are discussed in terms of the factors that influence whether or not emotional states affect judgment processes and the role of emotion labels in the effective recognition of ongoing emotional states. Also addressed is the consequence of adults' recognition of emotion in children for the effective socialization of emotion.     

Callous-unemotional traits and empathy deficits: Mediating effects of affective perspective-taking and facial emotion recognition

Although empathy deficits are thought to be associated with callous-unemotional (CU) traits, findings remain equivocal and little is known about what specific abilities may underlie these purported deficits. Affective perspective-taking (APT) and facial emotion recognition may be implicated, given their independent associations with both empathy and CU traits. The current study examined how CU traits relate to cognitive and affective empathy and whether APT and facial emotion recognition mediate these relations. Participants were 103 adolescents (70 males) aged 16–18 attending a residential programme. CU traits were negatively associated with cognitive and affective empathy to a similar degree. The association between CU traits and affective empathy was partially mediated by APT. Results suggest that assessing mechanisms that may underlie empathic deficits, such as perspective-taking, may be important for youth with CU traits and may inform targets of intervention.     

Conceptual and methodological issues in the judgment of facial expressions of emotion

In two studies, subjects judged a set of facial expressions of emotion by either providing labels of their own choice to describe the stimuli (free-choice condition), choosing a label from a list of emotion words, or choosing a story from a list of emotion stories (fixed-choice conditions). In the free-choice condition, levels of agreement between subjects on the predicted emotion categories for six basic emotions were significantly greater than chance levels, and comparable to those shown in fixed-choice studies. As predicted, there was little to no agreement on a verbal label for contempt. Agreement on contempt was greatly improved when subjects were allowed to identify the expression in terms of an antecedent event for that emotion rather than in terms of a single verbal label, a finding that could not be attributed to the methodological artifact of exclusion in a fixed-choice paradigm. These findings support two conclusions: (1) that the labels used in fixed-choice paradigms accurately reflect the verbal categories people use when free labeling facial expressions of emotion, and (2) that lexically ambiguous emotions, such as contempt, are understood in terms of their situational meanings.This research was supported in part by a Research Scientist Award from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 06091) to Paul Ekman.     

Congruence of meaning between facial expressions of emotion and selected emotion terms

How similar are the meanings of facial expressions of emotion and the emotion terms frequently used to label them? In three studies, subjects made similarity judgments and emotion self-report ratings in response to six emotion categories represented in Ekman and Friesen's Pictures of Facial Affect, and their associated labels. Results were analyzed with respect to the constituent facial movements using the Facial Action Coding System, and using consensus analysis, multidimensional scaling, and inferential statistics. Shared interpretation of meaning was found between individuals and the group, with congruence between the meaning in facial expressions, labeling using basic emotion terms, and subjects' reported emotional responses. The data suggest that (1) the general labels used by Ekman and Friesen are appropriate but may not be optimal, (2) certain facial movements contribute more to the perception of emotion than do others, and (3) perception of emotion may be categorical rather than dimensional.     

Strategies actually employed during response-focused emotion regulation research: Affective and physiological consequences

Addressing internal validity concerns in emotion regulation research, the present experiment was primarily designed to determine whether research participants are compliant when asked to use a response-focused strategy during emotional film viewing or whether these individuals incorporate the use of antecedent strategies. The influence of antecedent vs. response-focused strategy use on self-reported affect, physiological, and behavioural data were additionally investigated. A total of 82 healthy undergraduate participants were asked to use one of two response-focused emotion regulation techniques—suppression or exaggeration—while watching a 2 minute positive or negative movie. Following the movie, participants self-reported their affective response to the film, described how they tried to suppress or exaggerate their reaction (i.e., strategies used to regulate their response), and estimated the percentage of time they used each strategy. Representing “antecedent” and “response-focused” techniques, the strategies reported by participants were coded as “cognitive” or “muscular” in nature. Relative to exaggerators, participants in the suppression condition were significantly more likely to self-report using an antecedent (cognitive) strategy for at least some portion of the film (65% vs. 38%). During the suppression condition, greater use of antecedent strategies did not influence sympathetic reactivity to either movie but did result in significantly less self-reported negative affect to the negative movie.     

The role of egocentrism and focalism in the emotion intensity bias

People sometimes judge their emotions, preferences, and attitudes to be more intense than those of other people. Two experiments tested whether this emotion intensity bias in direct comparisons results from two non-motivated cognitive processes—egocentrism and focalism. In Study 1, the intensity bias was found even when comparing a friend’s preferences to peers. In Study 2, attention given to own versus other’s preferences, and the referent of the comparison (self or others) were manipulated. Results indicated that attention to others reduced the bias, presumably by reducing egocentrism. Consistent with focalism, the bias also emerged when a friend was the target of comparison, and the bias was eliminated when the self was the referent rather than the target of comparison. In the discussion, we evaluate these accounts in light of some alternative explanations for the intensity bias.     

Toward integrating cognitive components with computational models of emotion using software design patterns

Computational models of emotion (CMEs) are software systems designed to imitate particular aspects of human emotions. The main purpose of this type of computational model is to capture the complexity of the human emotion process in a software system that is incorporated into a cognitive agent architecture. However, creating a CME that closely imitates the actual functioning of emotions demands to address some challenges such as (i) sharing information among independently developed cognitive and affective components, and (ii) interconnecting complex cognitive and affective components that must interact with one another in order to generate realistic emotions, which may even affect agents’ decision making. This paper proposes an architectural pattern aimed at cataloging and describing fundamental components of CMEs and their interrelationships with cognitive components. In this architectural pattern, external cognitive components and internal affective components of CMEs do not interact directly but are extended by including message exchange methods in order to use a publish-subscribe channel, which enables their intercommunication, thus attenuating issues such as software heterogeneity. This structural approach centralizes communication management and separates the inherent complexity of the cognitive and affective processes from the complexity of their interaction mechanisms. In so doing, it enables the design of CMEs’ architectures composed of independently developed affective and cognitive components. The proposed architectural pattern attempts to make progress in capturing the complex process of human emotions in a software system that adheres to software engineering best practices and that incorporates quality attributes such as flexibility and interoperability.     

Affect as a mediator of attributional egotism

A three-stage model of the relationships among achievement outcomes, outcome-related affect, attribution, and emotion is tested in two studies. It is suggested that success and failure elicit positive and negative affective states due to prior conditioning. These affective states then lead to an attribution process that serves to defend and enhance self-esteem. Next, emotional labels are chosen that are consistent with the affective states and the attributions. Two studies were designed to test the proposed relationships among achievement outcomes, affective states, and attributions. In the first study, subjects received information indicating that they were strongly or mildly aroused as a result of receiving outcome feedback on an achievement task. The results indicated that low arousal reduced egotistical attributions to internal factors. In the second study, subjects either succeeded or failed on an achievement task. Half of the subjects were provided with an opportunity to misattribute the arousal elicited by their outcomes to an irrelevant source. Subjects in the misattribution condition made less egotistical attributions to external factors than subjects who were given no opportunity to misattribute their arousal. The results of both studies suggest that outcome-related affect mediates the relationship between outcomes and attributions in achievement situations.     

初中生的社会比较对认知与情感信任的影响

本研究旨在探讨不同友谊状态下,初中生的社会比较对认知与情感信任的影响,及两种信任在社会比较与亲密度变化关系中的中介作用。有效被试为522名(M=12.87岁, SD=0.67),开学初让被试提名一位最亲密朋友,期中考试后让其比较与该好友的成绩排名并评价对好友的认知与情感信任水平,随后重新评价该好友的亲密度。结果表明:在亲密朋友(第二次依旧为最亲密的朋友)中,向下比较的情感信任高于向上比较,社会比较不影响认知信任;在普通朋友(第二次亲密度降低的朋友)中,向上比较的认知和情感信任均高于向下比较;社会比较只通过认知信任影响亲密度变化(完全中介),即相比于向下比较,向上比较时的认知信任水平较高,从而更有利于维持友谊的亲密性。     

Dissociable influences of reward motivation and positive emotion on cognitive control

It is becoming increasingly appreciated that affective and/or motivational influences contribute strongly to goal-oriented cognition and behavior. An unresolved question is whether emotional manipulations (i.e., direct induction of affectively valenced subjective experience) and motivational manipulations (e.g., delivery of performance-contingent rewards and punishments) have similar or distinct effects on cognitive control. Prior work has suggested that reward motivation can reliably enhance a proactive mode of cognitive control, whereas other evidence is suggestive that positive emotion improves cognitive flexibility, but reduces proactive control. However, a limitation of the prior research is that reward motivation and positive emotion have largely been studied independently. Here, we directly compared the effects of positive emotion and reward motivation on cognitive control with a tightly matched, within-subjects design, using the AX-continuous performance task paradigm, which allows for relative measurement of proactive versus reactive cognitive control. High-resolution pupillometry was employed as a secondary measure of cognitive dynamics during task performance. Robust increases in behavioral and pupillometric indices of proactive control were observed with reward motivation. The effects of positive emotion were much weaker, but if anything, also reflected enhancement of proactive control, a pattern that diverges from some prior findings. These results indicate that reward motivation has robust influences on cognitive control, while also highlighting the complexity and heterogeneity of positive-emotion effects. The findings are discussed in terms of potential neurobiological mechanisms.     

The simulation of emotion experience: On the emotional foundations of theory of mind

An argument is developed that supports a simulationist account about the foundations of infants' and young children's understanding that other people have mental states. This argument relies on evidence that infants come to the world with capacities to send and receive affective cues and to appreciate the emotional states of others – capacities well suited to a social environment initially made up of frequent and extended emotional interactions with their caregivers. The central premise of the argument is that the foundation of infants' understanding of other minds is built upon an early-developing capacity to share others' emotion experiences. The emotion experiences elicited in interactions between caregivers and infants enable the elaboration of this primitive understanding into a more fully developed understanding of psychological subjects. The evidence presented in support of these claims derives from a wide range of studies of the phenomena of emotional contagion, affective communication, and emotion regulation involving infants, young children, and adults.