What “Intuitions” are Linguistic Evidence?

In “Intuitions in Linguistics” (2006a) and Ignorance of Language (2006b) I took it to be Chomskian orthodoxy that a speaker’s metalinguistic intuitions are provided by her linguistic competence. I argued against this view in favor of the alternative that the intuitions are empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to linguistic phenomena. The concern about these linguistic intuitions arises from their apparent role as evidence for a grammar. Mark Textor, “Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions” (2009), argues that I have picked the wrong intuitions: I should have picked non-judgmental linguistic “seemings”. These reside between metalinguistic judgments and linguistic performances and have an epistemic authority that the orthodox view may well be able to explain. Textor seems to think that the metalinguistic intuitions are not evidence at all. I argue that he is wrong about that. More importantly, I argue that there are no “in-between” linguistic seemings with epistemic authority.     

Susan Myers-Shirk’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Helping the Good Shepherd</Emphasis>: A Review Essay

In this essay, I review a recent book that deals with the history of pastoral counseling. I offer an overview of the book, some criticism of the book, and a discussion of how this book relates to my own work. I argue that what Susan Myers-Shirk has identified as a “liberal moral sensibility” among pastoral counselors seems to have certain affinities with Peter Homans’s “mourning religion” thesis. I suggest that this thesis can shed light on the divide between liberal and conservative pastoral counselors, a divide that Myers-Shirk identifies, and that this thesis can build on Myers-Shirk’s historical work by providing a rubric for understanding the relationship between private experience and public theory among liberal pastoral counselors. I also suggest that Myers-Shirk should write a sequel to this book.     

Structural correspondence between theories and convergence to truth

While “scientism” is typically regarded as a position about the exclusive epistemic authority of science held by a certain class of “cultured despisers” of “religion”, we show that only on the assumption of this sort of view do purportedly “scientific” claims made by proponents of “intelligent design” appear to lend epistemic or apologetic support to claims affirmed about God and God’s action in “creation” by Christians in confessing their “faith”. On the other hand, the hermeneutical strategy that better describes the practice and method of Christian theologians, from the inception of theological reflection in the Christian tradition, acknowledges the epistemic authority of the best available tests for truth in areas of human inquiry such as science and history. But this strategy does not assume that such tests, whose authority must be regarded as provisional, provides authority for the warrant of affirming claims constituting the confessed “faith”. By attributing theological import to claims advanced by appeal to the best available tests for truth in the practice of science, supporters of ID not only confuse the epistemic authority of these tests with the normative authority of a faith community’s confessional identity, but impute to scientific tests for truth a sort of authority that even goes beyond the “methodological naturalism” against which they counterpose their claims.     

The temporality of Merleau-Ponty’s intertwining

In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence, assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive.  In this article, I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering a number of examples.  In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure.     

Funny business in branching space-times: infinite modal correlations

The theory of branching space-times is designed as a rigorous framework for modelling indeterminism in a relativistically sound way. In that framework there is room for “funny business”, i.e., modal correlations such as occur through quantum-mechanical entanglement. This paper extends previous work by Belnap on notions of “funny business”. We provide two generalized definitions of “funny business”. Combinatorial funny business can be characterized as “absence of prima facie consistent scenarios”, while explanatory funny business characterizes situations in which no localized explanation of inconsistency can be given. These two definitions of funny business are proved to be equivalent, and we provide an example that shows them to be strictly more general than the previously available definitions of “funny business”.     

Predicate abstraction,the limits of quantification,and the modality of existence

For various reasons several authors have enriched classical first order syntax by adding a predicate abstraction operator. “Conservatives” have done so without disturbing the syntax of the formal quantifiers but “revisionists” have argued that predicate abstraction motivates the universal quantifier’s re-classification from an expression that combines with a variable to yield a sentence from a sentence, to an expression that combines with a one-place predicate to yield a sentence. My main aim is to advance the cause of predicate abstraction while cautioning against revisionism. In so doing, however, I shall pursue a secondary aim by conveying mixed blessings to those who hold the view that in the logical sense of “existence” some existing object is such as to exist contingently. Advocates of this view must concede Williamson’s recent contention that the domain of unrestricted objectual quantification could not have been narrower than it is actually, but predicate abstraction affords them some hope of accommodating this concession.     

Cracking the mirror: on Kierkegaard’s concerns about friendship

In this article, I offer a brief account of some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about friendship: its “preferential” nature and its being a form of self-love. Kierkegaard’s endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as “second self” involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon likeness between friends. This focus obscures a vitally important element, highlighted by the so-called “drawing” view of friendship. Once this is emphasized, we can see a significant aspect - though by no means all - of Kierkegaard’s worry as misplaced. However, the “drawing” view also enables us to begin to see what a “Kierkegaardian” friendship might look like.     

A Gentle Critique of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Mourning Religion</Emphasis>

This article offers three points of critical reflection about Mourning Religion, a collection of essays edited by William Parsons, Diane Jonte-Pace and Susan Henking, (University of Virginia Press 2008). It is suggested that the word “religion” and related terms ought to have been contextualized, that Melanie Klein’s theories ought to have been used more extensively and that nostalgia expressed for the loss of an idealized paternal authority ought to have been made more explicit.     

The “voice of justice” vs. the “voice of care” in the assignment of criminal sanctions

According to Gilligan's model of moral reasoning, some people approach difficult decisions situationally and in response to needs and relationships of the people involved, often including themselves. People who think this way operate with a “care voice” and tend to be girls and women. Others do so with concerns about rights, obligations, and rules, employing conventional standards uniformly to be fair. These people operate with a “justice voice.” A study was conducted to assess the usefulness of the model for understanding student opinions of penalty for two hypothetical criminal offenders. Based upon data obtained from a self-administered written questionnaire and a quantitative index of “voice,” three themes emerged. First, most students exhibited concerns reflective of the two internal moral structures, the “care voice” and the “justice voice,” when they responded to queries about the proper function of criminal sanctions. This indicates that at least two equally legitimate yet competitive definitions of criminal justice exist. Second, gender and “voice” are associated, but not invariably. Third, “voice” is more helpful than gender for explaining penalty choices. The care model is associated with penalty choices that are responsive to needs of people involved in the situation, and the custodial nature of sanctions lends insight into these choices. The justice model is associated with the assignment of normative sanctions. Moreover, many students expressed a “model of voice,” or a view of fairness, that conflicts with the dominant model of the criminal justice system.     

Reciprocity and the height of God: A defence of Buber against Levinas

Conclusion In this essay I have tried to show that the Buber’s notion of the I-Thou relation is not a reciprocal relation and therefore does not turn God into an equal. The word “Thou” merely indicates the initiative on the part of an I of turning toward and addressing that which confronts the I. In speaking “Thou,” the I does not reduce the other to an object, that is, an It. Hence, one allows the other to be as it is. More importantly, the action of speaking “Thou” is also an address and turning toward God. In so doing, the I has not reduced God to an equal, as Levinas fears.     

The Uses of Argument in Communicative Contexts

This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and second that when an arguer is in fact trying to induce an effect above and beyond rendering a reason manifest, the effect intended—the use to which his or her argument is put—need not be that hearers “do” what the stated reasons are reasons for “doing.” Where the actual or intended effect of making a reason R for “doing X” manifest is something other than “doing X,” I call it an oblique—as opposed to a direct—effect of making that reason manifest. The core of the paper presents an overview or map of the main categories of effect which arguments can have, and the main sub-types within each category, calling attention to the points at which such effects can be indirect or oblique effects. The purpose of that typology is to make it clear (i) how oblique effects can come about and (ii) how important a role they can play in the conduct of argumentation.     

The Spiritual Implications of Interpersonal Abuse: Speaking of the Soul

A holistic view of the person includes body, mind and spirit, or soul. The purpose of this paper is to explore the concepts of “soul” and “radical evil” within a conversation about destructive interpersonal abuse. Most religions and spiritual disciplines understand the human person, especially the human soul, as sacred. When the perpetrator, propelled by his own internal alienation, desecrates the soul of his victim through relational sexual abuse, the victim often experiences herself as a no-person. Her ongoing sense of identity is fragmented, her capacity for spiritual experience, for imagination, creativity, relatedness are deeply wounded. With the help of information from the field of neuroscience, as well as other theological perspectives, some pathways for healing of the soul are discussed.     

Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness

A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).     

A New Mixed View of Virtue Ethics, Based on Daniel Doviak’s New Virtue Calculus

In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In this paper, I argue that Doviak’s account makes an important contribution to agent-based virtue ethics, but it needs to be supplemented with a consequentialist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining its net-IVV calculus. This is because I believe that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology which it is important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect other people. To incorporate this intuition, I add to Doviak’s net-IVV calculus a scale for outcomes. The result is a mixed view which accommodates tenets (ii) and (iii) above, but allows for (i) to fail in certain cases. I argue that, rather than being a defect, this allowance is an asset because our intuitions about ought-implies-can break down in cases where an agent is grossly misguided, and our theory should track these intuitions.     

Civilian Immunity,Supreme Emergency,and Moral Disaster

Any plausible position in the ethics of war and political violence in general will include the requirement of protection of civilians (non-combatants, common citizens) against lethal violence. This requirement is particularly prominent, and particularly strong, in just war theory. Some adherents of the theory see civilian immunity as absolute, not to be overridden in any circumstances whatsoever. Others allow that it may be overridden, but only in extremis. The latter position has been advanced by Michael Walzer under the heading of “supreme emergency.” In this paper, I look into some of the issues of interpretation and application of Walzer’s “supreme emergency” view and some of the criticisms that have been levelled against it. I argue that Walzer’s view is vague and unacceptable as it stands, but that the alternatives proposed by critics such as Brian Orend, C.A.J. Coady, and Stephen Nathanson are also unattractive. I go on to construct a position that is structurally similar to Walzer’s, but more specific and much less permissive, which I term the “moral disaster” view. According to this view, deliberate killing of civilians is almost absolutely wrong.