Rush Rhees on Wittgenstein and “What Language Is”

Rush Rhees identified the question of “what language is” as central to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but believed he failed to follow up adequately the connections between the reality of discourse and our reality as persons. Integral to this is Rhees's elaboration of the distinction between such investigations into language and approaches to philosophy restricted to elucidating “the grammars of particular expressions.” The failure to fully acknowledge Rhees's contribution to the understanding of these issues has vitiated recent New Wittgensteinian discussion of both Wittgenstein and Rhees.     

Wittgenstein on the Place of the Concept “Noticing an Aspect”

Seeing aspects is a dominant theme in Wittgenstein's 1940s writings on philosophy of psychology. Interpreters disagree about what Wittgenstein was trying to do in these discussions. I argue that interpreting Wittgenstein's observations about the interrelations between “noticing an aspect” and other psychological concepts as a systematic theory of aspect‐seeing diminishes key lessons of Wittgenstein's explorations: these interrelations are enormously complicated and “noticing an aspect” resists neat classification. Further, Wittgenstein invites us to engage in his “placing activity,” and by doing so we are building a skill that is valuable for enabling us to help ourselves when we encounter conceptual difficulties.     

Tom Morawetz's “Robust Enterprise”: Jurisprudence after Wittgenstein

I examine one theme within Tom Morawetz's complex jurisprudential work (stemming from Wittgenstein): the concept of a practice. After considering this theme in some detail, I then sketch a different jurisprudential approach that still proceeds within the inspiration of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Here, I summarise Stanley Cavell's elaborate recounting of Wittgenstein's twin concepts, “criteria” and “grammar.” In a third and final section, I employ this alternative method to provide a brief example of how a Wittgensteinian approach might be made towards explicating and understanding Holmes’ classic claim regarding the need in jurisprudence to separate legal and moral concepts.     

“Part of the Very Concept”: Wittgensteinian Moral Philosophy1

X is “part of the very concept” of Y. This formulation recurs throughout Raimond Gaita's philosophy and informs Christopher Cordner's. I elucidate the formulation's meaning and the nature of the necessity posited, then conclude with a criticism. One cannot love evil. One cannot love cow dung. For Gaita, these claims differ in type. The first testifies to a conceptual relation, but the second to a “mere fact.” I see no clear basis for assigning to claims one type over another, which challenges the footing of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. Why do no moral“mere facts” partly define our form of life?     

Self-Presentation in Job Interviews: When There Can Be “Too Much of a Good Thing”1

Male and female subjects interviewed female applicants for an entry-level management position. The applicants were actually confederates of the researcher who engaged or did not engage in two different tactics of self-presentation: the emission of many positive nonverbal cues and the use of one popular grooming aid (perfume). It was predicted that alone, each of these tactics would enhance ratings assigned to the applicants. However, together, they would induce negative reactions among interviewers (e.g., attributions of manipulativeness to the applicant). It was further hypothesized that such reactions would be stronger among male than among female interviewers. Finally, it was predicted that the two self-presentational tactics investigated would affect interviewers' memory for information presented by the applicants. Results offered support for all of these hypotheses.     

The Counselor as “Chicken”

Is the counselor a wrestler who struggles with a client—adversary? This article argues for taking a one-down position rather than fighting or confronting.     

The Evolving “D” in “BASIC ID”

The multimodal counseling model is based on the notion that a client's concerns can be dealt with most successfully when the counselor or therapist treats several aspects of a client's functioning. The multimodal model uses the acronym BASIC ID to identify the areas of client functioning that frequently need to be treated. These areas include behavior, affect, sensation, imagery, cognition, interpersonal relations, and drugs. The D mode, which represents drugs, is a misunderstood aspect of the BASIC ID partly because it does not seem to parallel other aspects of the model. Over the past few years the D mode has been expanded to include more than drugs, in particular, to include diet and other physiological factors. This article describes the evolution of the D mode and attempts to show the importance of a physiological dimension to the multimodal counseling approach.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

“Alkie,”“Frat Brother,” and “Jock”: Perceived Types of College Students and Stereotypes About Drinking1

Two studies assessed perceived types of college students and associated stereotypes about drinking. In the first study, 64 university students responded to an open‐ended probe asking them to list types of college students and then rated the amount of drinking done by each of a set of preselected types. In the second study, 236 students responded to the same open‐ended item and directly rated a set of types that had been revised based on Study 1 in terms of drinking and involvement in the academic and sociosexual collegiate subcultures. As hypothesized, consensual responses to the open‐ended probe reflected the college student culture. Also as hypothesized, types of students socially defined in terms of the sociosexual aspects of college (e.g., “fraternity boy”) were rated as likely to drink heavily, whereas types that were seen as being pulled away from college social life, through assumed involvement in academics (e.g., “brain/straight As”), were rated as drinking relatively little. Finally, rated sociosexual involvement was positively correlated, and academic involvement was negatively correlated, with perceived drinking, which supports a central assumption of the framework guiding the research.     

“Patriarchy” in Czech Society1

1948 and 1989 were turning points in Czech society. In forty years under communism, men and women were equalized by the regime's totalitarianism and egalitarianism. I argue that these forces, as well as concomitant changes in the public and private spheres, dictate that women's situation should not be interpreted in terms of patriarchy. Women's issues and the problem of patriarchy, which under communism seemed irrelevant in Czech society, may now come to the fore because the postcommunist period requires women to undertake an essential rethinking of their identity.     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.