That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”     

“The Thing Happened as He Wished”: Recovering an American Indian Cultural Psychology

One of the chief questions confronting mental health professionals who serve American Indian communities is how best to offer genuinely helpful services that do not simultaneously and surreptitiously reproduce colonial power relations. To ensure that counselors and therapists do not engage in psy‐colonization, it is crucial to recognize the sometimes divergent cultural foundations of mental distress, disorder, and well‐being in “Indian Country.” In this article, I will consider four excerpts from a research interview undertaken among my own people, the Aaniiih Gros Ventres of north‐central Montana. At a superficial level, these excerpts seem to reinforce reigning sensibilities that are readily familiar within the mental health professions. And yet, closer analysis of these interview excerpts reveals several tantalizing facets of an indigenous cultural psychology that may well continue to shape life and experience among tribal members in this setting. I recover this distinctive cultural psychology through archival representations of cultural and community life, including analysis of an important tribal myth. This analysis makes possible an alterNative interpretation of these interview excerpts, grounded in an aboriginal cosmology, that yields important implications for conceiving a more inclusive knowledge base for psychology that only robust community engagement can reveal.     

Why Do We Still Call Them “Paradoxes”

The fact that therapists label some events “paradoxical” may suggest that our current beliefs or theories are limited in their ability to adequately account for those phenomena. It is argued that our underlying belief in objectivity surrounds therapeutic “paradoxes” with a persistently paradoxical aura, and leads to confusion in our understanding of a variety of phenomena. Maturana's ideas regarding structure determinism, instructive interaction, and phenomenal domains are used to suggest an answer to these difficulties. It is claimed that the problematic status of many theoretical concepts (for example, communication, information, resistance, homeostasis, and pathology) is revealing of something quite important — that the experiential validity of instructive interaction repeatedly leads us into implicitly or explicitly employing instructive interaction in a domain where it can never be valid: the domain of theory and explanation.     

The Counselor as “Chicken”

Is the counselor a wrestler who struggles with a client—adversary? This article argues for taking a one-down position rather than fighting or confronting.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

The Evolving “D” in “BASIC ID”

The multimodal counseling model is based on the notion that a client's concerns can be dealt with most successfully when the counselor or therapist treats several aspects of a client's functioning. The multimodal model uses the acronym BASIC ID to identify the areas of client functioning that frequently need to be treated. These areas include behavior, affect, sensation, imagery, cognition, interpersonal relations, and drugs. The D mode, which represents drugs, is a misunderstood aspect of the BASIC ID partly because it does not seem to parallel other aspects of the model. Over the past few years the D mode has been expanded to include more than drugs, in particular, to include diet and other physiological factors. This article describes the evolution of the D mode and attempts to show the importance of a physiological dimension to the multimodal counseling approach.     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.     

Why There Cannot be a Single Probabilistic Measure of Coherence

Bayesian Coherence Theory of Justification or, for short, Bayesian Coherentism, is characterized by two theses, viz. (i) that our degree of confidence in the content of a set of propositions is positively affected by the coherence of the set, and (ii) that coherence can be characterized in probabilistic terms. There has been a longstanding question of how to construct a measure of coherence. We will show that Bayesian Coherentism cannot rest on a single measure of coherence, but requires a vector whose components exhaustively characterize the coherence properties of the set. Our degree of confidence in the content of the information set is a function of the reliability of the sources and the components of the coherence vector. The components of this coherence vector are weakly but not strongly separable, which blocks the construction of a single coherence measure.     

Teaching Exodus as “Problem Text”

This essay explores how one might use the “problem” of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart as a learning opportunity in the classroom. The author identifies two pedagogical aims: (1) cultivating more sophisticated, critical readers of the Bible; and (2) helping students reflect on the contextual nature of interpretation. The essay discusses in some detail various ways of teaching the text, including an exercise in close reading, examination of sources, and a selective study of the history of interpretation. It also explores various lessons to be learned from these exercises, and addresses applicability of the approaches to other teaching contexts. An earlier version of this paper was prepared for the “Problem Texts” group of the consultation “Teaching the Bible in the 21st Century,” held at the Wabash Center in Crawfordsville, Indiana.     

Why Koreans Are More Likely to Favor “Apology,” While Americans Are More Likely to Favor “Thank You”

Two studies investigated whether apologies or thanks are preferred in asking favors in the United States and Korea, and how this relates to perceptions of reduction in positive and negative face threats. In the first study (n = 224), participants composed an e‐mail message where a favor was asked. In the second (n = 807), participants completed questionnaires including a prototypical e‐mail for the situation described in Study 1, as well as measures of negative and positive face threats. Findings showed that (a) Koreans more frequently included apologies in favor‐asking messages, while Americans more frequently included thanks; and (b) Americans considered repeated thanks to reduce the threat to hearers' negative and positive face, but Koreans considered repeated apologies to reduce the threat to speakers' positive face.