Similarity and Social Interaction: When Similarity Fosters Implicit Behavior Toward a Stranger

ABSTRACT

People interact more readily with someone whom they think they have something in common with. At a pedestrian crossing, confederates asked participants for the time and, in one condition, said she/he had the same watch as the participant. The amount of time that participants lingered near a confederate was used as the dependent variable. Participants in the similarity condition spent significantly more time near the confederate than when no similarity was manipulated. The results showed that similarity fosters implicit behavior, adding to the growing body of data on the positive effects of similarity and its role in social interaction.     

Romantic Crushes Promote Variety‐Seeking Behavior

Consumers making repeat consumption choices often need to decide whether to stick to their favorite option or to select something different. Understanding the situational factors that influence their willingness to seek more or less variety in consumption is of both theoretical and practical importance. The current research proposes that a salient relationship state—romantic crush—can increase consumers' variety‐seeking tendency in unrelated consumption situations. Building on the compensatory consumption literature, we suggest that the lack of reciprocal response in the romantic crush experience may lower consumers' sense of control in the romantic relationship. Therefore, they are motivated to restore their sense of control by making more varied choices in consumption domains. Five studies provide support for this hypothesis. In line with our control‐restoration account, the effect disappears when consumers' sense of control is boosted via other means. Moreover, the effect is specific to the experience of a romantic crush and cannot be generalized to other types of romantic relationship (e.g., initial stage of love).     

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way Through the Sermon

Abstract :  The purpose of this article is to give thought to the listener as co-creator of meaning with the preacher during the sermon event. The underlying conviction of the author is that preachers and listeners have always been co-creators but have not been recognized as such. The author sketches the history of the task of preaching as a movement from getting something said to getting something heard , and suggests that, building on this, preaching can now be viewed as getting something created . Finally, the qualities of humility, imagination , and a "catalytic consciousness" are seen as essential for any preacher willing to take up this task.     

Engaging the consumer: The science and art of the value creation process

Regulatory engagement theory [Higgins, E. T. (2006). Value from hedonic experience and engagement. Psychological Review, 113, 439–460.] proposes that value is a motivational force of attraction to or repulsion from something, and that strength of engagement contributes to value intensity independent of hedonic and other sources of value direction. This paper reviews different sources of engagement strength, including dealing with challenges by opposing interfering forces and overcoming personal resistance, preparing for something that is likely to happen, and using “fit” or “proper” means of goal pursuit. We present evidence that each of these sources of engagement strength can intensify the value of something, and we show how stronger engagement can not only make something positive more positive but also make something negative more negative. We also discuss how these effects of stronger engagement on the value of something else are independent of actors' own personal experiences during goal pursuit. We then broaden regulatory engagement theory by describing the nature of these personal experiences from different sources of engagement strength—distinct positive experiences (e.g., feeling “pleasure” vs. feeling “right”) and distinct negative experiences (e.g., feeling “tension” vs. feeling “defiance”)—and consider the science and art of combining them with engagement strength for maximal persuasion and influence.     

Ineffability: the Very Concept

Philosophia - In this paper, I analyze the concept of ineffability: what does it mean to say that something cannot be said? I begin by distinguishing ineffability from paradox: if something cannot...     

Children's understanding of the knowledge prerequisites of drawing and pretending

Many young children will claim that someone is pretending to be something even when the person does not know what that something is. To examine whether children's failure to take knowledge prerequisites into account is part of a more fundamental problem in recognizing how mental representations constrain external ones, the authors asked children whether an artist who did not know what something was, yet whose drawing bore resemblance to it, was drawing it. The same questions were asked regarding pretending. Children performed similarly on pretending and drawing questions, and performance on both questions improved when the protagonists' point of view was emphasized. Performance for drawing improved somewhat when alternative goals were stated. Further, cross-sectional data indicated that understanding how knowledge relates to producing external representations increases gradually from age 4 to age 8, suggesting that experiential factors may be crucial to this understanding.     

The Motif of the Irreparable: Potentiality,Contingency, and Redemption in Agamben's Theology

The work of Giorgio Agamben relies heavily on two rather opaque notions: the messianic and the irreparable. This essay is devoted to an analysis of the latter. After surveying the existing literature, I take my cue from Dietrich Bonhoeffer's prison letters and prepare the way for my own analysis of Agamben's irreparable. In the final part of the essay, I compare the irreparable with Agamben's use of Benjamin's thought of something unforgettable. I understand the role of the irreparable in this light, since, for Agamben, it means the chance of something given up by language, something given up altogether, and as such serves as entry to the paradigmatic.     

Toward an Epistemology of the Hand

Western philosophy has been greatly influenced by visual metaphors. Knowing something has commonly, yet implicitly, been conceptualized as seeing something clearly, learning has been framed as being visually exposed to something, and the mind has been understood as a ‘mirror of nature’. A whole ‘epistemology of the eye’ has been at work, which has had significant practical implications, not least in educational contexts. One way to characterize John Dewey’s pragmatism is to see it as an attempt to replace the epistemology of the eye with an epistemology of the hand. This article develops the epistemology of the hand on three levels: A level of embodiment and metaphors, of craftsmanship and social practices, and of schooling and education.     

Daily Events for Clinical Couples: Examining Therapy Interventions,Positive Events,Arguments, and Exercise in the Beginning Stage of Therapy

This study examined the daily association of several events within the beginning phase of couple therapy. Events examined were as follows: trying something from therapy, an argument, a positive event, and physical exercise. Participants were 33 couples in a treatment‐as‐usual setting who completed the Daily Diary of Events in Couple Therapy (DDECT). A dyadic multilevel model was used to explore the daily associations between predictor and outcome variables. Results showed when male partners tried something from therapy at rates greater than the average their female partners reported a more positive relationship while when female partners tried something from therapy at rates greater than the average it contributed to a more negative relationship. In addition, results showed that clients in couple therapy rarely try things from therapy on a daily basis. Finally, relative to other predictors trying something from therapy had a smaller, but significant relationship with outcomes.     

Art Media and the Sense Modalities: Tactile Pictures

It is widely assumed that the art media can be individuated with reference to the sense modalities. Different art media are perceived by means of different sense modalities, and this tells us what properties of each medium are aesthetically relevant. The case of pictures appears to fit this principle well, for pictures are deemed purely and paradigmatically visual representations. However, recent psychological studies show that congenitally and early blind people have the ability to interpret and make raised-line drawings through touch. This shows that pictures are not essentially visual representations. The view that pictures are essentially visual follows from influential views of the nature of depiction and of the nature of vision that are mistaken. By rooting out the mistake, we learn something about pictures, something about vision, and something about the doctrine that art media are individuated by the sense modalities.     

Methodological uncertainties in political science∗

ne important class of actions concerns tasks. Questions may be raised about whether we have succeeded or failed to do what we were trying to do. Not all the things we call actions are open to considerations of such success or failure. And questions of succeeding or failing are not raised solely about what we may have been trying to do. The paper attempts to classify various ways in which one may fail in an action; the array that results is explored in terms of evaluations rendered, responsibility, character, deliberate decision, and the like. The analysis of failing in what one has tried to do is made central. To be said to be trying to do something, one must have done the requisite things that constitute trying to do something and not to have succeeded yet in doing what one may have tried to do. “Trying to succeed”; in doing something is a redundant expression except for special cases; and though one may decide to try to do something, one cannot decide to succeed in this. One may actually succeed in doing what one has tried to do but one cannot deliberately succeed. Further distinctions are made between trying to do something and wishing to do something and believing that one is trying to do something; also, between failing in what one has tried to do, failing to try, failing to do something without failing in what one has tried to do, and failing to do something in respects in which one could never be said to have tried to do it.     

Sources of the discontinuity effect: Playing against a group versus being in a group

Intergroup relations tend to be more competitive than relations between individuals. This difference, called the “discontinuity effect,” has been demonstrated under a wide variety of conditions. Two separate explanations for the discontinuity effect were explored in our research. The first explanation is that something about playing against a group leads people to compete. The second explanation is that something about being in a group leads people to compete. The results supported both explanations, although the evidence more strongly favored the effect of being in a group. Distrust mediated both effects.     

Dialectics of Sign and Symbol and the Utterance of Archetype Theory

Debates surrounding Jung’s archetype theory could be characterized as tacit attempts to contend with the concept’s dual function as referring to something known to psychologists (sign) and standing for something that is fundamentally unknowable (symbol). This essay considers implications of the term “archetype,” outlines and critiques some of the conundrums of categorization and scientific credibility posed by Jung’s formulation of the theory, and prompts locating the archetypal “human quality” of being human in imaginaries of typical patterning of the experiential realm.     

Belief from the Past

Abstract: A person who remembers having done something has a belief that she did it from having done it. To have a belief that one did something from having done it is to believe that one did the action on the (causal) basis of having done it, where this belief (in order for one to have it) need not be (causally) based even in part on any contributor to the belief other than doing the action. The notion of a contributor to a belief (as opposed to a mere facilitating cause of the belief) is explicated through a series of examples. The account of having a belief that one did something from having done it is then deployed in criticising Ginet's account of ‘memory connection’, in assessing Martin and Deutscher's causal theory of remembering, in indicating how diachronic justification functions in a nontraditional theory of memory, and in setting forth one type of psychological connectedness which, according to advocates of a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, may be employed (noncircularly) in formulating the theory, and which, according to opponents of the theory, provides a target for criticising the theory.     

On the Suffering of Compassion

Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for P:s sake, and if that is all you do, then you are not affected with an afflictive suffering over something. The final section identifies and addresses a problem concerning self-pity, and a suggestion is made on how to specify the proposed account so as to cover both self-directed and other-directed compassion.     

Protecting Persons from Animal Bites: the Case for the Ontological Significance of Persons

Eric Olson criticizes Lynne Baker’s constitution account of persons on the grounds that personhood couldn’t be ontologically significant as nothing new comes into existence with the acquisition of thought. He claims that for something coming to function as a thinker is no more ontologically significant than something coming to function as a locomotor when a motor is added to it. He levels two related charges that there’s no principled answer about when and where constitution takes place rather than an already existing object just acquiring new properties. I’ll argue that none of these objections are problems for understanding person to be a substantial kind.

     

语言理解中主体职业特征与动作表征的激活

运用句-配范式以及句子理解与身体反应相互作用的实验范式,探讨 “做某事的是某人”与“某人做某事”两类句式理解过程中主体职业特征与动作表征的激活。结果发现,在“做某事的是某人”句子理解过程中,主体的职业特征和动作表征得到了激活,但在“某人做某事”句子理解过程中,主体职业特征表征和动作表征只有其中一种表征处于匹配状态时,另一种表征才能得到明显的激活。这表明,句子理解过程中,主体职业特征表征得到了激活,而主体职业特征表征与动作执行器表征的同时激活则受到对方匹配情况的影响,知觉符号理论得到了进一步的证明。     

KINDS AND CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE: IS THERE ANYTHING THAT IT IS LIKE TO BE SOMETHING?

Abstract: In this article I distinguish the notion of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature from that of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Work on consciousness has typically dealt with the latter while employing the language of the former. I propose several ways of analyzing what it is like to be a certain kind of creature and find problems with them all. The upshot is that even if there is something it is like to have certain kinds of experience, it does not follow that there is anything it is like to be a certain kind of creature. Skepticism about the existence of something that it is like to be an F is recommended.     

Emergence

Emergence refers to situations in which it appears one gets something for nothing. A phenomenon is emergent when it has significant aspects that are more than the sum of its parts. The term covers instances where joining components creates something that could not happen if they remained separate and situations where, from a human perspective, something new unexpectedly appears. This paper explores the origins of emergence in complex systems and shows how an appreciation of emergence informs psychoanalytic listening, understanding, and technique.     

The Epistemological Anarchist and the Dadaist

Philosophia - The article aims to use Feyerabend’s powerful analogy between the epistemological anarchist and the Dadaist in order to show something that has deeply characterized last...