Confusions of self with close others

This article explores the cognitive underpinnings of interpersonal closeness in the theoretical context of "including other in the self" and, specifically, the notion of overlap between cognitive representations of self and close others. In each of three studies, participants first rated different traits for self, close others (e.g., romantic partner, best friend), and less close others (e.g., media personalities), followed by a surprise source recognition task (who was each trait rated for?). As predicted, in each study, there were more source confusions between traits rated for self and close others (e.g., a trait rated for self recalled as having been rated for the close other) than between self (or close others) and non-close others. Furthermore, several results suggest that the greater confusions between self and close others are due specifically to interpersonal closeness and not to greater familiarity or similarity with close others     

Individual risk taking for self and others

In this experimental study, individual risk taking for self and others was observed for three experimental situations (the choice dilemma situations of Kogan and Wallach, 1964, the Pruitt and Teger gambling situation, 1969, and a simple one-trial gamble game). The results of the present study suggest that one takes as much risk for oneself as for somebody else. An attempt was made to determine to what degree the results could be explained by properties of the experimental situations.     

Mood-related changes in construing self and others

Two repertory grids were administered to 31 Canadian undergraduates (20 women and 11 men) in which they rated themselves and 10 personal acquaintances on 11 supplied constructs. For the initial (baseline) grid they followed neutral instructions. For the second grid, they rated the same figures while listening to happy music and attempting to recall pleasant memories. The results from both grids closely approximated a set of theoretical predictions derived from a model of interpersonal judgment by Lefebvre, Lefebvre, and Adams-Webber (1986) within the framework of personal construct theory.     

Defining traits differently for self and others

Identical trait labels may be understood differently in thinking about self and in thinking about others. Specifically, when making self-judgments, individuals define traits primarily in terms of unobservable manifestations, e.g., how one feels. However, in making other-judgments, particularly in making judgments about relatively unfamiliar others, individuals define traits primarily in terms of observable manifestations, e.g., how one looks. This prediction was tested in three experiments (Exp. 1: N = 96, Polish undergraduates including 19 men, 77 women; Exp. 2: N = 96, U.S. undergraduates including 18 men, 78 women; Exp. 3: N = 74, Polish undergraduates including 18 men, 56 women). Participants were asked to perform a generic trait judgment task followed by a specific trait judgment task in which the same traits were preceded by a qualifier "feels" or "looks". As expected, in the case of self-judgments, generic judgments predicted feels judgments better than looks judgments. This pattern did not occur for judgments of others and was reversed for judgments about others who were relatively unfamiliar.     

Conceptions of the self and others across time

People are full of plans, goals, hopes, and fears-future-oriented thoughts that constitute a significant part of the self-concept. But are representations of others similarly future oriented? Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that the future is seen as a larger component of the self than of another person. Study 2 found that because self-identity is tied to an unrealized future, the self is thought to be less knowable than others in the present. Study 3 indicates that people believe that others need to know who they are striving to be in order to be understood-more so than they believe they need to know others' strivings to understand them. Studies 4a and 4b tested an important implication of these findings, that because so much of who they are is tied to the future, people believe they are further from their ideal selves than others are. Implications for judgment and decision making are discussed.     

Intuitions about situational correction in self and others

People's attributional phenomenology is likely to be characterized by effortful situational correction. Drawing on this phenomenology and on people's desire to view themselves more favorably than others, the authors hypothesized that people expect others to engage in less situational correction than themselves and to make more extreme dispositional attributions for constrained actors' behavior. In 2 studies, people expected their peers to make more extreme dispositional inferences than they did themselves for a situationally constrained actor's behavior. People's expectation that they engage in more situational correction than their peers was diminished among Japanese participants, who have less desire to view themselves as superior to their peers (Study 3), and among participants who were led to view dispositional attributions more favorably than situational attributions (Study 4).     

Through the looking glass: self and others

In the present article we discuss the relevance of the mirror mechanism for our sense of self and our sense of others. We argue that, by providing us with an understanding from the inside of actions, the mirror mechanism radically challenges the traditional view of the self and of the others. Indeed, this mechanism not only reveals the common ground on the basis of which we become aware of ourselves as selves distinct from other selves, but also sheds new light on the content of our self and other experience, showing that we primarily experience ourselves and the others in terms of our own and of their motor possibilities respectively.     

Perspectives on personality: the relative accuracy of self versus others for the prediction of emotion and behavior

This study compares the relative accuracy of targets' self-reports and other-reports of personality in predicting two criteria: (a) emotional experience in daily life and (b) behavior in the laboratory. Ratings of the targets' extraversion and neuroticism were obtained from two knowledgeable informants and the targets themselves. Target participants wore an electronic signaling device ("beeper") for eight days and rated positive and negative emotions at four randomly selected times each day. The participants also interacted with an opposite-sex stranger in a laboratory context and their behavior was coded from videotapes. Targets' self-reports of personality were consistently more accurate than other-reports in predicting daily emotional experience. Self-reports also outperformed other-reports in predicting extraversion-related laboratory behaviors, but not neuroticism-related behaviors. The relative accuracy of self- and other-reports of personality would seem to depend on the criterion employed; self-reports are clearly better for the prediction of emotional experience, while for behavior the picture is mixed.     

Depression, self-focused attention, and expectancies for positive and negative future life events for self and others

In two studies, we examined depressed and nondepressed persons' judgments of the probability of future positive and negative life events occurring to themselves and to others. Study 1 demonstrated that depressed subjects were generally less optimistic than their nondepressed counterparts: Although nondepressed subjects rated positive events as more likely to happen to themselves than negative events, depressed subjects did not. In addition, relative to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects rated positive events as less likely to occur to themselves and more likely to occur to others and negative events as more likely to occur to both self and others. Study 2 investigated the role that differential levels of self-focused attention might play in mediating these differences. On the basis of prior findings that depressed persons generally engage in higher levels of self-focus than nondepressed persons do and the notion that self-focus activates one's self-schema, we hypothesized that inducing depressed subjects to focus externally would attenuate their pessimistic tendencies. Data from Study 2 supported the hypothesis that high levels of self-focus partially mediate depressive pessimism: Whereas self-focused depressed subjects were more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, externally focused depressed subjects were not. The role of attentional focus in maintaining these and other depressive pessimistic tendencies was discussed.     

Dispositional forgiveness of self, others, and situations

Six studies regarding forgiveness are presented. The Heartland Forgiveness Scale (HFS), a self-report measure of dispositional forgiveness (with subscales to assess forgiveness of self, others, and situations) was developed and demonstrated good psychometric properties. Forgiveness correlated positively with cognitive flexibility, positive affect, and distraction; it correlated negatively with rumination, vengeance, and hostility. Forgiveness predicted four components of psychological well-being (anger, anxiety, depression, and satisfaction with life); forgiveness of situations accounted for unique variance in these components of psychological well-being. Forgiveness and hostility demonstrated equivalent, inverse associations with relationship duration, and forgiveness accounted for unique variance in relationship satisfaction, even when controlling for trust. Forgiveness level correlated positively with decreased negativity in statements written about transgressions in the present versus the past tense.     

Social competency and social perceptivity in self and others

Males who self-reported heterosocial problems and whose role-play interactions were judged to be low on social competence were compared to a group of high socially competent males on their ability to judge their own and others' social competency. Results indicated that in comparison to the high-competent group, low-competent males showed less agreement with judges in rating their own and others' levels of competency. Using profile components of elevation, scatter, and pattern, more detailed analyses showed that the two groups differed primarily on scatter. The low-competent individuals had less scatter, suggesting that they have a discrimination deficiency. Implications of the results are discussed for the etiology and treatment of social incompetence and for future research.     

Alcohol-related expectancies for self and others reported by alcoholic men and women.

A questionnaire used by Rohsenow in 1983 was administered to 87 alcoholic men and women taking part in rehabilitation programs at local Swedish outpatient rehabilitation clinics. The purpose was to explore their alcohol-related expectancies for themselves and for others and to compare these with the results from other similar studies in other cultures. The answers, scored according to Rohsenow's eight factors, indicated that alcoholics expected larger positive and negative effects for others than for themselves. This discrepancy was slightly modified by such variables as sex, age, and drinking habits. Alcoholics in Sweden seem to have alcohol-related expectancies similar to those of social drinkers both in Sweden and in other Western countries.     

Depression and pessimism for the future: biased use of statistically relevant information in predictions for self versus others

The cognitive theories of depression emphasize the role of pessimism about the future in the etiology and maintenance of depression. The present research was designed for two reasons: to provide a clear demonstration that depressed individuals' predictions of the likelihood of future outcomes are more pessimistic than those of nondepressed individuals given identical information with which to make forecasts and identical conditions for forecasting, and to test two additional hypotheses regarding possible mechanisms underlying depressives' relative pessimism in forecasting: a social-comparison and a differential attributional-style hypothesis. We used a modification of the cue-use paradigm developed by Ajzen (1977, Experiment 1) and examined depressed and nondepressed people's predictions of the likelihood of future positive and negative outcomes for themselves and for others. The results provided strong support for pessimism on the part of depressed individuals relative to nondepressed individuals in forecasts for both self and others. In addition, whereas nondepressives exhibited a self-enhancing bias in which they overestimated their probability of success and underestimated their probability of failure relative to that of similar others, depressives did not succumb to either positive or negative social comparison biases in prediction. Finally, in line with the attributional-style hypothesis, depressed-nondepressed differences in subjects' cue-use patterns were obtained, especially in forecasts for self. The findings are discussed with respect to the mechanisms underlying predictive optimism and pessimism and the possible functions and implications of these predictive biases.     

Assessment of self and others during treatment for anorexia nervosa

Abstract

Repertory grids were used to compare a group of anorexic women (n = 12) with normal-weight (n = 12) and dieting (n = 10) control groups. Anorexics differed from both control groups in their perceptions of themselves and others. The constructs used were more meaningful to anorexics than to either control group. The way in which anorexics saw themselves differed from the way in which clinicians have indicated in the literature that they see their anorexic patients. Some constructs adopted a differential meaning and relevance for observer and observed when applied to the anorexic condition. The discrepancies between internally defined and externally imposed interpretations of construct meaning may help to explain why resistance to treatment and high relapse rates are encountered in anorexic women.