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1.
Benjamin Lange 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2020,101(3):612-629
I argue that you can be permitted to discount the interests of your adversaries even though doing so would be impartially suboptimal. This means that, in addition to the kinds of moral options that the literature traditionally recognises, there exist what I call other-sacrificing options. I explore the idea that you cannot discount the interests of your adversaries as much as you can favour the interests of your intimates; if this is correct, then there is an asymmetry between negative partiality toward your adversaries and positive partiality toward your intimates. 相似文献
2.
Chike Jeffers 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2013,51(4):488-510
This article critically evaluates the cosmopolitan writings of Kwame Anthony Appiah, investigating especially the extent to which he challenges or fails to challenge the problem of Eurocentrism in cosmopolitan discourse. I begin by discussing the way Appiah's construction of his cosmopolitan vision attempts to address criticisms of cosmopolitanism as unable to accommodate the partiality that is an inescapable aspect of human relationships. I relate this issue to Eurocentrism, arguing that the historical integration of the world through European imperialism gives people of color added reason to uphold certain forms of group partiality. I then consider promising points in Appiah's work, in which he can be seen as helping to construct an anti‐Eurocentric form of cosmopolitanism, as well as problematic points, in which he shows insufficient regard for the importance of cultural resistance. 相似文献
3.
Bengt Brülde 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2010,11(5):567-583
The idea that politics should promote the happiness of the population is rather common in the community of happiness researchers.
This political view is sometimes based on the happiness principle, the fundamental ethical view that we have a strong moral
reason to do what we can to maximize the happiness and minimize the suffering in the world. The first main purpose of this
paper is to investigate (1) what role this principle play in ethics as a whole, how it should be weighed against other moral
considerations, and (2) how exactly it should be understood, i.e. which possible version of the principle that is most plausible.
This is the only way to arrive at well-founded theory of the fundamental moral (and political) significance of happiness and
suffering (an “ethics of happiness and suffering”). The idea that politics should promote happiness is sometimes accompanied
by the notion that we should introduce some kind of happiness index, and that it is a central goal of politics to maximize
the value of this index. The second main purpose of this paper is to examine this suggestion. I will first ask (3) how such
an index should be constructed, assuming that it might be a good idea to construct an index in the first place. I assume that
an index of this kind cannot be plausible unless it incorporates a number of moral considerations, and that (3) is very closely
related to (2). I will then ask (4) whether the suggestion is plausible, or whether there are better ways to put a politics
of happiness into practice, e.g. to simply apply the knowledge we have about the determinants of happiness. 相似文献
4.
John Turri 《Synthese》2009,170(1):147-153
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper
divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This
puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 相似文献
5.
Gert Biesta 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(2):141-153
Much work in the field of education for democratic citizenship is based on the idea that it is possible to know what a good
citizen is, so that the task of citizenship education becomes that of the production of the good citizen. In this paper I
ask whether and to what extent we can and should understand democratic citizenship as a positive identity. I approach this
question by means of an exploration of four dimensions of democratic politics—the political community, the borders of the
political order, the dynamics of democratic processes and practices, and the status of the democratic subject—in order to
explore whether and to what extent the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can and should be understood as a particular order.
For this I engage with ideas from Chantal Mouffe and Jacques Rancière who both have raised fundamental questions about the
extent to which the ‘essence’ of democratic politics can be captured as a particular order. In the paper I introduce the figure
of the ignorant citizen in order to hint at a conception of citizenship that is not based on particular knowledge about what
the good citizen is. I introduce a distinction between a socialisation conception of citizenship education and civic learning
and a subjectification conception of citizenship education and civic learning in order to articulate what the educational
implications of such an ‘anarchic’ understanding of democratic politics are. While the socialisation conception focuses on
the question how ‘newcomers’ can be inserted into an existing political order, the subjectification conception focuses on
the question how democratic subjectivity is engendered through engagement in always undetermined political processes. This
is no longer a process driven by knowledge about what the citizen is or should become but one that depends on a desire for
a particular mode of human togetherness or, in short, a desire for democracy. 相似文献
6.
E.J. Lowe 《Erkenntnis》1998,48(2-3):191-208
I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and
whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate
identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to
this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the
same K as y?’ and ’How many Ks are there satisfying condition C?’, even if we may sometimes be unable in practice to discover
what these answers are. But other entities apparently lack either determinate identity, or determinate countability, or both.
In these terms I try to explain certain important ontological differences between familiar macroscopic objects and various
rather more esoteric entities, such as the ‘particles’ of quantum physics, quantities of material stuff, and tropes or property
instances.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
7.
Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According
to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity
to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt
a perceptual moral epistemology, such as intuitionism – which John McDowell criticizes for illicitly “borrow[ing] the epistemological
credentials” of perception. In this paper, I suggest that the most promising way for virtue ethics to use perceptual metaphors
innocuously is by adopting a skill model of virtue, on which the virtues are modeled on forms of practical know-how. Yet I
contend that this model is double-edged for virtue ethics. The skill model belies some central ambitions and dogmas of the
traditional view, especially its most idealized claims about virtue and the virtuous. While this may be a cost that its champions
are unprepared to pay, I suggest that virtue ethics would do well to embrace a more realistic moral psychology and a correspondingly
less sublime conception of virtue. 相似文献
8.
Ben Bryan 《Philosophia》2013,41(3):693-702
In The Impossibility of Perfection, Michael Slote tries to show that the traditional Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of the virtues is mistaken. His argumentative strategy is to provide counterexamples to this doctrine, by showing that there are what he calls “partial virtues”—pairs of virtues that conflict with one another but both of which are ethically indispensible. Slote offers two lines of argument for the existence of partial virtues. The first is an argument for the partiality of a particular pair of virtues: frankness and tact. The second is a kind of feminist critique. I argue that both of these lines of argument fail. In both cases, Slote fails to ask whether the apparent conflict between putatively partial virtues has arisen from a misunderstanding of the demands of those virtues. From this error I suggest we can learn an important lesson: whether in our studies thinking about the virtues or in our everyday lives trying to practice them, it is a serious mistake to focus on the relationships among virtues without considering precisely what each of these virtues demands. 相似文献
9.
Robert Audi 《The Journal of Ethics》2009,13(4):365-381
A major issue in political philosophy is the extent to which one or another version of nationalism or, by contrast, cosmopolitanism,
is morally justified. Nationalism, like cosmopolitanism, may be understood as a position on the status and responsibilities
of nation states, but the terms may also be used to designate attitudes appropriate to those positions. One problem in political
philosophy is to distinguish and appraise various forms of nationalism and cosmopolitanism; a related problem is how to understand
the relation of patriotism to each. Nationalists may tend to be patriots, but need not be; patriots may tend to be nationalists,
but need not be. Like nationalism, patriotism may also be considered in propositional forms or in related attitudinal forms;
but unlike nationalism and cosmopolitanism, patriotism can exist in the form of an emotion: roughly, love of one’s country.
This paper characterizes nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and patriotism in both forms and argues for a conception of patriotism
on which it is both distinct from nationalism and compatible with certain kinds of cosmopolitanism. It also suggests that,
in qualified forms, nationalism and cosmopolitanism may overlap in what they require of their proponents. 相似文献
10.
Charles Bingham 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2011,30(5):513-519
In this article, I argue that education has come to a crossroads. It is so easy to become educated that the role of the teacher
can be seen as redundant. Because of this fact, it is time to reconsider what the teacher does, and whether the aim of clear
communication by the teacher can, or should, be an educational goal. I argue that clear communication can no longer be embraced.
Instead I offer two new educational ideas for 2011 and beyond. One is that the teacher’s role should be a relational role.
The other idea is that the teacher’s speech should be poetic rather than informative. 相似文献
11.
Brian Hedden 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2019,99(3):581-604
If groups can have beliefs and other attitudes of their own, what determines which such attitudes the group rationally ought to have? A widespread presupposition is that group‐level beliefs should be a function of the beliefs of the group's members, and similarly for other attitudes. But a host of impossibility theorems show that no such aggregation function can satisfy intuitively attractive constraints while ensuring coherent group‐level attitudes. I argue that this presupposition is false. Group‐level attitudes should be a function of group‐level reasons (evidence, in the epistemic case), not individual‐level attitudes. This allows for a theory of group rationality that (i) bypasses a host of pessimistic results in the literature on judgment aggregation and (ii) treats rational individual‐level attitudes and rational group‐level attitudes in parallel. 相似文献
12.
Jiri Benovsky 《Erkenntnis》2010,73(1):101-121
Several metaphysical debates have typically been modeled as oppositions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist
approach. Such debates include the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about ordinary material objects, the Bundle (Humean)
Theory and the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of the Self, and Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In all three debates,
the substantivalist side typically insists that in order to provide a good treatment of the subject-matter of the theory (time,
Self, material objects), it is necessary to postulate the existence of a certain kind of substance, while the other side,
the relationist one, characteristically feels that this is an unnecessary expense and that one can get the job done in an
ontologically cheaper way just with inter-related properties or events. In this paper I shall defend the view that there is
much less of a disagreement between relational ontologies and substantival ontologies than it is usually thought. I believe
that, when carefully examined, the two sides of the debate are not that different from each other, in all three cases of pairs
of views mentioned above. As we will see, both the relational side and the substantival side work in the same way, suffer
from and answer the same objections, and are structurally extremely similar. It will be an important question—one that I shall
discuss in detail, and that is indeed the main point of interest for me in this paper—whether this means that the two sides
of the debate are somehow ‘equivalent’ or not, and what ‘equivalent’ could mean. 相似文献
13.
Edward James Dale 《Sophia》2010,49(3):393-406
The paper continues the model I began in a previous issue of Sophia. It is argued that the predominance of purely ascending or ‘top down’ forms of spirituality which stemmed largely from the
axial period and have been carried forward into modern, transpersonal theories of evolutionary spirituality is a mistake and
that there exists a lost or largely ignored form of spirituality—which I name somatic—which was the predominant domain of
early Neolithic and Palaeolithic experience. Aspects of what I call somatic mystical experiences have certainly been acknowledged
at times to a limited degree, though they have rarely been fully explored, and have usually been considered as basic to other
kinds of mystical experience, rather than fully developed forms in their own right. This article offers a fuller exploration
and places such states more accurately within a detailed developmental framework than has previously been the case. Other
issues relating to the horizon model across the two papers are also expanded. 相似文献
14.
Austen Clark 《Philosophical Studies》2006,127(2):167-193
We assemble here in this time and place to discuss the thesis that conscious attention can provide knowledge of reference
of perceptual demonstratives. I shall focus my commentary on what this claim means, and on the main argument for it found
in the first five chapters of Reference and Consciousness. The middle term of that argument is an account of what attention does: what its job or function is. There is much that is
admirable in this account, and I am confident that it will be the foundation, the launching-pad, for much future work on the
subject. But in the end I will argue that Campbell’s picture makes the mechanisms of attention too smart: smarter than they
are, smarter than they could be. If we come to a more realistic appraisal of the skills and capacities of our sub-personal
minions, the “knowledge of reference” which they yield will have to be taken down a notch or two. 相似文献
15.
Eddy Nahmias 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(3):627-667
Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate
effectively and control our actions accordingly: the ‘Deliberation and Control’ (DC) condition. The other intuition is that
free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict
when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some other way.
I suggest that intuitions about the AP condition arise when we face ‘close calls,’ situations in which, after deliberating,
we still do not know what we really want to do. Indeed, several incompatibilists suggest such close calls are necessary for
free will. I challenge this suggestion by describing a ‘confident agent’ who, after deliberating, always feels confident about
what to do (and can then control her actions accordingly). Because she maximally satisfies the DC condition, she does not
face close calls, and the intuition that the AP condition is essential for free will does not seem to apply to her. I conclude
that intuitions about the importance of the AP condition rest on our experiences of close calls and arise precisely to the
extent that our deliberations fail to arrive at a clear decision. I then raise and respond to several objections to this thought
experiment and its relevance to the free will debate. 相似文献
16.
Richard Davies 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2016,35(3):293-303
In this paper I explore the implications of the increasing social and sociable uses of new, mobile internet associated technologies (MIATs) for online learning. In particular I focus on tablet computers as at the vanguard of this shift. Drawing on discourses of technobiophilia and phatic communion, the propositions explored in this paper are that: (a) that internet associated technologies have been shaped by and reflect the ways in which humans engage with objects and each other in the physical world, (b) that of particular significance for MIATs are frequent small scale social interactions between users, and (c) that a more detailed consideration of these affordances would enhance online learning. I develop this account by considering the potential role of relationships for supporting the development of socially cohesive learning groups and the enhancement of online learning. In particular I focus on the need for partiality within a learning group and mechanisms for managing conflict. I conclude by offering two broad principles for a more sociable online learning experience. 相似文献
17.
Robert Heeger 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2005,8(1-2):123-139
The paper deals with partiality flowing from special relationships. Two main problems are discussed. The first concerns the relationship between partiality and genuine moral obligations. If partiality can bring about such obligations only if it is reasonable, what requirements should it meet in order to be reasonable? The second problem is one of animal ethics. Can the concept of reasonable partiality help us articulate what is morally at stake in a current discussion about the treatment of domestic animals, viz. the European discussion about the castration of pigs? 相似文献
18.
In this article I concentrate on three issues. First, Graham Oppy’s treatment of the relationship between the concept of infinity
and Zeno’s paradoxes lay bare several porblems that must be dealt with if the concept of infinity is to do any intellectual
work in philosophy of religion. Here I will expand on some insightful remarks by Oppy in an effort ot adequately respond to
these problems. Second, I will do the same regarding Oppy’s treatment of Kant’s first antinomy in the first critique, which
deals in part with the question of whether the world had a beginning in time or if time extends infinitely into the past.
And third, my examination of these two issues will inform what I have to say regarding a key topic in philosophy of religion:
the question regarding the proper relationship between the infinite and the finite in the concept of God. 相似文献
19.
Luca Bellotti 《Synthese》2007,154(2):199-229
20.
Jonas Olson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):365-378
According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other
than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to be favoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour. All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge: there are circumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due to the personal relations
in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing on the value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first
philosophers to draw attention to the partiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and consider
Ewing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirely satisfactory. I go on to develop
an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing could have offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing
actually did offer.
相似文献
Jonas OlsonEmail: |