Alfred Schutz: Philosopher and Social Scientist

Aron Gurwitsch's critique of Schutz's essay The Stranger is the starting point for this consideration of Schutz's relationship with phenomenology. This relationship is based on Schutz's emphasis on the value of the average as a phenomenological structure. In opposing sociology to philosophy, Gurwitsch takes this value as inferior in comparison with what he sees as cardinal issues of transcendental phenomenology. What Gurwitsch finds incompatible with phenomenological inquiry – the idea and practice of the natural attitude within the social sphere – Schutz turns into the core of his philosophy. The phenomenology of the natural attitude is as essentially philosophical as any reflectively practiced human science. The problem of how everydayness is constituted requires a phenomenological insight that leads the explorer – through reconstructing the meaning in terms of the mundane – straight to the origin.     

“Paramount reality” in Schutz and Gurwitsch

Conclusion Both Schutz and Gurwitsch describe reality as having a manifold character: Schutz speaks of multiple realities and Gurwitsch of orders of existence. Both hold that one realm of reality has a privileged status compared to the others: common everyday experience. However, in spite of this apparent convergence in their views, a closer reading of their various works reveal the important difference in what they understand under common everyday experience.For Schutz, it is the world of social action, characterized by him as paramount reality because of the constitutive processes of the experiences of time, space, sociality and meaning involved in action. For Gurwitsch, the realm of common everyday experience represents the counterpart and the origin of the constructed realm of science: therein lies its status of paramount reality. But what it really refers to is not ordinary experience, as most of his statements suggest, but pre-predicative experience, wherefrom the categories of the natural sciences, namely space and time, originate. Gurwitsch speaks of this pre-predicative experience, which he also calls primordial experience, as being essentially perceptual experience. However, he limits perceptual experience to sensory perception, leaving out the symbolic, social and action-related components of perception and becomes thus inconsistent with his adherence to the dismissal of the constancy hypothesis in his field theory of consciousness. The dismissal of the constancy hypothesis implies the recognition of the appresentational structures involving symbols, action and Others as inherent components of every perception. Schutz disagrees with Gurwitsch's reduction of the life-world Erlebnisse to sensory perception and this issue becomes the core of their debate on the phenomenon of paramount reality.     

A Problem in Schutz's Theory of the Historical Sciences with an Illustration from the Women's Liberation Movement

In the first part of this essay it is contended that Schutz's project is best called the philosophical theory of the cultural sciences; in the last parts it is shown that he offers satisfactory rudiments of a theory of the historical sciences except where the differentia specifica of those sciences is concerned. The central part is devoted to women's liberation as a case of contemporary history in relation to which Schutz's thought about the historical sciences needs correction.     

Social Constructionism as a Sociological Approach

This essay concerns itself with a detailed presentation of the contents of two works on the construction of reality in society. One is Berger and Luckmann’s well-known book (The social construction of reality. Penguin Book, Harmondsworth, 1966); the other is the somewhat less known book on the same subject by Holzner (Reality construction in society. Schenkman Publishing Company, Cambridge, 1972; orig. 1968). These works deal with the social construction of shared symbolic and cognitive universes of meaning, and partake of the same theoretical sources, namely, Symbolic Interactionism and Schutz’s phenomenological sociology. They differ in their theoretical pursuits, however. Berger and Luckmann deal with what is necessary for the construction of a shared symbolic world, as society is endowed with both an objective and a subjective reality. Holzner is more interested in the social distribution and control of reality construction, and in the different types of reality constructs.     

Death and the “life review” in Halakhah

Coping with old age involves resolving the task of integrity versus despair, which demands a nondefensive confrontation with the inevitability of death. Halakhah (Jewish ethics) also considered this task critical in later years of life, spoke of death's inevitability, and attempted to discourage denial of death. The Jewish approach seems compatible with Butler's concept of life review as a reconciliation with death and a reintegration of one's identity that occurs throughout later years. While the Eriksonian goal is confronting old age with a certain capacity for wisdom, the rabbis maintained that such wisdom must culminate in the creative act of repentance.     

Alfred Schutz and Economics as a Social Science

Over the years, a number of interpreters with an interest in economics have given some attention the work of Alfred Schutz. As intimated in this literature, the orientation of his delimited thought on economics stemmed from contacts with the Austrian school during his Vienna years. Probably because of this connection, there exists among these interpreters an inclination uncritically to align Schutz with the Austrians' thought. What will be argued in this paper is that in adopting such an uncritical position, each of these readings fails adequately to situate Schutz's critique of economic analyses within the framework of his own social theory. It will become apparent that his treatment of economics turned out to be a mixture of defence and critique, and that his interpretation of the subject and the intellectual status he ascribed to it were considerably more ambivalent and ambiguous than has been noticed. In particular, Schutz expressed significant reservations about the highly circumscribed and artificial depictions of the world of human action that some economists espoused, especially within the confines of marginalist theory. When arraigned against the phenomenology of the life-world that he had developed, and against the "postulates" around which he had constructed his social theory, much of extant economics did not meet the requirements of a properly grounded social science.     

Reification as dependence on extrinsic information

Marx criticized political economy for propounding an inverted, mystical view of economic reality. But he went beyond asserting the falsity and apologetic character of the doctrine to characterize it as reflecting a social practice of inversion or mystification — an inverted social world — in which individuals incorporate their own actions into a process whose dynamic lies beyond their control. Caught up in this process, individuals confront aspects of their own agency in the alien or reified form of a given, determining reality. Marx leaves unclear exactly how the process exerts and maintains its hold on agents, the nature of the reasons they might have for wanting to free themselves of it, and under what conditions they could do so. However, it is possible to abstract somewhat from Marx's specific concerns and to model a self-reproducing practice of reification that works through the informational environment of decision. Though of wider interest, this more general conception can shed light on the nature and critique of Marx's inverted world. It draws on conceptual resources from decision theory, game theory and general equilibrium theory.The author wishes to thank Christopher Ake, Daniel Hausman, Carl Hedman, Mark Kaplan, John Koethe, Marc Linder and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments or suggestions. Work on this paper was supported by the National Science Foundation and by The Graduate School and The Center for Twentieth Century Studies of the University of Wisconsin — Milwaukee.     

Understanding the Subjective Point of View: Methodological Implications of the Schutz-Parsons Debate

The bone of contention that divides Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons in their 1940–1941 debate is that Schutz acknowledges an ontological break between the commonsense and scientific worlds whereas Parsons only considers it “a matter of refinement.” Schutz’s ontological distancing that disconnects the “world of consociates” where social reality is directly experienced in face-to-face contacts, and the “world of contemporaries” where the Other is experienced in terms of “types” has been crucial to social scientists. Implicated in the break is that all intellectual attempts to understand experiences of Others must be based on the “models” constructed in the “world of contemporaries” (or “predecessors”); hence, epistemologically, to grasp the subjective point of view with a here-and-now understanding is an outright impossibility. Based on a Schutzian perspective, the author suggests that the sociologist must objectivize the Thou-orientations involved in his/her analysis in order that s/he can possibility grasp the subjective point of view in objective terms.

The Social Construction of Equality in Everyday Life

This article proposes "equality" as a topic for interactionist research. By drawing on the perspectives of Herbert Blumer, Alfred Schutz, and Harold Garfinkel, an attempt is made to lay the theoretical groundwork for studying the interpretive and experiential aspects of equality. Blumer's fundamental premises of symbolic interactionism, Schutz's analysis of relevance and typification, and Garfinkel's treatment of reflexivity and indexicality are explicated and applied to the subject of equality. I then draw upon the moral theory of John Dewey to suggest the positive role that interactionist theory and research might play in the resolution of problematic situations that are framed in terms of equality. Collectively, the complementary aspects of Blumer's, Schutz's, Garfinkel's, and Dewey's thought are used to justify and launch a program of research on a neglected yet important topic: the social construction of equality in everyday life.     

Intersubjectivity,time and social relationship in Alfred Schutz's philosophy of music

Alfred Schutz's (Vienna 1899 — New York 1959) research into the philosophy of music certainly cannot be regarded as the most notable aspect of this writer, born and educated in Vienna, later a naturalized American citizen. Nor can it legitimately be maintained that Schutz's writings on the subject form a systematic corpus in his work. Schutz was above all a social scientist, strongly attracted, as were many writers of the first half of this century, to the project of aphilosophical foundation within his field of expertise. In this project, where phenomenology is encountered, the question ofintersubjectivity together with that ofcommunication among individuals, plays a crucial role. It is, therefore, undoubtedly correct to consider Schutz's theoretical interests in music within this framework; thus music tends to assume a paradigmatic value, in the sense that the musical piece in its concrete temporal development, in the presence of performers and listeners, demonstrates in a truly exemplary manner, how the process of social relationship actually functions.Although mindful of this frame of reference, nontheless we feel it can be asserted that the works of Schutz which we are about to examine are in themselves interesting stimuli, independently of any organic connection with the author's general project. These stimuli have furthermore proveked a theoretical debate that is still going on in the USA.     

The Weight of Context: Headscarves in Holland

This paper explores the potential of a contextual approach to multicultural conflict. It reconstructs two cases that were hotly debated in the Netherlands—Islamic headscarves for police officers and for court officers—and asks whether a contextual approach reaches compromises and thus promotes social stability more easily than a deductive approach. The argument is that a deductive approach accepts standing interpretations of normative principles, whereas a contextual approach reinterprets these principles in the light of the circumstances and that, whether or not it promotes social stability, a contextual approach makes us attend to otherwise neglected perspectives and thus yields greater normative insights.     

Approaches to the study of the world of everyday life

Conclusion I have only begun to sketch out some of the differences between the work of Harold Garfinkel and Alfred Schutz. As the work of ethnomethodology accumulates and as other commentators begin to explore their similarities and differences, a clearer picture will, I am certain, emerge. For now, I shall only conclude with the following brief summary. As Natanson (1966, p. 152) has noted, “for Schutz, mundane existence is structured by the typifications of man in the natural standpoint. Common sense is then an achievement rather than something simply given.” The main issues with which Schutz was concerned were how to investigate social reality and comprehend it (Natanson, 1966): …in terms which do not violate its character. How is warranted knowledge possible of the experiential world defined by the natural standpoint? The answer Schutz offers is by way of a reconstruction of the typifications of mundane life, but the underlying theme he is exploring is the intentional nature of consciousness in its abstractive and ideational modalities. Typification as such, rather than types and constructs, is the underlying concern. By tracing out the phenomenological genesis of typification from its prepredicative grounds to its self-conscious activity in generalization, he has provided an approach to an epistemology of the social world. [p. 154] Garfinkel, on the other hand, seeks to trace out the genesis of the perception, interpretation, and accomplishment of social occasions and their settings by members of society as they live and operate within the natural attitude in the world of everyday life. Their activities are taken without question as whatever social reality is for them. The processes whereby they accomplish these activities so as to make them recognizable become his main concern and it is the discovery and reconstruction of these processes, under the ethnomethodological reduction, of which his findings consist. By describing the methods used by members, he provides an approach to the methodology of the social world, that is, an ethno or members' methodology, for the construction, interpretation, and recognition of the social world. Presented to the Sheffield Conference—“Theorising Language and the Life World” sponsored by the British Society for Phenomenology. An earlier version of this paper has been published in German in R. Grathoff and W. Sprondel (eds)Alfred Schutz und die Idee des Alltags fur die Sozial wissenschaften, Enke Verlag, Stuttgart, 1976. I am grateful to D. Laurence Wieder, Jeff Coulter and Neil Wilson for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

The Symbol and the Theory of the Life-World: “The Transcendences of the Life-World and Their Overcoming by Signs and Symbols”

This essay presents a phenomenological analysis of the functioning of symbols as elements of the life-world with the purpose of demonstrating the interrelationship of individual and society. On the basis of Alfred Schutz's theory of the life-world, signs and symbols are viewed as mechanisms by means of which the individual can overcome the transcendences posed by time, space, the world of the Other, and multiple realities which confront him or her. Accordingly, the individual's life-world divides itself into the dimensions of time, space, the social world and various reality spheres which form the boundaries or transcendences that the I has to understand and integrate. Signs and symbols are described as appresentational modes which stand for experiences originating in the different spheres of the life-world within the world of everyday life, within which they can be communicated, thereby establishing intersubjectivity. Schutz's theory of the symbol explains how social entities – such as nations, states or religious groups – are symbolically integrated to become components of the individual's life-world. The following paper reconstructs Schutz's concept of the symbol as a crucial component of his theory of the life-world, which is seen as an outstanding phenomenological contribution to the theory of the sign and the symbol in general.     

A Negotiation Approach to Intake and Treatment Choice

Treatment choice is the decision process whereby the psychotherapeutic methods and the psychotherapist are determined when psychotherapy is recommended for a specific client. In this article the problem of treatment choice is situated within an integrative view of psychotherapy. A review of the literature confirms the usefulness of the following concepts for treatment choice: client preferences, client control of the situation of choice, and the mutual acceptability of differing views of therapists and clients. These research findings reveal the importance of four elements in the psychotherapeutic intake strategy: exploration of the client's perspective, informing the client, negotiation as a process of confrontation between the client's and the clinician's perspective, and the client's ultimate choice between alternative treatment proposals.     

Crossing the Finite Provinces of Meaning. Experience and Metaphor

Schutz’s references to literature and arts in his theoretical works are manifold. But literature and theory are both a certain kind of a finite province of meaning, that means they are not easily accessible from the paramount reality of everyday life. Now there is another kind of referring to literature: metaphorizing it. Using it, as may be said with Lakoff and Johnson, to understand and to experience one kind of thing in terms of another. Literally metapherein means “to carry over”. Metaphorizing in this view is then a specific kind of border-crossing between different provinces of meaning. That poses two questions: 1. What means finiteness of those provinces of meaning, what kind of border crossings are possible? What is the ground for metaphorizing meaning? 2. Could this concept used for founding a theory of the constitution of the societal and of society, that overcomes the dichotomy of structure/agency? These questions will be answered with one example in view: Schutz’ report to Kaufmann of his first visit of Husserl describing his experience as feeling like Wilhelm Meister at the Society of the Tower. In a first step this metaphor is presented together with some crumbs of metaphor theory. In a second step these crumbs will be connected to Husserl’s concept of experience. After developing a short overview over Schutz’ “finite provinces of meaning,” the relation of experience, metaphors to the intersubjectivity of these provinces in their dependence from writing and printing is discussed.     

The Foundation of an Interpretative Sociology: A Critical Review of the Attempts of George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz

George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz proposed foundations for an interpretative sociology from opposite standpoints. Mead accepted the objective meaning structure a priori. His problem became therefore the explanation of the individuality and creativity of human actors in his social behavioristic approach. In contrast, Schutz started from the subjective consciousness of an isolated actor as a result of a phenomenological reduction. He was concerned with the problem of explaining the possibility of this isolated actor’s perceiving other actors in their existence, their concreteness, and the motives for their behavior. I treat these two approaches and their associated problems as equally relevant. My evaluation is based on their success in solving their specific problems. The aim is to decide which of the two approaches provides the more adequate foundation for an interpretative sociology.

A Social Version of Gerotranscendence: Case Study

This article reexamines the concept of gerotranscendence in the light of anthropological findings. Particular social patterns in a nursing home reveal a unique reality communal to its tenants. The author assumes that the tenants' spontaneous patterns of social gathering construct a collective death consciousness which is spiritual in its nature. Tornstam's term another paradigm seems suitable not only for a developmental shift in old age but also for the situational shift in the daily life of the subjects. Anthropological concepts, as well as contextual and inter-subjective parameters, join to indicate that some gerotranscendence dimensions are experienced in what the author terms as sitting and giving episodes.     

A Review of Jesus: A Psychological Biography

Capps's book uses historical, sociological, and psychological methods to probe the personal identity and self-understanding of Jesus. This reviewer suggests that historical, sociological, and psychological methods are modes of discourse that are modern forms of myth. Myth is understood as any narrative form that is used, and/or taken for granted, as a way of self-understanding and understanding the world. These disciplines are useful critical tools with which to explore the text and its world, but they do not guarantee knowledge about the past. As modern modes of discourse they create narratives (i.e., myths) about the past, that for us are preferred epistemological pathways. Jesus Christ is the ultimate model of the God-person relationship in the Christian west. Therefore, any serious attempt to render a realistic portrait of Jesus using contemporary modes of describing reality has the possibility of effecting a profound transformation of the images of God and Jesus. This then can transform our own relationship with God. The value of Capps's book is not in any knowledge it might give us about Jesus, but in the transformation it can effect within the reader, and the author, of central religious images. Psychoanalytic and developmental theories are limited in their explanatory effectiveness because they are materialistic and personalistic (reductive). The analytical psychology of Carl Jung and the archetypal psychology of James Hillman are proposed in order to add a transpersonal dimension to Capps's approach to the personality of Jesus.     

Local dependence latent structure models

A local independence latent structure model, which assumesm latent classes, requires a minimum of 2m-1 items for the solution of the 2m ² latent parameters. If one adds 3 items to the test and if one assumes local dependence between pairs of items, thereby adding additional latent parameters, _ij , representing the association between itemsi andj, then it is possible to obtain estimates for all of the latent parameters: latent class frequencies latent probabilities, and measures of association between pairs of items. The solution consists of (1) forming (m + 1) × (m + 1) matrices of manifest data, which are singular, (2) solving for the _ij in equations that result from the singularity of the data matrices, (3) correcting the manifest data by removing the contamination due to local dependence, and (4) estimating the remaining latent parameters from the corrected data, using methods outlined in earlier literature.