Interpersonal Moral Conflicts Between Couples: Effects of Type of Dilemma, Role, and Partner's Judgments on Level of Moral Reasoning and Probability of Resolution

Forty-two male–female couples completed Kohlberg's test of moral development and made moral judgments about the most recent interpersonal moral conflict they had experienced in their everyday lives. Participants made lower stage moral judgments about their interpersonal moral conflicts than about the dilemmas on Kohlberg's test. The type of interpersonal moral conflict participants experienced and their role in the conflict were related to the types of moral judgments they made. Participants who reported philosophical conflicts made more mature moral judgments than participants who reported antisocial conflicts, especially if their role in the antisocial conflict was that of a transgressor. Conflicts were most likely to be resolved when partners' moral judgments about their conflict were similar in moral maturity. The implications of these findings for models of moral judgment are discussed.     

Sources of variation in moral judgment: Toward a model of real-life morality

To evaluate the extent to which the models of moral judgment advanced by Kohlberg (1984) and by Gilligan (1982, 1988) are able to account for real-life moral judgment, we investigated the relation of sex and type of moral dilemma to moral stage and moral orientation. Eighty young adult men and women made moral judgments about two hypothetical Kohlberg dilemmas, two real-life antisocial dilemmas, and two real-life prosocial dilemmas. We failed to find any sex differences in moral judgment. Moral stage and moral orientation varied across the three types of dilemma. Kohlberg's dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 4 moral judgments, real-life prosocial dilemmas pulled for care-oriented Stage 3 moral judgments, and real-life antisocial dilemmas pulled for justice-oriented Stage 2 moral judgments. The content of moral judgments was related to their structure. There was a positive relation between stage of moral judgment on Kohlberg dilemmas and on real-life dilemmas. The implications of these findings for a new, more interactional, model of real-life moral judgment are discussed.     

Hypnotic disgust makes moral judgments more severe

Highly hypnotizable participants were given a posthypnotic suggestion to feel a flash of disgust whenever they read an arbitrary word. They were then asked to rate moral transgressions described in vignettes that either did or did not include the disgust-inducing word. Two studies show that moral judgments can be made more severe by the presence of a flash of disgust. These findings suggest that moral judgments may be grounded in affectively laden moral intuitions.     

Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality: a critical evaluation of Kohlberg's model

In this article, the authors evaluate L. Kohlberg's (1984) cognitive- developmental approach to morality, find it wanting, and introduce a more pragmatic approach. They review research designed to evaluate Kohlberg's model, describe how they revised the model to accommodate discrepant findings, and explain why they concluded that it is poorly equipped to account for the ways in which people make moral decisions in their everyday lives. The authors outline in 11 propositions a framework for a new approach that is more attentive to the purposes that people use morality to achieve. People make moral judgments and engage in moral behaviors to induce themselves and others to uphold systems of cooperative exchange that help them achieve their goals and advance their interests.     

Evaluations of moral and conventional intergroup transgressions

To investigate children's understanding of intergroup transgressions, children (3–8 years, N = 84) evaluated moral and conventional transgressions that occurred among members of the same gender group (ingroup) or members of different gender groups (outgroup). All participants judged moral transgressions to be more wrong than conventional transgressions. However, when asked to make a judgment after being told an authority figure did not see the transgression, younger participants still judged that moral violations were less acceptable than conventional transgressions, but judged both moral and conventional transgressions with an outgroup victim as more acceptable than the corresponding transgressions with an ingroup victim. Older children did not demonstrate the same ingroup bias; rather they focused only on the domain of the transgressions. The results demonstrate the impact intergroup information has on children's evaluations about both moral and conventional transgressions.     

A bad taste in the mouth: gustatory disgust influences moral judgment

Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought.     

Entitlement,exploitativeness, and reasoning about everyday transgressions: A social domain analysis

Social domain theory was used to examine the role of entitlement and exploitativeness in reasoning about everyday transgressions in two studies. Exploitativeness was positively associated with believing that transgressing was acceptable, whereas entitlement was negatively associated. Exploitive participants justified these judgments using personal (e.g., appeal to choice) and less moral (e.g., appeal to welfare of others) reasoning, whereas highly entitled people used more prudential but less personal reasoning. Exploitive participants were less likely to acknowledge the relevance of non-personal concerns (i.e., morality, conventions, and prudence) when considering transgressions. The association between exploitativeness and acceptability of transgressing was mediated by the degree to which issues were believed to involve a concern for others. Implications for narcissistic behavior and decision-making are discussed.     

Tainting the soul: Purity concerns predict moral judgments of suicide

Moral violations are typically defined as actions that harm others. However, suicide is considered immoral even though the perpetrator is also the victim. To determine whether concerns about purity rather than harm predict moral condemnation of suicide, we presented American adults with obituaries describing suicide or homicide victims. While harm was the only variable predicting moral judgments of homicide, perceived harm (toward others, the self, or God) did not significantly account for variance in moral judgments of suicide. Instead, regardless of political and religious views and contrary to explicit beliefs about their own moral judgments, participants were more likely to morally condemn suicide if they (i) believed suicide tainted the victims’ souls, (ii) reported greater concerns about purity in an independent questionnaire, (iii) experienced more disgust in response to the obituaries, or (iv) reported greater trait disgust. Thus, suicide is deemed immoral to the extent that it is considered impure.     

Social Closeness and Decision Making: Moral, Attributive and Emotional Reactions to Third Party Transgressions

Decisions involving moral vectors are inherently social. This paper investigates social closeness to others as one of the important factors that mediate our evaluations of moral infractions. The influence of social closeness on participants?? third-party evaluations of moral transgressions was measured across development. Participants?? intentional attributions, punitive sentiments, moral judgments, and emotional reactions were measured using responses to hypothetical vignettes that describe socio-moral transgressions involving theft. Participants?? attribution judgments, punitive decisions, and emotional reactions differed when their social relationship with the perpetrator (Study One), and alternatively with the victim (Study Two), of the transgression was varied. Evidence is provided for the supposition that morality is a construct of social cooperative exchange and that social closeness influences socio-moral evaluations and judgments.     

Reciprocal associations between young children's developing moral judgments and theory of mind

Associations between young children's developing theory of mind (ToM) and judgments of prototypical moral transgressions were examined 3 times across 1 year in 70 American middle class 2.5- to 4-year-olds. Separate path models controlling for cross-time stability in judgments, within-time associations, and children's age at Wave 1 indicated that across both 6-month intervals, children who evaluated moral acts as more wrong independent of authority had more mature ToM 6 months later; in addition, judgments of moral transgressions as less permissible at Wave 2 also led to more advanced ToM at Wave 3. Children with more advanced ToM judged that moral rules are more alterable, however, and rated moral transgressions as less deserving of punishment. Finally, more advanced ToM initially led to evaluations of moral transgressions as less independent of rules and then to judgments of moral transgressions as more independent of rules. During the preschool years, early moral judgments and theory of mind appear to develop as reciprocal, bidirectional processes.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

Why do we punish groups? High entitativity promotes moral suspicion

People typically take a moral deservingness perspective when deciding on appropriate punishment for intentional wrongdoings committed by individuals. Considerably less is known about how people reason about wrongdoings committed by groups, even though there are fundamental differences in how people perceive individuals versus groups. The present research examined perceived entitativity, the degree to which a group is perceived to be a unified, single agent, as a potential determinant of moral reasoning about transgressions committed by groups. We found that participants recommended more severe punishments for high entitativity (vs. low entitativity) perpetrator groups, particularly in the presence of morally mitigating circumstances that typically lessen punitiveness. This effect was mediated by perceptions of greater moral accountability in high-entitativity groups. Thus, justice is not equal for all groups. Implications for retributive justice and the criminal justice system are discussed.     

Structural flexibility of moral judgment.

One of the central assumptions of Kohlberg's theory of moral development--that moral judgment is organized in structures of the whole--was examined. Thirty men and 30 women were given 2 dilemmas from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, a 3rd involving prosocial behavior, and a 4th involving impaired driving. Half the Ss responded to the prosocial and impaired-driving dilemmas from the perspective of a hypothetical character, and half responded from the perspective of the self. No sex or perspective differences in moral maturity were observed. Ss scored highest in moral maturity on Kohlberg's dilemmas, intermediate on the prosocial dilemma, and lowest on the impaired-driving dilemma. In partial support of Kohlberg's contention that his test assesses moral competence, there was a negative linear relationship between scores on his test and the proportion of Stage 2 judgments on the 2 other dilemmas. An interactional model of moral judgment is advanced.     

The duality of virtue: Deconstructing the moral hypocrite

The present study examined the processes giving rise to moral hypocrisy, a phenomenon in which individuals judge their own transgressions to be less morally objectionable than the same transgressions enacted by others. Two alternative models of the source of hypocrisy were compared to determine whether hypocrisy results from automatic or volitional biases. Findings demonstrated not only that participants viewed their own transgressions as significantly more “fair” than the same transgressions enacted by others, but also that this bias was eliminated under conditions of cognitive constraint. These findings support the view that hypocrisy stems from volitionally-guided justifications, and thereby suggest that at a more basic level, humans possess a negative response to violations of fairness norms whether enacted by themselves or others.     

Priming virtue: Forgiveness and justice elicit divergent moral judgments among religious individuals

Forgiveness and justice are related virtues but they may exert divergent effects on moral judgments. Participants were primed with either forgiveness or retributive justice and made moral judgments of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that religious participants recalling an experience of forgiveness reported more favorable attitudes toward moral transgressors than did those recalling an experience of retributive justice. Experiment 2 replicated the priming effect on moral judgments using a subtle prime of either forgiveness or justice (word search) and a different dependent measure. Experiment 3 employed a more religiously diverse sample and revealed the moderating role of religious commitment. These results suggest that salience of forgiveness leads to more favorable evaluations of moral transgressors compared to retributive justice for religious individuals.     

The Gender Heuristic and the Database: Factors Affecting the Perception of Gender-Related Differences in the Experience and Display of Emotions

Two studies investigated the conditions under which people use gender stereotypes about emotion to make judgments about the emotions of self and others. Participants in Study 1 either played or watched a competitive word game (actual game conditions), or imagined themselves playing or watching the same game (hypothetical condition). Participants actually involved in the game made emotion judgments either immediately after the game (online condition) or after a time delay (delayed condition). Both in terms of self-reports of emotional experience and perceptions of the emotional displays of others, gender-related stereotypes had a significant influence on judgments of participants in the hypothetical condition but had no significant influence on online judgments. Furthermore, participants rating their own emotional experiences (after a 1-week delay) exhibited responses consistent with gender stereotypes, whereas participants rating the emotional displays of others (after a 1-day delay) did not show a gender-stereotypic response pattern. Study 2 found that participants rating hypothetical others were more likely to employ gender-related stereotypes of emotion than participants rating themselves were. The results of both studies suggest that people tend to use an emotion-related gender heuristic when they lack a database of concrete situational experiences on which to base their judgments.     

Are there different moral domains? Evidence from Mongolia

In this paper we report a study conducted in Mongolia on the scope of morality, that is, the extent to which people moralize different social domains. Following Turiel's moral‐conventional task, we characterized moral transgressions (in contrast to conventional transgressions) in terms of two dimensions: authority independence and generality of scope. Different moral domains are then defined by grouping such moral transgressions in terms of their content (following Haidt's classification of morally relevant domains). There are four main results of the study. First, since all five Haidtian domains were moralized by the Mongolian participants, the study provides evidence in favour of pluralism about moral domains. However, the study also suggests that the domain of harm can be reduced to the fairness domain. Furthermore, although the strong claim about reduction of all moral domains to the domain of fairness does not seem to hold a significant number of participants did indicate considerations of fairness across domains. Finally, a significant amount of participants moralized conventional transgressions a la Turiel, but it did not reach a statistical significance.     

A test of whether attributions provide for self-enhancement or self-defense

It is well known that people often make attributions in a way that is favorable to their self-concepts (see R. L. Collins, 1996, for a review). However, it is less clear whether the primary effect is to enhance self-esteem or to defend against the possible loss of self-esteem. The authors performed an experiment to test these possibilities against each other. In a completely between-participants design, participants recalled either a positive behavior or a negative behavior that was performed by themselves or others. They then judged the positivity or negativity of the behavior and made trait attributions about the actor (i.e., himself, herself, or others). The results indicated that although judgments and trait attributions for positive behaviors were similar for the self and for others, judgments and trait attributions for negative behaviors were less negative for the self than they were for others. The authors interpreted these and other findings as supporting a defensive strategy rather than an enhancive strategy.     

Emotional and behavioural reactions to moral transgressions: cross-cultural and individual variations in India and Britain

Reactions to moral transgressions are subject to influence at both the cultural and individual levels. Transgressions against an individual's rights or against social conventions of hierarchy may elicit different reactions in individualistic and collectivistic cultures. In the current study, affective and behavioural reactions to transgressions of autonomy (rights) and community (hierarchy) were examined in India and Britain. Results revealed that although reactions to autonomy transgressions are similar in India and Britain, Indian participants express more moral outrage than do Britons in response to transgressions of community. Results also supported the contention of emotion‐specificity in affective moral reaction: Participants in both India and Britain reported anger in response to autonomy transgressions, but contempt in response to violations of community. Importantly, these results extend previous research by demonstrating the importance of emotion specificity in moral reactions, as opposed to categorization or dilemma resolution. In addition, an individual difference measure of respect for persons was shown to moderate reactions to moral transgressions. Specifically, participants with high respect for persons were less negative to violators of the community ethic, but not the autonomy ethic. These findings highlight the importance of examining emotion‐specific responses in the moral domain and introduce a significant individual difference variable, respect for persons, into the psychology of morality.