Reasoning about the height and location of a hidden object in 4.5- and 6.5-month-old infants

The present experiments examined 6.5- and 4.5-month-old infants' ability to represent and to reason about the height and location of a hidden object. In Experiments 1 and 2, the infants were habituated to a screen that rotated back and forth through a 180 degree arc, in the manner of a drawbridge. Following habituation, a box was placed behind the screen, and the infants saw two test events. In one (possible event), the screen rotated until it reached the occluded box; in the other (impossible event), the screen rotated through either the top 80% or the top 50% of the space occupied by the box. The results indicated that (a) the 6.5-month-old infants were surprised when the screen rotated through the top 80%, but not the top 50%, of the box and (b) the 4.5-month-old infants failed to be surprised even when the screen rotated through the top 80% of the box (4.5-month-old infants do show surprise, however, when the screen rotates through the entire (100%) box (Baillargeon, 1987a]. Experiments 3 and 4 tested whether infants would be better at detecting that the screen rotated farther than it should if provided with a second, identical box to the side of the box behind the screen. This second box stood out of the screen's path and so remained visible throughout the test trials. The results indicated that with the second box present (a) the 6.5-month-old infants showed surprise when the screen rotated through the top 50% of the occluded box and (b) the 4.5-month-old infants were surprised when the screen rotated through either the top 80% or the top 50% of the box. The results of Experiment 5 revealed that the improvement in performance brought about by the second box disappeared when this box was no longer in the same fronto-parallel plane as the box behind the screen. Different models are considered to describe the impressive quantitative and qualitative physical reasoning abilities revealed by these findings.     

Infants' representations of three-dimensional occluded objects

Infants' ability to represent objects has received significant attention from the developmental research community. With the advent of eye-tracking technology, detailed analysis of infants' looking patterns during object occlusion have revealed much about the nature of infants' representations. The current study continues this research by analyzing infants' looking patterns in a novel manner and by comparing infants' looking at a simple display in which a single three-dimensional (3D) object moves along a continuous trajectory to a more complex display in which two 3D objects undergo trajectories that are interrupted behind an occluder. Six-month-old infants saw an occlusion sequence in which a ball moved along a linear path, disappeared behind a rectangular screen, and then a ball (ball-ball event) or a box (ball-box event) emerged at the other edge. An eye-tracking system recorded infants' eye-movements during the event sequence. Results from examination of infants' attention to the occluder indicate that during the occlusion interval infants looked longer to the side of the occluder behind which the moving occluded object was located, shifting gaze from one side of the occluder to the other as the object(s) moved behind the screen. Furthermore, when events included two objects, infants attended to the spatiotemporal coordinates of the objects longer than when a single object was involved. These results provide clear evidence that infants' visual tracking is different in response to a one-object display than to a two-object display. Furthermore, this finding suggests that infants may require more focused attention to the hidden position of objects in more complex multiple-object displays and provides additional evidence that infants represent the spatial location of moving occluded objects.     

2.5-month-old infants' reasoning about when objects should and should not be occluded.

The present research examined 2.5-month-old infants' reasoning about occlusion events. Three experiments investigated infants' ability to predict whether an object should remain continuously hidden or become temporarily visible when passing behind an occluder with an opening in its midsection. In Experiment 1, the infants were habituated to a short toy mouse that moved back and forth behind a screen. Next, the infants saw two test events that were identical to the habituation event except that a portion of the screen's midsection was removed to create a large window. In one event (high-window event), the window extended from the screen's upper edge; the mouse was shorter than the bottom of the window and thus did not become visible when passing behind the screen. In the other event (low-window event), the window extended from the screen's lower edge; although the mouse was shorter than the top of the window and hence should have become fully visible when passing behind the screen, it never appeared in the window. The infants tended to look equally at the high- and low-window events, suggesting that they were not surprised when the mouse failed to appear in the low window. However, positive results were obtained in Experiment 2 when the low-window event was modified: a portion of the screen above the window was removed so that the left and right sections of the screen were no longer connected (two-screens event). The infants looked reliably longer at the two-screens than at the high-window event. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that, at 2.5 months of age, infants possess only very limited expectations about when objects should and should not be occluded. Specifically, infants expect objects (1) to become visible when passing between occluders and (2) to remain hidden when passing behind occluders, irrespective of whether these have openings extending from their upper or lower edges. Experiment 3 provided support for this interpretation. The implications of these findings for models of the origins and development of infants' knowledge about occlusion events are discussed.     

Object permanence in five-month-old infants

A new method was devised to test object permanence in young infants. Five- month-old infants were habituated to a screen that moved back and forth through a 180-degree arc, in the manner of a drawbridge. After infants reached habituation, a box was centered behind the screen. Infants were shown two test events: a possible event and an impossible event. In the possible event, the screen stopped when it reached the occluded box; in the impossible event, the screen moved through the space occupied by the box. The results indicated that infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event. This finding suggested that infants (1) understood that the box continued to exist, in its same location, after it was occluded by the screen, and (2) expected the screen to stop against the occluded box and were surprised, or puzzled, when it failed to do so. A control experiment in which the box was placed next to the screen provided support for this interpretation of the results. Together, the results of these experiments indicate that, contrary to Piaget's (1954) claims, infants as young as 5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when occluded. The results also indicate that 5-month-old infants realize that solid objects do not move through the space occupied by other solid objects.     

Post-error slowing is influenced by cognitive control demand

Post-error slowing (PES) has been shown to reflect a control failure due to automatic attentional capture by the error. Here we aimed to assess whether PES also involves an increase in cognitive control. Using a cued-task-switching paradigm (Experiment 1) and a Stroop task (Experiment 2), the demand for top down control was manipulated. In Experiment 1, one group received dimension cues indicating the relevant stimulus dimension (e.g., “number”) without specifying the response-category-to-key mapping, hence requiring considerable top down control. Another group was shown mapping cues providing information regarding both the relevant task identity and its category-to-key mapping (e.g., “one three”), requiring less top down control, and the last group received both types of cues, intermixed. In Experiment 2, one group performed a pure incongruent Stroop condition (name ink color of incongruent color names, high control demand), and another group received a pure neutral Stroop condition (name color patches, low control demand). In Experiment 2a, participants received the two conditions, intermixed. A larger PES was observed with dimension cues as compared with mapping cues, and with incongruent Stroop stimuli as compared to neutral stimuli, but not when the conditions were intermixed. These findings reveal that PES is influenced by the control demands that characterize the given block-wide experimental context and show that proactive cognitive control is involved in PES.     

The role of color diagnosticity in object recognition and representation

The role of color diagnosticity in object recognition and representation was assessed in three Experiments. In Experiment 1a, participants named pictured objects that were strongly associated with a particular color (e.g., pumpkin and orange). Stimuli were presented in a congruent color, incongruent color, or grayscale. Results indicated that congruent color facilitated naming time, incongruent color impeded naming time, and naming times for grayscale items were situated between the congruent and incongruent conditions. Experiment 1b replicated Experiment 1a using a verification task. Experiment 2 employed a picture rebus paradigm in which participants read sentences one word at a time that included pictures of color diagnostic objects (i.e., pictures were substituted for critical nouns). Results indicated that the “reading” times of these pictures mirrored the pattern found in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, an attempt was made to override color diagnosticity using linguistic context (e.g., a pumpkin was described as painted green). Linguistic context did not override color diagnosticity. Collectively, the results demonstrate that color information is regularly utilized in object recognition and representation for highly color diagnostic items.     

Infants’ coding of location in continuous space

The ability to code location in continuous space is fundamental to spatial behavior. Existing evidence indicates a robust ability for such coding by 12 months, but systematic evidence on earlier origins is lacking. A series of studies investigated 5-month-olds’ ability to code the location of an object hidden in a sandbox, using a looking-time paradigm. In Experiment 1, after familiarization with a hiding-and-finding sequence at one location, infants looked longer at an object being disclosed from a location 12 inches (30 cm) away than at an object emerging from the hiding location, showing they were able to code location in continuous space. In Experiment 2, infants reacted with greater looking when objects emerged from locations 8 inches (20 cm) away from the hiding location, showing that location coding was more finely grained than could be inferred based on the first study. In Experiment 3, infants were familiarized with an object shown in hiding-and-finding sequences at two different locations. Infants looked longer at objects emerging 12 inches (30 cm) away from the most recent hiding location than to emergence from the other location, showing that infants could code location even when events had previously occurred at each location. In Experiment 4, after familiarization with two objects with different shapes, colors, and sounding characteristics, shown in hiding-and-finding sequences in two locations, infants reacted to location violations as they had in Experiment 3. However, they did not react to object violations, that is, events in which the wrong object emerged from a hiding location. Experiment 5 also found no effect of object violation, even when the infants initially saw the two objects side by side. Spatiotemporal characteristics may play a more central role in early object individuation than they do later, although further study is required.     

The drawbridge phenomenon: representational reasoning or perceptual preference?

Two experiments investigated whether infants would look longer at a rotating "drawbridge" that appeared to violate physical laws because they knew that it was causally impossible, as claimed by R. Baillargeon, E. S. Spelke, and S. Wasserman (1985) and R. Baillargeon (1987a). Using a habituation paradigm, they reported that infants looked longer at a display that appeared impossible (rotated 180 degrees while an obstructing box was behind it) than at one that appeared possible (rotated only 112 degrees, appearing to stop at the box). Experiment 1 eliminated habituation to 180 degree screen rotations. Still, infants looked longer at the 180 degree impossible rotations. Critically, however, infants also looked longer at possible 180 degree rotations in Experiment 2, in which no obstruction was present. Moreover, no difference in effect size was found between the 2 experiments. These findings indicate that infants' longer looking at 180 degree rotations is due to simple perceptual preference for more motion. They question R. Baillargeon's (1987a) claim that it is due to infants' representational reasoning about physically impossible object permanence events.     

How do 8‐month‐old infants recognize causality in object motion and that in human action?1

Abstract: In Experiment 1, 8‐month‐old infants were first habituated to the event in which a moving object collided with another behind an occluder, then they were shown the two test events with no occluder: the contact event, in which the two objects actually collided, and the non‐contact event, in which the second object started to move without contact with the first. The infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. In Experiment 2, in which the first object was a human actor, however, infants looked at the non‐contact event reliably longer than the contact event. In Experiment 3, in which both objects were human actors stood face‐to‐back, infants looked at the non‐contact event longer, whereas in Experiment 4, in which human actors faced toward each other, infants looked at both events equally. In Experiment 5, in which the first actor told the second to go, 10‐month‐old infants looked at both events for an equal amount of time. These results suggest that 8‐ and 10‐month‐old infants appreciate different causal principles between objects and humans, and that, in doing this, they may acknowledge the possibility of communication between humans.     

The spread of attention to hidden portions of occluded surfaces

We report two experiments in which the two-rectangles method of Egly, Driver, and Rafal (1994) was used to test whether object-specific attentional cuing advantages can spread to hidden portions of occluded objects. Displays began with portions of two rectangles hidden by a third, occluding object. One end of one of the two rectangles was cued, after which the occluder rotated around its center point and target stimuli were presented. In one condition, the occluder was removed from in front of the other objects, either by rotating away from them (Experiment 1B) or by rotating and then slipping behind them (Experiment 1B). In another condition, the occluder first rotated away but then returned to its original position. In both experiments, an object-specific cuing advantage occurred in the occluderremoved condition for targets that appeared in what had been hidden locations of the cued object. No analogous advantage occurred in the occluder-returned condition.     

Six-month-olds’ ability to use linguistic cues when interpreting others’ pointing actions

The present research investigated whether six-month-olds who rarely produce pointing actions can detect the object-directedness and communicative function of others’ pointing actions when linguistic information is provided. In Experiment 1, infants were randomly assigned to either a novel-word or emotional-vocalization condition. They were first familiarized with an event in which an actor uttered either a novel label (novel-word condition) or exclamatory expression (emotional-vocalization condition) and then pointed to one of two objects. Next, the positions of the objects were switched. During test trials, each infant watched the new-referent event where the actor pointed to the object to which the actor had not pointed before or the old-referent event where the actor pointed to the old object in its new location. Infants in the novel-word condition looked reliably longer at the new-referent event than at the old-referent event, suggesting that they encoded the object-directedness of the actor’s point. In contrast, infants in the emotional-vocalization condition showed roughly equal looking times to the two events. To further examine infants’ understanding of the communicative aspect of an actor’s point using a different communicative context, Experiment 2 used an identical procedure to the novel-word condition in Experiment 1, except there was only one object present during the familiarization trials. When the familiarization trials did not include a contrasting object, we found that the communicative intention of the actor’s point could be ambiguous. The infants showed roughly equal looking times during the two test events. The current research suggests that six-month-olds understand the object-directedness and communicative intention of others’ pointing when presented with a label, but not when presented with an emotional non-speech vocalization.     

A new method for calibrating perceptual salience across dimensions in infants: the case of color vs. luminance

We report a new method for calibrating differences in perceptual salience across feature dimensions, in infants. The problem of inter-dimensional salience arises in many areas of infant studies, but a general method for addressing the problem has not previously been described. Our method is based on a preferential looking paradigm, adapted to determine the relative salience of two stimuli. We report here on the case of stimuli differing in color and luminance, though the method has wider potential. We were able to determine on a psychophysical curve the point at which a color contrast was equally salient to infants as a given luminance contrast. We then used these calibrated, 'iso-salient' stimuli in an object memory study. Results showed that 6.5-month-old infants noticed a color, but not a luminance, change while tracking an occluded object. Our method should have numerous applications in the study of bottom-up effects on infant attention and visual working memory.     

How 7-month-olds interpret ambiguous motion events: Category-based reasoning in infancy

This paper investigates the role of static and dynamic attributes for the animate-inanimate distinction in category-based reasoning of 7-month-olds. Three experiments tested infants’ responses to movement events involving an unfamiliar animal and a ball. When either the animal or the ball showed self-initiated irregular movements (Experiment 1), infants expected the previously active object to start moving again. When both objects were moving together in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 2), infants expected only the animal to start moving again. Initial looking preferences for each object did not influence results. When either the facial features of the animal were removed, or its furry body was replaced by a plastic spiral in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 3), infants formed no clear expectation regarding future movements. Based on this set of findings we conclude that 7-month-olds flexibly combine information about the static and dynamic properties of objects in order to reason about motion events.     

Priming 4.5-month-old infants to use height information by enhancing retrieval

How do infants select and use information that is relevant to the task at hand? Infants treat events that involve different spatial relations as distinct, and their selection and use of object information depends on the type of event they encounter. For example, 4.5-month-olds consider information about object height in occlusion events, but infants typically fail to do so in containment events until they reach the age of 7.5 months. However, after seeing a prime involving occlusion, 4.5-month-olds became sensitive to height information in a containment event (Experiment 1). The enhancement lasted over a brief delay (Experiment 2) and persisted even longer when infants were shown an additional occlusion prime but not an object prime (Experiment 3). Together, these findings reveal remarkable flexibility in visual representations of young infants and show that their use of information can be facilitated not by strengthening object representations per se but by strengthening their tendency to retrieve available information in the representations.     

Identification of objects in 9‐month‐old infants: integrating ‘what’ and ‘where’ information

Following Leslie, Xu, Tremoulet and Scholl (1998) , we distinguish between individuation (the establishment of an object representation) and identification (the use of information stored in the object representation to decide which previously individuated object is being encountered). Although there has been much work on how infants individuate objects, there is relatively little on the question of when and how property information is used to identify objects. Experiment 1 shows that 9‐month‐old infants use shape, but apparently not color, information in identifying objects that are each moved behind spatially separated screens. Infants could not simply have associated a shape with a location or a screen without regard to objecthood, because on alternate trials the objects switched locations/screens. Infants therefore had to bind shape information to the object representation while tracking the objects’ changing location. In Experiment 2, we tested if infants represented both objects rather than ‘sampled’ only one of them. Using the same alternation procedure, infants again succeeded in using shape (but not color) information when only one of the screens was removed – the screen that occluded the first‐hidden object (requiring the longer time in memory). Finally, we relate our behavioral findings both to a cognitive model and to recent neuroscientific studies, concluding that ventral ‘what’ and dorsal ‘where’ pathways may be functionally integrated by 9 months.     

Eye tracking provides no evidence that young infants understand path obstruction

In two experiments with 47 4-month-olds, we investigated attention to key aspects of events in which an object moved along a partly occluded path that contained an obstruction. Infants were familiarized with a ball rolling behind an occluder to be revealed resting on an end wall, and on test trials an obstruction wall was placed in the ball's path. In Experiment 1, we did not find longer looking when the object appeared in an impossible location beyond the obstruction, and infants did not selectively fixate the object in this location. In Experiment 2, after rolling one or two balls, we measured infants' fixations of a two-object outcome with one ball in a novel but possible resting position and the other in a familiar but impossible location beyond the obstruction. Infants looked longer at the ball in the possible but novel location, likely reflecting a looking preference for location novelty. Thus we obtained no evidence that infants reasoned about obstruction and identified a violation on that basis.     

Visual tracking and existence constancy in 5-month-old infants

Visual fixation and cardiac deceleration for 36 infants 20–24 weeks old were recorded during three kinds of events in which objects moving on a linear trajectory were temporarily occluded by a screen: (1) a familiar object appeared on both sides of the screen; (2) a novel object appeared on both sides of the screen; and (3) a novel object appeared to change to a familiar one behind the screen. Infant attention was related to novelty and familiarity of objects and there was no evidence of behavior reflecting the expectancy that a stable object continued to exist behind the screen. These findings are in conflict with those of previous tracking studies and the discussion focuses upon explanations for this discrepancy.     

Nine‐ to 11‐month‐old infants' reasoning about causality in anomalous human movements1

Two habituation experiments investigated 9–11‐month‐old infants' reasoning about causality in anomalous human movements. During habituation, infants saw an event in which a person walked toward a stationary person behind an occluder who fell down after an interval. Then, the infants were tested with two events without the occluder: the contact event in which the first person pushed the second one to fall down and the no‐contact event in which the second person fell down without any contact. In Experiment 1, in which the persons were face‐to‐back, infants looked at the no‐contact event for a longer time, whereas in Experiment 2, in which the persons were face‐to‐face, they looked at both the events for equal duration. Thus, infants considered it unnatural when a person fell down without external force in the absence of any action from a distance (e.g. communication). Infants seem to apply the physical contact principles to human movements in certain cases.