Crossing species boundaries

This paper critically examines the biology of species identity and the morality of crossing species boundaries in the context of emerging research that involves combining human and nonhuman animals at the genetic or cellular level. We begin with the notion of species identity, particularly focusing on the ostensible fixity of species boundaries, and we explore the general biological and philosophical problem of defining species. Against this backdrop, we survey and criticize earlier attempts to forbid crossing species boundaries in the creation of novel beings. We do not attempt to establish the immorality of crossing species boundaries, but we conclude with some thoughts about such crossings, alluding to the notion of moral confusion regarding social and ethical obligations to novel interspecies beings.     

The Philanthropy of the Orthodox Church: A Rumanian Case Study

On the basis of a definition of God as "love", human philanthropyis derived from Divine philanthropy, and therefore extends toall human beings. Because Divine philanthropy is most centrallyexpressed in Christ's incarnation and resurrection, Christ'sidentification with all who suffer presents the strongest motivationfor human philanthropy. After a short review of the RomanianOrthodox Church's development after 1989, the author turns tohis special case study, the Social-Medical Day-Care ChristianCentre for older citizens. He describes the wan in which Church-basedphilanthropy can integrate socialmedical with Christian pastoralcare, and how this work draws the local communities into assuminga shared responsibility.     

Speciation of Superions from Humans: Is Species Cleansing the Ultimate Form of Terror and Genocide?

Using ideas from evolution, and what is known about higher stages of development, we examine a hypothetical scenario, in which new humanoid species, called Superions, are produced. What would then happen with current humans? Recent genetic engineering advances have led to creating life forms with particular characteristics. Scientists are already genetically engineering human beings. Some changes are to improve health. Engineering of traits such as intelligence, higher stage reasoning or less neuroticism is also very likely. This is seen as the ultimate terrorist act because it is genocide, not against a culture, but against an entire species. The article will also discuss how Homo Sapiens could defend themselves against this. Relating two species (systems), the Homo Sapiens and Superions constitutes metasystematic operations. Developing a system of discourse that would not destroy the Homo-sapiens requires paradigmatic operations (Sonnert and Commons, Individ Soc 4:31–35, 1994).     

SPECIESISM AND MORAL STATUS

Abstract: Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. I argue that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans.     

Variation in the anthropomorphization of supernatural beings and its implications for cognitive theories of religion

The cognitive study of religion has been highly influenced by P. Boyer's (2001, 2003) claim that supernatural beings are conceptualized as persons with counterintuitive properties. The present study tests the generality of this claim by exploring how different supernatural beings are conceptualized by the same individual and how different individuals conceptualize the same supernatural beings. In Experiment 1, college undergraduates decided whether three types of human properties (psychological, biological, physical) could or could not be attributed to two types of supernatural beings (religious, fictional). On average, participants attributed more human properties to fictional beings, like fairies and vampires, than to religious beings, like God and Satan, and they attributed more psychological properties than nonpsychological properties to both. In Experiment 2, 5-year-old children and their parents made both open-ended and closed-ended property attributions. Although both groups of participants attributed a majority of human properties to the fictional beings, children attributed a majority of human properties to the religious beings as well. Taken together, these findings suggest that anthropomorphic theories of supernatural-being concepts, though fully predictive of children's concepts, are only partially predictive of adults' concepts.     

Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference

A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. However, this view on human reasoning is unable to explain human accomplishments like technological innovations or scientific progress. David Papineau offers a theory of human theoretical rationality that is consistent with the psychological view on human reasoning but that can also explain how humans sometimes are able to transcend the limitations of their biologically quick and dirty modes of thought and thereby reach a high level of accuracy. Papineau claims that the abilities that constitute theoretical rationality are unique to the human species and thus, that human reasoning is fundamentally distinctive after all. In this paper I am going to discuss to what extent these abilities in fact are unique to our species and whether this theoretical rationality can be called an anthropological difference.     

Resources for Indigenous Theology from a Sami Perspective

By looking at resources for indigenous theology, this article focuses on some key concepts in Sami tradition and how they are linked to a native understanding of the Christian concept of creation. An important aspect is the reciprocity between human beings and other beings or “creations”. The article takes the biblical injunction to love one's neighbour as challenged through Sami spirituality and theology to apply also to how one should behave towards other beings.     

“Our Fellow Creatures”

This paper defends “moral individualism” against various arguments that have been intended to show that membership in the human species or participation in our distinctively human form of life is a sufficient basis for a moral status higher than that of any animal. Among the arguments criticized are the “nature-of-the-kind argument,” which claims that it is the nature of all human beings to have certain higher psychological capacities, even if, contingently, some human beings lack them, and various versions of the idea that there is a special form of life that all human beings share but of which no animal can be a full participant. The paper concludes that none of these arguments succeeds in demonstrating that there are moral reasons to permit animals to be treated less well than members of our own species whose psychological capacities and potential are no higher than those of the animals.     

The Role of Picture Books in Children's Spiritual Development and Meaning Making [1]

This paper sets out to explore how spiritual development might be addressed through the use of picture books in the primary classroom. The working definition for what is meant by ‘spiritual development’ is drawn from a variety of sources but is principally informed by the National Curriculum Council (NCC) and Ofsted discussion papers and the work of John Hull. Thus the work centres on the aspects of spirituality that are developed through experiencing relationships with other human beings and the world in which we live. The paper draws upon original classroom based research carried out with a group of 8 year old children in an inner city school. The children's group discussions centre around the picture book ‘Dogger’ by Shirley Hughes. The paper explores how the children are able to make and negotiate meaning as they address ‘spiritual’ issues.     

Killing Humans and killing Animals

It is one thing to say that the suffering of non‐human animals ought to be considered equally with the like suffering of humans; quite another to decide how the wrongness of killing non‐human animals compares with the wrongness of killing human beings. It is argued that while species makes no difference to the wrongness of killing, the possession of certain capacities, in particular the capacity to see oneself as a distinct entity with a future, does. It is claimed, however, that this is not the only factor to be taken into account: pleasant or happy life is in itself good. The application of these conclusions to killing animals for food is then considered, with some passing reflections on infanticide.     

人类基因组计划及基因革命对伦理的挑战

人类基因组序列的测定和研究具有重大的科学价值和经济价值,同时,也带来一系列社会问题。基因组计划和基因革命对伦理造成了致命的冲击。人类基因商品化对公正原则提出了挑战;基因设计引发生命唯物化,引起了人类的尊严危机;优生运动有可能违背自主原则和平等原则。人类基因组计划应坚持那些体现了人类及其社会本性、价值和尊严的伦理原则即不伤害人、尊重人、有益于人、公正对待人,以及人与人之间互相团结等。     

Describing our “humanness”: Can genetic science alter what it means to be “human”?

Over the past several decades, geneticists have succeeded in identifying the genetic mutations associated with disease. New strategies for treatment, including gene transfer and gene therapy, are under development. Although genetic science has been welcomed for its potential to predict and treat disease, interventions may become ethically objectionable if they threaten to alter characteristics that are distinctively human. Before we can determine whether or not a genetic technique carries this risk, we must clarify what it means to be “human”. This paper inquires how “humanness” has been defined within various academic fields. The views of several legal theoreists, scientists, bioethicists, psychologists, philosophers and anthropologists whose works seem to best reflect how “humanness” is understood in their respective fields of study are considered. Our survey attempts to chart a path for a more detailed study on the meaning of “humanness” in the future. We assess four traits commonly identified in the literature as defining what it means to be human: cognition, biological or physiological composition, social interaction with other “human” beings, and spirituality. The nature of the relationship between these characteristics, in our view, is symbiotic: genetic intervention which alters one of them could have repercussions on one or more of the others. In conclusion, we offer guidance to those participating in genetic research and treatment regarding the parameters within which they may proceed without threatening the preservation of what is distinctively human.     

MORAL DECISIONS ABOUT HUMAN GERM-LINE MODIFICATION

Technologies for human germ-line modification may soon enable humanity to create new types of human beings. Decisions about use of this power entail an unprecedented combination of difficulties: the stakes are immense, the unknowns are daunting, and moral principles are called into question. Evolved morality is not a sure basis for these decisions, both because of its inherent imperfections and because genetic engineering could eventually change humans’ innate cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, consensus is needed on moral values relevant to germ-line modification. These values could be based on characteristics of human beings that would remain constant regardless of revised genomes.     

Is Human Enhancement also a Personal Matter?

Emerging technologies are increasingly used in an attempt to “enhance the human body and/or mind” beyond the contemporary standards that characterize human beings. Yet, such standards are deeply controversial and it is not an easy task to determine whether the application of a given technology to an individual and its outcome can be defined as a human enhancement or not. Despite much debate on its potential or actual ethical and social impacts, human enhancement is not subject to any consensual definition. This paper proposes a timely and much needed examination of the various definitions found in the literature. We classify these definitions into four main categories: the implicit approach, the therapy-enhancement distinction, the improvement of general human capacities and the increase of well-being. After commenting on these different approaches and their limitations, we propose a definition of human enhancement that focuses on individual perceptions. While acknowledging that a definition that mainly depends on personal and subjective individual perceptions raises many challenges, we suggest that a comprehensive approach to define human enhancement could constitute a useful premise to appropriately address the complexity of the ethical and social issues it generates.     

Challenges To Human Equality

According to liberal egalitarian morality, all human beings are one another's moral equals. Nonhuman animals, by contrast, are not considered to be our moral equals. This essay considers two challenges to the liberal egalitarian view. One is the ``separation problem,' which is the challenge to identify a morally significant intrinsic difference between all human beings and all nonhuman animals. The other is the “equality problem,” which is to explain how all human beings can be morally equal when there are some human beings whose psychological capacities (and, in some cases, their psychological potentials as well) are no higher than those of certain nonhuman animals. The focus throughout is on the ethics of killing but the arguments are of broader relevance. The essay reaches a skeptical conclusion about our ability to meet these challenges.     

Is the Ambivalence a Sign of the Multiple-Self Nature of the Human Being? Interdisciplinary Remarks

Ambivalence is a constituent feature of human beings. The aim of this article is to systematise the fundamental sources of ambivalence (neuropsychic, socio-cultural and situational) and highlight that ambivalence can be considered as an external sign or manifestation of a complex and multiple internal human nature; that is, a human being constituted by multiple selves. In this paper the self is viewed as a principle of organization and integration for action, that is, as a complex neurological process and not as a static entity. The purpose is to show how by assuming ambivalence and the multiple-self, social and anthropological theories can offer a more realistic view of human beings.     

关于克隆人试验与伦理学的三原则

由于克隆人试验的对象是人的活细胞,不是人的胚胎;并且由于人只能有限地决定自己的未来,根本无法决定自己的出生;同时由于基因诊断和修复有助于新生儿的健康,因而克隆人试验既不会伤害任何人的生命体,也不会侵犯任何可能出现的克隆人的自主权和平等权,进而不会违反伦理学的三原则。     

Dominance Hierarchies and Health: Constructing Personal Zones of Spiritual Power and Healing in Modern Medicine

Ethological studies of animals in groups and sociobiology indicate that hierarchies of dominance amongst some species ensure the survival of the group. When transferred to human groups, dominance hierarchies suggest a crucial role played by recasting the scope of such hierarchies of dominant and subordinate members to included “hyper-dominant beings.” A recognition of such beings as even more dominant than the socially dominant members of a hierarchy facilitates the empowerment of the socially subordinate members. Religious belief and practice works to establish such hyper-dominant beings (“gods,” “goddesses,” and so forth) as superior members of human groups. Doing so is a means of ensuring the survival of the species and, thus, enhancing healing and human health. The “doctor–patient” relationship is examined from such a point of view, with an emphasis on whether the hierarchy created by the relationship allows consideration of alternative and complementary forms of medical treatment.     

Spiritual Intelligence: Evolving Transpersonal Potential Toward Ecological Actualization For a Sustainable Future

The ecological crisis is confronting humanity with a need to recognize the interconnectedness of all life, and the Akashic Field as formulated by Ervin Laszlo (2004a) has identified how a universal information field connects humans to a greater transpersonal consciousness. The Akashic Field could provide humanity with a focus to deepen its understanding of a holistic view of life. The global crisis will confront human beings with the need to develop their transpersonal potential and spiritual intelligence, which has the potential to contribute to an ecological actualization of human beings’ relationship to the world, and the development of a sustainable future.     

AN EVOLUTIONARY CRITIQUE OF THE CREATED CO-CREATOR CONCEPT

Abstract The created co‐creator theology states that human beings have the purpose of creating the most wholesome future possible for our species and the global ecosystem. I evaluate the human aspect of this theology by asking whether it is possible for human beings to do this. Do we have sufficient knowledge? Can we be motivated to do what is necessary to create a wholesome future for ourselves and our planet? We do not at present have sufficient knowledge, but there is reason to believe that with further scientific research we will be able to acquire it. The more difficult question is whether we can be motivated to cooperate on the scale necessary to fulfill this purpose. Evolutionary theories of human sociality, altruism, and cooperation are reviewed. I conclude that it is possible for human beings to fulfill the purpose defined for us by the created cocreator concept, but doing this will not be easy.