The irrelevance of folk intuitions to the "hard problem" of consciousness

Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system - System One - that will generate the same data whether or not we experience phenomenal consciousness. This is a problem for a range of current experimental philosophy research into consciousness or our concept of it. If experimental philosophy is to shed light into phenomenal consciousness, it needs to be better founded in an understanding of how we make judgments.     

The irrelevance of the No Best Possible World Defense

Conclusion Certainly NBPW can justify metaphysical evil, which is all Leibniz intended it to do. Probably, as suggested by Bruce Reichenbach, NBPW can rebut an atheistic argument from the non-existence of the best possible world. It could even augment a GGD by defending against a divine obligation to have created a “larger” world. But NBPW by itself cannot serve to derail the logical problem of evil in any way whatsoever; theists must find refuge in a GGD if they are to find it at all. Lacking a GGD, NBPW is irrelevant; given a GGD, NBPW is superfluous.     

Virtuous motives,moral luck,and assisted death

Abstract

In this paper I outline a motive-based virtue account of right action, according to which an action is right if it expresses or exhibits virtuous motive, and which defines virtue in terms of human flourishing. I indicate how this account allows us to deal with the problem of consequential luck. By applying this account to the question of whether it is ever morally right or acceptable to assist in someone’s death, I demonstrate how it also allows us to deal with the problem of circumstantial luck, which arises when an agent finds himself in a situation where he is forced to choose between two reprehensible acts.     

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior

Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes morality as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism.     

The role of moral commitments in moral judgment

Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments.     

The dual moral self: moral centrality and internal moral motivation

In this study, the relationship between two aspects of the moral self, moral centrality and internal moral motivation, was analyzed. It is argued that these 2 aspects are conceptually distinct but nonetheless empirically related. Based on a cross-sectional study of 205 adolescents (M age = 14.83 years, SD = 2.21 years) it was found that moral centrality and internal moral motivation, even though substantially correlated, interacted in predicting moral emotion expectancies. Even though moral centrality was unrelated to adolescents' age it predicted a longitudinal increase in internal moral motivation over a 1-year interval. Overall, the findings call for a differentiation of moral centrality and internal moral motivation as 2 distinct but interrelated aspects of moral self-development that follow different developmental trajectories and are differentially related to age. At the same time, the study points out that adolescence may be less important for the development of the moral self than commonly assumed.     

Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousness

The unfolding argument (UA) was advanced as a refutation of prominent theories, which posit that phenomenal experience is determined by patterns of neural activation in a recurrent (neural) network (RN) structure. The argument is based on the statement that any input–output function of an RN can be approximated by an “equivalent” feedforward-network (FFN). According to UA, if consciousness depends on causal structure, its presence is unfalsifiable (thus non-scientific), as an equivalent FFN structure is behaviorally indistinguishable with regards to any behavioral test. Here I refute UA by appealing to computational theory and cognitive-neuroscience. I argue that a robust functional equivalence between FFN and RN is not supported by the mathematical work on the Universal Approximator theorem, and is also unlikely to hold, as a conjecture, given data in cognitive neuroscience; I argue that an equivalence of RN and FFN can only apply to static functions between input/output layers and not to the temporal patterns or to the network’s reactions to structural perturbations. Finally, I review data indicating that consciousness has functional characteristics, such as a flexible control of behavior, and that cognitive/brain dynamics reveal interacting top-down and bottom-up processes, which are necessary for the mediation of such control processes.     

The relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour of Chinese adolescents

The present study investigated the relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour from a first‐person perspective. The major findings support the following four hypotheses. (la) The moral orientation of girls is higher than that of boys, and (1b) boys are more delinquent than girls; (2) the moral orientation of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents; (3) the moral judgment of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents; and (4) the moral development of prosocial adolescents is higher than that of delinquent adolescents. Few researchers have attempted to investigate how moral orientation and moral judgment relate to prosocial and antisocial behaviour in a single study. The present study fills this research gap. Moreover, the study of moral judgment from a first‐person perspective appears to be a meaningful and useful approach. Future studies should be conducted to investigate whether moral judgment from a first‐person perspective is more predictive of moral behaviour than moral judgment from a third‐person perspective. It would also be meaningful to conduct a cross‐cultural study to investigate the relation of moral orientation and moral judgment to prosocial and antisocial behaviour in different cultures. The use of a self‐report method in a study of prosocial and antisocial behaviour has certain limitations; for example, respondents may not give honest responses. However, this method has been found to be useful and acceptable, especially for researching the correlations among a large number of variables.     

From reassurance to irrelevance: adolescent psychology and homosexuality in America

American psychology by the 1920s contained a greater capacity for viewing some homosexual experiences as normal than most current historical literature suggests. Developmental psychologists agreed with psychiatrists that adult homosexuality was pathological, but they also agreed that adolescent sexual development included a homosexual phase. Until the late 1960s, developmental texts reassured parents and teachers that homosexual behavior among adolescents was transitory and quite normal. The psychiatric view of homosexuality as pathology came under attack after the middle of the century and eventually was abandoned. The developmental concern with a transitory homosexual phase disappeared gradually. This trend in psychology suggests underlying social and cultural changes.     

The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: an empirical examination of the moral individual

Recognizing limitations in classic cognitive moral development theory, several scholars have drawn from theories of identity to suggest that moral behavior results from both moral judgments and moral identity. The authors conducted 2 survey-based studies with more than 500 students and managers to test this argument. Results demonstrated that moral identity and moral judgments both independently influenced moral behavior. In addition, in situations in which social consensus regarding the moral behavior was not high, moral judgments and moral identity interacted to shape moral behavior. This interaction effect indicated that those who viewed themselves as moral individuals pursued the most extreme alternatives (e.g., never cheating, regularly cheating)--a finding that affirms the motivational power of a moral identity. The authors conclude by considering the implications of this research for both theory and practice.     

Age-related differences in responses to thoughts of one's own death: mortality salience and judgments of moral transgressions

Two experiments explored age differences in response to reminders of death. Terror management research has shown that death reminders lead to increased adherence to and defense of one's cultural worldview. In Study 1, the effect of mortality salience (MS) on evaluations of moral transgressions made by younger and older adults was compared. Whereas younger adults showed the typical pattern of harsher judgments in response to MS, older adults did not. Study 2 compared younger and older adults' responses to both the typical MS induction and a more subtle death reminder. Whereas younger adults responded to both MS inductions with harsher evaluations, older adults made significantly less harsh evaluations after the subtle MS induction. Explanations for this developmental shift in responses to reminders of death are discussed.     

The relation of moral judgment development and educational experience to recall of moral narratives and expository texts

Moral text processing was used as an ecologically valid method for assessing implicit and explicit moral understanding and development. The authors tested undergraduates, seminarians, and graduate students in political science and philosophy for recall of moral narratives and moral expository texts. Multivariate analyses of covariance using educational experience as an independent variable, age and moral judgment score as covariates, and recall of embedded moral arguments as a dependent variable revealed a relation between education and level of moral arguments recalled. Lower stage moral reasoning was best recalled by undergraduates, whereas higher stage reasoning was best recalled by graduate students, with seminarians intermediate for both types of text. Moral judgment score was related to recall of the highest level moral arguments even when age and educational experience were controlled. Moral judgment development appeared to be particularly helpful in recall of expository compared with narrative texts.     

Radical moral encroachment: The moral stakes of racist beliefs

Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist belief reflects a failure to not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we believe.     

Permissible killing and the irrelevance of being human

This is a review essay of Jeff McMahan's recent book The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (OUP: 2002). In the first part, I lay out the central features of McMahan's account of the wrongness of killing and its implications for when it is permissible to kill. In the second part of the essay, I argue that we ought not to accept McMahan's rejection of species membership as having any bearing on whether it is permissible to kill a particular individual, as there are ways of understanding its relevance that are more plausible than McMahan allows. A review essay of Jeff McMahan. The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).