Rational Natural Law and German Sociology: Hobbes,Locke and Tönnies

While the roots of modern German sociology are often traced back to historicism, the importance of rational natural law in the inception of the founding work of German sociology, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft by Ferdinand Tönnies, intended as a ‘creative synthesis’ between rational natural law and romantic historicism, should not be overlooked. We show how in his earliest scholarly work on Thomas Hobbes and John Locke the shift in the meaning of the two concepts ‘Gemeinschaft’ and ‘Gesellschaft’ represents a departure from early liberal enlightenment to a Weltanschauung marked by romantic authors such as Fichte, Novalis and Haller, by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Spencer and Marx, notwithstanding Tönnies' adherence to the political and social values of a liberal civil society.     

Was Thomas Aquinas a Sociobiologist? Thomistic Natural Law,Rational Goods,and Sociobiology

Abstract. Traditional Darwinian theory presents two difficulties for Thomistic natural‐law morality: relativism and essentialism. The sociobiology of E. O. Wilson seems to refute the idea of evolutionary relativism. Larry Arnhart has argued that Wilson's views on sociobiology can provide a scientific framework for Thomistic natural‐law theory. However, in his attempt to reconcile Aquinas's views with Wilson's sociobiology, Arnhart fails to address a critical feature of Aquinas's ethics: the role of rational goods in natural law. Arnhart limits Aquinas's understanding of rationality to the Humean notion of economic rationality–that “reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions.” On Aquinas's view, rationality discovers goods that transcend the merely biological, viz., the pursuit of truth, virtue, and God. I believe that Aquinas's natural‐law morality is consistent with some accounts of sociobiology but not the more ontologically reductionist versions like the one presented by Wilson and defended by Arnhart. Moreover, Aquinas's normative account of rationality is successful in refuting the challenges of evolutionary relativism as well as the reductionism found in most sociobiological approaches to ethics.     

Is Natural Kindness a Natural Kind?

Philosophical Studies -     

Is Law’s Conventionality Consistent with Law’s Objectivity?

Legal positivism’s multi-faceted insistence on the separability of law and morality includes an insistence on the thoroughly conventional status of legal norms as legal norms. Yet the positivist affirmation of the conventionality of law may initially seem at odds with the mind-independence of the existence and contents and implications of legal norms. Mind-independence, a central aspect of legal objectivity, has been seen by some theorists as incompatible with the mind-dependence of conventions. Such a perception of incompatibility has led some anti-positivist theorists to reject the notion of law’s conventionality, and has led some positivist theorists to query law’s mind-independence. What will be contended here is that both camps are mistaken.

Love,Power and Consistency: Scotus’ Doctrines of God’s Power,Contingent Creation,Induction and Natural Law

I first examine John Duns Scotus’ view of contingency, pure possibility, and created possibilities, and his version of the celebrated distinction between ordained and absolute power. Scotus’ views on ethical natural law and his account of induction are characterised, and their dependence on the preceding doctrines detailed. I argue that there is an inconsistency in his treatments of the problem of induction and ethical natural law. Both proceed with God’s contingently willed creation of a given order of laws, which can be revoked and replaced with a new order of laws. In the case of ethical natural law God promulgated the Decalogue, for example; in the case of nature, there are physical laws that can be known by induction. Scotus exalts the freedom of God and the mutability of ethical natural law in order to explain exceptions to it disclosed by revelation (for example, the Old Testament command to Abraham to kill Isaac). Yet he treats ethical natural laws as (mostly) not universal and immutable. In contrast, he holds that we can arrive at knowledge of the universal and immutable laws of nature, except for those regularities that result from free will. Finally, I present several ways of characterising this tension between Scotus’ doctrines.     

Are Emotions Natural Kinds?

ABSTRACT— Laypeople and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience)—that is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about that emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.     

How to Prove Hume’s Law

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem...     

Gödel’s Natural Deduction

This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled “Gödel on deduction”, which examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to Gödel and general proof theory. When writing that other paper, the authors were not acquainted with a system of natural deduction that Gödel presented with the help of Gentzen’s sequents, which amounts to Ja?kowski’s natural deduction system of 1934, and which may be found in Gödel’s unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave in 1939 at the University of Notre Dame. Here one finds a presentation of this system of Gödel accompanied by a brief reexamination in the light of the notes of some points concerning his interest in sequents made in the preceding paper. This is preceded by a brief summary of Gödel’s Notre Dame course, and is followed by comments concerning Gödel’s natural deduction system.     

Fitts’ Law is modulated by movement history

Fitts’ Law is one of the most robust and well-studied principles in psychology. It holds that movement time (MT) for target-directed aiming movements increases as a function of target distance and decreases as a function of target width. The purpose of this study was to determine whether Fitts’ Law is affected not only by the demands of the target on the current trial but also by the requirements for performance on the previous trial. Experiments 1 and 2 examined trial-to-trial effects of varying target width; Experiment 3 examined trial-to-trial effects of varying target distance. The findings from Experiments 1 and 2 showed that moving a finger or cursor towards a large object on a previous trial shortened the movement time on the current trial, whereas the opposite occurred with a small object. In contrast, target distance on the previous trial had no effect on movement time on the current trial. These findings suggest that performance on trial n has a clear and predictable effect on trial n+1 (at least for target width) and that Fitts’ Law as it is normally expressed does not accurately predict performance when the width of the target varies from trial to trial.     

Are the Natural Numbers Fundamentally Ordinals?

There are two ways of thinking about the natural numbers: as ordinal numbers or as cardinal numbers. It is, moreover, well‐known that the cardinal numbers can be defined in terms of the ordinal numbers. Some philosophies of mathematics have taken this as a reason to hold the ordinal numbers as (metaphysically) fundamental. By discussing structuralism and neo‐logicism we argue that one can empirically distinguish between accounts that endorse this fundamentality claim and those that do not. In particular, we argue that if the ordinal numbers are metaphysically fundamental then it follows that one cannot acquire cardinal number concepts without appeal to ordinal notions. On the other hand, without this fundamentality thesis that would be possible. This allows for an empirical test to see which account best describes our actual mathematical practices. We then, finally, discuss some empirical data that suggests that we can acquire cardinal number concepts without using ordinal notions. However, there are some important gaps left open by this data that we point to as areas for future empirical research.     

Natural theology: Theism or antitheism?

I propose that reasons advanced in support of theism serve just as well, or can be modified to serve just as well, as reasons for believing that there exists a wholly evil supreme being (‘antitheism’). Accordingly, I suggest that attempts to justify theism are futile, since all would-be success is neutralized by the corresponding support that is thereby provided for antitheism.     

Violations of Fitts’ Law in a Ballistic Task

ABSTRACT

The authors explored changes in the postural preparation and movement times during jumps into targets of different sizes placed at different distances from the participant. Both movement and preparation times scaled with movement distance. Neither movement nor preparation time showed an effect of target size, although preparation time showed a tendency to increase for smaller targets. These observations show that the classical Fitts’ law can be violated in tasks that involve a ballistic component. The data corroborate a hypothesis that Fitts’ law originates at the level of movement planning.     

Campbell’s Law and the Ethics of Immensurability

The paper examines “Campbell’s Law”: “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor.” The examination of measurability leads to explaining the reason for existence of a class of unmeasurable phenomena. The author describes a kind of habitus in which a strong taboo against measuring must exist by necessity, not by choice. The taboo is, in effect, a result of degradation of a certain kind of habitus. And finally, the paper demonstrates under which conditions the Campbell’s law is in effect, and how we can mitigate its effects in social decision-making.