The ontology of intentionality II: dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics

This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence.     

Keeping quiet on the ontology of models

Stein once urged us not to confuse the means of representation with that which is being represented. Yet that is precisely what philosophers of science appear to have done at the meta-level when it comes to representing the practice of science. Proponents of the so-called ‘syntactic’ view identify theories as logically closed sets of sentences or propositions and models as idealised interpretations, or ‘theoruncula, as Braithwaite called them. Adherents of the ‘semantic’ approach, on the other hand, are typically characterised as taking them to be families of models that are set-theoretic, according to Suppes and others, or abstract, as Giere has argued. da Costa and French (Science and Partial Truth. OUP, Oxford, 2003) suggested that we should refrain from ontological speculation as to the nature of scientific theories and models and focus on their appropriate representation for various purposes within the philosophy of science. Such an approach allows both linguistic and non-linguistic resources to play their appropriate role (see also French and Saatsi, Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the 2004 PSA Meeting, 78:548–559, 2006) and can be supported by recent case studies illustrating the heterogeneity of scientific practice. My aim in this paper is to further develop this ‘quietist’ view, and to indicate how it offers a fruitful way forward for the philosophy of science.     

Technology as prospective ontology

Starting from common-sense notions of ‘furniture of the world’ a process ontology is developed in which prospective is an integral part. Technology as configurations that work (precariously) embodies expectations which structure further development. Examples (a cloned puppy, hotel keys, DC airplanes, stem cells, and overpasses on Long Island) are used to develop the notion of material narratives that are “written”, not just by engineers and designers/producers, but also by users: “reading” implies some further “writing”. In contrast to prevailing notions of technological control (through manipulation of building blocks), the “writing” of nanotechnology is modulation of the invisible and impredictable - an extreme example of unruly technology and repair work after the fact, where in practice control is a gesture not so different from magic. Because ontology cannot be other than prospective, it is political throughout. Thus, prospective technology highlights ontological politics.     

The ontology of artifacts

Beginning with Aristotle, philosophers have taken artifacts to be ontologically deficient. This paper proposes a theory of artifacts, according to which artifacts are ontologically on a par with other material objects. I formulate a nonreductive theory that regards artifacts as constituted by—but not identical to—aggregates of particles. After setting out the theory, I rebut a number of arguments that disparage the ontological status of artifacts.     

The ontology of neglect

As shown by neuroscientific evidence, neglect may occur without elementary sensorimotor impairments. The deficit is to be found at a higher, more abstract level of representation, which prevents the patient not only from seeing, but from conceiving the contralesional space. By analysing a series of neuropsychological results, in this paper we suggest a crucial role of time for the construction of a world: on this basis, we try to explain how it is possible that half the ontology gets lost. The analysis of the ontological implication of neglect will allow us to shed light on manifestations of the pathology apparently disconnected.     

Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments

Guala argues that there is a mismatch between most laboratory experiments on costly punishment and behavior in the field. In the lab, experimental designs typically suppress retaliation. The same is true for most theoretical models of the co-evolution of costly punishment and cooperation, which a priori exclude the possibility of defectors punishing cooperators.     

The ontology of meanings

In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of mental events.

A theoretical comparison of list scanning models

Eight specific list scanning models are developed and relationships between predictions of contrasting models (serial versus parallel search, self-terminating versus exhaustive processing) are investigated. All models assume that items contained in a list are uniquely defined by specific features, and that the only process by which two items may be tested for equality is to compare corresponding features. All models predict RT to be linearly related with list length when no subject errors occur. With errors, some models predict theoretical nonlinearity but sample calculations indicate that deviation from linearity is slight in many cases. The importance of coding strategy is also discussed.     

The ontology of social groups

Synthese - Two major questions have dominated work on the metaphysics of social groups: first, Are there any? And second, What are they? I will begin by arguing that the answer to the ontological...     

Social support in the workplace: Tests of six theoretical models

Six theoretical models of social support in relation to perceived job stress, burnout, and health were tested both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. Participants at Time 1 were state correctional officers (N = 262) who completed questionnaires in which multiple indicators of each construct were assessed. Time 2 participants (N = 177) were those officers from the Time 1 sample who completed the questionnaire again three months later. Structural equation analyses revealed that only one of the six models was supported by cross-sectional results. In this model a direct negative relationship between the WORKPLACE SOCIAL SUPPORT and BURNOUT latent variables was specified, along with direct, positive relationships between the JOB STRESS and BURNOUT latent variables and the BURNOUT and POOR HEALTH latent variables. However, none of the six models was supported by the longitudinal results. Thus, cross-sectional results were consistent with a model in which social support on the job influences positive health only through its direct and negative effect on burnout symptoms, but such causal connections were not validated longitudinally.     

The phenomenological ontology of literature

Literary ontology is essentially a phenomenological issue rather than one of epistemology, sociology, or psychology. It is a theory of the phenomenological essence intuited from a sense of beauty, based on the phenomenological ontology of beauty, which puts into “brackets” the sociohistorical premises and material conditions of aesthetic phenomena. Beauty is the “objectified” emotion. This is the phenomenological definition of the essence of beauty, which manifests itself on three levels, namely “emotion qua selfconsciousness,” “sense of beauty qua emotion,” and “sentiment qua sense of beauty.” Art on the other hand is the “objectification of emotion” whose most general and closest manner to “humanity” is literature and poetry. Poetry is the origin of language and the linguistic essence is a metaphor. Language as “the house of being” is both “thinking” and “poetry.” Literature expresses the essence of art in the most direct way and, in traditional Chinese aesthetic terminology, literature is the “language of emotion” conveyed by the writer based on his own emotion towards the “language of scene.”     

Beyond androgyny: The emergence of sex-role transcendence as a theoretical construct

Recent trends in sex-role research are reviewed with the purpose of showing a paradigm shift in the kinds of issues and questions thought to be important for an understanding of sex-role development. Two recent advances, conceptualizations of androgyny and sex-role transcendence are described with particular emphasis on the emergence of sex-role transcendence as a new theoretical construct. It is argued that while personality, social-learning, and structural-developmental theories account for sex-role identity and androgyny, only structural-developmental theory provides an adequate conceptual framework for the construct of sex-role transcendence. Questions are raised concerning the empirical demonstration of the concept.